Opinion
2013-05-29
In the Matter of TYRIWALI B. (Anonymous), appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Marcia Egger of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo, Elizabeth I. Freedman, and Moon Choi of counsel), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Marcia Egger of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo, Elizabeth I. Freedman, and Moon Choi of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, THOMAS A. DICKERSON, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Tyriwali B. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (McElrath, J.), dated September 21, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated July 12, 2012, made upon his admission, finding that he had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of assault in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and, inter alia, placed him on probation for a period of 12 months. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the proper disposition in a juvenile delinquency proceeding ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 141; Matter of Jesus S., 104 A.D.3d 694, 961 N.Y.S.2d 231;Matter of Tafari M., 90 A.D.3d 1052, 1053, 934 N.Y.S.2d 852;Matter of Cooper C., 81 A.D.3d 643, 644, 915 N.Y.S.2d 863;Matter of Gustav D., 79 A.D.3d 868, 869, 912 N.Y.S.2d 424), and its determination is accorded great deference ( see Matter of Donovan E., 92 A.D.3d 881, 882, 939 N.Y.S.2d 515). Here, contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent and, inter alia, placing him on probation for a period of 12 months instead of directing an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 315.3; Matter of Jesus S., 104 A.D.3d 694, 961 N.Y.S.2d 231;Matter of Natasha G., 91 A.D.3d 948, 949, 937 N.Y.S.2d 616). The appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplationof dismissal merely because this was his first encounter with the law, or in light of the other mitigating circumstances that he cites ( see Matter of Ashanti D., 100 A.D.3d 886, 887, 955 N.Y.S.2d 118;Matter of Natasha G., 91 A.D.3d at 949, 937 N.Y.S.2d 616). The disposition was appropriate in light of, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense and the recommendation made in the probation report ( see Matter of Jesus S., 104 A.D.3d 694, 961 N.Y.S.2d 231;Matter of Gustav D., 79 A.D.3d at 869, 912 N.Y.S.2d 424).