Opinion
No. 2-715 / 02-1171
Filed September 11, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, James Weaver, District Associate Judge.
C.A. appeals the termination of her parental rights to A.A. AFFIRMED.
Esther Dean, Muscatine, for appellant.
Jeffrey Johnson, Muscatine, for father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Korie Shippee, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
William Creasey, Muscatine, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Christine appeals the termination of her parental rights to A.A., age two, pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (Supp. 2001). We affirm.
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) provides:
e. The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "significant and meaningful contact" includes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) provides:
h. The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
A.A. was adjudicated a child in need of assistance in February 2001 pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2001) (child likely to suffer harm due to parents' failure to exercise reasonable degree of care in supervising their child). A.A.'s adjudication was based on evidence of unsanitary and unsafe conditions in Christine's home. A subsequently entered dispositional order left A.A. in Christine's care subject to the protective supervision of the Iowa Department of Human Services. Christine was ordered to undergo substance and psychological evaluations and follow the treatment recommendations made by her evaluators.
In October 2001 A.A. was placed with her maternal grandmother following Christine's confinement in a residential correctional facility for violating her probation in an unrelated criminal case. Christine's escape from that facility resulted in her commitment to the custody of the Department of Corrections for a term not to exceed five years. Christine remained confined in May 2001 when the State petitioned to terminate her parental rights on the grounds earlier referred to.
The juvenile court's July 5, 2002, order terminating Christine's parental rights includes the following findings of fact:
The court finds the petitioner has proven the necessary allegations by clear and convincing evidence. [A.A.] has been adjudged to be in need of assistance. She is less than three years old. She has not been in the care of either parent for eight months. During the past six months neither parent has maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child in an effort to discharge parental duties and responsibilities. Christine has not used services or followed through with recommended treatment to alleviate the potential for further adjudicatory harm of the type and nature existing at the time of the adjudication.
The juvenile court terminated Christine's parental rights in accordance with these findings, resulting in this appeal.
II. Scope of Review .
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993). Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( g); In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa 1993).
III. The Merits .
The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)( o); In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998). To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116 by clear and convincing evidence. See Iowa Code § 232.116 (Supp. 2001). "Clear and convincing evidence" means there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the evidence. Raim v. Stancel, 339 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa Ct.App. 1983).
Christine claims the State failed to prove she did not maintain significant and meaningful contact with A.A. after A.A. was removed from her care. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e). Christine cites visitation restrictions and the juvenile court's order suspending service and contact with A.A. following her incarceration rather than a lack of interest as reasons for her limited contact with A.A. Our review of the record, however, leads us to conclude otherwise.
The visitation restrictions and order suspending services resulted from Christine's misconduct both before and after her incarceration. Christine must take responsibility for the conduct causing her confinement. In re J.L.W., 523 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). Her incarceration provides no justification for her failure to maintain the requisite contact with A.A. In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d at 8. Similarly, reduction or elimination of Christine's furlough privileges during her initial confinement was attributable to her violation of facility rules. Moreover, Christine's escape from that facility with another inmate provided more than adequate justification for the court's no-contact order. In any event, Christine only visited with A.A. twice between December 2001 and June 2002 following restoration of her visitation privileges. We also agree with the State's observation that Christine has done "virtually nothing to achieve the objectives of the case permanency plan." We accordingly affirm on this issue. Because we affirm on this issue, we need not consider Christine's claim that the State failed to meet its burden under section 232.116(1)(h). See In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996) (where juvenile court terminates on multiple statutory grounds, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited to affirm).
Christine alternatively contends the juvenile court should have exercised its discretionary power to preserve the parent-child relationship under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a), (c), and (e). None of these potential grounds to save the parent-child relationship were advanced or ruled upon by the juvenile court; therefore, error has not been preserved on this issue. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pfibsen, 350 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Iowa 1984).
Finally, we reject Christine's argument that termination of her parental rights was not in A.A.'s best interests. Once the relevant section 232.116(1) time limitation period lapses, termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). "Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting. Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be constant, responsible, and reliable." In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990). Termination of Christine's parental rights advances rather than conflicts with A.A.'s immediate and long-term best interests.
The juvenile court's decision terminating Christine's parental rights is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.