Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J37418
Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Tyree H. (appellant) appeals from an order finding he committed second degree robbery and resisted arrest. He contends: (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in requiring him to take psychotropic medication as a condition of his probation; and (2) there was insufficient evidence supporting a finding that he committed robbery. We reject the contentions and affirm the juvenile court’s order.
Factual and Procedural Background
On March 26, 2007, a wardship petition was filed alleging that appellant, then age 17, committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) (count one), resisted arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) (count two), and committed trespass (Pen. Code, § 602, subd. (m)) (count three).
At a contested jurisdictional hearing, the victim testified he was riding his bicycle when four youths approached him. One of the youths knocked the victim off his bike, and as the victim ran away, three others chased him, caught up with him, took his cell phone, necklace, and approximately $500. The three youths beat the victim for about four minutes as they robbed him, causing injury to the victim’s head, leg and back. When a truck drove by, the youths stopped beating the victim and fled toward a school. Someone in the truck called the police, and the police arrived shortly thereafter. The victim said he could not see the youths’ faces because they were wearing hooded sweatshirts and “because everything was just so fast.” He testified that the youths were black, 16 to 20 years old, and were wearing baggie pants and sweatshirts with “diamonds on them.”
The victim made an in-field identification of appellant when a police officer brought appellant to him in handcuffs and asked him whether he recognized appellant. He testified that he identified appellant based on appellant’s clothing and the fact “that he had dirt on him just like me,” “from tumbling around in the dirt . . . fighting around . . . .” In court, the victim said he could not identify anyone in the courtroom as one of the robbers. When asked whether he was scared to testify against appellant, the victim stated: “No, I’m not scared; but yes, that maybe later he might take the initiative to do something, if not him, send somebody else to do something to me.”
Police officer Mark Thompson testified that he responded to a broadcast concerning a robbery and located appellant and another youth hiding behind trash cans and some cardboard boxes a few blocks from the scene of the robbery. The youths saw Thompson and ran away, and did not stop when Thompson told them to stop. Thompson eventually caught up to appellant, and when appellant fell, Thompson detained him. Thompson searched appellant and found 16 dollars and a cell phone. Appellant said the cell phone was his. Police officer Javier Munoz testified that he spoke to the victim in Spanish and obtained a statement from him. He testified that he warned the victim regarding identification by reading to him verbatim from an admonition card. The victim told Munoz that he understood what was read to him. The victim identified appellant as one of the youths involved in the robbery, and said twice that he was certain appellant was one of the robbers.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense moved to dismiss the petition and strike the identification of appellant. The court denied the motions. Appellant testified he was on his way to a hospital to see a friend who had been shot, when he saw five males running in his direction, saying, “The boys is coming.” Appellant understood the statement to mean that a crime was occurring or the police were coming, and he was scared. Appellant testified that he had previously been detained by police who drew their guns and told him to get on the ground because they suspected him of a crime with which he was ultimately not charged. He did not want to take the “risk of waiting,” so he and a friend he was with ran. They “waited until the coast was clear,” and appellant was on a dirt trail when he fell and was detained by Thompson. Appellant testified he did not rob anyone and that he had 16 dollars because his friend had given him money to get his hair done.
On cross-examination, appellant testified he was not running from the police, did not hear an officer tell him to stop, and never crouched down or hid behind a garbage can. He testified that “a girl at my school” named Dena, whose last name he did not know, gave him 16 dollars to get his hair done. When the prosecutor asked, “And this friend Dena just happened to give you money?” appellant explained that he and Dena were “close friends.” When asked where he was planning to get his hair done, he said he was going to a friend’s apartment. He had known the friend, Marlisa, since elementary school but did not know her last name. He did not know Marlisa’s address because she moved while appellant was in custody.
Psychologist Mitchell Eisen testified on behalf of the defense as an expert on the subject of eyewitness identification. He described studies that show that a stressful event may cause a witness to be unable to observe another person’s facial features. He testified that a cross-racial identification is less reliable than an identification between people of the same race. He further testified that when there are multiple subjects involved in a crime, the divided attention of the witness may affect the reliability of the identification. He stated that in-field single person show-up identification procedures are subject to suggestibility, and that the failure to provide a cautionary admonition to a witness before an in-field identification would impact the reliability of any resulting identification.
According to a probation officer’s dispositional report, appellant’s discipline records from school showed that in the years 2005 and 2006, he had received detentions for excessive tardies, three truancy letters and three referrals for defiant or disrespectful behavior. Appellant reported that he “gets down” because he has no job or money, and appellant’s mother reported that she took appellant to a hospital approximately three years ago after appellant told her he wanted to kill himself. Appellant was not diagnosed with any mental health illness but met with a counselor on an as needed basis for several months. The mother said she has many verbal altercations with appellant, whose “moods go from one extreme to the next, with no in between.” She reported that appellant “gets in her face” but “leaves her home before he gets physical,” and sometimes stays out overnight. She reported that appellant used to get into physical altercations with his stepfather when the stepfather lived with them.
The probation officer was concerned about appellant’s history of family conflict and limited supervision. The officer was also concerned that appellant had told an intake officer that he drank alcohol for the first time when he was 15 years old and smoked marijuana on a monthly basis, but changed his story to say that he had smoked marijuana only twice in his life. The report recommended, among other things, that appellant undergo drug testing and individual counseling as part of his probation plan. The report indicated that a counselor could evaluate appellant and determine whether he needs psychotropic medication.
On July 3, 2007, the juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, sustained the petition as to the first two counts and dismissed the third count. The court placed appellant on probation, and as one of the conditions of probation, ordered appellant to take all medications prescribed by his treating physicians. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Discussion
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in requiring him to take prescribed medications as a condition of his probation because the “condition infringes upon appellant’s liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs . . . .” Assuming, without deciding, that appellant has not waived his right to present this argument on appeal, we conclude there was no error.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b) provides that a juvenile court “may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (Italics added.) The statute grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. (In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692, citing In re Ronny P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1207.) “[T]he power of the juvenile court is even broader than that of a criminal court.” (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 678.) “ ‘A condition of probation which is impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.’ [Citation.]” (In re Frankie J. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1153.) Thus, the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases “will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse.” (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in requiring appellant to take all medications prescribed by his treating physicians. Appellant’s mother had informed the probation officer that appellant had threatened to kill himself and had met with a counselor on an as-needed basis. Although this incident had occurred three years before the probation report was prepared, the juvenile court, “in planning the conditions of appellant’s supervision, . . . must consider not only the circumstances of the crime but also the minor’s entire social history.” (See In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20.) Appellant had difficulty controlling his emotions and his “moods [went] from one extreme to the next, with no in between.” He was involved in frequent verbal altercations with his mother in which he “g[ot] in her face,” and had physical altercations with his stepfather.
The crime appellant was found to have committed was a violent one. The youths, including appellant, attacked the victim for about four minutes and did not stop beating him until a truck drove by. Their attack left the victim with serious injuries, including approximately eight bumps on his head, injury to his back, and a fractured leg. As the probation officer noted, it was likely that individual counseling would allow appellant to be “evaluated for any psychotropic medication that may be needed.” The probation condition that appellant take mediations deemed necessary by a counselor or treating physician was reasonably related to the violent crime and to potential future criminality. (See In re Frankie J., supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 1153 [probation condition is invalid only if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality].)
Appellant’s reliance on Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 504 U.S. 127, is misplaced. There, the United Supreme Court described the forced administration of psychotropic medication as a “particularly severe” interference with a person’s liberty, but it did so in the context of a defendant who was forced to take medication to control his behavior during trial, despite requests that he be allowed to show the jury his true mental state in offering an insanity defense. (Id. at pp. 130, 134.) The court did not address whether it is appropriate to require a juvenile to take prescribed medication as a condition of his probation. Further, United States v. Cope (9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3d 908, (Cope), on which appellant relies, is inapposite. Cope held the district court erred in requiring the defendant to “take all prescribed medication” without explicitly stating why it was necessary to issue such an order. (Id. at pp. 917-918.) However, Cope’s holding was based on an interpretation of a federal statute requiring district courts to follow certain procedures in imposing the conditions of a supervised release after imprisonment. (Ibid.) As federal authority interpreting federal law, Cope is not binding on this court, and we decline to apply it to this case. (See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190.)
Moreover, In re Bushman (1970) 1 Cal.3d 767, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. 1, is distinguishable. There, a practicing attorney and licensed private pilot was placed on probation after he protested against the condition of airport runways and was convicted of disturbing the peace. (Id. at pp. 771-772.) The court held it was error to order psychological treatment because there was “no evidence” that the defendant needed psychiatric care, and “no showing” that mental instability contributed to the offense or was reasonably related to future criminality. (Id. at p. 777.) In contrast, here, as set forth above, there was evidence showing the probation condition placed on appellant was reasonably related to the crime and potential future criminality.
Substantial evidence supports the finding that appellant committed robbery.
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that he committed robbery. We disagree.
“ ‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) “The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor’s guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment.” (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that appellant committed robbery. The victim was unable to identify appellant in court and testified he had trouble seeing the youths’ faces when they robbed him, but he acknowledged he identified appellant at the scene of the incident. Police officer Munoz testified that he admonished the victim regarding identification and that the victim told him twice that he was certain appellant was one of the robbers. The victim initially said he was not afraid to testify against appellant but admitted, “yes, that maybe later he might take the initiative to do something, if not him, send somebody else to do something to me.” From these facts, the juvenile court could infer that the victim correctly identified appellant at the scene of the robbery, but did not identify appellant in court due to fear of retribution.
Although a defense expert’s testimony suggested that the identification made in this case may not have been reliable, the juvenile court “is not bound to accept the opinion of any expert as conclusive, but should give to it the weight to which [it] shall find it to be entitled.” (Pen. Code, § 1127b; see also People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1142-1143.) It is well established that “the opinion of an expert witness is neither conclusive nor controlling beyond its weight, which must be ascertained by the same rules ordinarily applied to the reception and consideration of all other evidence . . . .” (People v. Hales (1914) 23 Cal.App. 731, 735-736.) Thus, where, as here, the juvenile court was presented with other evidence, including an in-field identification made after an admonition and appellant’s flight, it was free to weigh the expert’s testimony against all other evidence in determining that appellant had committed the robbery.
We note that the expert testified that the failure to provide a cautionary admonition to a witness before an in-field identification impacts the reliability of any resulting identification. Here, Officer Munoz testified that he read to the victim from an admonition card before presenting appellant to him for identification.
Further, there was evidence that appellant ran from the scene of the robbery and hid and ran from the police, refusing to stop when instructed to do so. “The flight by the appellant is one of the factors which is relevant in concluding that he was conscious of his guilt. This consideration ‘. . . affords a basis for an inference of consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission.’” (People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532, 543, quoting People v. Brunk (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 453, 455.) Appellant testified that he ran because he was scared, and that he did not hide from police or hear the police tell him to stop. However, Officer Thompson’s testimony directly conflicted with that of appellant. He testified that he saw appellant and his friend hiding behind garbage cans and cardboard boxes just a few blocks away from the scene of the robbery. He testified that the youths looked up and ran away and did not stop when he told them to stop. Officer Thompson chased after appellant and kept him in sight, before ultimately catching up with appellant and detaining him. Questions of credibility are for the juvenile court and are entitled to great weight. (People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 248.) The juvenile court could find, based on Officer Thompson’s testimony, that appellant fled the scene of the robbery and from police because he was “conscious of his guilt.”
Moreover, the juvenile court could infer from appellant’s testimony that he was not telling the truth. After Thompson testified regarding his observations, appellant denied he was crouching or hiding behind anything, denied running from the police, and denied hearing an officer tell him to stop. His testimony regarding borrowing money from a friend to get his hair done also contained some inconsistencies. The juvenile court could reasonably discredit appellant’s testimony and infer from it a consciousness of guilt. (See People v. Showers (1968) 68 Cal.2d 639, 643 [false statements by a defendant support an inference of consciousness of guilt].)
Disposition
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, Acting P. J., Siggins, J.