Opinion
Case No. 17-56006
2019-01-18
IN RE: Kenneth Paris WEATHERSPOON, Debtor.
Jeffrey Willis, Willis The Firm Legal Services, Ronald A. Wittel, Jr., 1141 S. High St., LLC, Columbus, OH, for Debtor.
Jeffrey Willis, Willis The Firm Legal Services, Ronald A. Wittel, Jr., 1141 S. High St., LLC, Columbus, OH, for Debtor.
OPINION AND ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION TO CLAIM OF EXEMPTIONS
John E. Hoffman, Jr., United States Bankruptcy Judge
I. Introduction
Creditor Thirty Four Corporation ("Thirty Four") objects to the exemptions claimed by debtor Kenneth Weatherspoon (the "Debtor") under sections 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (c) of the Ohio Revised Code in funds that several asbestos personal injury trusts have paid or will pay to the probate estate of his father, Paris Weatherspoon, Jr. Sections 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (c) permit a debtor to exempt payments made on account of the wrongful death or bodily injury of an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent. The parties agree that the exemptibility of the funds turns on whether the Debtor was a dependent of his father at the time of his death or during the year leading to his passing, a time when he would have been experiencing bodily injury from the asbestos exposure.
Under Ohio law, an individual is a dependent of another person if he relies on the other person for support in the form of the necessities of life such as food and shelter or the money used to purchase those necessities. Support also may take the form of necessary services that reduce the expenses the dependent must incur to hire someone else to perform the services. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Thirty Four has carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor did not rely on Paris Weatherspoon for support and thus was not a dependent of his father during the relevant time period.
II. Jurisdiction and Constitutional Authority
The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this contested matter under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the general order of reference entered in this district. This is a core proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). And because exemption disputes "stem[ ] from the bankruptcy itself," the Court also has the constitutional authority to enter a final order adjudicating this matter. In re Hamm , 586 B.R. 745, 747 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018) (quoting Stern v. Marshall , 564 U.S. 462, 499, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) ); see also Murphy v. Felice (In re Felice) , 480 B.R. 401, 432–33 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (holding that "the right to exempt property from the bankruptcy estate stems directly from § 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code").
III. Procedural History
On September 20, 2017, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code along with, among other documents, his schedules of assets and liabilities. He listed his interest in the asbestos funds on his schedule of assets and also included them on his schedule of exemptions. At issue here are the exemptions the Debtor claims under sections 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (c) of the Ohio Revised Code, which exempt payments made on account of the wrongful death or bodily injury of an individual of whom the debtor is a dependent or was a dependent on the date of the individual's death. Doc. 1 at 22, 25.
The Debtor also claims $374 of cash on hand from the asbestos funds as exempt under section 2329.66(A)(3) and seeks to apply the $1,250 wildcard exemption of section 2329.66(A)(18) to the funds. Id. at 25; Doc. 23. Thirty Four objects to these exemptions on the basis that it has a lien on the Debtor's interest in the asbestos funds. Doc. 19. In his response, the Debtor contends that any lien Thirty Four has impairs his exemptions in the funds and that any such lien is avoidable under § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. Doc. 23; see also Doc. 26 (the Debtor's motion to avoid Thirty Four's lien under § 522(f) ). A status conference on those matters will be scheduled by separate order or notice.
On October 17, 2017, the meeting of creditors required by § 341 of the Bankruptcy Code was convened. Thirty Four, which holds a state court judgment against the Debtor for unpaid rent in the amount of $31,400 plus interest, participated in the § 341 meeting. During the meeting, its counsel asked the Debtor whether he had been financially dependent on Paris Weatherspoon at the time of his death, and the Debtor testified under oath that he had not. Relying on this testimony, Thirty Four filed an objection to the exemption that the Debtor was asserting in the asbestos funds. Doc. 19. The Debtor then filed a response in which he contended that he had in fact been a dependent of his father. Doc. 23.
Because it was clear that the exemptions under sections 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (c) would be available to the Debtor only if he were determined to be a dependent of Paris Weatherspoon, the Court entered an agreed order setting an evidentiary hearing on that issue (the "First Hearing"). Doc. 50. The transcript of the First Hearing (Doc. 68) will be referred to as "Transcript I." In addition to hearing the testimony of the Debtor during the First Hearing, the Court admitted into evidence Thirty Four's Exhibits 1–20 and 22–46, as well as the Debtor's Exhibits E, I, J, and the amended claim form (but not the accompanying email) attached to his Exhibit N. Tr. I at 44–47, 103–04.
The Court determined after the First Hearing that discrepancies between the Debtor's testimony and his 2015 federal income tax return required reopening the record. In particular, when the Debtor was asked during the First Hearing how he was able to meet certain expenses after his father passed away on October 24, 2015, he testified that he used income earned in 2015 from the rental of lawn care equipment. The Debtor, however, had not included the amount of that income on his 2015 federal income tax return. And contrary to the Debtor's testimony that he only began receiving social security disability benefits in 2016, Tr. I at 49, 58, the Court discovered after the First Hearing that more than $6,000 of such benefits appeared on his tax return for 2015, a discrepancy that had not been explored by counsel during the hearing. Concluding that justice required reopening the record for the sole purpose of hearing evidence on those two points, the Court entered an order scheduling a second evidentiary hearing in order to receive such evidence (the "Second Hearing"). Doc. 57. The transcript of the Second Hearing (Doc. 70) will be referred to as "Transcript II." The Court heard the testimony of the Debtor and received his Exhibit O into evidence during the Second Hearing.
IV. Findings of Fact
The Debtor, who was not married in 2015, Tr. I at 49, contends that he relied on his father for support during that year in four ways: (1) to work without compensation at the convenience store that the Debtor owned and operated; (2) to assist with the Debtor's transportation needs by giving him a car; (3) to provide free after-school childcare for an elementary-school-age son of the Debtor whom the Court will identify only by the initials "TD"; and (4) to provide cash assistance throughout the year. Tr. I at 11–13, 50–57. According to the Debtor, he used the cash to pay his bills, including bills relating to housing and childcare expenses incurred after his father became too sick to provide childcare. Id. at 11–12, 50–55, 66–67. But the Debtor, who made a number of inconsistent statements under oath, was not a reliable witness, and the Court did not find his testimony to be credible.
Having reviewed the evidence, and having observed the Debtor's demeanor and assessed his credibility, the Court makes the following findings of fact.
A. The Convenience Store
The convenience store the Debtor operated was not his first business venture. Before beginning operations at the store in early 2015, he operated a lawn-care business during the first half of 2014. Tr. I at 39, Tr. II at 15–16. But after suffering a stroke at the age of 46 in July 2014, Tr. I at 57, Tr. II at 16, the Debtor decided to leave the business behind, leading him to sell his lawn-care equipment in October 2014, Tr. II at 15–16. Some time later, he purchased the convenience store and in February 2015 began operating it under the name of "Angel's Carryout" with a license to sell beer and wine and a license to operate as an Ohio lottery retailer. Tr. I at 52, 74.
Early in 2015, the Debtor's father would help out at Angel's Carryout two or three days a week by "ringing up" customers at the cash register while the Debtor was away from the store on errands. Tr. I at 51–52. Paris Weatherspoon, however, was unable to come to the store during the four to five months before he passed away from lung cancer on October 24, 2015. Id. at 52, 88. The Debtor therefore could not possibly have been relying on his father to work at the store starting around June 2015. Further, after initially testifying that he needed his father to work at the store for free because he could not afford to pay anyone to do the work, id. at 52, the Debtor's own attorney pointed out—and the Debtor then conceded—that he in fact paid a couple of employees eight dollars an hour to do "heavy lifting stuff that I couldn't do," id. at 53. The Debtor offered no explanation as to why those employees would have been unable to perform the work he said his father did (i.e., operating the cash register while the Debtor was running errands), and it is reasonable to infer that the Debtor would have been able to operate the store without his father's assistance during the entire year, as he admittedly did during the four to five months before his father passed away. For these reasons, the Court finds that the Debtor did not rely on the services his father occasionally provided at the convenience store.
Courts are permitted to make "reasonable inferences from th[e] testimony." United States v. Maliszewski , 161 F.3d 992, 1025 (6th Cir. 1998).
B. The Debtor's Transportation Needs
Paris Weatherspoon, who did not have a driver's license, gave the Debtor his high mileage 1995 Cadillac DeVille. Tr. I at 56, 72. But the Debtor also owned a truck, and although he stated that the truck "had problems," he provided no testimony or other evidence suggesting that it could not be driven. Id. at 56. In fact, the Debtor claimed a business expense for the truck on his 2015 federal income tax return, stating on the return that he drove the truck over 5,000 miles for work, including using it to commute to the store. The Debtor also stated on the return that the truck was available for his personal use. Ex. 32 at 5. Because the Debtor had his own vehicle available for both work and personal use, the Court finds that he did not rely on his father to provide transportation.
C. Childcare Services for TD
The Debtor claimed one dependent, TD, on his 2015 tax return. Ex. 32. The Debtor initially testified that his father provided childcare services for TD in 2015 until his illness caused him to be unable to care for his grandson sometime around June of that year. Tr. I at 53–54, 88. The Debtor also testified during the First Hearing that the need to provide childcare for TD after his father became unable to do so cost the Debtor $260 a week, or more than $3,000 in 2015, and that he used money his father had given him to help pay for the childcare. Id. at 54–55, 93. But the Debtor conceded during the Second Hearing that he did not have childcare expenses for TD in 2015 because his operation of the convenience store allowed his son to be with him "all the time" that year. Tr. II at 20; see also id. at 22–23. And, as discussed below, Paris Weatherspoon did not have the financial wherewithal to make the cash payments for childcare that the Debtor claims he made. For these reasons, the Court cannot credit the Debtor's testimony that he relied on his father for childcare services or for cash to hire a third party to provide such services.
D. Shelter
Housing was the other major expense that the Debtor testified he needed assistance with in 2015. The evidence, however, shows that the Debtor was not relying on his father for shelter at that time.
For the first five or six months of 2015, the Debtor and TD lived in a house located on Botsford Drive in Columbus, Ohio, a home the Debtor was in the process of buying under a lease-purchase contract that required him to make monthly payments of $700. Ex. E; Tr. I at 60–62. The Botsford Drive home also was Paris Weatherspoon's primary residence at that time. Tr. I at 90. Although the Debtor maintained that his father took up residence at Botsford Drive in order to help him out, the evidence established that the Debtor was the provider—rather than the recipient—of housing assistance. For Paris Weatherspoon had been evicted from another property sometime in 2014 and needed a place to live. Id. at 90–91. And although the Debtor testified that Paris Weatherspoon would give him money for food, rent, and utilities while living with him at Botsford Drive, id. at 34–35, it appears that much of this money would have been for the father's own portion of those living expenses. Furthermore, the Debtor could not have been using the money he says his father gave him to make each of the monthly payments required under the lease purchase contract, because he defaulted on the payments required by the contract and was evicted from Botsford Drive around May or June 2015. Id. at 63–65, 91.
According to the Debtor, Paris Weatherspoon gave him $2,400 (approximately $300 to $400 on a roughly monthly basis) during the first six or seven months of 2015, which would have included most of the time that they lived at Botsford Drive. Tr. I at 39.
After the Debtor lost the Botsford Drive home, he and TD lived at the convenience store for three months, while Paris Weatherspoon lived full-time at a nursing home. Id. at 65–66, 102. On his 2015 federal income tax return, the Debtor reported rent for business property (other than vehicles, machinery, and equipment) of $14,600, which would have included the rent for the premises where Angel's Carryout was located. Ex. 32 at 4. This rent was an expense deducted from the gross income generated by the business that year, id. , meaning that the Debtor was not relying on his father to pay the rent for the premises where the Debtor was living during the summer of 2015. Of course, this living arrangement was far from ideal. According to the Debtor, his father therefore gave him an additional $800 around August 2015 to cover the security deposit and first month's rent for an apartment on Calimero Drive in Columbus, Ohio. Tr. I at 37, 66–67. But any money that Paris Weatherspoon gave the Debtor at that time would have been intended in large part to provide for the elder man's living arrangements. For although his father passed away before he could do so, Paris Weatherspoon intended to move back in with the Debtor on Calimero Drive, leading the Debtor to make arrangements with his father's nursing home to bring a hospital bed into the apartment there. Id. at 67, 69, 89, 102. Based on all the evidence, the Court finds that the Debtor did not rely on his father for shelter.
E. The Financial Condition of the Debtor and His Father
On his federal income tax return for 2015, the Debtor reported that the amount of the gross receipts from the convenience store was $54,783, and with costs of goods sold of $20,000 and expenses of $29,479, the amount of net profit from the business was $5,304. Ex. 32. In addition to his business income, the Debtor's 2015 tax return included social security income in the amount of $6,173, id. , an amount paid based on the disabilities that resulted from his stroke the year before, Tr. II at 7. Although the total income that the Debtor reported to the IRS for 2015 was only $11,477, he also received governmental assistance. For example, the Debtor was eligible to receive a "waiver through welfare," so that he "didn't have to pay ... a month[ly] [premium] for healthcare" once he took the steps necessary to obtain the waiver. Tr. II at 11. Although no similar evidence was introduced regarding public food assistance that the Debtor or TD received in 2015, the Debtor did not testify that he would have been unable to provide food for himself or TD without help from Paris Weatherspoon. Thus, the Court finds that the Debtor did not rely on his father for cash to buy food.
A letter the Debtor obtained from the Social Security Administration states that the amount of his social security benefit in 2015 was $6,142.01. Ex. O. The Debtor was unable to explain the $30.99 discrepancy between that amount and the figure he reported on his tax return. Tr. II at 8, 25–27. Whatever the amount, $2,674.70 of the social security benefits was paid to satisfy the Debtor's child-support obligations to five minor children, including TD. Ex. O; Tr. II at 8, 12–13.
While the Debtor's income in 2015 was very modest, so too was his father's. The only income identified on Paris Weatherspoon's bank statements in 2015 was a monthly $819 benefit from the Social Security Administration. Exs. 38–44. There was no evidence that Paris Weatherspoon had any other source of income that year, meaning that Paris Weatherspoon's total income was $8,190 from January 2015 through the date he passed away in October 2015. Combined with the $1,285.11 with which he began 2015, Ex. 38, the amount of cash available to Paris Weatherspoon that year would have been only $9,475.11. As discussed above, according to the Debtor, his father gave him $2,400 during the first half of 2015 and an additional $800 around August 2015 (for the Calimero Drive apartment), for a total of $3,200. If Paris Weatherspoon gave $3,200 of cash to the Debtor in 2015, this would have left him with less than $6,300, or $630 per month on average, to provide for his own needs before his passing in October 2015. Accordingly, based on his bank statements, it does not appear that Paris Weatherspoon had the financial ability to offer the cash assistance the Debtor claims he provided.
Upon cross-examination by counsel for Thirty Four, the Debtor testified that he had not discovered any source of income that his father had in 2015 other than Social Security. Tr. I at 32.
The Debtor did not testify that Paris Weatherspoon neglected his own needs in order to provide support to the Debtor. Instead, when asked how his father met his own expenses, the Debtor answered that his father "was working several jobs" and that he "had money that [the Debtor] did not know about." Tr. I at 35. The Debtor, however, also testified that his father was too sick to visit Angel's Carryout as of June 2015, id. at 52, 88, which means that he certainly would have been unable to work one job, let alone several, during the months leading up to his death. And contrary to the Debtor's suggestion that his father "was working several jobs," the Debtor explained his decision not to file a 2015 tax return on his father's behalf by pointing out that his father did not work in 2015 and that his father's only income that year, as far as he knew, was nontaxable social security income. Id. at 32, 42–44. All of this belies the Debtor's contention that his father had "money that I did not know about." Id. at 35. The Debtor also conceded that his father died with nothing "but a couple dollars in his account." Tr. I at 35. Given this, and in light of the small amount of income reflected on the father's bank statements, the Debtor's testimony that his father had "money [the Debtor] did not know about" is neither credible nor sufficient to support a finding that Paris Weatherspoon was in a position to support the Debtor financially.
F. The Debtor's Representations That He Was Not Financially Dependent on His Father
Asserting that his lung cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos, Paris Weatherspoon filed several claims with asbestos personal injury trusts before passing away on October 24, 2015. The Debtor then filed other such claims after his father's death. Exs. 1–20; Tr. I at 15. The Debtor did not file any claims asserting that he himself was injured as a result of his father's asbestos exposure; instead, the claims all "list[ed] the name of the Injured Party as Paris Weatherspoon." Doc. 54 ¶¶ 6–7; see also Tr. I at 15. Several of the claim forms that the Debtor submitted to the asbestos trusts stated that he was not financially dependent on his father. E.g. , Exs. 2 at 13; 5 at 13; 6 at 11; 7 at 14, 9 at 12; see also Tr. I at 16–17.
Although the parties stipulated that "[p]rior to his death, Debtor's father filed claims against several asbestos personal injury settlement trusts," Doc. 54 ¶ 4, each claim form that was admitted as an exhibit appears to have been filed by the Debtor.
The asbestos trusts have paid funds to Paris Weatherspoon's probate estate to settle the claims, and as the sole beneficiary of his father's estate, the Debtor has received over $25,000 of these settlement funds. Tr. I at 83.
Only two claim forms state that the Debtor was financially dependent on his father; one is undated, Ex. 8 at 15, and the other was submitted after the exemption dispute with Thirty Four arose, Ex. N at 13; see also Tr. I at 76–81.
The Debtor also stated under oath during the § 341 meeting that he was not financially dependent on his father at the time of his father's death. Tr. I at 86. Attempting to explain this testimony away, the Debtor stated that he was "stunned" and "dumbfound[ed]" when Thirty Four's attorney "came at [him] like a locomotive" during the § 341 meeting. Tr. I at 94. But the Debtor's testimony at the two hearings before the Court revealed him to be an intelligent person who had the communication skills necessary to push back against a probing cross-examination by Thirty Four's counsel. Indeed, he did so repeatedly during the First and Second Hearings. Thus, it strains credulity to suggest that aggressive questioning during the § 341 meeting would have caused the Debtor to disclaim financial dependence on his father if he in fact believed he was his dependent. In the end, the Court finds the Debtor's unvarnished testimony during the § 341 meeting that he was not a dependent of his father to be more believable than the testimony he provided after Thirty Four's objection put him on notice that his status as a non-dependent would require the exemption's disallowance.
G. The Debtor's Lack of Credibility
The findings of fact set forth above demonstrate the multiple inconsistencies in the Debtor's testimony. To summarize:
• The Debtor initially testified that, in 2015, he needed his father to work at Angel's Carryout because he could not afford to hire employees. But the Debtor then admitted that he had paid a couple of employees eight dollars an hour to perform various duties during the year.
• The Debtor testified during the First Hearing that he incurred more than $3,000 of childcare expenses in 2015 and that he used money his father had given him to help pay for the childcare, but then conceded during the Second Hearing that he had incurred no childcare expenses that year.
• The Debtor testified several times during the First Hearing that he did not receive social security disability benefits in 2015, even though he in fact received thousands of dollars of such benefits that year, as his tax return reflected.
• The Debtor testified that he paid for childcare after his father passed away in 2015 by using income he received from the rental of lawn care equipment for several months in 2015, even though he had sold the lawn care equipment in 2014 and rented it for only two weekends in 2014.
• The Debtor testified that his father met his own expenses by working several jobs, yet he also testified that he did not file a 2015 tax return on his father's behalf because his father did not work in 2015.
• The Debtor stated under oath during the § 341 meeting that he was not financially dependent on his father at the time of his father's death, but he testified during the hearings before the Court that he was a dependent of his father, a discrepancy that he was unable to convincingly explain.
These inconsistencies led the Court to conclude that the Debtor was not a credible witness and to find the Debtor's testimony that he depended on his father for support to be unpersuasive.
V. Legal Analysis
A. The Parties' Respective Burdens
Under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, "the objecting party has the burden of proving that ... exemptions are not properly claimed." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c). The party objecting to the claimed exemption therefore "bears the burden of proving that the exemption is not applicable," Zingale v. Rabin (In re Zingale) , 693 F.3d 704, 707 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c) ), and of doing so by a preponderance of the evidence, In re Kimble , 344 B.R. 546, 551 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006).
The objecting party's initial burden is to produce evidence rebutting the presumed validity of the claimed exemption. If it does, then the burden of production shifts to the debtor. Describing the parties' shifting burdens in exemption litigation, this Court explained that:
[a] claimed exemption is presumptively valid. When an exemption has been claimed, it is the objecting party's burden ... to prove that the exemption is not properly claimed. This means that the objecting party initially has the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. The objecting party must offer evidence to rebut the presumptively valid exemption. If the objecting party produces evidence to rebut the exemption, the burden of production shifts to the debtor to demonstrate the propriety
of the claimed exemption. The burden of persuasion always remains with the objecting party.
In re Peacock , 292 B.R. 593, 596 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that bankruptcy "does not alter the burden [of proof] imposed by the substantive law." Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue , 530 U.S. 15, 17, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000). Although Raleigh was decided in the context of an objection to a proof of claim and did not involve Bankruptcy Rule 4003(c), some bankruptcy courts have questioned the continued viability of the rule in light of the Supreme Court's holding in that case. See , e.g. , In re Tallerico , 532 B.R. 774, 776 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that Rule 4003(c) is invalid "to the extent it assigns the burden of proof on an objection to a state-law claim of exemption in a manner contrary to state law"); In re Barnes , 275 B.R. 889, 898 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002) (same). These cases are well-reasoned, and Ohio courts place the burden of proof on the party claiming an exemption. Thus, it could be argued that here the Debtor should shoulder the burden of proving the exemption was properly claimed. See , e.g. , Estate of Hersh v. Schwartz , 195 Ohio App.3d 295, 959 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (2011). But even if decisions such as Tallerico are correctly decided, it is not for this Court to determine that Raleigh overruled Zingale by implication; instead, it must follow Zingale until the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit overrules it. Cf. Agostini v. Felton , 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) ("[O]ther courts should [not] conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent. We reaffirm that ‘[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’ " (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. , 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) ). Thirty Four therefore must carry the burden of persuading the Court that the Debtor is not entitled to the exemptions he claims.
B. The Exemptions Claimed by the Debtor
Individual debtors may exempt from property of the estate either: (1) the property exempt under applicable state law and federal nonbankruptcy law; or (2) the property identified in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, unless applicable state law specifically does not authorize debtors to use the § 522(d) exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)–(3). As a resident of Ohio, the only exemptions available to the Debtor were those afforded by Ohio law, which "specifically does not authorize debtors who are domiciled in this state to exempt the property specified in" § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2329.662 (West 2018).
In support of his claimed exemptions in the asbestos settlement funds, the Debtor relies on sections 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (c) of the Ohio Revised Code, which permit an Ohio resident to exempt:
(12) The person's right to receive, or moneys received during the preceding twelve calendar months from, any of the following:
....
(b) A payment on account of the wrongful death of an individual of whom the person was a dependent on the date of the individual's death, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the person and any of the person's dependents;
(c) ... [A] payment, not to exceed twenty thousand two hundred dollars, on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, of the person or an individual for whom the person is a dependent[.]
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2329.66(A)(12)(b) & (c).
As the statute makes clear, a person claiming these exemptions must be a "dependent" of the injured or deceased individual and, when the payment is on account of wrongful death, must have been a dependent on the date of the individual's death. The Debtor takes the position that a dependent is someone who relies on another for any amount of support. By contrast, Thirty Four argues that an individual is a dependent of another person only if the purported dependent satisfies each of the requirements for dependency under federal tax law, including the requirement that he receive more than one-half of his support from the other person. Given this disagreement, the Court must first determine the meaning of the term "dependent" for purposes of sections 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (c). In so doing, the Court will rely primarily on the law of Ohio, because "when a debtor claims a state-created exemption, the exemption's scope is determined by state law[.]" Law v. Siegel , 571 U.S. 415, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1196–97, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014).
In addition to arguing that the exemptions under sections 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (c) are unavailable to the Debtor because he was not a dependent of his father, Thirty Four contends that the exemptions are unavailable for another reason. It argues that "[s]ince the Debtor is an heir in the Estate of his father, and does not have his own claim for personal injury or wrongful death as a result of his father's exposure to asbestos, the Debtor has no entitlement to a claim of exemption pursuant to [Ohio Revised Code sections] 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (A)(12)(c)." Doc. 46 at 3. In other words, according to Thirty Four, in the language of the exemption statute, any "right to receive" that the Debtor has is a right to receive an inheritance from his father, not a right to receive a payment on account of the wrongful death or bodily injury of his father. Similarly, any "moneys received" by the Debtor were received from his father's probate estate, not from payments on account of the wrongful death or bodily injury of his father. Although the Court need not reach this issue given the disposition of the dependency issue, it notes that there is support in the case law for Thirty Four's position. See In re Byrne , 541 B.R. 254, 257–58 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (holding that the Chapter 7 debtor was not entitled to claim an exemption in her deceased nondebtor spouse's life insurance policy and pension plan of which she was not a beneficiary, because the debtor had only the right to an inheritance, not a right to receive a payment under the pension plan or life insurance policy); In re Aguilar , No. 98-81393, 1998 WL 34064589, at *2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the Chapter 7 debtor was not entitled to claim an exemption in one-half of the settlement proceeds of her former spouse's personal injury action, because the debtor only had the right to receive the proceeds under a dissolution decree, not on account of the personal bodily injury of her former spouse).
C. The Definition of "Dependent"
The Ohio exemption statute does not define "dependent," the Ohio Revised Code contains no generally applicable definition of the term, and there is no controlling Ohio case law defining it. The Court therefore must predict how the Ohio Supreme Court would define the term, In re Wengerd , 453 B.R. 243, 247 (6th Cir. BAP 2011), using the same methodology that it would use, Drown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Scott) , 424 B.R. 315, 330 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010), aff'd , 2011 WL 1188434 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011). In making the required prediction, the Court may rely on analogous cases decided by the Ohio Supreme Court as well as persuasive opinions by lower appellate courts in Ohio and other jurisdictions. See Kimble , 344 B.R. at 552.
Under Ohio law, a court's "duty in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the [legislature] as expressed in the language it enacted." Pelletier v. City of Campbell , 153 Ohio St.3d 611, 109 N.E.3d 1210, 1215 (2018). Section 1.42 of the Ohio Revised Code "guides [the] analysis." Id. This section provides that "[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage [unless they] have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise[.]" Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.42. Thus, absent a technical or particular meaning, "[u]ndefined words used in a statute must be accorded their usual, normal, or customary meaning." State ex rel. Bowman v. Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs , 77 Ohio St.3d 398, 674 N.E. 2d 694, 695 (1997). In other words, "[t]he legislature is ... free to define [a term] in any manner it sees fit," but "[a]bsent such definition [the Court is] obliged to use the ordinary meaning of the word." Seven Hills Sch. v. Kinney , 28 Ohio St.3d 186, 503 N.E.2d 163, 165 (1986). Of course, this rule is not unique to Ohio. It is the rule generally, including under federal bankruptcy law, as the Supreme Court has said many times. See , e.g. , Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1759, 201 L.Ed.2d 102 (2018).
As the Court has previously pointed out in the context of interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, "[a] word's ordinary meaning is often determined by reference to dictionaries." In re Harkins , 491 B.R. 518, 527 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013) (quoting Terrell v. United States , 564 F.3d 442, 451 (6th Cir. 2009) ). This is also true under the law of Ohio, where it is "common practice to resort to dictionaries as a source for determining the established, ordinary meaning of words." Jones v. Chagrin Falls , 116 Ohio App.3d 249, 687 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1997). Indeed, Ohio courts consistently have used dictionaries such as Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged ("Webster's ") and The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language ("American Heritage ") to establish the ordinary meaning of words that have no statutory definition. See , e.g. , Pelletier , 109 N.E.3d at 1216–17 (relying on Webster's ); Cincinnati City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ. , 122 Ohio St.3d 557, 913 N.E.2d 421, 424 (2009) (relying on Webster's and American Heritage ); State ex rel. Pontillo v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. Bd. , 98 Ohio St.3d 500, 787 N.E.2d 643, 649 (2003) (relying on Webster's ); State ex rel. Ditmars v. McSweeney , 94 Ohio St.3d 472, 764 N.E.2d 971, 975 (2002) (same); Benken v. Porterfield , 18 Ohio St.2d 133, 247 N.E.2d 749, 752 (1969) (same); Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Edwards , 174 Ohio App.3d 174, 881 N.E.2d 325, 329 (2007) (relying on American Heritage ); City of Westerville v. Kuehnert , 50 Ohio App.3d 77, 553 N.E.2d 1085, 1091 (1988) (same).
The relevant definition is the one that was in use on the date of the enactment of the statute under consideration. See Volz v. Volz , 167 Ohio St. 141, 146 N.E.2d 734, 738 (1957) (holding that "in determining the intent of the General Assembly, this court must be guided by the ordinary meaning of the words which the General Assembly used at the time that it used them"). Section 2329.66(A)(12) was originally enacted into law on September 28, 1979 "as an emergency act in response to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978." In re Abbott , 466 B.R. 118, 124 n.3 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012). This means that in order to "give effect to the intent of the [legislature] as expressed in the language it enacted," Pelletier , 109 N.E.3d at 1215, the Court must determine the ordinary meaning of the term "dependent" in 1979. To do so, the Court must look to dictionaries in use at that time. Cf. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd. , 566 U.S. 560, 566–67, 132 S.Ct. 1997, 182 L.Ed.2d 903 (2012) (reviewing the version of dictionaries that were in use when Congress enacted the statute at issue in order to determine the ordinary meaning of a term used in the statute); Velez v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. , 795 F.3d 578, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Smith , 985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 571 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Halloran , 664 F. App'x 23 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that the United States Supreme Court "has taken this approach on multiple occasions, relying on dictionary definitions from the eras of the relevant statutes' enactments as interpretive tools").
According to the editions of the American Heritage and Webster's dictionaries in use at the time of the enactment of section 2329.66(A)(12) in 1979, the noun "dependent" means (as it still does today) "[o]ne who relies on another for support," American Heritage 354 (1969), and "one that depends or is dependent; esp : one relying on another for support," Webster's 604 (1966). Somewhat circularly, "rely" is defined as meaning "[t]o depend [on]," American Heritage at 1099, while "depend" in turn is defined as meaning "[t]o rely, as for support or aid," id. at 354. The term "support" provides more information—it means "[m]aintenance or subsistence." Id. at 1293. And according to the entry for "livelihood" to which the entry for "support" also refers, "subsistence" and "maintenance" both "refer to that which provides the necessities of life .... Subsistence refers to that which barely supports life .... Maintenance [is] usually reckoned as the equivalent in money of what is needed to provide necessities such as food, lodging, and clothing." Id. at 763.
Taken together, then, a dependent was and still is a person who relies on another for the necessities of life and/or the money used to purchase those necessities. Support may take the form not only of money and goods, but also of necessary services, such as childcare, that reduce the expenses the debtor must incur to hire someone else to perform the services. Cf. In re Collopy , 99 B.R. 384, 384 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). In Collopy , the bankruptcy court held that the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy of which the debtor's mother was the beneficiary was exempt under a statute that exempts life insurance policies in which the beneficiaries are "relative[s] dependent upon" the debtor. Id. at 384. In so holding, the court found that the debtor's mother was a dependent given that she was "entirely dependent upon her daughter in a physical sense" because, among other things, "the daughter provides transportation for marketing, banking and medical attention." Id.
Although Thirty Four concedes that support may take the form of services, it contends that an individual should not be considered a dependent of another person unless he relies on the other person for more than one-half of his support. The dictionary definitions of "dependent" discussed above, however, do not contain even a hint of a more-than-one-half-support requirement. Likewise, another dictionary in use at the time of the enactment of section 2329.66(A)(12), the Revised Fourth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary , did not include any such requirement. See Black's Law Dictionary 524 (4th ed. 1968) (defining dependent to mean "[o]ne who derives support from another"). True, a Fifth Edition of Black's had become available a few months before the Ohio legislature passed the bill that included section 2329.66(A)(12), and this version of Black's included the following definitions of dependent: "One who derives his or her main support from another. Means relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid of someone else." Black's Law Dictionary 393 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). But this definition would be too slender a reed on which to impose a more-than-one-half-support requirement, because only part of it refers to "main support" while the other, like American Heritage and Webster's , does not.
The current edition of Black's defines "dependent" generally as "[s]omeone who relies on another for support" and makes clear that the more-than-one-half-support requirement applies only in the area of tax law. Black's Law Dictionary 531 (10th ed. 2014).
Moreover, an exemption statute must be construed in a manner that "will promote its purpose"—to "protect the family against destitution," Dennis v. Smith , 125 Ohio St. 120, 180 N.E. 638, 640 (1932), by shielding property that debtors need to support themselves and their dependents, Daugherty v. Cent. Tr. Co. of Ne. Ohio , 28 Ohio St.3d 441, 504 N.E.2d 1100, 1104–05 (1986). Keeping in mind "the liberal construction of exemption statutes afforded by the courts of [Ohio]," id. at 1105, the Court concludes that the more-than-one-half-support requirement is contrary to the purpose of the Ohio exemption statute. By contrast, the more-than-one-half-support requirement is consistent with the purpose of tax statutes. As one court has pointed out, "[f]or internal revenue purposes, unless a line is drawn as to the degree of support required in order to claim a ... dependent, there could be a substantial impact upon the revenue." In re Tracey , 66 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986). Furthermore, "such a line makes supervision of collection of taxes easier because Internal Revenue Service employees have a standard for rejection of unqualified exemptions." Id. Precise line drawing, however, is unnecessary when the purpose of the statute is to protect property of the debtor from his or her creditors.
Using the tax definition in the exemption context also would violate the rule that courts must use a term's ordinary meaning unless the legislature has directed otherwise. Thus, in a case addressing whether the debtor's adult daughter and her minor granddaughter were her dependents for purposes of the state homestead exemption, a bankruptcy court applied the non-tax definition of dependent. In doing so, it concluded that the debtor's support of her daughter and granddaughter made them her dependents even though there was insufficient evidence that the debtor provided them with more than one-half of their support. In re Versace , No. CV 16-05593-HB, 2017 WL 1501386, at *2–4 & n.11 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2017). Similarly, in determining the meaning of "dependent" under a no-fault motor vehicle insurance statute, a Pennsylvania appellate court rejected the use of the definition under which a dependent is "[o]ne who derives his or her main support from another." Rago v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 355 Pa.Super. 207, 513 A.2d 391, 393 (1986) (quoting the Fifth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary ). As the court noted, the "purpose of the [statute] would not be served by limiting the term ‘dependent’ to signify only a person who relied on a decedent either for his or her sole support or for his or her main support." Id. at 394. So too here.
Notably, certain sections of the Ohio Revised Code define the term "dependent" to include only those individuals who receive at least one-half of their support from another person. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 145.43 (defining "dependent" for purposes of the statute governing the Public Employees Retirement System); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3307.562 (defining "dependent" for purposes of the statute governing the State Teachers Retirement System); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.30 (defining "dependent" in the context of calculating unemployment compensation benefits). The fact that the Ohio legislature included a one-half-support requirement in those statutes but not in the Ohio exemption statute bolsters the conclusion that no such requirement should be imposed in the exemption context. See In re Rigdon , 133 B.R. 460 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991). In Rigdon , the issue was whether debtors who had settled litigation over the wrongful death of their minor son could claim an exemption in an annuity purchased with the settlement proceeds, which they would be entitled to do only if they were dependents of their son. The court noted that other Illinois statutes defined the term "dependent" in such a way that an individual cannot be a dependent if he receives less than fifty percent of his support from the other person. Id. at 463. But like the Ohio exemption statute, the Illinois exemption statute at issue in Rigdon did not include such a requirement. The Rigdon court therefore declined to "use[ ] a specific percentage of support to set a benchmark" and instead adopted a broad definition under which the debtors would be considered dependents of their son if they were "supported financially, either directly or indirectly by [him], and [if they] reasonably relie[d] on such support." Rigdon , 133 B.R. at 465.
Although no Ohio court has defined "dependent" for purposes of the exemption statute, a case decided in the context of the Ohio workers' compensation law suggests how Ohio courts might rule. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Morates , 120 Ohio App. 315, 202 N.E.2d 317 (1963). In Wheeling Steel , the court was asked to decide which definition should be used in connection with determining the persons who qualify as dependents of deceased workers. In so doing, the court looked to the definitions supplied by a version of Webster's Dictionary : "(1) Relying on or subject to someone else for support, and (2) unable to exist or sustain oneself without support or aid." Id. at 318. Finding that the claimant qualified under the first definition but not the second, the court concluded that because it was "required to construe the [statute] liberally in favor of claimants," it "must follow the first definition"—"relying on or subject to someone else for support." Id.
Just as the court in Wheeling Steel was required to give a liberal construction to the Ohio workers' compensation statute, it has long been the law in Ohio that "a liberal rule of interpretation should be applied" to exemption statutes and that "[i]n applying the rule of liberal construction, all reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the statute being applicable to the particular case." Dennis , 180 N.E. at 640 ; see also Daugherty , 504 N.E.2d at 1104–05 ; Peacock , 292 B.R. at 595. True, the Ohio Supreme Court made clear in Dennis that the rule of liberal construction does not "mean[ ] that words and phrases shall be given an unnatural meaning, or that the meaning shall be enlarged or expanded to meet a particular state of facts." Dennis , 180 N.E. at 640. And according to the Dennis court, "[a] liberal construction must still be a fair and reasonable one, in an effort always to ascertain the legislative intent." Id. But defining "dependent" to mean one who relies on another for support is not only an appropriately liberal construction, it is a fair and reasonable one as well. Again, the Ohio Revised Code directs that "[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.42. That is, as is also the case under federal law, courts "must ... interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context." Abramski v. United States , 573 U.S. 169, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2267, 189 L.Ed.2d 262 (2014) ; see also Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A. , 562 U.S. 61, 64, 131 S.Ct. 716, 178 L.Ed.2d 603 (2011) (construing a provision of the Bankruptcy Code in light of its "text, context, and purpose"). Nothing in the text, context, or purpose of the Ohio exemption statute suggests that the Ohio legislature intended the term "dependent" to be so restrictive as to mean someone who relies on another person for one-half or more than one-half of his support. For all these reasons, the Court must use the definition of "dependent" that does not impose a more-than-one-half-support requirement.
Although the definition of "dependent" is broader than Thirty Four would have it be, the definition does have its limits. A dependent is someone who "relies" on another for "support," meaning that he needs the assistance of the other person to obtain the necessities of life. See Estate of Dimaggio v. United States , No. 1:15-CV-00311-EJL, 2017 WL 3431399, at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2017) ("To demonstrate financial dependence, a [party] ‘must show that they were actually dependent, to some extent, upon the decedent for the necessaries of life.’ " (quoting Foster v. City of Fresno , 392 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2005) )), appeal dismissed , No. 17-35816, 2017 WL 6878095 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 2017) ; Hill v. S. Cal. Edison Co. , No. E054748, 2013 WL 1927199, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2013) ("[The plaintiff] has not presented any evidence that she was financially dependent on [her] [s]on .... Th[e] evidence shows [she] accepted money from [her] son, but did not need or require the money to pay for the necessities of life."). For example, unless the Debtor needed his father to give him a car for transportation or needed his father to give him money for food, housing, or the other necessities of life, then it cannot be said that the Debtor relied on his father for material support. Similarly, if the Debtor did not need his father to provide childcare for TD or to work at the convenience store, then the Debtor cannot be said to have been relying on his father for those services. In sum, the reliance and support components of the definition of dependent together lead to the conclusion that a debtor is not a dependent merely because he received goods, cash, or services from another person. This conclusion is consistent with the Debtor's own position that his father was not his dependent merely because the Debtor delivered meals to him at the nursing home, did his laundry instead of having it done at the nursing home, and drove him places he needed to go. Tr. I at 81–82.
D. Thirty Four Met Its Burden
Because a claimed exemption is presumptively valid, the Debtor is presumed to have been a dependent of his father. As the party objecting to the exemption, Thirty Four had the initial burden of producing evidence to rebut this presumption. Thirty Four easily met its initial burden. Addressing the Debtor's assertion of dependency on Paris Weatherspoon generally, it introduced both documentary and testimonial evidence establishing that the Debtor did not consider himself to be financially dependent on his father. First, it introduced multiple claim forms that the Debtor had submitted to asbestos personal injury trusts stating that he was not financially dependent on Paris Weatherspoon. Thirty Four then elicited the Debtor's testimony that he had stated under oath during the § 341 meeting that he was not financially dependent on his father. While this evidence generally rebutted the exemption's presumed validity, Thirty Four presented other evidence that negated the Debtor's claim that he relied on his father for financial support in specific ways (to work at the convenience store and to provide childcare, housing, and transportation).
Once Thirty Four produced evidence sufficient to rebut the exemption's presumed validity, the burden of production shifted to the Debtor to offer evidence supporting the exemption. Although the Debtor conceded during the Second Hearing that he did not need childcare in 2015, the Debtor met his burden by testifying that he relied on Paris Weatherspoon to provide him with a car, free labor at the convenience store, and cash assistance throughout the year. True, the Debtor's testimony was largely unreliable, but that is a matter best considered in the context of deciding whether Thirty Four met its burden of persuasion. Cf. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 509–10, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (holding that "the burden-of-production determination necessarily precedes the credibility-assessment stage").
Thirty Four presented sufficient evidence establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor was not a dependent of Paris Weatherspoon. In fact, it demonstrated that the Debtor did not actually rely on Paris Weatherspoon for support in any of the ways he claimed. Because Paris Weatherspoon was unable to work at the Debtor's store starting about four months before his death, and because the Debtor had employees who would have been able to perform any work the Debtor's father was doing, the Debtor did not rely on his father to provide services at the convenience store. Nor did he rely on this father for transportation, because the Debtor had a vehicle of his own that was available for both work and personal use. Likewise, the Debtor did not rely on his father to provide childcare services or to give him cash to hire anyone else to provide those services in 2015, because the Debtor conceded that he did not need childcare services that year.
The Debtor also did not rely on his father to meet his needs for shelter. Whatever cash Paris Weatherspoon provided, if any, would have gone to pay for his own living expenses, as he was residing with the Debtor at Botsford Drive after being evicted from another property sometime in 2014. And the Debtor clearly did not effectively use any cash his father gave him to keep the Botsford Drive home, because the Debtor defaulted on the required payments and was evicted around May or June 2015. During the next three months, the Debtor lived at the convenience store, where the rent was paid using gross income generated by the business, meaning that the Debtor did not rely on his father for housing during that time. After living at the store during the summer of 2015, the Debtor signed a lease for the Calimero Drive apartment with the intention that his father would again live with him there. Although Paris Weatherspoon passed away before his move into the Calimero Drive apartment with the Debtor could be finalized in the fall of 2015, his intention to move there—as well as the Debtor's plans to move a hospital bed into the apartment—demonstrates that most of any cash his father provided with respect to the apartment was intended to meet his own needs.
Further, the Debtor was eligible to receive (and did receive once he applied for it) assistance with his healthcare premiums through a welfare program. Although no similar evidence was introduced regarding public food assistance that the Debtor or TD received in 2015, there is no reason to believe—and the Debtor never testified—that he would have been unable to provide food for himself or TD without Paris Weatherspoon's help. The Court therefore concludes that the Debtor did not rely on his father to provide food.
In addition, Paris Weatherspoon's bank statements demonstrate that he lacked the ability to support the Debtor financially and still provide for his own needs. Rather than suggesting that Paris Weatherspoon neglected his own needs in order to provide him support, the Debtor instead testified that his father was working several jobs to support himself. But this could not have been the case, because Paris Weatherspoon's worsening health prevented him from even coming to the convenience store starting around June 2015, let alone working one or more jobs. And while the Debtor testified that his father had financial resources that the Debtor did not know about, this testimony was inconsistent with all the other evidence regarding his father's finances. The multiple inconsistencies in the Debtor's testimony undermined his credibility, leading the Court to give no credence to his testimony that he relied on cash gifts from his father in 2015. In sum, Thirty Four carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor was not relying on his father for food, shelter, transportation, childcare or any other necessities of life at the time of his death or during the year preceding it.
Finally, Thirty Four demonstrated that on several occasions before the exemption dispute arose the Debtor admitted that he was not financially dependent on his father. He submitted multiple claim forms to the asbestos trusts stating that he was not financially dependent on Paris Weatherspoon. Although the Debtor testified that he never saw those forms before they were submitted to the trusts, the forms were consistent with the Debtor's testimony during the § 341 meeting that he was not financially dependent on his father at the time of his death. The Debtor's suggestion that his testimony during the § 341 meeting that he was not a dependent of his father resulted from tough questioning by Thirty Four's counsel was simply not believable in light of his demonstrated ability to withstand vigorous cross-examination during the hearings before the Court. Rather, the Court concludes that the Debtor testified during the § 341 meeting that he was not financially dependent on his father because he believed he was not.
VI. Conclusion
The Court appreciates the difficulties the Debtor is facing. Despite having received a bankruptcy discharge in this case, he faces significant health and financial challenges down the road. And these challenges would undoubtedly be less daunting if the Debtor were able to exempt the funds available from the asbestos personal injury trusts. But despite its sympathy for the Debtor's situation, the Court must apply the law to the facts. Here, application of the legal principles discussed above to the evidentiary record made at the hearings leads to an inescapable conclusion: Thirty Four has carried its burden of persuading the Court that he was not a dependent of his father. Thirty Four's objection to the Debtor's claim of exemptions under sections 2329.66(A)(12)(b) and (c) of the Ohio Revised Code is accordingly sustained.