Opinion
E033171.
11-7-2003
INFINITY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM LLORENS, Defendant and Respondent.
Infinity, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Infinity, an inmate at Ironwood State Prison in Riverside County, filed this action against William Llorens, another inmate. The complaint alleges that Llorens is an inmate clerk who types up California Department of Corrections (CDC) rules violation reports on CDC form 115 at the direction of CDC. Infinity alleges that this practice is an invasion of his privacy because Llorens is entrusted with confidential information about prisoners in the performance of his clerical duties. Infinity further alleges that this practice has caused him emotional distress and he seeks general damages of $7.
Infinity also seeks exemplary damages of $40 million. He explains that prison guards cannot write form 115s and that inmate clerks are employed at "slave wages" to perform this task: "Surely an example must be made of this situation to bring this illicit practice to an end." Specifically, he seeks the money "as punitive punishment to stop a hundred years of the illicit practice of prisoners being given the trusted responsibility to handle information on other prisoners in order to type up CDC Form 115 (Rev. 7/88) Rules Violation Reports. Such jobs ought to be given to qualified prison staff."
The complaint was served on Llorens by mail, by serving the prisons litigation coordinator. Not surprisingly, Llorens did not respond to the complaint and his default was entered on October 9, 2002. Infinity then filed a motion for a default judgment which was heard on December 20, 2002. Infinity appeared by video conferencing and testified in support of the allegations of the complaint. In addition to the allegations against Llorens, Infinity claimed that CDC was liable for punitive damages because it ordered Llorens to perform the clerical tasks, and it is responsible for his actions in doing so.
On December 23, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for judgment. Infinity appeals.
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
In a three-page decision, the trial court recounted the general facts described above and Infinitys testimony at the hearing. The court noted that Infinity did not offer any testimony as to any particular information that Llorens gained or misappropriated as a result of his clerical assignment.
The trial court cited Penal Code section 5054, which provides that the Director of the Department of Corrections is responsible for the management and control of the state prisons, including responsibility for the employment of inmates. Employment rules are set out in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations (Regulations). According to regulation 3040, each inmate is required to work as assigned. Regulation 3041 provides performance standards for inmate work.
The trial court decided the first and second causes of action as follows: "First Cause of Action: Actionable negligence requires a) a legal duty towards the class of persons that includes a plaintiff, b) a breach of that legal duty, and c) the breach as the proximate cause or legal cause [of] injury, Jackson vs. Ryder Truck Rental Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837. Defendant here is apparently assigned to do clerical and typing work at the prison as instructed. He has no duty towards Plaintiff not to engage in the type of activity assigned by the staff of the Department of Corrections. In addition, Defendant has not breached any duty towards Plaintiff by engaging in the assigned conduct. It appears that Defendant is performing his assigned duties properly and as directed without a showing of any injury to Plaintiff caused by Defendant. The Complaint herein thus fails to plead an actionable cause of action for negligence. [¶] Second Cause of Action: Invasion of privacy requires conduct that is `egregious or highly offensive and intentionally intrudes upon the seclusion of another or his private affairs. Miller vs National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463[, 1487, 1489]. Defendant here is not engaged in an `egregious conduct. He is simply performing his regularly assigned clerical duties. There is no evidence that he has intentionally intruded upon any privacy enjoyed by Plaintiff."
Since the trial court found no negligence, and no invasion of privacy, it found no basis for an award of exemplary damages. It also found a lack of the oppression, fraud or malice necessary to support an award of exemplary damages under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a).
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that it had heard the evidence offered by Infinity, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 585, subdivision (b), that the evidence presented was not sufficient to state a cause of action against defendant, and that Infinity failed to present a prima facie case showing that he was entitled to relief. The trial court also noted that indigent inmates are to some extent protected from default judgments. (Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 926-927.)
INFINITYS APPEAL
On appeal, Infinity does not contest the trial courts ruling that his complaint was insufficient to state causes of action for negligence or intentional invasion of privacy. Nor does he contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for entry of judgment. Such contentions would be meritless.
Instead, Infinity contends that Llorens was sued only in his capacity as a special agent of CDC, and that CDC is itself responsible in damages because it violated the Information Practices Act by ordering Llorens to handle confidential information.
Infinity cannot overcome two major deficiencies with his current argument. First, since the trial court correctly determined that he had not stated a cause of action against Llorens, he has obviously not stated a cause of action against CDC or anyone else. In other words, in Infinitys terms, he has simply not shown that the practice of using inmate clerks to fill out rules violation reports is an "illicit practice" or an invasion of his privacy. Secondly, Infinity did not sue the State of California or CDC as a state agency. Thus, even if he had a meritorious cause of action, he cannot recover from the state or CDC.
Nevertheless, we will briefly consider the substantive arguments raised in the opening brief. The principal argument which is now asserted is based on regulation 3041, subdivision (e). That subdivision states: "Inmates in assignments where they will type, file, or otherwise handle any nonconfidential information pertaining to another inmate shall comply with all state Information Practices Act (Civil Code Sections 1798, et. seq.) requirements. [& para;] (1) For purposes of this section inmates in such assignments are designated `special agents of the Department of Corrections as defined in Civil Code Section 2297, for the limited purposes of typing, filing, and handling information under the supervision of employees of the Department, and for no other purpose. [& para;] Pursuant to Civil Code Section 2318 inmate `special agents are specifically deprived of the authority to disobey instructions as described in Civil Code Section 2320."
Infinity argues that Llorens was a special agent of CDC, that it ordered him to handle confidential information, and that CDC is responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Regulation 3041 does not expressly prohibit a clerk inmate from accessing, handling or using confidential information. It merely states that inmates handling nonconfidential information must comply with the Information Practices Act of 1977 (Civ. Code, § 1798, et seq. (the Act). The Act is intended to restrict the dissemination of personal information in order to protect personal privacy. (Civ. Code, § 1798.1, subd. (c).) Accordingly, it restricts state agencies in the collection of personal information (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.14-1798.23), it restricts disclosure of personal information (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.24-1798.29), and it provides guidelines for individuals to access information which the agency maintains concerning the individual (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.30-1798.44). The Act also contains provisions for civil remedies for violation of its provisions. (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.45-1798.53.)
Accordingly, we agree with Infinity that the Act is applicable to CDC because it is a government agency. As noted above, the regulation expressly provides that a clerk inmate must comply with the Act. (Reg. 3041, subd. (e).) Although there is no evidence here that Llorens did not comply with the Act, we also agree with Infinity that Llorens, as a clerk inmate, is a special agent of CDC, as provided in the regulation. Civil Code section 2297 states: "An agent for a particular act or transaction is called a special agent. All others are general agents." The regulation also cites Civil Code section 2318, which states: "Every agent has actually such authority as is defined by this Title, unless specially deprived thereof by his principal, and has even then such authority ostensibly, except as to persons who have actual or constructive notice of the restriction upon his authority."
The fact that Llorens is a special agent of CDC does not aid Infinity because the trial court did not find that the Act was violated. Indeed, the Act authorizes disclosure of personal information to other employees and agents in order to conduct government business. Specifically, the Act provides that an agency may disseminate personal information concerning a person "[t]o those officers, employees, attorneys, agents, or volunteers of the agency which has custody of the information if the disclosure is relevant and necessary in the ordinary course of the performance of their official duties and is related to the purpose for which the information was acquired." (Civ. Code, § 1798.24, subd. (d).) The allegations of the complaint that Llorens typed up rules violation reports on CDC form 115 appear to relate to appropriate uses of personal information for CDC purposes. Such disclosure would be both relevant and necessary to the performance of official duties, and there is no allegation that Llorens used the information improperly. In other words, despite Infinitys contrary argument, there is nothing wrong with entrusting clerk inmates with personal information so long as they do their job and do not misuse the information.[]
Infinity merely argues that Llorens cannot be trusted with personal information concerning other inmates because Llorens is himself an inmate: "If prisoners could be trusted, they would not be in prison." However, a violation of the Act requires a misuse of personal information in a way which has an adverse effect on the individual. (Civ. Code, § 1798.45, subd. (c).)
Proceeding from the principle that a clerk inmate is a special agent of CDC, Infinity argues that CDC is responsible for the agents wrongful acts under the respondeat superior doctrine. Under that doctrine, "the innocent principal or employer is liable for the torts of his agent or employee, committed while acting within the scope of his employment." (2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Agency and Employment, § 115, p. 109.) The trial court also found that the converse was true: "[D]efendant is not the principal and an innocent agent is not liable for the principals torts if there were any."
Of course, the doctrine is inapplicable where the agent is not liable, and Infinity has not shown that Llorens is liable. (2 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Agency and Employment, at § 116, p. 111.) And, as noted above, CDC would be the proper defendant for a lawsuit claiming that it was responsible for the torts of its agent committed within the scope of the agency.[]
Infinity argues that the Attorney General should have represented Llorens because Llorens was a special agent of CDC. But the Attorney General defends cases in which the state or state officers are a party in their official capacity. (Gov. Code, § 12512.) Although the Attorney General would represent CDC in litigation because it is a state agency, Infinity has not sued the State of California or CDC. The Attorney General therefore had no duty to appear in the action. (Gov. Code, §§ 12510-12512.)
Thus, if CDC violated the Act by instructing its special agents to disregard the Act, and Llorens did so, CDC would potentially be liable under the civil remedies provisions stated in Civil Code section 1798.45 et seq. But no such violation has been shown here, and this action has not been brought under those sections.
The only issue here is whether the trial court erred in declining to enter a default judgment against Llorens. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making that decision. Since Infinity does not even contend that the trial court erred, the trial courts decision must be affirmed.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P. J. and McKINSTER, J.