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Ingram v. Commonwealth

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Jun 5, 2012
No. 10-P-1508 (Mass. App. Ct. Jun. 5, 2012)

Opinion

10-P-1508

06-05-2012

LARRY D. INGRAM v. COMMONWEALTH.


NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his complaint against the Commonwealth pursuant to G. L. c. 258, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (Act). We affirm on different grounds.

The plaintiff has also appealed from two orders of a Single Justice of this court. The first order, docketed August 2, 2011, allowed the Commonwealth's request to file a memorandum of law in lieu of a brief in 10-P-1508. The second order, docketed October 13, 2011, in 11-P-1766, denied the plaintiff's 'Motion to Disqualify Clerk-Magistrate.' Those cases have now been consolidated with the appeal in 10-P-1508 pursuant to this panel's order docketed May 18, 2012. We now affirm both orders of the Single Justice.

The plaintiff is an inmate at the North Central Correctional Institution at Gardner. His complaint alleges that Department of Correction (department) employees were negligent in 'fail[ing] to secure plaintiff's legal property at its secure storage area.' The complaint alleges that on March 16, 2006, the plaintiff discovered that certain legal documents were missing from his box in the secure inmate property storage area. According to the complaint, the plaintiff notified the department employees of the loss and filed a formal grievance on April 11, 2006. The grievance was denied on April 27, 2006, and the plaintiff filed a grievance appeal with the superintendent, which was denied on May 17, 2006. After review by the departmental grievance coordinator (DGC), the superintendent's denial of the plaintiff's grievance appeal was supported on August 21, 2006. On April 11, 2008, the plaintiff sent a presentment letter to the Attorney General seeking compensation for legal property negligently secured by department employees. He then commenced this action on April 13, 2009. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974), on both presentment and immunity grounds, and the judge allowed the motion to dismiss on presentment grounds as follows:

Denial of the plaintiff's grievance appeal has not been raised as part of this appeal.

'The plaintiff acknowledges in his opposition that he realized that his documents were missing by March 16, 2006. Therefore he needed to make presentment on or before March 16, 2008 and he needed to file suit on or before March 16, 2009. He did neither. Pursuit of administrative remedies does not suspend these strictly enforced deadlines.'
A judgment dated September 28, 2009, was entered on the docket on October 1, 2009, and the plaintiff filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, the plaintiff primarily argues that it was error for the judge to allow the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss based on a ruling that 'administrative remedies do[] not suspend these strictly enforced deadlines [of presentment and filing of suit].' We agree. General Laws c. 127, § 38E(c), specifically provides that, in the context of inmate grievances, 'All applicable statute of limitations and presentment periods shall be tolled from the date of the filing of a grievance pursuant to this section until the final administrative resolution of the grievance.' Because the administrative grievance process was not concluded until August 21, 2006, when the DGC affirmed the superintendent's denial of the grievance appeal, the plaintiff's written claim was within the statutory time allowed when it was presented to the Attorney General on April 11, 2008. See G. L. c. 258, § 4. Accordingly, allowing the Commonwealth's motion on that ground was error.

The Commonwealth does not argue otherwise, and acknowledges that the remedy provided under G. L. c. 127, § 38E(c), is applicable in this case. Neither does the Commonwealth make any argument supporting the grounds of the judge's ruling.

Section 4 of G. L. c. 258, inserted by St. 1978, c. 512, § 15, requires that claims against a 'public employer' must be 'presented . . . in writing . . . within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose.' Since § 38E tolls the presentment period, the submission of the plaintiff's claim was timely when filed one year and eight months after the final administrative resolution of his grievance. See G. L. c. 258, § 4; G. L. c. 127, § 38E.

However, the Commonwealth also argued that its motion to dismiss should be allowed on immunity grounds. General Laws c. 258, § 10(d), exempts from coverage under the Act 'any claim arising in respect of . . . the lawful detention of any goods or merchandise by any law enforcement officer.' 'Where property is lost as a result of negligence of court officers, the Commonwealth is immune because any such loss arose in relation to or out of the lawful detention of property by law enforcement officers.' Vining v. Commonwealth, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 690, 695 (2005). While Vining involved the application of § 10(d) to court officers, the same reasoning applies to correction officers. The United States Supreme Court has held that the term 'law enforcement officer' appearing in § 2680(c) of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) includes Federal correction officers alleged to have lost a prisoner's personal property. See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 218-228 (2008). We see no reason why the same should not be true of the Act. 'We have long recognized that G. L. c. 258 is modeled closely on the [FTCA], 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. (2000). . . . As such, Federal court decisions construing provisions of the FTCA are helpful in construing the Act.' Vining v. Commonwealth, supra at 693. The plaintiff's case therefore was properly dismissed on this alternative ground.

As to the plaintiff's argument regarding Superior Court Rule 9A, he was given a full opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss (see entry number 16 on the docket of the Superior Court).

Judgment affirmed.

Orders of the Single Justice docketed August 2, 2011, and October 13, 2011, affirmed.

By the Court (Kantrowitz, Trainor & Hanlon, JJ.),


Summaries of

Ingram v. Commonwealth

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT
Jun 5, 2012
No. 10-P-1508 (Mass. App. Ct. Jun. 5, 2012)
Case details for

Ingram v. Commonwealth

Case Details

Full title:LARRY D. INGRAM v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court:COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT

Date published: Jun 5, 2012

Citations

No. 10-P-1508 (Mass. App. Ct. Jun. 5, 2012)