Opinion
No. 04-03-00413-CV
Delivered and Filed: October 20, 2004.
Appeal from the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas, Trial Court No. 95-06-13409-CV, Honorable Antonio G. Cantu, Judge Presiding.
Sitting by assignment.
Reversed and Remanded.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Integrity Group, Inc. appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Medina County Commissioners Court. We hold the Commissioners Court is without authority to reject Integrity's plat because of the lot size and therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In 1993 Integrity began the process of seeking approval to subdivide a 4.843-acre tract of land adjacent to Medina Lake. Part of the tract is located over the Edwards Aquifer Recharge Zone; and Integrity plans on employing on-site sewage systems. Ultimately, in 1995, the Medina County Commissioners Court denied final approval of Integrity's plat application "because the proposed plat does not meet Medina County's Subdivision Rules and Regulations and/or checklist and is, therefore, not in compliance." In response, Integrity sued the Commissioners Court for injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as a writ of mandamus. See Medina County Comm'rs Court v. Integrity Group, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 6, 7-8 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ); Medina County Comm'rs Court v. Integrity Group, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 307, 308-09 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). The trial court granted the Commissioners Court's motion for summary judgment, which contends that the Commissioners Court is authorized — as an agent for what is now called the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality — to reject the plat because it fails to comply with the one-acre minimum lot requirement contained in the Subdivision Rules for Medina County for subdivisions over the Edwards Aquifer Recharge Zone. We disagree.
"[A] commissioners court shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State." Tex. Const. art. V, § 18. "Texas courts have interpreted this to mean that, although a commissioners court may exercise broad discretion through implied powers in conducting county business, the legal basis for any action taken must be grounded ultimately in the Texas Constitution or statutes." White v. Eastland County, 12 S.W.3d 97, 100 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1999, no pet.). A commissioners court's power relative to the plat approval process is found in Chapter 232 of the Texas Local Government Code. Under section 232.002(a) of the Code, a commissioners court "may refuse to approve a plat if it does not meet the requirements prescribed by or under [chapter 232]or if any bond required under [chapter 232] is not filed with the county." Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 232.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003). On the other hand, if a developer meets the statutory requirements, the commissioners court's duty to approve the plat becomes ministerial.
See, e.g., Elgin Bank of Texas v. Travis County, 906 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied) (per curiam) ("Section 232.003 is the only authority upon which the county may base platting requirements."); Projects American Corp. v. Hilliard, 711 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1986, no writ.) ("Under [the predecessor to chapter 232], the authority of the commissioners court to approve plats is not discretionary. If a plat submitted meets all statutory requirements, the commissioners court cannot impose additional requirements, but must approve such plat."); Commissioners Court v. Frank Jester Dev. Co., 199 S.W.2d 1004, 1007 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("When the platter has done all that the statute demands, [the commissioners courts duty to authorize the filing of the plat] becomes a mere ministerial duty, the performance of which may be compelled by mandamus."); see also Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. Nos. JM-789 (1987) ("[T]he statutory powers granted to the county over subdivisions are plainly limited to ordering certain standards to be applied to the physical dimensions and construction standards of streets and roads. . . . Thus, when a person who seeks to file and record a plat has complied with all of the statutory requirements outlined in chapter 232 of the Local Government Code, approval and filing of the plat becomes a mere ministerial duty."); JM-534 (1986) ("If a person who seeks to file and record a plat has complied with the statutory requirements outlined in [the predecessor to chapter 232], approval and filing of the plat becomes a mere ministerial duty."); JM-317 (1985) ("If the owner or owners of the tract of land subdivided in the plat follow the specified statutory procedure outlined in [the predecessor to chapter 232], the commissioners court is not authorized to reject the filing of the plat.").
If the proposed plat is not located in a county near an international border, the plat requirements prescribed by chapter 232 are located in sections 232.001-.0032. Section 232.001(b) requires the plat to describe the subdivision by metes and bounds, locate the subdivision with respect to an original corner of the original survey of which it is a part, state the dimensions of the subdivision and each lot, street, or other part to be dedicated to public use, and be acknowledged by the owner or his agent and filed with the county clerk. Id. § 232.001(b). The subdivision requirements concern road development, drainage, and lot and block monumentation. See id. at § 232.003. Additionally, if the source of water for the subdivision is to be groundwater, section 232.0032 permits a commissioners court to require a statement "that adequate groundwater is available for the subdivision." Id. at § 232.0032. Chapter 232 thus does not require a plat to include planned water and sewer facilities unless the plat is located in a county near an international border. See id. at § 232.022; § 232.023 (b)(6). In short, the only "authority" the Commissioners Court has cited, and the only authority we have found, that might permit a commissioners court to reject a plat because of lot size is this statement in the Summary of Facts in this court's opinion in Medina County Comm'rs Court v. Integrity Group, Inc., 944 S.W.2d at 6: "Before the [Commissioners] [C]ourt grants a plat final approval, the subdivider must comply with [Medina County's] rule governing lot sizes. . . ." Id. at 7. However, this statement is made in the Summary of Facts; it is not supported by authority; and it is clearly dicta since the opinion deals not with the plat approval process but with the Commissioners Court's and the individual commissioners' official immunity. See id. We therefore decline to give it weight in the plat approval context.
Because there is no statutory authority authorizing the Commissioners Court to reject a plat because of lot size, the trial court erred in granting the commissioners court's motion for summary judgment on this ground. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We express no opinion as to whether the Commissioners Court may effectively regulate minimum lot size in other contexts, such as the building and sewage facility permitting processes.
CONCURRING OPINION
I concur with the court's judgment. I write separately, however, to address a contention presented by the Medina County Commissioners Court that is not directly answered in the majority opinion.
The Commissioners Court contends that the cases cited by Integrity (and relied upon by the majority) are not controlling because the cases do not address a situation in which the county has been given additional statutory authority to regulate plats beyond the basic regulations specified in Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 232.001-.0032 (Vernon Supp. 2004). The Commissioners Court claims that as the authorized agent of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, it can impose a one-acre minimum lot size requirement when use of on-site sewage disposal facilities over the Edwards Aquifer Recharge Zone is contemplated. This authority is allegedly derived from Chapter 366 of the Texas Health and Safety Code and corresponding rules in the Texas Administrative Code. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 366.001-.0924 (Vernon 2001 Supp. 2004); 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 285. Indeed, section 285.40 of the Administrative Code provides that "[e]ach lot or tract of land on the recharge zone on which OSSFs [on-site sewage facilities] are to be located shall have an area of at least one acre . . . per single family dwelling." 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 285.40(c)(1).
Recognizing that the Local Government Code does not contain the one-acre minimum size requirement, the Commissioners Court argues that rules of statutory construction should be employed to harmonize applicable provisions of the Local Government Code with the Health and Safety Code. When the provisions are harmonized, the Commissioners Court contends it can reject Integrity's plat because: (1) the land in question is over the Edwards Aquifer Recharge Zone; (2) use of OSSFs is contemplated; and (3) the plat does not provide for one-acre lots. The error in the Commissioners Court argument, however, is that the statutes relied upon by the Commissioners Court for authority to impose a one-acre minimum lot size do not pertain to the limited issue before the court at this time: the right of the Commissioners Court to accept or reject the tendered plat. The Health and Safety Code and Administrative Code provisions relied upon by the Commissioners Court concern the permitting and construction of OSSFs. On the other hand, the Local Government Code provisions at issue concern a county's authority to accept and file a tendered plat. There is no need to employ rules of statutory construction to harmonize the statutes because we are not faced with conflicting statutory provisions.
The Commissioners Court has a ministerial duty to approve a plat that complies with the provisions of Chapter 232 of the Local Government Code. See Elgin Bank v. Travis County, 906 S.W.2d 120, 122-23 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied). While at first blush it may seem more efficient to submit plats only if they can meet other requirements, such as the OSSF requirements, the two processes of accepting a plat and permitting an OSSF are separate. That the two processes remain separate does not diminish the Commissioners Court's role as an agent for the Commission on Environmental Quality. Whether the Commissioners Court, as an agent for the Commission on Environmental Quality, can ultimately regulate minimum lot sizes is a question for another day.