Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. J202629 Francis M. Devaney, Judge.
HUFFMAN, J.
In May 2006, the minor, U.V. (minor), was declared a ward of the Juvenile Court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 following his admission that he committed an assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court committed the minor to Camp Barrett for 270 days and imposed other terms of probation. One of the conditions imposed was that the minor was required to take an assaultive behavior class while at Camp Barrett. At the annual review of the minor's probation the trial court, at the request of the probation officer, ordered the minor to attend a 28-week treatment course.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
The minor did not appeal from the 2006 dispositional order and does not challenge the true finding or the original disposition on this appeal. The minor does appeal from the April 30, 2007 order which added the 28-week course to the requirements of his probation. The minor contends the court lacked the authority to modify the terms of his probation in the absence of a showing of changed circumstances and, even if there were changed circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the new requirement. We find the court properly added a necessary treatment requirement that had been inadvertently omitted in the original disposition order and affirm the trial court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the minor does not challenge the basis of the original disposition, we will set forth a very brief summary of the facts of the underlying offense in order to provide context for our analysis of the issues raised by this appeal.
In April 2006, the minor and his girlfriend got into an argument. During the disagreement the minor assaulted his girlfriend by knocking her to the ground and repeatedly banging her head on the concrete. When the victim attempted to get up the minor punched her in the face and knocked her down again. The minor was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the altercation.
DISCUSSION
The minor contends the trial court lacked the authority to add a 28-week treatment program to his probation conditions. He argues that the trial court did not articulate any changed circumstances within the meaning of section 778 and thus the court could not modify his probation. He further argues the court abused its discretion by adding the course since he had previously been ordered to complete a program at Camp Barrett, which should have been sufficient to meet his rehabilitative needs.
Section 778 provides: "Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a ward of the juvenile court or the child himself through a properly appointed guardian may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a ward of the juvenile court for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court. The petition shall be verified and, if made by a person other than the child, shall state the petitioner's relationship to or interest in the child and shall set forth in concise language any change of circumstance or new evidence which are alleged to require such change of order or termination of jurisdiction. [¶] If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order or termination of jurisdiction, the court shall order that a hearing be held and shall give prior notice, or cause prior notice to be given, to such persons and by such means as prescribed by Sections 776 and 779, and, in such instances as the means of giving notice is not prescribed by such sections, then by such means as the court prescribes."
Relying on the language of section 778, the minor argues any modification of juvenile probation requires proof of changed circumstances. His argument is based on his interpretation of People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095, in which the court upheld an extension of adult probation to complete restitution where the payment schedule imposed by the original probation order did not allow complete payment of restitution within the time of the grant of probation. The court deemed the delay in payment to be a change in circumstances. The minor agues that Cookson holds that authority to modify probation requires changed circumstances. He therefore reasons the trial court's order in this case is invalid because nothing had changed since the original disposition order.
The Attorney General contends the trial court's order was authorized by section 775 and was not limited by section 778. We agree with that analysis. Section 775 provides: "Any order made by the court in the case of any person subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside, as the judge deems meet and proper, subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this article." Under that section the trial court may modify its prior orders as long as it provides the procedural safeguards required by section 776 by giving notice to the parties and providing an opportunity to argue the merits of any proposed modification.
This court recently addressed the authority of the juvenile court to reconsider its prior orders and to correct those orders when deemed necessary. (Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 116.) The Nickolas F. case involved the interpretation of section 385 relating to a dependency proceeding, which is virtually identical to section 775 relating to delinquency proceedings. The court stated, regarding section 385: "[T]he juvenile court may modify an order that contains a clerical error, but may also reconsider the substance of a previous order the court considers to have been erroneously, inadvertently or improvidently granted." (Nickolas F., supra, at p. 116.)
Section 385 provides: "Any order made by the court in the case of any person subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside, as the judge deems meet and proper, subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this article."
We believe the analysis of Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 92 is controlling in this case. Here the probation officer noted the 28-week course was a standard and important requirement for a minor who has engaged in the type of assaultive behavior involved in this case. The probation officer's report noted the requirement had been inadvertently omitted from the original dispositional order. Further, the trial court noted the seriousness of the current offense and stated the 28-week course was necessary for the minor's rehabilitation.
The primary consideration of juvenile probation is the rehabilitation of the minor. (In re Florance (1956) 47 Cal.2d 25, 28.) Unlike adults, a juvenile cannot refuse probation because it is not a grant of leniency but is an important part of the minor's rehabilitation. (In re Francisco S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 946, 954.) Juvenile probation being different from its adult counterpart is more broadly interpreted by the courts in order to carry out the purpose of preventing minors from repeating their delinquent activity.
In the present case it is clear the trial court acted within its discretionary authority. The important 28-week course had been omitted from the disposition order. Although the original disposition directed the minor to take a shorter course at Camp Barrett, it is unclear from the record whether he successfully completed such course. Although the minor said he completed the course and offered an excuse for not producing a certificate of completion, the record does not compel a conclusion that he actually completed the course at the Camp Barrett.
The memo to the trial court for the annual review also indicated the minor was experiencing difficulties at home and may have been using alcohol. To the minor's credit, his urine tests did not show the presence of drugs or alcohol, and he was employed full time at the Urban Corps. The discussions between the court and the minor at the annual review apparently caused the court to be concerned about the minor's explanations regarding his problems at home and the amount of time the minor was "doing stuff" with friends. The court was clear in its view the minor was not in violation of probation, but was equally clear that the minor needed the added course to address the serious problems that led to his criminal behavior. We are satisfied the trial court properly exercised its discretion under section 775 to modify the dispositional order to add a probation requirement that had been inadvertently omitted and had not been addressed by any other part of the probation requirements.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., IRION, J.