Opinion
J-S18017-17 No. 3108 EDA 2016 No. 3109 EDA 2016
04-19-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.T.-D.N., A MINOR APPEAL OF: C.B.N., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.N.N., A MINOR APPEAL OF: C.B.N., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000186-2014 CP-51-DP-0012032-2010 Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000187-2014 CP-51-DP-0012031-2010 BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD, J. MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant C.B.N. ("Mother") appeals from the September 13, 2016 orders granting petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS") for involuntary termination of her parental rights to her children, Z.T.-D.N., born November 2009, and Z.N.N., born October 2008, (collectively, "the Children"). Upon careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
The family in this case became known to DHS on December 31, 2009, when DHS received a General Protective Services ("GPS") report that Mother was transient, suffered from bipolar disorder, and was breastfeeding [Z.T.-D.N.] while suffering from a serious, untreated infection of [methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus "MRSA"]. This report was substantiated. On January 6, 2010, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") and placed the Children in a foster home. The court adjudicated the Children dependent at a January 21, 2010, hearing and fully committed them to DHS custody.Trial Ct. Op., 11/10/16, at 1-2 (some formatting added).
Mother made steady progress in complying with court-ordered objectives, and on June 13, 2011, the court returned the Children to Mother and discharged the case.
On February 27, 2012, DHS received a GPS report alleging that Mother was facing eviction and had refused to enter a shelter with the Children. DHS obtained an OPC and placed the Children in a foster home. The Children were adjudicated dependent on March 7, 2012, and fully committed to DHS custody. The case was transferred to a Community Umbrella Agency ("CUA") which developed a Single Case Plan ("SCP") with objectives for Mother.
At regularly-scheduled permanency hearings between 2012 and 2015, Mother never successfully complied with her SCP objectives. DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights on April 23, 2014. This petition was amended on August 19, 2016.
A goal change and termination hearing was held on September 13, 2016. At the hearing, the CUA case manager, Alice Williams, testified that Mother's SCP objectives were to obtain suitable and permanent housing, attend the Clinical Evaluation Unit for a dual diagnosis assessment, attend the Achieving Reunification Center for services, undergo a Parenting Capacity Evaluation, and visit with the Children. Trial Ct. Op. at 2; N.T., 9/13/16, at 16.
Ms. Williams testified that Mother did not currently have appropriate housing for the Children and had lived at five different addresses since 2012, and thirteen different addresses since 2009. Mother had received three housing grants. Mother was offered a chance to enter a shelter, but refused. At the time of the hearing, Mother was living in a family member's house, and did not have a lease for that house. Trial Ct. Op. at 2.
Mother did not consistently attend mental health treatment until June 14, 2016. Ms. Williams testified that she was concerned about Mother's mental health because Mother was dismissive of problems, had mood swings, and cursed at CUA employees. Trial Ct. Op. at 2.
Mother completed a parenting class, but Ms. Williams testified that she believed Mother needed an additional parenting class because Mother had not expressed an interest in how the Children were doing. Mother refused to sign a consent for mental health treatment for one of the Children, and DHS had to obtain a court order. Mother had a Parent Capacity Evaluation in 2013, which recommended that she maintain housing, continue employment, obtain a general equivalency diploma, attend therapy, and participate in visits. Although Mother obtained a diploma and continued employment, she failed to comply with the other recommendations. Mother was referred for a second Parent Capacity Evaluation, and, after rescheduling several times, had an appointment scheduled for October 2016, after the court's hearing on DHS's petition for a goal change and termination of Mother's parental rights. Trial Ct. Op. at 2-3; N.T., 9/13/16, at 22-28, 44-46, 74-76.
Ms. Williams testified that Mother usually attended visits, but had not seen the Children for at least one month by the time of the September 13, 2016 hearing. Z.T.-D.N. told Ms. Williams he did not want to see Mother, and the Children threw tantrums when it was time for Mother to visit. Trial Ct. Op. at 3. The Children were in pre-adoptive homes, and Ms. Williams testified that it was in their best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights. Trial Ct. Op. at 3; N.T., 9/13/16, at 29, 48-50.
Dawn Scott, the CUA reunification coach who supervised Mother's visits with the Children, testified that Mother had not been consistent with visits in the last six months. Visits were moved from Mother's house to DHS after Mother yelled at a foster parent during a visit. Mother was offered twenty-two visits at DHS. She attended six. Mother brought the Children's sibling, a baby, to visits, and focused on the baby rather than the Children. At one visit, Mother brought food for the baby, and when the Children said they were hungry and asked for some, she fed it all to the baby. During visits, Mother is not open to feedback or redirection. Z.T.-D.N. did not want to visit Mother; had to be carried, kicking and screaming, to the visits; and did not want to interact with Mother during the visits. Z.N.N. refused to attend one visit. Ms. Scott described Mother's relationship with Z.N.N. (who was seven years old at the time of the hearing) as more of a "girlfriend relationship" than a parent-child relationship. Ms. Scott testified that Mother is unable to provide for the Children, and it is in the Children's best interest to be adopted. Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4; N.T., 9/13/16, at 93-102, 104-09, 115-20.
Mother presented testimony from Melissa Watts, a previous CUA supervisor. Ms. Watts stated that when she had the case, between December 11, 2015 and March 30, 2016, she believed reunification was a viable option. At that time, she also believed that termination of Mother's rights would not be in the Children's best interest, and would cause the Children irreparable harm. However, Ms. Watts never supervised any visits between Mother and the Children and never spoke to the Children about Mother. When Ms. Watts was the case supervisor, Mother was renting a room in a shared living facility, and did not have room for the Children there. Trial Ct. Op. at 4; N.T., 9/13/16, at 139-50.
Mother testified, accurately identifying her SCP objectives and stating that she completed them prior to her reunification with the Children in 2011. Mother claimed that she did not understand her objectives when the Children came back into care in 2012. Mother had attended almost every court hearing. Mother said that she missed visits with the Children because the reunification coach did not show up, and she had difficulty attending therapy because it conflicted with her work schedule. Mother began therapy in June of 2016. She signed releases for CUA to obtain her mental health records. She denied ever having any mental health diagnosis, despite documentation showing that she had been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. Although Mother attended two parenting classes, she was unable to explain what she had learned. Mother had two jobs and was trying to save money, but could not afford a deposit for appropriate housing. Mother admitted that she refused to sign consents when Z.T.-D.N. was hospitalized in 2016. She did not know the name of the Children's therapists. Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5; N.T., 9/13/16, at 151-52, 157, 159-60, 164, 165-67, 171-72, 174, 180, 183-84, 191-93, 197-98.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (8) and (b), and changed the Children's goals to adoption. Trial Ct. Op. at 5. On September 26, 2016, Mother filed timely notices of appeal. This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte.
The trial court also found that termination was appropriate under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5). See N.T., 9/13/16, at 228; Decree of Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 9/13/16. However, the trial court does not mention Subsection (a)(5) in its opinion. Because we affirm on the basis of the trial court's decision with regard to Subsections (a)(1), (2), and (8) and Subsection (b), we need not address Subsection (a)(5). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.) (en banc) (holding that in order to affirm, Superior Court need only agree with trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) and as to Section 2511(b)), appeal denied , 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the Children's fathers, who did not appeal. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5 n.1.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated mother's parental rights where such determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence under the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)[,] as mother made progress towards working and meeting her FSP[] goals, namely staying drug free, working towards obtaining housing, working on parenting skills, and other goals, during the child's placement?Mother's Brief at 4. Mother challenges only the termination of her parental rights; she does not challenge the change of the permanency goal to adoption.
B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it involuntarily terminated mother's parental rights without giving primary consideration to the effect that the termination would have on the developmental[,] physical and emotional needs of the child as required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Mother does not define "FSP," but this acronym is often used for Family Service Plan. See , e.g., In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 97 (Pa. Super. 2011). The goals Mother identifies in her brief are consistent with her SCP objectives. --------
We consider Mother's issues in light of our well-settled standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are satisfied. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act provides:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
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(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (8), and (b).
Mother argues that the trial court failed to recognize the progress she had made toward meeting the goals DHS set for her. She also contends that the trial court failed to consider her bond with the Children and the effect that termination of her parental rights would have on the needs and welfare of the Children.
After careful review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the trial court's decision, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion by the Honorable Joseph Fernandes. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5-13 (holding (1) clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother's parental rights under subsections (a)(1), (2) and (8); and (2) court properly determined that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the best interest of the Children). Because we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law, we affirm the orders below. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. The parties are instructed to include the attached trial court decision in any filings referencing this Court's decision.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/19/2017
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