Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Super. Ct. No. JD108229, Robert Anspach, Judge.
Laura D. Pedicini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J., and Cornell, J.
Larry R. appeals from a November 2007 order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to his son Tristen. Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel submitted a letter dated March 19, 2008, advising that no brief would be forthcoming (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952). By order dated March 24, 2008, we extended time for appellant to personally file a letter brief.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Appellant has since filed such a letter brief with this court. In it, he complains the court arbitrarily stripped him of his right to be a parent because it previously prohibited visitation while appellant was incarcerated. Thus, in appellant’s estimation, the court prevented him from developing a bond with his son. Having reviewed the appellate record as summarized below, we conclude appellant’s remarks do not amount to claims that the juvenile court committed an error affecting the outcome of this case (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994) and will affirm.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Upon Tristen’s birth in September 2005, respondent Kern County Department of Human Services (department) detained him and initiated the first of two dependency proceedings. At the time of Tristen’s birth, both of his parents were incarcerated and unable to care for the newborn. In particular, appellant was awaiting trial on burglary and related charges. He was eventually convicted and sentenced to state prison where he remains today.
Meanwhile in November 2005, the court, having exercised its dependency jurisdiction over Tristen, adjudged the newborn a dependent, removed him from parental custody, and ordered reunification services for each parent. Among the court’s November 2005 findings and orders was a determination that visitation while either parent was incarcerated would be detrimental to Tristen given his very young age and lack of relationship with his parents. At the conclusion of the November 2005 hearing, the court gave appellant notice of his appellate rights. He did not appeal.
Six months later, the court terminated services for appellant. By that time, appellant was incarcerated in state prison at Norco and made no progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes for Tristen’s out-of-home placement. The mother, however, made some gains in dealing with her underlying methamphetamine addiction so that the court continued services for her. By the fall of 2006, she made such substantial progress that the court placed Tristen in her care subject to family maintenance services. In early April 2007, the court dismissed Tristen’s dependency.
As it turned out, the mother was still using methamphetamine while caring for Tristen. In turn, Tristen was once again detained and the department recommenced dependency proceedings. This time the court denied both parents reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for Tristen.
The court conducted its section 366.26 hearing for Tristen in November 2007. It was undisputed that the child was adoptable. The only contested issue was whether he had developed enough of a relationship with his mother that termination would be detrimental. The court rejected the mother’s claim and, having found Tristen adoptable, terminated parental rights. Notably, appellant waived his right to be transported for the court hearing.
DISCUSSION
For the first time, appellant complains about the court’s 2005 visitation restriction. The time to challenge that decision, however, has long since passed. Not only did appellant not challenge it in the trial court, he did not appeal when given the opportunity to do so from the court’s November 2005 decision.
Appellate jurisdiction to review an appeal able order depends upon a timely notice of appeal. (In re Elizabeth G. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1331.) The November 2005 dispositional order was an appeal able judgment. (In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 233; § 395.) His appeal now from the court’s most recent order entered in Tristen’s dependency may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed. (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563.) Thus, appellant has waived the opportunity to complain about the visitation restriction. (Steven J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811.)
Furthermore, there is no basis for appellant’s claim that the court’s decision to terminate his parental rights was arbitrary. Once reunification services have failed, the court must shift its focus from reunifying a family to advancing the child’s needs for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Visits alone are insufficient to establish detriment. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418 [even the loss of a child’s frequent and loving contact with a parent is insufficient to show detriment].)
Finally, we observe
“An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (E.g., Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 .…) Hence, the appellant must make a challenge. In so doing, he must raise claims of reversible error or other defect (see ibid.), and ... ‘present argument and authority on each point made’ (County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591 ...; accord, In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 272, 278 ...). If he does not, he may, in the court’s discretion, be deemed to have abandoned his appeal. (Berger v. Godden [(1985)] 163 Cal.App.3d [1113] at p. 1119.) In that event, it may order dismissal. (Ibid.) Such a result is appropriate here. With no error or other defect claimed against the orders appealed from, the Court of Appeal was presented with no reason to proceed to the merits of any unraised ‘points’—and, a fortiori, no reason to reverse or even modify the orders in question. (See People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 289 ....)” (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)
Having reviewed his letter brief and the record herein, we conclude appellant raises no arguable issue regarding the court’s decision to terminate parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.