Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SJ11750, William E. Lehnhardt, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego S.Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
Leah R. appeals orders declaring her daughter, Trinity R., a dependent child of the juvenile court and placing Trinity in her care. She contends the court erred in denying her petition to invalidate the judgment, in which she alleged the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not comply with requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). She asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the jurisdictional findings and the court erred in declaring Trinity a dependent child when she (Leah) was cooperative and immediately began services. She also contends she was denied due process.
We conclude the issues Leah raises concerning ICWA are moot, and we do not discuss these issues. As to the other matters Leah raises, we hold the court did not err in finding the allegations of the petition true or declaring her daughter a dependent child, and Leah has not shown a denial of due process. We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2007, the Agency petitioned on behalf of five-year-old Trinity under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging she had been exposed to domestic violence in the family home during an altercation between Leah and her boyfriend, J.S. The petition additionally alleged Leah had a history of domestic violence. The court found a prima facie showing had been made and ordered Trinity detained.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
The petition originally also alleged that Trinity had tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. But a confirmatory test was negative and that count was dismissed.
Leah indicated she could be a member of four tribes: Walipai, Yavapai, Apache and Mohave. Leah's counsel told the social worker of Trinity's possible affiliation with the Colorado River Indian Tribes (CRIT), and gave him contact information for the CRIT tribal representative. Trinity's maternal grandparents, who live in Arizona, said Trinity is one-half Hualapai, Yavapai-Apache and Mohave Indian. They requested their home be evaluated for placement. A letter from Wassaja Family Services in Fountain Hills, Arizona, said both grandparents had undergone background checks and recommended they be considered for Trinity's placement.
At a special hearing on January 31 the Agency's counsel stated CRIT indicated Leah is a member of CRIT and Trinity is eligible for membership. A CRIT tribal representative stated CRIT planned to intervene in the proceedings.
Trinity was detained in foster care, and there were problems and delays in scheduling visitation for her and Leah. Trinity started counseling because she was having temper tantrums in foster care. The court gave the social worker discretion to detain her with Leah with concurrence of Trinity's counsel. Leah's cousin, who lives in San Diego, had immediately come forward to request Trinity's placement with her. On February 7 the court gave the social worker further discretion to detain Trinity with the cousin upon approval of her home. On March 2 the court ordered Trinity detained with the cousin.
On February 26 Leah filed a JV-180 form, requesting the court detain Trinity with her. She stated she was engaged in services and she attached a declaration explaining her version of the incident with J.S. Trinity was detained with Leah on March 23, and Leah withdrew this petition.
On February 28 Leah petitioned to invalidate Trinity's removal from her custody, arguing the Agency violated notice provisions of ICWA and did not make active efforts to avoid the removal.
Subsequently, the Agency provided notice of the proceedings to CRIT, the Tonto, Yavapai and White Mountain Apache tribes, the Prescott and Fort McDowell Yavapai tribes, the Mojave Tribe, the Hualapai tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The court denied Leah's petition to invalidate the proceedings and dismiss the petition, finding there had been adequate ICWA notice.
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, which began on April 6, the former social worker testified Trinity spontaneously told her about the domestic violence incident with J.S. and that Leah also had had violent incidents with another man, T.M. When he was first questioned, Trinity's father, M.R., denied there had been any domestic violence during his relationship with Leah, but he then admitted he had been arrested after they had an argument. The current social worker testified Leah was cooperative and engaged in services, but recommended the court assume jurisdiction to ensure that she continue with services. He acknowledged there were initial problems in setting up visits and testified he began the process of evaluating Leah's cousin's home before he left for a three-week vacation, but did not detain Trinity there at the time because the home had not yet been evaluated.
At the conclusion of the social worker's testimony, the court denied Leah's motion to dismiss the section 300 petition.
Leah's therapist testified Leah was open and unguarded during sessions and was devastated that Trinity had witnessed the domestic violence incident. She said Leah does not fit the profile of a domestic violence victim. Her opinion was based on what Leah had told her.
Leah's roommate and Leah's cousin both testified they had never seen Leah engage in domestic violence. The cousin testified she immediately had tried to have Trinity detained in her care, but Trinity was instead detained in foster care, and the Agency delayed completion of her home evaluation for three weeks. T.M. denied ever hitting Leah and said there was no domestic violence during their relationship.
Leah testified J.S. was at her home on the night of the incident because he did not have a ride home; he was intoxicated and she tried to get him to leave. In a struggle over her car keys, he threw her to the floor, and she grabbed a knife and swung it at him after he pushed her head down. She said she told the first social worker about her Indian heritage during their first meeting.
The court found the allegations of the petition true, declared Trinity to be a dependent child of the court, placed her with Leah and ordered Leah to participate in services.
DISCUSSION
I
THE ISSUES LEAH RAISES CONCERNING ICWA ARE MOOT
Leah contends the court erred in denying her petition to invalidate the proceedings on the basis that there had not been compliance with ICWA requirements. The issues Leah raises concerning ICWA are moot.
An appellate court will not review questions which are moot and only of academic importance, nor will it determine abstract questions of law at the request of a party who shows no substantial rights can be affected by the decision. (Keefer v. Keefer (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 335, 337.) An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief. (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.) Here, this court can grant Leah no relief regarding ICWA matters.
On June 28, 2007, the court continued Trinity in Leah's care and terminated juvenile court jurisdiction. Leah has custody of Trinity, their Indian family is intact and the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction. Thus, there is no relief this court can provide concerning the ICWA issues, and analysis of these issues would serve no purpose. We reject Leah's argument that this court should consider the issues because they are of such magnitude that they will infect other juvenile dependency proceedings involving other Indian children, they are likely to reoccur and they are of continuing public interest. The circumstances of this case were not typical in that very early in the proceedings Leah let the court know of her Indian heritage and CRIT appeared and participated throughout the proceedings. Also, reversal on ICWA grounds would not affect a finding on whether substantial evidence supported the court's jurisdictional findings or dispositional order. The issues Leah raises concerning ICWA are separate from the general jurisdictional issues and are moot.
II
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITION TRUE OR IN DECLARING TRINITY A DEPENDENT CHILD OF THE COURT
A. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings.
Leah contends the court erred in finding the allegations of the petition to be true. She argues they were not supported by substantial evidence and Trinity was not at risk. She also maintains she was cooperative, demonstrated a commitment to change and engaged in services, therefore, the court erred in declaring Trinity a dependent child. Leah has not shown error.
A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) "[W]e must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also '. . . view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' " (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114, quoting In re Biggs (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 337, 340.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
A petition is brought on behalf of the child, not to punish the parents. (In re Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593, 599.) The focus of the statute is to avert harm to the child. (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536.)
Trinity was at substantial risk of serious harm because Leah and J.S. had a violent altercation in her presence during which Leah cut J.S. with a knife. Trinity told the social worker that Leah also had another boyfriend who "was just like this one, he hurt [Leah] a lot of the time, he choked her too." Trinity's father, M.R. admitted he had been arrested after an incident with Leah. Although Leah began participating in services, she denied and minimized her problems with domestic violence. She did not tell her therapist about past incidents of domestic violence with T.M. The incident with J.S. was serious and there was evidence that Leah had a past history of domestic violence with two other men, M.R. and T.M. The social worker opined if a person had a past relationship involving violence it was more likely that violence would continue in the future unless the person participated in services. The court was entitled to rely on the social worker's opinion. (See In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1420-1421.) Substantial evidence supported the court's assumption of jurisdiction. The court did not err in declaring Trinity a dependent child to ensure that Leah would participate in services so that Trinity would be protected from the risk of serious harm.
B. Leah has not Shown a Denial of Due Process.
Leah asserts the court violated her right to due process by not allowing testimony by a psychologist who would have testified as an expert about interviewing children in general and about related issues such as children's suggestibility and reliability. She stated she planned to call the psychologist because she had agreed not to have Trinity testify. He would not have commented specifically on what Trinity told the social workers. The court determined the expert's testimony would not be relevant to the case.
An appellate court reviews a trial court ruling as to the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201.) "The issue of the relevance of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse." (People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 32.) An appellate court will not reverse a juvenile court's decision on the admission of evidence unless the court has abused its discretion. (In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, 35.)
Leah has not shown the court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence. There was no evidence that Trinity had been subjected to formal interviews. The former social worker said Trinity spontaneously volunteered information about the domestic violence without being asked. Trinity told the current social worker that Leah was in trouble, then did not want to talk about this further. Later, when the social worker asked what she meant by her statement, she told him about the incident with J.S. Under these circumstances, Leah has not shown an abuse of the court's discretion in not permitting the expert to testify.
Leah also asserts the court and the Agency violated her right to due process by not complying with the law. "[D]ue process requires 'notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' " (In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1418, quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314.) "The essence of due process is fairness in the procedure employed . . . ." (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 757.) Leah was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. She was afforded the protections of the juvenile court law. We see no due process violation on these facts.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, J. IRION, J.