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In re Toland

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two
Aug 21, 2007
140 Wn. App. 1015 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)

Opinion

No. 35070-0-II.

August 21, 2007.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 03-3-03026-0, Susan Serko, J., entered June 2, 2006.


Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Van Deren, A.C.J., concurred in by Bridgewater and Hunt, JJ.


Peter Paul Toland appeals the trial court's order staying his Pierce County Superior Court dissolution action pending a Japanese trial court's decision concerning whether it would accept jurisdiction over the parties' dissolution action filed in Tokyo by Peter's wife, Etsuko Futagi Toland. Holding that the Pierce County Superior Court stay expired by its own terms when the Japanese court accepted jurisdiction and rendered a final dissolution decree, we affirm. We also award attorney fees to Etsuko.

For clarity and to distinguish between the parties, we refer to them by their first names.

FACTS

Peter and Etsuko were married in Japan on March 22, 1995. Thereafter, the military transferred Peter to Washington, where he and Etsuko lived as husband and wife from July 1996 until July 1999. Another military assignment took them back to Japan in July 1999, where they remained until they separated in July 2003. Their daughter was born in Japan on October 17, 2002. Etsuko became a naturalized United States citizen in April 2003.

On September 29, 2003, Peter petitioned for dissolution of their marriage in Pierce County Superior Court, but he did not serve Etsuko. On November 6, 2003, Etsuko petitioned for mediation with a Tokyo family court in order to resolve their marriage disputes. Peter participated in the Tokyo family court mediation attempt to resolve the case.

In Japan, mediation ( chotei) is compulsory prior to litigation in most family disputes. An agreement between the parties arising from the mediation "is the equivalent of a court decree." CP at 279. "If the separating or divorcing parents fail to reach an agreement at [mediation], the case is then transferred to a family court determination procedure." CP at 279.

When the mediation failed, Etsuko filed her dissolution petition with the Tokyo family court on April 1, 2004. She served Peter with the petition on April 19, 2004, in Japan. On April 23, 2004, Peter retained attorneys in Japan and petitioned the Tokyo family court for child visitation. Peter then filed an amended petition in Pierce County Superior Court on May 10, 2004, and served Etsuko in Japan on June 7, 2004.

On July 12, 2004, Etsuko and Peter reached a mediation agreement in the Tokyo family court that stated: "Both the Petitioner [Etsuko] and the Respondent [Peter] acknowledge that the Japanese Court has the international jurisdiction over the settlement of the child custody (visitation negotiation). . . . This agreement has the same effectiveness as a settled adjudication according to the Domestic Affairs Trial Law — Article 21." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 115-16. The agreement set the terms and conditions of Peter's visitation rights and his obligation to pay monthly child support. It also provided that "these terms and conditions will expire at [the] time [the parties divorce]." CP at 116.

In Pierce County Superior Court, Etsuko filed a motion to dismiss Peter's Washington dissolution petition based on forum non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction over Etsuko and their child. On August 24, 2004, a Pierce County Superior Court commissioner entered an order dismissing Peter's Washington dissolution petition with prejudice because: (1) the parties had extensive contacts with Japan, (2) Japan had assumed jurisdiction over the matter, and (3) Washington had no jurisdiction over their child under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).

Chapter 26.27 RCW.

Peter moved to revise the commissioner's ruling. He asserted that Japan had not yet issued a jurisdictional decision in the matter and that the Pierce County Superior Court "should not dismiss the action in Washington until the outcome . . . is determined in Japan." CP at 138. The trial court vacated the commissioner's order and ordered:

4.3 If the Court in Japan rules it has jurisdiction . . . the action in Japan shall proceed and upon final decree in Japan this matter shall be dismissed;

4.4 Pending definitive rulings in Japan either accepting jurisdiction or rejecting jurisdiction, this matter shall be stayed and no hearings or other matters shall be scheduled or heard in this matter, including the issuance of a case schedule, subject to right of appeal;

4.5 If the Court in Japan rejects jurisdiction or dismisses the action, this matter may proceed;

4.6 The Court is making no ruling concerning jurisdiction over [Etsuko or the parties' child].

CP at 150.

On June 14, 2005, without dismissing his Washington action, Peter filed for divorce in Arlington, Virginia. On September 20, 2005, in Pierce County Superior Court, Peter filed a Civil Rule (CR) 41 motion to dismiss his Washington dissolution action. Peter argued that he was entitled to voluntarily dismiss his dissolution action under CR 41 because (1) Washington lacked substantive jurisdiction because he had been residing in Virginia for the past 15 months, (2) he was no longer requesting relief from the trial court in Washington, and (3) Etsuko had never answered his petition and was not seeking relief from the Washington court. In an attached declaration, his Virginia counsel stated:

CR 41 provides in part: "Subject to the provisions of rules 23(e) and 23.1, any action shall be dismissed by the court: . . .[upon] motion of the plaintiff at any time before plaintiff rests at the conclusion of his opening case."

[I]t is our position that if this Court of Washington State is not interested in proceeding on the divorce and related issues as the case is stayed in Washington State, the case in Washington State should be dismissed and that Virginia should now handle all related matters. Although [Peter] once had many contacts and connections with Washington State, most of these have now shifted to Virginia.

CP at 348.

At the Pierce County Superior Court hearing on Peter's motion to dismiss, Etsuko informed the court that the Tokyo family court had asserted jurisdiction over the parties, the marriage, and their child and had, in fact, issued a decree of dissolution on September 29, 2005. The Tokyo family court accepted jurisdiction because both Peter and Etsuko, who are United States citizens, sought redress in the Japanese courts. The Tokyo family court ruled that it had "trial jurisdiction in Japan for [Etsuko's] petition for divorce, designation of child custody and payment of child support . . . as well as petition for distribution of assets." CP at 226. It also found that Peter "appeared" when Etsuko petitioned the Tokyo family court for mediation; that he himself "petitioned for child visitation, on the assumption that trial jurisdiction is in Japan;" and that "an agreement was established on the basis of that assumption." CP at 227. The Tokyo family court also noted that the parties' child had lived her entire life in Japan. Stating that Etsuko was employed and economically independent, the Tokyo court awarded her full custody. The court also distributed their assets and ordered Peter to pay monthly child support; however, it did not specify a schedule of contacts between Peter and their daughter. Peter did not appeal the Tokyo family court's rulings.

Etsuko also informed the Pierce County Superior Court that the Tokyo family court dissolution decree would become final only after two weeks had passed following service of the final decree on Peter. She alleged that Peter had avoided the commencement of the appeal period by discharging his attorneys in Japan on September 29, 2005, (the same day as the entry of the decree of dissolution), thereby, removing their ability to officially accept the final decree on his behalf.

The Pierce County Superior Court denied Peter's motion to dismiss after it had conferred with the Virginia trial judge concerning which state was the proper forum under RCW 26.27.251 and their conclusion was that, if the matter were to proceed "in the United States, Washington is the appropriate" jurisdiction. Report of Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 21, 2005) at 10. The Pierce County Superior Court also stated,

RCW 26.27.251(2) states in relevant part: "If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state."

All right. I have a very definite feeling that Mr. Toland is doing some forum shopping. But here's my feeling about this case, and it's my feeling from the beginning: He started this divorce here in September of '03. She then started her divorce in Japan, and proceeded with that divorce ultimately to conclusion. He never served her . . . until . . . June of the following year. So that divorce sat here for a long time with not being perfected in any way. She, then, in the meantime, started her process, and it went ultimately to conclusion, and he engaged in that process.

. . . .

Now, if Japan had no jurisdiction [to enter a dissolution decree], and there are certainly arguments, I think that issue has got to be appealed in Japan. If it gets reversed, then fine, we proceed with this case. If it doesn't, then the Japanese case is the final word as far as I'm concerned. Now let me talk about [Peter's CR 41 voluntary motion to dismiss]. . . . [W]hat I'm going to do is this: I'm going to give [Etsuko] a week in which to file a counterclaim, or cross-claim for divorce because basically [she] was operating under the assumption that there's nothing more to be filed at that point. If she doesn't file a response — and she can file a response that says in the event that the Japanese decree is overturned [then] here's what I want in this proceeding . . . [—] I will then[,] following the mandates of CR 41, dismiss the action.

RP (Oct. 21, 2005) at 14-17. Etsuko filed a response to Peter's Washington petition.

On February 24, 2006, Peter filed a motion to lift the stay in Pierce County Superior Court, asserting that, contrary to his earlier claim of Virginia domicile, he was domiciled in Washington. He stated that he "has been on military assignment in Washington, DC," and that "he had Washington state domicile up to the year 1999, which he did not relinquish by reason of his military assignment in Japan." CP at 156. This statement contradicted his September 2005 statement that he was domiciled in Virginia for 15 months.

Peter, in his September 2005 motion to dismiss, represented to the Pierce County Superior Court that "it makes no economic sense for Washington to continue to resolve the case here. The dissolution was only pending in Washington because [Peter] was domiciled in Washington. His domicile has now switched to Virginia." CP at 382.

In Pierce County Superior Court, Etsuko moved for CR 11 sanctions against Peter asserting that he had not timely appealed the original stay and contingent dismissal order, because Peter filed his motion without a good faith argument and because he filed for the improper purpose of avoiding the effect of the dissolution granted in Japan. She told the court that the Japanese divorce became final on March 10, 2006, and, therefore, moved to dismiss the Washington action.

CR 11(a) provides in part:

The signature of a party or an attorney constitutes a certificate by the party or attorney that [he] has read the pleading, motion or legal memorandum, and that to the best of the party's or attorney's knowledge, information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is well grounded in fact; (2) it is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (3) it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

The Pierce County Superior Court filed a letter decision ruling that "[e]ntry of the Japanese decree triggers dismissal . . . per the September 15, 2004 Order." CP at 327. On June 2, 2006, the Pierce County Superior Court dismissed Peter's case with prejudice.

Peter appeals the September 15, 2004 order staying his Washington dissolution action.

ANALYSIS

I. September 2004 Stay Order — Mootness

Peter contends that the Washington trial court erred in staying his dissolution action in September 2004. We hold that this issue is moot because we are unable to provide effective relief on his claim.

At oral argument, Peter stated that "we're not challenging the [wait and see approach of the trial court]." Despite this apparent waiver of the issue raised in his appellate brief, we address it here.

Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 2.3(a) allows for discretionary review of "any act of the superior court. . . ." Here, the trial court specifically indicated that Peter could immediately appeal the stay order as it was "subject to the right of appeal[.]" CP at 150. It is undisputed that Peter did not immediately request that we stay the Pierce County Superior Court's order and provide relief. But we cannot provide effective relief now following the entry of a dissolution decree in Japan, the expiration of the Pierce County Superior Court's stay, and its dismissal according to the terms of the September 15, 2004 stay order in Washington.

A case is moot if the appellate court is unable to provide effective relief. In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93 P.3d 124 (2004); Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984); In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 376-77, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). The stay order provided that it would expire when the Japanese court accepted jurisdiction over the dissolution action. The stay order also provided that no hearings were to be scheduled in the matter. But once the Japanese court accepted jurisdiction, a hearing took place on October 15, 2005 on Peter's CR 41 motion to dismiss based on his asserted Virginia domiciliary. And it is undisputed that the Japanese court entered a divorce decree on September 29, 2005, and that the stay lapsed by its own terms no later than March 10, 2006, when the Japanese decree was officially final.

Furthermore, Peter asks us to vacate "the order staying [the case]." But if the Pierce County Superior Court stay order of September 15, 2004, is vacated, then the August 24, 2004, commissioner's order declining jurisdiction in Washington and dismissing Peter's Washington dissolution petition with prejudice would be the only effective order in Pierce County Superior Court. Peter essentially asks us to affirm the Pierce County Superior Court's order vacating the commissioner's order of dismissal and to then amend the commissioner's order to allow his dissolution petition to proceed in Washington. Not only can we not create new superior court orders, but now there is an unappealed final 2006 dissolution decree from Japan. Therefore, we are unable to provide effective relief and this issue is moot.

II. September 2004 Stay Order — No Abuse of Discretion

Peter's argument that the Pierce County Superior Court abused its discretion in staying the Washington dissolution action is unavailing. We review a trial court's decision to stay for an abuse of discretion. King v. Olympic Pipeline Co., 104 Wn. App. 338, 348, 16 P.3d 45 (2000). "'[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.'" King, 104 Wn. App. at 350 ( quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936)).

Here, the Pierce County Superior Court stayed the case "[p]ending definitive rulings in Japan," that would assist the trial court in deciding whether to decline jurisdiction. CP at 150. The Pierce County Superior Court noted that Peter served Etsuko after she served him with her petition. It also noted that Peter accepted Etsuko's mediation request and participated in mediation in Japan. Peter claims that he did not "subject himself to Japanese jurisdiction by participating in . . . mediation," but he fails to prove that his participation was insufficient to establish the Japanese court's jurisdiction over him. Br. of Appellant at 23. The Tokyo family court expressly found that Peter submitted to its jurisdiction by requesting affirmative relief and participating in the mediation.

A party relying on foreign law bears the burden of pleading and proving the elements of foreign law relied on. Byrne v. Cooper, 11 Wn. App. 549, 555, 523 P.2d 1216 (1974). Peter relies solely on his attorney's statement that attempts to explain, in generic terms and without citing to Japanese law, that mediation in Japan is "a different entity" from any related dissolution action. CP at 306. But this is insufficient evidence of Japanese law in light of the Tokyo family court's express finding that Peter "appeared" when Etsuko petitioned for mediation and requested relief in that forum. CP at 227.

Peter also claims that the Tokyo family court lacked personal jurisdiction over him under the "Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, January 19, 1950, U.S. — Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1652 [hereinafter SOFA Agreement]." Br. of Appellant at 20-21. He argues that the "SOFA Agreement specifically provides that '[m]embers of the United States armed forces . . . and their dependents . . . shall not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in the territories of Japan.'" Br. of Appellant at 21-22. Nevertheless, the Tokyo family court assumed jurisdiction, stating that Peter, Etsuko, and their child "are recognized as having had a permanent residence in Japan." CP at 227. Because Peter fails to sufficiently brief or analyze the applicable Japanese law and the interaction between the SOFA Agreement and Japanese law on this matter, the Pierce County Superior Court had a sufficient basis to stay the Washington case pending the outcome of the dissolution matter in Japan; and it did not abuse its discretion by doing so.

For instance, Etsuko points out that the SOFA Agreement provides, "The United States shall not claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of Japan for members or employees of the United States armed forces in respect of the civil jurisdiction of the courts of Japan." Br. of Resp't at 17 n. 16 (citing CP at 364).

Furthermore, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, trial courts have discretionary power to decline jurisdiction where, in the court's view, "the difficulties of litigation militate for the dismissal of the action," provided the moving party submits to jurisdiction in a more convenient forum. Werner v. Werner, 84 Wn.2d 360, 370, 526 P.2d 370 (1974). We review a decision based on forum non conveniens for an abuse of discretion. Myers v. Boeing Co., 115 Wn.2d 123, 128, 794 P.2d 1272 (1990). To obtain a dismissal on this basis, Etsuko needed to show that the Tokyo family court constituted an adequate alternative forum, that is, an alternative forum where "some relief, regardless how small, is available." Sales v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 115 Wn. App. 222, 228, 156 P.3d 303, 306 (2007).

Here, the record shows that Peter and Etsuko were married in Japan, their child was born in Japan and had never left Japan, they lived together in Japan from July 1999 until their separation in July 2003 after their child was born, Etsuko did not leave Japan after their child was born, Etsuko filed for dissolution in Japan, and Peter sought and participated in family court mediation in Japan. The Pierce County Superior Court ordered that if the Tokyo family court rejected jurisdiction or dismissed Etsuko's action, Peter could proceed with his dissolution petition in Washington.

The record supports the Pierce County Superior Court's decision to stay the Washington dissolution action pending the outcome of the litigation in Japan and to decline jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens. Thus, the Pierce County Superior Court did not abuse its discretion.

III. June 2, 2006 — Dismissal Order

Peter also assigns error to the June 2, 2006 Pierce County Superior Court order dismissing his dissolution petition, but he does not provide any authority or argument to support this assignment of error. We normally do not review issues unsupported by argument or authority. Rules of Appellate Proceedings (RAP) 10.3(a)(6); Zink v. City of Mesa, 137 Wn. App. 271, 278, 152 P.3d 1044 (2007). Accordingly, we need not address it; but the record is adequate for our review and because Peter argues that "the Washington trial court's dismissal of this action has severed the parental relationship between [the parties' child] and her father," we briefly discuss his claim. Br. of Appellant at 35.

RAP 10.3(a)(6) provides in part that: "The brief of the appellant or petitioner should contain: . . . [t]he argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record."

Peter asserts that it "was error for the trial court . . . to dismiss this case without entering a judgment that adjudicated the father's custodial rights rather than ignoring them." Br. of Appellant at 37. At oral argument, Peter argued that the Pierce County Superior Court should "make a visitation order for" his child and stated that Peter wanted "a custodial judgment that allows him to see his daughter." Therefore, it is clear that the relief Peter ultimately seeks is an established right to see his child.

"[T]he party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of establishing its existence." In re Marriage of Hall, 25 Wn. App. 530, 536, 607 P.2d 898 (1980). The UCCJEA governs whether a trial court can exercise child custody jurisdiction:

[A] court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:

(a) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;

(b) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under (a) of this subsection, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under RCW 26.27.261 or 26.27.271, and:

(i) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent . . . have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and

(ii) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships.

RCW 26.27.201(1). This determination is a question of law we review de novo. In re Marriage of Kastanas, 78 Wn. App. 193, 197, 896 P.2d 726 (1995).

The child's home state is defined as "the state in which a child lived with a parent . . . for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." RCW 26.27.021(7). "A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state of the United States." RCW 26.27.051(1).

Peter argues that "Washington possessed UCCJEA jurisdiction" because his child "was domiciled in Washington and could not be domiciled in Japan." Br. of Appellant at 29. But the dispositive question under RCW 26.27.201 is the child's "home state," not the child's domicile. Washington lacked jurisdiction to enter a parenting plan because Washington was not the child's home state and because the Tokyo family court, which had jurisdiction as Etsuko's and the child's home state under RCW 26.27.201(1)(b), did not decline jurisdiction. Because Washington had no jurisdiction to adjudicate Peter's custodial rights, it could not grant Peter the relief he requested and the Pierce County Superior Court properly dismissed his claims.

IV. Attorney Fees

Etsuko requests attorney fees on appeal based on RCW 26.09.140, RCW 4.84.185, and RAP 18.1.

RAP 18.1(a) provides: "If applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review before either the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the party must request the fees or expense as provided in this rule, unless a statute specifies that the request is to be directed to the trial court."

RCW 26.09.140 provides:

The court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for reasonable attorney's fees or other professional fees in connection therewith, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or enforcement or modification proceedings after entry of judgment.

Upon any appeal, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for the cost to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorney's fees in addition to statutory costs.

"Although the statute does invest appellate courts with discretion to order a party to pay fees and costs . . . that provision must be read in light of the fact that the statute ties the award of fees to a consideration of financial circumstances." In re Marriage of Rideout, 150 Wn.2d 337, 357, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003). Etsuko's request for attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140 fails because she has not established her financial need for an attorney fee award. RAP 18.9(a) and RCW 4.84.185 authorize us to award attorney fees as sanctions. In considering whether to award attorney fees as a sanction, "our primary inquiry is whether, when considering the record as a whole, the appeal is frivolous, i.e., whether it presents no debatable issues and is so devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal." Streater v. White, 26 Wn. App. 430, 434, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). "[A]ll doubts as to whether an appeal is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the appellant." Streater v. White, 26 Wn. App. at 435.

RAP 18.9(a) provides in part: "The appellate court on its own initiative or on motion of a party may order a party or counsel, . . . who uses these rules for the purpose of delay, files a frivolous appeal, or fails to comply with these rules to pay terms or compensatory damages to any other party who has been harmed by the delay or the failure to comply or pay sanctions to the court."

RCW 4.84.185 states in relevant part:

In any civil action, the court having jurisdiction may, upon written findings by the judge that the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing such action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim, or defense. This determination shall be made upon motion by the prevailing party after a voluntary or involuntary order of dismissal, order on summary judgment, final judgment after trial, or other final order terminating the action as to the prevailing party. The judge shall consider all evidence presented at the time of the motion to determine whether the position of the nonprevailing party was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause.

Here, the record indicates that Peter's appeal followed a series of legal maneuvers to obtain jurisdiction over his wife and child in the United States, despite his participation and acquiescence to jurisdiction in the Tokyo family court system. Peter's candor about his own circumstances was notably lacking in his changing representations about his domicile — first Washington, then Virginia, then Washington again. The Pierce County Superior Court found that he appeared to be forum shopping. Furthermore, he failed to appeal the Pierce County Superior Court stay order in 2004, when we might have been able to timely determine the jurisdictional question, and he failed to appeal the Tokyo family court's rulings on jurisdiction or its final determination of the dissolution issues. His tactical decisions throughout the proceeding resulted in this appeal, which is wholly lacking in merit, and in Etsuko incurring litigation expenses and attorney fees in the United States, even though she and their child have resided solely in Japan since 1999. Under these circumstances his appeal was frivolous and on this basis we award Etsuko her attorney fees on appeal in an amount to be determined upon compliance with RAP 18.1.

We affirm the Pierce County Superior Court's order staying Peter's dissolution action until the Tokyo family court resolved the issue of its jurisdiction over the parties and the Japanese dissolution action and its order dismissing Peter's case following entry of a dissolution decree in Japan. We award attorney fees and costs for the appeal to Etsuko.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

BRIDGEWATER, J., HUNT, J., concur.


Summaries of

In re Toland

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two
Aug 21, 2007
140 Wn. App. 1015 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
Case details for

In re Toland

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of the Marriage of PETER PAUL TOLAND, Appellant, and ETSUKO…

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two

Date published: Aug 21, 2007

Citations

140 Wn. App. 1015 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
140 Wash. App. 1015