Opinion
No. 06-17-00051-CR
08-29-2017
CALANDRIA RENEE IVERSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 71st District Court Harrison County, Texas
Trial Court No. 11-0323X Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Calandria Renee Iverson pled guilty to credit card or debit card abuse and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. However, in accordance with the terms of Iverson's plea agreement, the trial court suspended the sentence in favor of placing her on community supervision for five years. Four years later, the State alleged that Iverson violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision and moved for revocation. After Iverson pled true to four of the allegations contained within the motion, the trial court revoked Iverson's community supervision and ordered her confined to state jail for a period of twenty months.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.31 (West 2016).
On appeal, Iverson argues that her sentence violated her Eighth Amendment protections because it was disproportionate to the underlying offense. Because we find that we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of Iverson's sole issue on appeal, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
When a defendant is convicted of a crime and placed on community supervision, the Legislature has placed restrictions on her right to appeal certain matters. See Act of May 21, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1205, § 8, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4078, 4081, repealed by Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, § 3.01, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2321, 2395 (re-codified as TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.755). With limited exceptions not present here, "an appeal from an order revoking [community supervision] is limited to the propriety of the revocation and does not include a review of the original conviction." Traylor v. State, 561 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); see Corley v. State, 782 S.W.2d 859, 860 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Hoskins v. State, 425 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); Stafford v. State, 63 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd) (per curiam); see also King v. State, 161 S.W.3d 264, 266-68 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref'd).
Recognizing the jurisdictional defect, this Court provided Iverson, by letter dated August 7, 2017, with an opportunity to demonstrate how we had jurisdiction over this appeal. In her response, Iverson argues that the phrase "propriety of the revocation" should include the sentence, which she describes as the "result of the revocation." We disagree. See Bailey v. State, 160 S.W.3d 11, 13, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (pointing out that the right to appeal a conviction and punishment accrues at the time the defendant is placed on community supervision). Iverson's claim that her sentence is disproportionate is necessarily an attack on the punishment she received at the time she was placed on community supervision. Consequently, we conclude that Iverson does not attack the propriety of the revocation. Furthermore, the sentence assessed when she was placed on community supervision was the result of a negotiated plea agreement, which she can no longer attack. See Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of Iverson's sole point of error. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Ralph K. Burgess
Justice Date Submitted: July 31, 2017
Date Decided: August 29, 2017 Do Not Publish