Opinion
No. 3-101 / 02-2031.
Filed February 28, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, William S. Owens, Associate Juvenile Judge.
Appeal from a termination of parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Sarah Cochran, of Foss, Kuiken Gookin, P.C., Fairfield, attorney for guardians.
William Glass, Keosauqua, for appellant Mother.
Leslie Lamping, of Day, Meeker, Lamping Schlegel, Washington, for appellant Father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Patrick McAvan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Michael Fisher, guardian ad litem for the minor children.
Considered by Sackett, C. J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Jack is the father of J.M., born on June 20, 1989. J.M. and his two-half siblings were removed from Jack's care in August 2000 after the Department of Human Services issued a founded child abuse report against him for striking one of the half-siblings.
Jack is not the biological father of the half-siblings, but cared for them while their mother was in prison.
The children were adjudicated in need of assistance and spent more than a year in foster care. At that time, the State petitioned to terminate Jack's parental rights. The juvenile court found the statutory grounds were met but determined J.M's best interests would not be served by termination because the child had not come to grips with the absence of his parents.
Later, the State re-petitioned to terminate Jack's rights. Jack filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence predating the prior termination order. The juvenile court denied the motion. Following a hearing, the court terminated Jack's parental rights to J.M. This appeal followed.
II. Motion in Limine
Jack first contends the juvenile court should have granted his motion in limine. In overruling the motion, the district court stated,
[I]t is clear that a determination of what is in the best interests of a child cannot be made in a vacuum. All evidence available to the court since the outset of the CINA case is probative, and relevant to the issue of what is in the best interests of the children.
We agree with this assessment. See In re Adkins, 298 N.W.2d 273, 277-78 (Iowa 1980); In re H.R.K., 433 N.W.2d 46, 48 (Iowa Ct.App. 1988).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Jack next contends there was insufficient evidence to support termination of his parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (Supp. 2001) (child four or older removed from home for twelve of the last eighteen months and child cannot be returned home). On our de novo review, we disagree.
Jack was on probation for drug and assault convictions, but expressed an interest in having J.M. returned to his care. To that end, he participated in supervised visitation and was about to graduate to overnight visits when he tested positive for methamphetamine and disappeared.
A warrant was issued for Jack's arrest. He was apprehended after several months, and his probation was revoked. Jack spent several months in prison, discharging his sentence just two weeks before the second termination hearing. By this time, the bond he once shared with J.M. had all but ruptured.
As one Department social worker testified, Jack's disappearance placed J.M. and his half-siblings in "dire circumstances;" they could not understand why he so abruptly suspended his relationship with them. The worker expressed a conviction that Jack would be unable to re-establish a stable home for J.M. following this extended absence. J.M.'s school counselor seconded this opinion, stating J.M. had "pretty much given up on the relationship with his mother and his father. . . ." She opined:
it's important for rights to be terminated so that [J.M.] can have stability. He is very aware that he doesn't have his own family, that his parents don't keep in contact with him, and he wants his own parents. He said he wants his own home to live in. He doesn't want to live in foster care until he's eighteen.
We find sufficient evidence to support termination of Jack's parental rights to J.M. As the juvenile court stated:
Jack is not in a position to have [J.M.] returned to his care today. Additional time and services would be necessary to work toward Jack's reunification with his son. However, even with that additional time, and more services, the history of this case would strongly suggest that reunification is, at best, a tenuous prospect. The evidence is clear that [J.M.] needs permanency now. He should not be expected to wait for his father to get his life together. Jack had numerous opportunities to do so. Unfortunately, Jack chose a different path.