Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD16468
McAdams, J.
In this juvenile dependency proceeding, the father of a dependent child appeals the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights. He challenges the court’s finding that the benefits of adoption outweigh the detriment from severing the biological parent-child relationship. We find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This appeal involves Tyler O., who was born in January 1999. Tyler’s birth parents are Kimberly C. (the mother) and appellant Craig O. (the father).
2005 Petition
This dependency proceeding began in September 2005, when Tyler was placed in protective custody by Sunnyvale police officers on a report of physical abuse. Two days later, a petition was filed on Tyler’s behalf by the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (the Department). The petition sought dependency jurisdiction over the child pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
According to the petition, the mother’s whereabouts were unknown. The father had “full physical and legal custody of the child, awarded by Family Court, due to the mother’s alcoholism and her subsequent inability to appropriately care for the child.” The petition asserted that the father physically abused Tyler by excessive discipline, including spanking and pinching him. It further alleged that the father has a history of domestic violence against the mother. A first amended petition was filed in October 2005, which contained essentially identical allegations.
Tyler was detained and placed with his paternal grandmother, Alice O.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
The Department prepared a jurisdiction/disposition report, dated October 14, 2005. It recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction over the child and provide family reunification services. The report described a number of family strengths, including the father’s love for his child, the father’s history of “appropriately providing and caring for Tyler,” and “an extended family support system, in the form of the paternal grandmother and paternal aunt, who [have] helped the father raise the child.”
At the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing in October 2005, the father submitted on the amended petition, which the juvenile court found true. The court continued Tyler’s placement with the paternal grandmother, and the father was given family reunification services.
Review Hearings
Review hearings were held in November 2005, April 2006, and September 2006. During the review period, the mother was located, but she indicated that she was not in a position to care for Tyler and she expressed that she “did not want to take the child away from his paternal grandmother, paternal aunt, or his father.” At the 12-month review hearing in October 2006, Tyler was returned to the father’s custody with family maintenance services.
2007 Supplemental Petition
In February 2007, the Department filed a supplemental petition under section 387, following an incident in which Tyler was placed in protective custody by Sunnyvale authorities “due to verbal and emotional abuse and inappropriate discipline by his father.” The court placed Tyler with the Department, in the children’s shelter/emergency satellite home, but with authorization for “extended” visitation with the paternal grandmother.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
In April 2007, the Department filed a jurisdiction report, which recommended removal from the father’s custody, continued placement with the paternal grandmother, and the termination of services to the father. The report also requested that a permanency planning hearing be set.
At the April 2007 hearing, the father submitted on the supplemental petition, with “changes to the petition and recommendations as stated on the record.” The agreed changes included visitation for the father once a week for two hours, supervised; the social worker was given discretion to increase the frequency and duration of the visits, but not to permit unsupervised visitation. Reunification services were terminated, and the matter was set for a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26.
Further Proceedings
In a report dated August 21, 2007, which was prepared for the permanency planning hearing, the Department recommended guardianship with the paternal grandmother as the permanent plan.
A mediation concerning visitation was scheduled for September 2007. By then, the permanent plan recommendation had changed from guardianship to adoption.
Meanwhile, in October 2007, the paternal grandmother’s application for de facto parent status was granted.
Permanency Planning; Termination of Parental Rights
After several continuances, the contested permanency planning hearing was held on February 25, 2008.
The documentary evidence introduced at the hearing included two reports submitted by the Department: the August 2007 report, which had recommended guardianship as the permanent plan, and a January 2008 addendum, which changed the recommendation to adoption. Represented by the district attorney’s office, Tyler submitted a letter from district attorney social worker Michael Gammino, who likewise recommended adoption. Gammino also testified at the hearing, as did the Department’s social worker, Cyriac Parathara, and the father.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court first found that Tyler was likely to be adopted. The court also determined that the benefit of the parent-child relationship between Tyler and his father did not outweigh the benefit to Tyler from adoption, which the court described as “the most permanent placement.” The court therefore terminated the father’s parental rights and it freed Tyler for adoption.
The court also terminated the parental rights of the mother, who did not appear despite notice of the hearing.
Appeal
This appeal by the father ensued. He challenges the court’s decision not to apply the parental bond exception to adoption.
DISCUSSION
As a framework for our analysis, we begin with a brief overview of the principles of dependency law that inform our decision. Against that backdrop, we analyze the specific argument raised here by the father.
I. Overview of Dependency Law
The Legislature has provided for juvenile court jurisdiction over dependent children. (See § 300 et seq.) The primary goal of the dependency statutes is “to ensure the safety, protection, and well-being of children who are at risk of abuse, neglect, or exploitation, while preserving the family whenever possible.” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 824.)
In dependency proceedings involving the removal of children from their parents, there are generally four phases: jurisdiction, disposition, reunification (unless bypassed), and the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 391.) We are concerned with the fourth and final phase here.
A. Permanency Planning
At the appropriate juncture, the juvenile court is required to select and implement a permanent plan for a dependent child. (§ 366.26; In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164.) “The selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26 takes place after the juvenile court finds that the parents are unfit and the child cannot be returned to them.” (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.) “A juvenile court at a section 366.26 hearing must select one of three plans for the child: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care.” (In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792, 1797.)
“Where there is no probability of reunification with a parent, adoption is the preferred permanent plan.” (In re Tabatha G., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.) “Adoption is the preferred placement because it offers the prospect of a secure permanent home.” (In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 774.) “Where the trial court finds that the child is likely to be adopted, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental under one of [five] specified exceptions.” (Id. at p. 773.) As relevant here, the statute provides an exception to adoption in cases of a demonstrated parental bond resulting in a beneficial parent-child relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
B. Burden of Proof
Parents seeking to avoid the termination of their parental rights based on the parent-child relationship bear the burden of proving that the statutory exception for parental bond applies to them. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466; see also, e.g., In re Jamie R., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.)
C. Appellate Review
As California Supreme Court precedent teaches, the juvenile court’s placement determination for a dependent child typically is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re Stephanie M. (1994)7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) But many courts have employed the substantial evidence review standard when the issue on appeal is the termination of parental rights, since the requisite case-by-case assessment of relevant circumstances generally requires a fact-based analysis. (See, e.g., In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400; In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) As a practical matter, the differences between the two standards of review are not significant. “In its emphasis on deference, the abuse of discretion standard is similar to the substantial evidence rule.” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1065.) Furthermore, “evaluating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling.” (Id. at p. 1067.)
Applying that deferential review standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the order. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) We thus examine the record to decide whether “a reasonable trier of fact could find that termination of parental rights is appropriate based on clear and convincing evidence.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 423, internal quotation marks omitted; accord, In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 400.) The appellant has the burden of showing that the challenged order lacks evidentiary support. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
With that statutory overview in mind, we turn to the case at hand.
II. Analysis
The father asserts error in the juvenile court’s refusal to apply the parental bond exception to the termination of parental rights. As we explain, given the deferential standard that governs our review, we find no basis for reversal here.
A. Considerations
The “parental bond” or “beneficial relationship” exception to adoption is contained in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). As developed in the case law, the exception comprises three essential elements: regular visitation and contact; a parental role; and a relationship that “promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
That provision reads in pertinent part as follows: “(c)(1) If the court determines … that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. … Under these circumstances, the court shall terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
1. Visitation and Contact
The first requirement for the parental bond exception, “regular visitation and contact with the child,” is explicit in the statute. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); see, e.g., In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 689 [mother had maintained “regular visitation and contact”]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1343 [mother had been consistent in her visitation, although the visits did not progress to unsupervised contact].)
In this case, evidence concerning the frequency of visitation was contained in both of the reports submitted by the Department. In its August 2007 report, the Department stated: “Since the beginning of May of this year, very few visits took place between Tyler and his father and most of the time, [the father] cancelled the visits.” Clover House had been had been supervising the visits, but because of the father’s no-shows, it “terminated future visitation.” Thereafter, on “the initiative of the paternal aunt, [the social] worker offered to resume visitation at the [Department’s] office and the father visited Tyler on 7/25/07.” The January 2008 addendum report likewise confirmed: “The Department has provided supervised visits for the father with Tyler since August, 2007 after the Clover House terminated visitation due to consecutive cancellations by the father.” That report also advised that the father’s visits were “more regular since the middle of September, 2007.” The father had “asked for longer visits later and since December 2007, he was given one and a half hour visits, on a weekly basis.” In addition, the social worker “approved some family visits for Tyler with his father under the supervision of the paternal aunt….” At the hearing, the father testified that supervised weekly visits had been taking place at his house for the past month.
As for the nature of the visits, the Department’s January 2008 addendum report advised that the father brought “food to the visits and Tyler enjoyed the food and engaged in different activities with his father. Most of the time, they were engaged in playing football in the front yard and some times playing indoor games. Their main focus and discussion was centered around the games and Tyler got excited whenever he won the game.” The father testified: “We play games. We interact. But while we’re playing the game we talk. It’s not just about playing the game, it’s about talking and interacting, seeing how he’s doing in school.”
In rendering its ruling, the court observed that visitation “happens on a weekly basis for one and half hours in a supervised setting….” But the court also commented on the “reasonably short duration that the relationship has been positive and that visitation has occurred on a regular basis.”
In our view, neither the frequency nor the quality of the father’s recent visitation offers a “compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” as required by the statute. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); see, e.g., In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 468 [termination of parental rights affirmed despite mother’s appropriate and loving conduct during visits].)
2. Parental Relationship
The second requirement is implicit in the statute. As this court explained more than a decade ago, frequent, loving contact alone is not sufficient to establish the requisite parent-child relationship. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.) The statute contemplates a relationship that is parental in nature. (Id. at p. 1418.) Thus, in order to trigger the statutory exception, the parent must occupy a role that goes beyond that of friendly visitor, extended family member, or day care provider. (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 468; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52; In re Beatrice M., at pp. 1419-1420.) As we have previously observed: “While friendships are important, a child needs at least one parent.” (In re Brittany C., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 854.)
The parental relationship is demonstrated by “the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Such “daily nurturing” is the hallmark of a parental relationship. (In re Brittany C., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 854; see also, e.g., In re Jamie R., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) By the same token, however, everyday “contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child relationship. A strong and beneficial parent-child relationship might exist such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, particularly in the case of an older child, despite a lack of day-to-day contact and interaction.” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.)
Many different variables shape the parent-child relationship. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576.) “Parent-child relationships do not necessarily conform to a particular pattern.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Four factors are commonly cited: “The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.” (In re Autumn H. at p. 576; see also, e.g., In re Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 689; In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 467-468; In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206.) Given the many different forms that parent-child relationships may take, application of the “exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond.” (In re Autumn H., at p. 576.)
Examining the particular relationship at issue here in light of the foregoing factors, we find support in the record for the juvenile court’s determination that the father does not occupy a parental role in relation to Tyler.
We start with the first two factors, age and time in parental custody. Tyler turned nine in January 2008, the month before the challenged decision. The father won legal custody of Tyler six years before, in January 2002. But as the father acknowledged in testimony, he always had substantial family support in caring for Tyler. Tyler’s time thus had been divided “all his life” between his father, his paternal grandmother, and his paternal aunt. As the father testified, “he’s always had three rooms, one at my sister’s, one at my mother’s, one at my house. It’s just the way he was raised. He was raised with the fact that my mother and my sister and I all love him very, very much. [¶] When I was working my mother or sister would watch Tyler. And that was on a consistent basis. For seven years everything was very consistent.” As the father described it, the “routine” was for Tyler to stay at his home from Sunday to Wednesday, then with the other relatives for most of the rest of the week. As described in the Department’s January 2008 report, “Tyler has a bond with his grandmother and she was fully involved in his life ever since his birth. She also co-parented Tyler even before he came into the Dependency system.” Under these circumstances, neither the child’s age nor his time in his father’s care compels a finding that the father occupies a parental role in Tyler’s life. (Cf. In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 467-468.)
Addressing the next factor, we consider whether the parent-child interaction has been beneficial to Tyler. Social worker Gammino testified to his expert opinion that “a parental relationship does not really exist between the father and Tyler primarily because of Tyler’s responses to the father. [¶] He tends to be fearful of the father. He tends to have a lot of ambivalence towards the father based on the history of this case and the father’s behavior and the numerous placements that have been – occurred with the father and Tyler being removed.” On cross-examination, the father acknowledged that Tyler had “been scared of being with” him. Tyler’s fear of his father and his ambivalence toward him support a finding that their interaction is not entirely positive or beneficial. (See In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 467, fn. 4.)
Furthermore, in Gammino’s stated opinion, even the more recent positive visits were not indicative “that there’s a parental relationship; it’s more again of a pseudoparent or a peer, that sort of thing.” Social worker Parathara agreed, saying: “The relationship with the dad is more like a friendly playful entertainment-oriented and fun-oriented pleasant relationship.” Even the father acknowledged that quality. In describing his relationship with Tyler, the father testified: “We have a good relationship. It’s a relationship at first – at first it was – we were always best friends. We always did everything together. [¶] I was told that that’s not the best thing to be his best friend so I tried to be more of a father figure and be his parent.” As explained above, frequent, loving contact alone is not sufficient to establish the requisite parent-child relationship. (In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1418-1419.) The statute contemplates a relationship that is parental in nature. (Id. at p. 1418; In re Brittany C., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 854.) Here, as the court found on substantial evidence, Tyler’s “relationship with father is a friendly one.” But it is not parental.
That brings us to the last factor – ability to meet the child’s needs. In this case, the evidence demonstrates that it is the paternal grandmother who has primarily acted as a parent to Tyler. In addition to her “co-parenting” role throughout most of Tyler’s life, the paternal grandmother had had primary responsibility for the child’s day-to-day care for some two years – the entire duration of the dependency proceeding up to the February 2008 hearing, except for one four-month period starting in early October 2006 (when the child was returned to the father’s custody with family maintenance services) and ending in early February 2007 (when the child was again removed). As social worker Gammino observed, as compared to the father, the grandmother “tends to be more of the parent, … the one who provides the day-to-day structure of Tyler.” Social worker Parathara agreed, offering his expert opinion that “the grandmother is more of a psychological parent to Tyler.” As Parathara explained, “When it comes to parenting things, he’s looking at the grandmother. And she’s the one who’s taking care of any of his school things, in his medical aspects, in his daily routines and all that.”
Without disputing this factual assessment, the father argues: “It is not necessary for the parent to establish that he has the ‘primary’ parental relationship with the child. A child may have numerous primary attachments, and to terminate parental rights based on the child’s ‘primary’ attachment to the child’s long-term care giver is to allow the rule to swallow the exception.” The father offers no dependency law supporting this proposition, which we reject in any event. The statute provides the general rule: Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), upon finding “that the child is likely to be adopted,” the court “must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental” under a specific statutory exception. (In re Jamie R., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 773, italics added.) The statute also provides the exception that is relevant to this case, which applies to a beneficial parental relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Here, the court found that “the parent/child relationship for this child rests with the paternal grandmother at this time.” The court thus did not find that the paternal grandmother was the primary parental figure; it found that she was the parent in Tyler’s life.
The father also asserts that the change in recommendation from guardianship to adoption was largely based on “the friction between [the father] and his mother, a reason irrelevant to the decision whether parental rights should be terminated.” The juvenile court effectively rejected that assertion on relevance grounds. It interrupted questions about the change in recommendation, saying: “It is not a question of whether guardianship is detrimental to the child, it’s not a question of whether there is conflict between the father and the grandmother. [¶] . . . [¶] The question is whether the child is adoptable and likely to be adopted. [¶] And the only exception would be – that I can think of that would be applicable here – is that the father has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing that relationship.” As the juvenile court recognized, the reasons for the change in recommendation are irrelevant. Furthermore, the governing review standard requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the order. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) For that reason, like the juvenile court, we reject the father’s assertion that improper motives motivated the change in recommendation.
In short, the evidentiary record in this case provides no basis for reversing the juvenile court’s determination that the father’s relationship with Tyler was not sufficiently parental to warrant application of the statutory exception.
3. Balancing Test
In determining applicability of the parental bond exception, the juvenile court weighs the benefit to the child of continuing the parent-child relationship against the advantages of permanency through adoption. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424-425.) On one side of the equation is the relationship with the biological parent, which “must be sufficiently strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination.” (In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) On the other side of the equation is permanence for the child through adoption. The “juvenile court must engage in a balancing test, juxtaposing the quality of the relationship and the detriment involved in terminating it against the potential benefit of an adoptive family.” (In re Cliffton B., at pp. 424-425.)
In assessing the benefit to the child of continuing the natural parental bond, the court looks for substantial benefit from the relationship and great harm from its termination. (See, e.g., In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349; In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 466; In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) As to the first element, “the parent must show more than that the relationship is ‘beneficial.’ ” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 52, fn. 4.) Concerning the second element, this court has previously rejected the notion “that the parent need only show some, rather than great, harm at this stage of the proceedings,” reasoning that a contrary rule “would defeat the purpose of dependency law….” (In re Brittany C., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 853.)
On the question of harm from the loss of the father-son relationship, the father points to testimony by social worker Gammino that “clearly Tyler loves his father. And I think that even though I’m recommending adoption I think that it would be a significant loss on Tyler’s part if he was not able to have contact with his father.”
Notwithstanding that testimony, the juvenile court did not find the “great harm” needed to invoke the exception. (In re Brittany C., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 853.) The court explicitly acknowledged the father-son bond, saying Tyler “loves his father. It is something that he does not want to give up.” But the court nevertheless concluded that the relationship did not outweigh the benefit that Tyler would derive from adoption. As the court put it, “the evidence is not there that his relationship with his father outweighs the benefit to him that would occur for him to have the most permanent placement.” Furthermore, there is evidence here that suggests that the benefit to Tyler of continued contact with his father may not be irrevocably lost. Despite a sometimes-rancorous relationship with the father, the paternal grandmother had indicated her willingness to allow visits between Tyler and the father. In any event, the evidence presented to the juvenile court supports its implicit determination that the parent-child relationship was not so vital to Tyler’s long-term well-being or of such substantial benefit that great harm would result from its termination. (See In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.)
In this case, the juvenile court explicitly balanced the benefits of maintaining the parent-child relationship against the benefits of security, stability, and permanence that an adoptive home with his grandmother would provide for Tyler. In reaching that conclusion, the court honored the well-established legislative preference for an adoptive placement over the less permanent alternatives of guardianship or foster care. (See, e.g., In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1344-1345.) As this court observed more than a decade ago: “The Legislature has decreed … that guardianship is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents.” (In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.) “In decreeing adoption to be the preferred permanent plan, the Legislature recognized that, ‘Although guardianship may be a more stable solution than foster care, it is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature.’ ” (Ibid.) “Adoption is the preferred placement because it offers the prospect of a secure permanent home.” (In re Jamie R., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.) In other words, “guardianship is only the best possible permanent plan for children in circumstances where the exceptions to terminating parental rights in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) apply.” (In re Beatrice M. at p. 1420.) Where, as here, the parent fails to carry the burden of establishing the applicability of the parental bond exception, adoption is the appropriate permanent plan. (Ibid.)
B. Conclusion
Viewed in the light most favorable to the order, the record supports the juvenile court’s decision. Having weighed the parent-child relationship against Tyler’s need for permanence and stability, the juvenile court properly afforded him the most permanent and secure placement that it could – adoption. That determination is amply supported in fact and law.
Disposition
We affirm the order of February 25, 2008, terminating appellant’s parental rights and freeing Tyler for adoption.
WE CONCUR: Mihara, Acting P.J., Duffy, J.