Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. Nos. 76500 & 76501
Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
In the second appeal in this dependency matter, Samuel G., Sr., father of the minors Veronica G. and Samuel G., Jr., appeals the juvenile court’s orders under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 entered at the conclusion of the six-month review hearing on family reunification. In particular, father contends the juvenile court’s finding under section 366.21, subdivision (e) — that the return of the children to the physical custody of the parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being of the children—is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
Initially, father also contended the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After augmentation of the record upon respondent Agency’s motion, father states in his reply brief that he agrees the juvenile court has complied with the ICWA. Accordingly, we deem this issue moot.
Factual & Procedural background
In the prior appeal in this dependency matter, In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179 (Veronica G.), we affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order, concluding as follows: “[T]he juvenile court in this case was presented with substantial evidence of a sustained pattern of physical and emotional abuse of the children perpetrated in an environment of ongoing domestic violence between the parents. Both children testified mother struck them daily with an open hand or fist, or kicked them, and that father witnessed this behavior but did not stop it. Mother admitted that she “popped Samuel in the mouth.” That such abusive behavior had been ongoing for some time is corroborated by evidence of the children’s burn marks, which they stated had been caused by mother with a cigarette lighter between one and two years ago. Both children stated they were afraid of their mother. Both children stated they had witnessed acts of domestic violence in which father slapped mother, pushed her to the floor and choked her. Samuel confirmed his father rammed his mother’s car with his truck three times as they tried to leave the house after father and mother argued. The children’s testimony constitutes ample evidence for the trial court’s conclusion they were at a substantial risk of serious physical and emotional harm.” (Veronica G., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 185-186.)
Pursuant to Evidence Code section 451, we take judicial notice of the Veronica G. opinion from the parents’ prior appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders in this case, and hereby incorporate it by reference in its entirety. Because the parties are familiar with that opinion, we need not reiterate the factual and procedural background therein. Rather, we focus on events after the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction and its disposition removing the children from the custody of the parents.
We also noted that at the conclusion of the contested jurisdictional hearing held on February 26, 2007, “the juvenile court declared dependency as to both children and confined parental visitation to one hour per week ‘until we have had the benefit of a supervised therapeutic visit at least two hours in duration with a report back, and then I will entertain a step-up in visitation depending on the result of that.’ Subsequently, after father declared suicidal tendencies in open court, the juvenile court ordered visitation could only take place where a metal detector was available to screen father before the visit.” (Veronica G., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 184, fn. 3.)
It was against this backdrop that the juvenile court declared dependency and adopted a case plan for the parents, which included parenting and anger management classes, as well as mental health evaluations and individual and/or family counseling as recommended by treatment providers. On April 5, 2007, mother filed a section 388 petition to modify visitation, asking the court to allow supervised visitation between children and parents at Central Park in San Mateo rather than in a building where father is subject to search by going through a metal detector.
The Agency opposed mother’s section 388 petition to change the venue for visitation. The Agency submitted a psychological evaluation of father by Dr. Mark Patterson. During his interview with Dr. Patterson, father stated of the social worker who took his children from the home, “I fucking hate that bitch!” Asked whether he believed if any of his personal problems have affected his children, father responded: “I’m not the identified problem. There’s no allegations for me in this. I already went through anger management in 1997.” Dr. Patterson’s psychological tests showed: father has “limited insight into his personal problems”; “[h]is capacity for empathy is relatively low”; and “he may respond quickly with anger” if his plans or intentions are interrupted. “From a diagnostic perspective,” Dr. Patterson states, “there is evidence of a personality disorder with narcissistic, depressive, passive-aggressive and sadistic features.” Father’s personality structure, Dr. Patterson states, “is rigid and narcissistic, and [] he may respond with anger or arrogance when confronted about his behavior.” Dr. Patterson concluded that father “appears to have the basic capacity to be an adequate parent to his children. At the same time, his apparent difficulties with anger dyscontrol are apt to interfere with that capacity to a substantial degree. In [my] opinion, . . . [father] is currently unable to provide a physically and emotionally safe rearing environment for his children in light of his mental health problems in combination with the current level of stress he is experiencing.” Subsequently, the court denied mother’s section 388 request as to a changed venue for father’s visitation but permitted off site visits for mother only.
The Agency filed an interim review report on June 4, 2007. The report noted that in April mother injured her knee and ankle at work and would be on crutches for 4-8 months. Mother reported that parents did not have the money to pay for anger management classes because they were out of work and could barely afford to pay the rent. The social worker noted that in interviews father was silent unless directly asked a question, otherwise he let mother do the talking. Mother confirmed that father “prefers for her to make the arrangements . . . and he likes for her to speak on his behalf after she has consulted with him.” The social worker opined that parents are “making partial progress towards complying with the court orders and that they are mostly cooperative. The undersigned is concerned that the [parents] . . . are simply going down a list of things needed to be done to show that they have complied. [Father] does not directly communicate with the undersigned and so it is hard to assess whether or not he is trying to address the issues that brought the children into custody or just trying to comply with court orders.”
The Agency filed a six-month status review report on August 10, 2007. It states that the family “has been mostly compliant with services offered.” Parents have been attending anger management and parenting classes. Mother has been referred to individual counseling but states she is not interested. However, the report also expresses concern that parents are in a state of denial regarding the situation: “The parents . . . still deny that any abuse has occurred. The family is in need of time to work through these differences in family therapy, which has yet to begin.” This concern is reiterated in the Agency’s Addendum Report filed on September 11, 2007, which states: “The undersigned believes that [parents] will not be able to fully benefit from services ordered and provided to unify them with their children until they get to the underlying issues of why the children have claimed to be abused. . . . [¶] Hopefully in the family sessions some of this will begin to be resolved and a break through will occur towards aiding in an emotionally healthy reunification for this family.”
At the contested six-month review hearing on September 13, 2007, father’s counsel cross-examined the case social worker, Nazirah Oyenuga. Oyenuga stated that the principal components of the reunification plan were for parents to complete mental health examinations; complete anger management classes and parent education services; participate in counseling or therapy as directed to include individual or family therapy; and to engage in visitation with the children. Parents had completed parenting classes, although the instructor, Rebecca Wixon, recommended they continued with some education in co-parenting. Parents were participating in anger management classes. Father was not recommended for individual counseling but for family therapy with the children, which had not yet happened yet. Oyenuga stated that “father is presently doing what he’s been asked to do.”
Asked whether she found father deficient in any areas of the reunification plan, Oyenuga stated she does not have an assessment because “father does not speak to me regarding what he does.” Asked what remains to be done by father before the children could be returned, Oyenuga said “[t]here needs to be family counseling between the children and the father to better the relationship.” She stated that the “real problem” in returning the children to the parents’ home at this point is that “the parents have not really shown insight as to why the children stated they have been abused. [¶] The parents do not admit any guilt and feel that if they do say they did commit any abuse, then they are being pressured to do that. [¶] I think without that, the children are unable to heal emotionally because the children are still saying this occurred and this happened.” Oyenuga opined that it is important for the children’s emotional well-being that the parents take responsibility for the family’s current situation.
Oyenuga stated that as a service provider in the reunification plan it is important that she is able to communicate directly with each parent. Father, however, does not communicate with her. Oyenuga stated that she cannot make an informed assessment if she is unable to talk with a parent because that parent does not wish to speak with her. Oyenuga said she had left messages for father several times, and mother said she would have father speak with Oyenuga, but father remained uncommunicative towards Oyenuga.
Oyenuga states that although parents are participating in services, she was concerned that father in particular was “not necessarily gaining anything from the services.” Oyenuga felt father was “going through the motions” in the sense he was “going [to] and attending” classes, but she could not determine if he was gaining any “insight” because he would not talk to her. Oyenuga opined that father’s lack of communication was based on his resentment that the Agency was intruding into parents’ lives. Oyenuga did not believe that parents accept the Agency is trying to help the family by extending services to parents because “they don’t actively engage with me. . . . They are doing the services, but they are only doing what they absolutely have to do, the bare minimum to get the kids back; the mother a bit more, but I’m not sure about the father.” She stated that “I don’t believe the parents have insight as to the situation and what’s happening as to how the children actually feel. [¶] I think a lot [of] the focus is on how they [parents] feel.”
Rebecca Wixon, a human services supervisor and parenting instructor for the Agency testified that parents participated in and completed all 14 sessions in their court-ordered parenting class. Wixon said that after their completion of the initial parenting class she recommended co-parenting services for parents because “there is a significant power struggle between the two of them.” This power struggle, she opined, reflects that “the parents don’t necessarily agree on approaches to parenting or discipline, and I feel like that disagreement and incongruence could really have a negative impact on the children and their ability to understand what it is their parents’ expectations are and meet those expectations . . . .” Wixon further opined that at the present time parents did not have the ability to act as a unit in parenting children. Wixon based this opinion on her observations of parents in role playing exercises in parenting class, “where we will talk about situations that occur in families and how parents collaborate with one another in dealing with those situations. [¶] It was my impression that there is some competition between the parents in who is right and that both of them become very rigid in their opinion and inflexible with one another. [¶] One of the things we talk about in co-parenting is how important it is to accommodate one another and agree on major issues in parenting. [¶] And at this point, I don’t feel like there is sufficient communication between the mother and father; that that interaction would happen in a way that would be clear to a 9-year-old and a 12-year-old, helping them understand what the expectations are, what the boundaries are, and what the limits are that are being set.”
On cross-examination by father’s counsel, Wixon stated father passed the parenting class and had done well enough “in terms of sufficient recall of the material.” Asked whether father “complies with th[e] curricula” in the class, Wixon replied, “I don’t think I can answer that question, . . . because it’s beyond attending class and filling out paperwork. [¶] There is an expectation of insight and ability to apply the material in real life situations. I didn’t see a fluid or comprehensive ability to apply that material in our class.”
At closing argument, mother’s counsel stated mother “is not in opposition to services. She has done the parenting classes and she’s open to doing the co-parenting classes as suggested by Ms. Wixon. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] As the social worker testified, the mother has complied with services and has shown signs of progress. . . . [¶] Mr. Palmer [anger management counselor] testified the mother has gained skills. She did open up. She attended the classes, and she is active in the classes. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] She is not arguing that we are ready to return these children. . . . [¶] She is willing to do the counseling with the children, the family counseling. She is open to the therapy. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] In terms of visitation, the social worker testified visitations are going well. In fact, they have taken steps to modify the visitation from the original order. [¶] The mother is grateful that happened and does ask the court to grant discretion to the social worker to move visitation so she has discretion to move it to unsupervised when the time is right.”
Father’s counsel argued that the children should be returned to father because he had complied with the case plan as ordered. This led to the following colloquy between counsel and the court:
Counsel: [T]here were five major areas in the case plan for my client; mental health examination, anger management, parenting classes, participation in counseling and visitation. [¶] You also heard from the social worker that my client has completed most if not all of those. Some are ongoing. [¶] But we are nonetheless left with a recommendation that the children stay out of my client’s custody. [¶] The reason that seems to be implied to the Court is basically somehow that he has an attitude problem.
The Court: Not infrequent in situations that arise out of a domestic violence scenario, [counsel].
Counsel: Absolutely true, your honor. But requirements have been set up for him. And although he doesn’t get along well with the social worker, he has . . . completed most of all those five criteria put out for him. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I think we should be careful how we look at his participation in the case plan. It’s very difficult to require a good attitude in addition to the stuff laid out in the case plan.
The Court: A good attitude is not required. What is required is that the feelings toward one gender be addressed in counseling to a satisfactory degree. . . . [¶] . . . [T]he pattern I see over and over again is one of transferring the prior aggression, which is now under control by the Courts as to one’s spouse as one’s whipping post, transferring that passive aggression to the next available, logical succession. That frequently turns out to be, unhappily, a female social worker or other females telling this angry person, who has not addressed his anger, what to do. [¶] It becomes rather than a reunification attempt with the team, it turns into yet the next episode in the ongoing power struggle of an unhappy man. [¶] Unfortunately, the children are held hostage to this anger. That’s the scenario I see being played out here. That’s why insight is the key. [¶] Going through the motions and taking the written test and getting a score does not mean he’s a different man than he was six months ago. [¶] The evidence produced at this hearing seems to run to the opposite conclusion. He hasn’t addressed the primary issues. He hasn’t gained any insight.
Counsel: Well, your Honor, . . . [h]e has done substantially everything that’s been asked of him in the case plan. [¶] He may not have a good attitude. . . . But I would suggest, your Honor, he has done what is asked of him. . . .
Court: [Counsel], this is not about a good attitude. This is about insight. [¶] Why does your client think we are sending him to counseling? We don’t care about counseling, per se. It is not an exercise to go through, like jogging half a mile. [¶] We are sending him to counseling, whether it be assessed as individual or group or family, so he can gain insight into what happened in that home that led the Court to be involved. . . . [¶] Counseling without gaining insight is just going through the motions. . . . [¶] I’m not seeing any insight gained. That’s the key here. If there’s no insight, then there’s no solution to the problems that brought this family to the attention of the Court. This is a dangerous situation for these children. It was six months ago, and I haven’t seen anything on your client’s behalf that leads me to believe he has changed his core values and gained insight so this won’t happen again. [¶] And regrettably, he’s still using the children’s mother in a way that is not only thwarting his progress but in a sense thwarting hers. She’s still doing his thing; running interference between him and the social worker. She still hasn’t developed the vertebrate posture to say, ‘No. Stop it. Do your own thing. I’m taking care of my business.’ This is potentially as dangerous a domestic violence situation as it was six months ago. That’s a sad scenario and a dangerous brew to send children home to.”
The court observed that the social worker could not give direct information to the court unless she has direct communication with both parents, but father was “blowing her off [and] he doesn’t get to do that.” The court also stated that “we basically have good groundwork” and “parents who are familiar with the drill” so that “we can work hard the next six months and get the missing piece, which is the actual insight piece, and, hopefully, be on our way to begin to think about some family therapy which will not be deleterious to these children.” Accordingly, the court continued dependency and ordered individual therapy for father focused on the issue of anger management to be followed by family therapy. The court also ordered father to communicate directly with the social worker in future and for “mother to not be the messenger for father anymore.” The twelve-month review hearing was set for February 11, 2008. Father filed a timely notice of appeal on September 13, 2007.
Discussion
Father contends that there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the minors would suffer detriment if returned to his custody. We disagree. “We review the correctness of an order pursuant to section 366.21 to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Shaundra L. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 303, 316.) That standard requires us “to determine whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could make the findings challenged. . . .” (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.)
Subdivision (e) of section 366.21 governs the six-month status review hearing conducted by the juvenile court in this case. At the time of the hearing, that subdivision stated in pertinent part: “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing, the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent . . . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment. . . . The failure of the parent . . . to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. In making its determination, the court shall review and consider the social worker’s report and recommendations and the report and recommendations of any child advocate appointed pursuant to Section 356.5; and shall consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent . . . and the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided. [¶] Whether or not the child is returned to a parent or legal guardian, the court shall specify the factual basis for its conclusion that the return would be detrimental or would not be detrimental. The court also shall make appropriate findings pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 366; and, where relevant, shall order any additional services reasonably believed to facilitate the return of the child to the custody of his or her parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e) (2007) [italics added].)
Here, the juvenile court was presented with a disturbing psychological report on father stating that “there is evidence of a personality disorder with narcissistic, depressive, passive-aggressive and sadistic features”; “there is evidence that he is vulnerable to loss of control of his anger”; father “showed limited insight into the situations (internal and external) that put him at risk for loss of anger control”; and that he “was not as open as he could have been during the assessment process” and “did not acknowledge that his children have been exposed to risk through his behavior.” These character traits were evident in father’s approach to the court-ordered reunification services. The case social worker testified that father appeared to resent the assistance the Agency was attempting to provide and that he would not communicate directly with her. She opined that father was going through the motions in reunification without taking responsibility for, or showing any understanding of, the circumstances leading to court intervention, and therefore he was not gaining anything from the services offered. Similarly, the parenting instructor testified that although father tested well enough on the course, she did not observe in him the ability or insight to apply the material to real life situations.
This constitutes substantial evidence that the return of the children at the six-month review stage would have been detrimental, because it shows that father failed to make substantive progress in the case plan and reflects his lack of effort to address underlying problems that led to court intervention. (See § 366.21, subd. (e) [providing that parent’s failure to make “substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental” and that in making its determination, “the court shall . . . consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent . . . and the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided”].) Moreover, having determined that return of the children would be detrimental, the court ordered the “additional services reasonably believed to facilitate the return of the child to the custody of his or her parent or legal guardian” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)) by specifying that father communicate with the social worker, engage in individual therapy focused on anger management, and proceed thereafter to family therapy. In sum, the juvenile court’s ruling fully complies with subdivision (e) and substantial record evidence supports the court’s finding under the preponderance standard that the return of the child to father after the six-month review would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.
Father asserts, however, that this case “bears a strong resemblance to other published cases where substantial evidence did not support the finding of detriment,” citing Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322 (Jennifer A.) and David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768 (David B.). These cases are not at all similar to this case. Concluding that substantial evidence did not support the finding that returning the children to mother’s physical custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the children, the court in Jennifer A. granted mother’s petition for writ relief from the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a hearing under section 366.26. (Jennifer A, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.) The court stated that the children had been detained after mother, a single parent, left them alone in a motel room while she went to work. (Id. at p. 1326.) However, the appellate court noted that, in striking contrast to the case at bar, “[a]s early as the six-month hearing, Mother’s social worker and therapist recognized Mother was ‘far removed’ from leaving the children at home alone again, had learned proper parenting skills, and had accepted responsibility for the circumstances that brought the children into the juvenile court's custody.” (Ibid. [italics added].)
In further striking contrast to the case at bar, there was “no evidence either Mother or Father ever physically or emotionally abused the children,” “no evidence she has a mental illness . . . affecting her parenting skills” and mother “substantially complied with her reunification plan, has completed parenting courses and counseling, has completed drug treatment, and knows proper parenting behavior.” (Jennifer A, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1326 [italics added].) If that were not enough to distinguish Jennifer A. from this case, the appellate court also noted that the social worker confirmed mother “has good parenting skills and testified ‘she pretty much does those things that we normally associate with good parenting.’ ” (Id. at p. 1327.)
David B., supra, is just as easily distinguishable. The Court of Appeal termed David B. “a troubling case.” (David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.) The court granted David’s petition for writ of mandate and reversed the juvenile court’s order ruling that his three-year-old daughter Susan could not be safely released to his custody at the conclusion of reunification and setting the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. (Id. at pp. 772-773.) However, just like Jennifer A., supra, the facts in David B. are profoundly distinct to those presented here.
First, unlike here, Susan was never removed from David’s care under a section 300 petition. Rather, “David had no contact with Susan from the time she was five-months old and her mother disappeared with her, until she was a year and a half old and taken into custody by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA).” (David B., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.) In short, David had no history of either domestic violence or child abuse. Moreover, “he immediately demonstrated a commitment to her when he was notified of her plight by SSA. During his 18 months of reunification, he did virtually everything SSA requested of him, and then some. He even requested anger management classes on his own initiative, to avoid any possibility he might subject his daughter to the type of violence that had marred his own childhood. It is undisputed by everyone that he loves his daughter and has shown consistent dedication to her welfare and their reunification.” (Ibid. [italics added].) David, therefore, demonstrated none of the resistance and resentment towards reunification shown by father in this case. And David had no history of domestic violence or child abuse, nor did he show any signs of serious psychological problems, factors which make father’s perfunctory approach to reunification here all the more troubling.
Relying on Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738 (Blanca P.), father also contends that the juvenile court erred because it based its finding of detriment on a vague and speculative perception that father “fail[ed] to ‘internalize’ the skills learned while participating in reunification services.” Procedurally and factually, Blanca P. is a somewhat complex case. There, four siblings Nora (13), Juan (7), Daisy (3) and Isaias (1) were removed from the parents Blanca (mother) and Rogelio (father) in April 1994, after Juan was struck hard enough in the face by his mother to leave finger marks. (Id. at p. 1742.) In October 1994, after a physical observation by Daisy’s foster parent and an inconclusive and suggestive child abuse interview, a subsequent petition was filed alleging Rogelio had penetrated Daisy’s vagina prior to detention. (Ibid.) However, at the hearing on the subsequent petition held in April 1995, the judge mistakenly believed that the truth of the sexual abuse allegations had already been established, and ordered that the parents undergo a psychological evaluation. (Id. at pp. 1744-1745.) Parents continued with therapy and compliance with their reunification plan throughout the summer of 1995, and in August the psychologist filed an evaluation “exonerating Rogelio of any propensity to sexually abuse children.” (Id. at 1745.) Indeed, the psychologist “opined that much of the family’s troubles were the result of a lack of rapport with the social worker assigned to the case.” (Ibid.) The same social worker prepared the report for the 18-month review held in January 1996, in which she opined that “Rogelio had not made sufficient ‘progress’ in therapy and had not ‘internalized’ proper parenting skills, [an opinion] based mostly on the couple’s refusal to admit, in therapy, that Rogelio had molested Daisy.” (Id. at p. 1747.) The trial court found it would be detrimental to return the children to the home, terminated reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing for May 1996. (Ibid.)
The appellate court, however, concluded that without evidence of the alleged molestation — which had never been sustained after presentation of evidence at a hearing — the remaining record evidence could not independently support the trial court’s detriment finding. (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747.) The court noted that, aside from the allegation of molestation, the case against mother (Blanca) on the finding of detriment boiled down to: (1) the social worker’s “fuzzy notion that [Blanca] did not truly believe what she has been taught about child discipline,” and; (2) the social worker’s and therapist’s opinion that Blanca had not “ ‘internalized’ what she has learned in parenting classes” because she refused to believe her husband is a child molester. (Id. at p. 1751.) The court concluded that “[t]he failure to ‘internalize’ general parenting skills is simply too vague to constitute substantial, credible evidence of detriment,” and in strong terms noted that “[t]o hold otherwise would come perilously close to allowing legal decisions of monumental importance to the persons involved to be based on nebulous ideas more appropriate to an afternoon talk show than a court of law.” (Ibid.)
Seizing upon the above language in Blanca P. regarding mother’s failure to “internalize,” father asserts that the trial court’s finding of detriment in this case is founded upon the similarly nebulous and vague concept of his failure to gain “insight.” Although father’s attempt to establish a parallel between Blanca P. and the case at bar does not bear out upon close inspection, Blanca P. is helpful nevertheless.
The Blanca P. court observed that: “In deciding whether it would be detrimental to return a child, the easy cases are ones where there is a clear failure by the parent to comply with material aspects of the service plan. . . . [¶] The harder cases are, like the one before us, where the parent has complied with the service plan, but for some reason has not convinced a psychologist or social worker that it would be safe to return the child to the parent. The problem is not, as it were, quantitative (that is, showing up for counseling or therapy or parenting classes, or what have you) but qualitative (that is, whether the counseling, therapy or parenting classes are doing any good). These are sensitive cases, fraught with emotional overtones, because they invariably deal with an evaluation of the personality, character and attitudes of the parent.” (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1748 [italics added].) Here, we freely acknowledge this may be one of those cases where the problem is “qualitative” rather than “quantitative.” (Ibid.)
Helpfully, the Blanca P. court did not stop with its initial observation but reviewed past cases in an attempt to show “the quantum of evidence concerning a parent’s personality, character and attitudes required to sustain a detriment finding.” (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1749.) The court identified several legal precepts that apply in this area: First, “psychological evaluations can serve as credible evidence to sustain a detriment finding”; second, such evaluations must be “reasonably specific and objective”; third, there should be evidence to corroborate such evaluations; and, fourth, “mere subjective impressions,” even by professionals, is “insufficient evidence of detriment.” (Id. at p. 1750.) Applying these standards, the Blanca P. court concluded that “[t]here is nothing there here. We have no clinical evaluation, no testing to indicate mental illness, just the opinion of the mother's social worker and a therapist that she has not “internalized” what she has learned in parenting classes.” (Id. at p. 1751.)
In the end, the Blanca P. court issued a writ of mandate commanding the juvenile court to hold a new 18-month review hearing to determine if Rogelio molested Daisy, and further instructed that if juvenile court found Rogelio did not commit the molestation then the children should be returned to their parents because “there is no support for a detriment finding apart from the molestation allegations.” (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1760.)
Initially, we note this case bears none of procedural and factual complexity of Blanca P. Unlike Blanca P., where mother appealed a detriment finding based largely on unsustained jurisdictional allegations of sexual abuse against father, we have a single petition against both parents which was sustained on the basis of “substantial evidence of a sustained pattern of physical and emotional abuse of the children perpetrated in an environment of ongoing domestic violence between the parents,” backed by the testimony of both children and other objective evidence of abuse such as old burn marks on their bodies and reported instances of domestic violence. (Veronica G., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 185-186.) From the outset, therefore, the reunification plan in this case addressed the problems—child abuse and domestic violence—that resulted in the juvenile court taking jurisdiction and removing the children from the home. Indeed, the Blanca P. court explicitly urged that “[o]ur comments should not be taken beyond their context,” which does not involve “the much more difficult problem of the parent who unquestionably has molested [or abused] a child, who admits the molestation [or abuse], faithfully complies with the reunification plan, says all the right things, and yet there is still doubt as to whether he or she really has reformed.” (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1752, fn. 7.) Thus, this case presents the “much more difficult problem” noted in Blanca P., supra—the children were unquestionably abused both emotionally and physically, parents admitted to the abuse, at least in part, they complied for the most part with the reunification plan, but “there is still doubt” as to whether father really has reformed. (Ibid.)
Even by the standards of Blanca P., however, there is substantial evidence of detriment. Both the case social worker and the parenting instructor offered evaluations to the effect that father was simply going through the motions in reunification without really taking any of it to heart. This is what was most troubling to the juvenile court, and why the court ordered additional individual therapy for father focused on anger management. These evaluations were not, as in Blanca P., “mere subjective impressions”: Rather, they “serve as credible evidence to sustain [the] detriment finding” because they are “reasonably specific and objective ” and are corroborated by other evidence. (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1750.) Social worker Oyenuga’s specific evaluation was that although father was attending services she was not sure that he had gained the desired “insight” into why the court had intervened because he would not communicate with her. She provided evidence of that in father’s obstinate refusal to return her calls, and to channel any communications through mother. Father’s unwillingness to communicate is further corroborated by parenting instructor Wixon. She described how father usually only participated when “asked directly,” and after an early misunderstanding in class over a question Wixon asked, “father was less vocal about participating.”
Wixon also offered a specific evaluation that father lacked insight and ability to apply the material from the parenting class to real life situations, despite the fact father passed the class and showed sufficient recall of the material on the test. Her evaluation was based on “participation in class based on answers that parents give, parents’ homework, insight into problems that have existed within the family, parents’ sort of retrospective view on how things have been, and based on new knowledge, what they would do differently.” During role playing exercises, for example, Wixon observed a “competition between the parents in who is right and that both of them become very rigid in their opinion and inflexible with one another.” Wixon thought this power struggle between parents over the children needed to be addressed through further classes in co-parenting, where parents learn “how important it is to accommodate one another and agree on major issues in parenting.”
Furthermore, in Blanca P., the psychologist’s report exonerating Rogelio of any propensity to sexually abuse children (Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1745) actually contradicted the social worker’s evaluation. That is not the case here. Rather, as noted above, the psychologist’s report on father stated that “there is evidence of a personality disorder with narcissistic, depressive, passive-aggressive and sadistic features”; “there is evidence that he is vulnerable to loss of control of his anger”; father “showed limited insight into the situations (internal and external) that put him at risk for loss of anger control”; and that he “was not as open as he could have been during the assessment process” and “did not acknowledge that his children have been exposed to risk through his behavior.” Presciently, the psychologist reported that father “may show rigid personality features [and] . . . probably has limited insight into his personal problems”; as well, father “is apt to be cynical of others’ motives, and his social interactions may be characterized by manipulations, deception and hypocrisy. . . . He is apt to be in conflict with family members and authority figures. Treatment may be quite challenging with [such individuals and] he may experience difficulty learning from his experience.” Thus, not only is the psychologist’s report further independent evidence of detriment, it is consistent with the social worker’s and parenting instructor’s evaluations and also provides further corroboration to substantiate them.
In sum, the analysis under the standards and precepts of Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1738 shows that there is substantial record evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of detriment
Disposition
The orders of the juvenile court after the six-month review hearing are affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.