Opinion
07-27-2016
In the Matter of TYSHAWN B. (Anonymous), appellant.
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow and Julie Steiner of counsel), for respondent.
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgow and Julie Steiner of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, BETSY BARROS, and FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.
Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Barbara Salinitro, J.), dated December 15, 2015. The order adjudicated Tyshawn B. a juvenile delinquent, and directed his placement in a nonsecure detention facility for a period of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review an order of fact-finding of that court dated November 24, 2015, which, after a hearing, found that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and menacing, and the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the appellant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification evidence.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The appellant contends that the hearing court improperly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony. The presentment agency established at the Wade hearing (see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 ) that the showup identification of the appellant was properly conducted within close spatial and temporal proximity to the crime (see People v. Cuesta, 103 A.D.3d 913, 915, 959 N.Y.S.2d 744 ; People v. Davis, 39 A.D.3d 873, 835 N.Y.S.2d 311 ). Contrary to the appellant's contention, the showup was not unduly suggestive (see Matter of Madeline D., 125 A.D.3d 965, 5 N.Y.S.3d 169 ; People v. Crumble, 43 A.D.3d 953, 842 N.Y.S.2d 35 ; People v. Gil, 21 A.D.3d 1120, 803 N.Y.S.2d 634 ).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621 ; Matter of Ashley P., 74 A.D.3d 1075, 1075–1076, 903 N.Y.S.2d 146 ; Matter of Eddie J., 68 A.D.3d 870, 889 N.Y.S.2d 485 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant, in concert with another, forcibly stole property from the victim (see Penal Law § 160.10[1] ; see also Matter of Corey S., 139 A.D.3d 533, 30 N.Y.S.3d 551 ; Matter of Virginia B., 21 A.D.3d 1029, 1030, 801 N.Y.S.2d 409 ; People v. Thomas, 273 A.D.2d 161, 710 N.Y.S.2d 246 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Stanley F., 76 A.D.3d 1067, 907 N.Y.S.2d 882 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Danielle B., 94 A.D.3d 757, 758, 941 N.Y.S.2d 685 ). Upon reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination was not against the weight of the evidence (see Family Ct. Act § 342.2[2] ; Matter of Starsha R., 96 A.D.3d 952, 946 N.Y.S.2d 492 ; cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).