Opinion
23967.
Decided July 9, 2003.
Dawn C. Thomas, Esq., For Town of Riverhead, for Petitioners.
David J. Gilmartin, Jr., Esq., For Town of Southhampton Harold A. Steuerwald, Esq., For Town of Brookhaven Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York by Jeffrey P. Mans, Assistant Attorney General for The New York State Board of Real Property Services, for Respondents.
Petitioner seeks a judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR annulling Respondent's determination to establish a segment special equalization rate for that portion of the Town of Southampton located within the Riverhead Central District pursuant to RPTL § 1314. Respondent, New York State Board of Real Property Services (hereinafter "Real Property Services") moves to dismiss the instant proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner opposes Real Property Services' motion on the grounds that the establishment of "segment equalization rates" differ from state equalization rates and special equalization rates, and therefore, RPTL § 1218 does not apply. Respondent, Town of Southhampton (hereinafter "Southampton") does not oppose Real Property Services' motion. Respondent, the Town of Brookhaven (hereinafter "Brookhaven") failed to submit papers on the motion.
The issue before the Court is whether the establishment of segment equalization rates falls within the parameters of RPTL § 1218, or whether it is governed solely by RPTL § 1314. RPTL § 1218 provides in pertinent part:
A final determination of the state board relating to state equalization rates may be reviewed by the appellate division of the supreme court in the manner provided by article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules upon application of the county, city, town or village for which the rate or rates were established.
McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 49A, R.P.T.L. § 1218. Real Property Services may establish a segment equalization rate for a city or town, or the real property within a city or town, when it appears that the state equalization rate established for the city or town is inequitable as applied to real property within a school district located within more than one city or town. In other words, relief through a segment special equalization rate is only available where the overall equalization rate of a city or town is not reflective of the property values within a particular segment of the city or town. See, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 49A, R.P.T.L. § 1314(2); City of Oswego v. New York State Board of Real Property Services, 280 A.D.2d 99 (3rd Dept. 2001); Wisseman v. New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 212 A.D.2d 196 (3rd Dept. 1995), lv. to app. den., 87 N.Y.2d 804 (1995).
The challenged act is Real Property Services' establishment of a segment special equalization rate. The establishment of an equalization rate is a quasi-judicial determination which must be supported by substantial evidence. See, City of Syracuse v. State Board Of Equalization and Assessment, 101 A.D.2d 653, 654 (3rd Dept. 1984), aff. 64 N.Y.2d 894 (1985). Whether Real Property Services is establishing the state rate, a special rate or a segment special rate, the Court does not find a distinction as to the standard of review. See, Matter of City of Oswego v. New York State Board of Real Property Services, Index No. 6562-99, Sup. Ct., Albany Co., February 5, 2000 (Malone, Jr., J.); Matter of Town of Newburgh v. New York State Board of Real Property Services, Index No. 4889-99, Sup. Ct., Albany Co., December 30, 1999 (Cobb, J.); Matter of Town of New Berlin v. New York State Board of Real Property Services, Index No. 2749-00, Sup. Ct., Albany Co., October 25, 2000(Connor, J.). The Court finds that the establishment of a segment special equalization rate is "a final determination of the state board relating to state equalization rates" as contemplated by RPTL § 1218. Although the Court generally has the power to transfer matters that raise the question of whether a determination is supported by substantial evidence to the Appellate Division, the Court cannot transfer a matter over which it does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, C.P.L.R. §§ 7803(4), 7804(g); McKinney's Cons. Laws of New York, Book 49A, R.P.T.L. § 1218; see also, Town of Greenburgh v. New York State Bd. of Real Property Services, 2000 WL 1419646 (2nd Dept. 2000); Matter of City of Oswego v. New York State Board of Real Property Services, Index No. 6562-99, Sup. Ct., Albany Co., February 5, 2000 (Malone, Jr., J.); Matter of Town of Newburgh v. New York State Board of Real Property Services, Index No. 4889-99, Sup. Ct., Albany Co., December 30, 1999 (Cobb, J.).
Accordingly, since the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the instant proceeding the same must, therefore, be dismissed; Petitioner shall have leave to recommence the instant proceeding, in the Appellate Division, Third Department within thirty days of the date hereof. The foregoing shall constitute the decision and order of this Court. All papers shall be forwarded to the Office of the Attorney General for filing and service. The signing of this decision and order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of that section relative to filing, entry and notice of entry.
SO ORDERED.