Opinion
2013-03-6
In the Matter of JESUS S. (Anonymous), appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Elana Roffman of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Elizabeth I. Freedman of counsel; Daniel H. Fishman on the brief), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Elana Roffman of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Elizabeth I. Freedman of counsel; Daniel H. Fishman on the brief), for respondent.
, P.J., REINALDO E. RIVERA, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Jesus S. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Olshansky, J.), dated April 30, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated March 22, 2012, made upon his admission, finding that he had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of assault in the third degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation under the supervision of the Probation Department of the County of Kings for a period of 12 months.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the proper disposition in a juvenile delinquency proceeding ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 141; Matter of Tafari M., 90 A.D.3d 1052, 1053, 934 N.Y.S.2d 852;Matter of Cooper C., 81 A.D.3d 643, 644, 915 N.Y.S.2d 863;Matter of Gustav D., 79 A.D.3d 868, 869, 912 N.Y.S.2d 424), and its determination is accorded great deference ( see Matter of Donovan E., 92 A.D.3d 881, 882, 939 N.Y.S.2d 515). Here, contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in adjudicating him a juvenile delinquent and placing him on probation for a period of 12 months instead of directing an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 315.3; Matter of Natasha G., 91 A.D.3d 948, 949, 937 N.Y.S.2d 616). The appellant was not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his first encounter with the law, or in light of the other mitigating circumstances that he cites ( see Matter of Ashanti D., 100 A.D.3d 886, 955 N.Y.S.2d 118;Matter of Natasha G., 91 A.D.3d at 949, 937 N.Y.S.2d 616;Matter of Tafari M., 90 A.D.3d at 1053, 934 N.Y.S.2d 852). The record establishes that the imposition of probation was the least restrictive alternative consistent with the appellant's best interests and the need for protection of the community ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 352.2[2][a] ), particularly in light of, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense and the recommendation made in the probation report ( see Matter of Cooper C., 81 A.D.3d at 644, 915 N.Y.S.2d 863;Matter of Gustav D., 79 A.D.3d at 869, 912 N.Y.S.2d 424).