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In re T.X.

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Sep 10, 2008
No. F054317 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 10, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County No. 06CEJ601641-2, Timothy A. Kams, Judge.

Cathy Rene Reading, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lloyd G. Carter and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

THE COURT

Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Wiseman, J., and Cornell, J.

The court found appellant, T.X., was a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after it sustained allegations charging him with battery on a school employee (Pen. Code, § 243.6), battery on school property (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. (a)(1)), and disturbing the peace of a school campus (Pen. Code, § 415.5, subd. (a)). On November 20, 2007, the court committed T.X. to the Elkhorn Correctional Facility boot camp for a period not to exceed 365 days after which he would be released on probation to the custody of his parents.

On appeal, T.X. contends that one of his conditions of probation is ambiguous and overbroad. We agree with T.X. and will modify the probation condition at issue. In all other respects we will affirm.

FACTS

On October 9, 2007, T.X. and several other students disrupted a volleyball game by whistling loudly, causing the game to be stopped several times. The group was contacted by security officer James Mata and Vice-Principal Ovidio Martinez. Mata and Martinez asked to look inside T.X.’s backpack. As T.X. handed the backpack to them, C.V. hit Martinez on the arm. Mata and Martinez detained Chong. T.X. then attempted to take back his backpack, spilling its contents including a small razor and some cans of spray paint. T.X. fled from the area but returned a few minutes later and kicked Martinez in the back and struck him with his fist twice on the back of head. T.X. and C.V. fled but were both arrested the following day. In a post-arrest statement, T.X. claimed he only threw a three-ring binder at Mata.

DISCUSSION

T.X. did not object to any of the terms and conditions of probation the court imposed. One condition required T.X. “[n]ot to use or possess narcotics, other controlled substances or related paraphernalia[.]” T.X. contends this condition violates his state and federal right to due process because it is constitutionally overbroad in that it limits “his right to obtain reasonable and necessary medical treatment.” We agree.

“A juvenile court is vested with broad discretion to select appropriate probation conditions. [Citation.] The court may impose any reasonable condition that is ‘fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ ([Welf. & Inst. Code] § 730, subd. (b).) A condition of probation that is impermissible for an adult probationer is not necessarily unreasonable for a minor. [Citation.] Juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and their constitutional rights are more circumscribed. [Citation.] Further, when the state asserts jurisdiction over a minor, it stands in the shoes of the parents. A parent may curtail a child’s exercise of constitutional rights because a parent’s own constitutionally protected ‘“‘liberty’”’ includes the right to ‘“‘bring up children’”’ and to ‘“‘direct the upbringing and education of children.’”’ [Citation.] Thus, the juvenile court may impose probation conditions that infringe on constitutional rights if the conditions are tailored to meet the needs of the minor. [Citation.]” (In re Antonio C. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1033.)

“The juvenile court’s exercise of discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases ‘will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse.’ [Citation.]” (In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692.)

“[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. [Citations.]” (People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72.)

“‘A probation condition is invalid if it: (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality….’ [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.) As a general rule, the failure to object at the time that probationary conditions are imposed on Lent grounds waives a claim of error on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.) This rule, however, does not extend to a facial challenge to a probation condition on constitutional grounds of vagueness and overbreadth where the issue presents a pure question of law that can be corrected without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887 (Sheena K.).)

Preliminarily, we note that T.X. appears to argue that the drug condition is overbroad because it was not reasonably related to his offense and social history. This contention, in essence, attacks the reasonableness of imposing this condition and was forfeited by T.X.’s failure to object to imposition of this condition on these grounds. T.X., however, did not waive his contention that the condition at issue is overbroad because this contention presents a pure question of law. Further, we agree with T.X. that, as written, the contention limits his right to obtain medical care because it would prohibit him from possessing narcotics and controlled substances that are legally prescribed by a physician and the paraphernalia to administer them.

Respondent asserts that whether the drug condition is overbroad depends on whether the condition is closely tailored to the purpose of the condition. Respondent further contends that the juvenile court generally imposes probation conditions to achieve the ends of justice and to reform and rehabilitate the minor. Thus, according to Respondent, T.X.’s contention does not present a pure question of law and was thus forfeited, because determining whether the condition was overbroad requires this court to assess the degree of T.X.’s reform and rehabilitation, which in turn requires the court to examine information contained in the record. We disagree.

Determining whether the drug condition is constitutionally overbroad because it prohibits T.X. from using legally prescribed controlled substances and related paraphernalia does not require an assessment of how effective this condition is in rehabilitating T.X. Thus, we reject respondent’s assertion that T.X.’s contention does not present a pure question of law and was thus forfeited by his failure to object to it in the juvenile court.

Respondent also argues that T.X.’s contention does not present a pure question of law because his challenge to the reasonableness of the condition in relation to the facts of his case requires the court to review the record. Respondent is correct with respect to T.X.’s challenge to the drug condition on reasonableness grounds, which we have already concluded T.X. forfeited by his failure to object to the drug condition on these grounds in the juvenile court. However, determining whether the drug condition here is overbroad does not require an assessment of the reasonableness of the condition in light of the facts and circumstances of T.X.’s case.

Respondent further contends the drug condition is not overbroad because the terms “narcotic” and “controlled substance” are specifically defined in the Health and Safety Code and thus, not overbroad themselves. This contention is not persuasive because the crux of T.X.’s contention is not that these terms are overbroad, thus making the drug condition overbroad. Instead, he contends that the failure to limit the drug condition to drugs and paraphernalia he cannot legally possess makes this condition overbroad because it infringes on his right to receive medical treatment. Accordingly, we conclude that the drug condition at issue is overbroad and we will modify it.

DISPOSITION

The drug condition is modified to prohibit T.X. from using or possessing illegal narcotics, other illegal controlled substances or related paraphernalia. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

In re T.X.

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Sep 10, 2008
No. F054317 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 10, 2008)
Case details for

In re T.X.

Case Details

Full title:In re T.X., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Sep 10, 2008

Citations

No. F054317 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 10, 2008)