Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. J189607
Lambden, J.
The Alameda County Social Services Agency (agency) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 on behalf of T.M., the son of Katie M. (mother). T.M. was removed from mother’s home and placed with his father. Subsequently, the court terminated mother’s reunification services. Agency filed a second petition after father was incarcerated for child endangerment and, at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, mother requested that T.M. visit her once in November 2007 and once in December 2007 at the state prison where she was incarcerated. The court ruled that the decision whether to have T.M. visit mother in prison was within the agency’s discretion. On appeal, mother contends that the lower court improperly delegated its authority on visitation to the agency. We conclude that this appeal is moot and therefore dismiss it.
All further unspecified code sections refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
BACKGROUND
We only set forth those facts relevant to the issue raised on this appeal. The agency filed a section 300 petition on March 9, 2004, on behalf of T.M. The petition alleged under subdivision (b) that mother abused methamphetamine and marijuana and under subdivision (j) that T.M.’s sibling tested positive for methamphetamine when she was born. T.M., who was born near the end of 2000, was released to his father’s care.
On March 14, 2004, mother was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and receiving stolen property. She was placed in a mandatory one-year residential drug treatment program.
The agency recommended that T.M. be placed with father with family maintenance services to him and reunification services for mother with liberal unsupervised visits. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on April 8, 2004, the court adjudged T.M. a dependent of the court and placed T.M. with father under the supervision of the agency.
Mother left her one-year residential treatment program before completing it. She returned to jail from April 19 until April 26, 2004. Mother reported on April 29, 2004, that she had enrolled in a different program. However, she relapsed and was terminated from this program on May 20, 2004. Father reported that mother was visiting T.M. at least once every other week.
Mother was incarcerated from July 30, 2004, until January 28, 2005. During this period, on October 28, 2004, the court held its six-month status review hearing. The court terminated reunification services for mother and T.M. remained placed with father. The court ordered that visits between T.M. and his mother be arranged by the child welfare worker.
The child welfare worker met with father on November 5, 2004, to discuss visitation arrangements. The following day, father took T.M. to see his mother at the jail, but T.M. could not visit because, according to the jail staff, mother had not completed required classes.
T.M. was living with father, his girlfriend, and her family. Father was arrested and incarcerated in September 2004. After father’s release, T.M. and father continued to live with father’s girlfriend and her family. There was a report of sanitary concerns in the home and of father using methamphetamine. Father agreed to clean the home and drug test. He tested negative for drugs twice, but did not take the test on five separate occasions. He also had not followed through on attending a parenting class.
Father attempted to take T.M. to visit his mother in jail for the second time on December 11, 2004. However, he arrived after the time for visit and no visit occurred.
On January 28, 2005, when mother was released from jail, she joined the maternal grandmother on a visit with T.M. Mother had a supervised visit with T.M. on February 8, 2005, but did not show up for a supervised visit on February 18, 2005.
Mother was arrested again on April 25, 2005. The child welfare worker met with father on March 31, 2005; he stated that mother was visiting T.M. sporadically. Mother had made no attempt to contact the child welfare worker regarding visitation.
On August 10, 2005, at the 18-month status review hearing, the court ordered a team decision meeting and a progress report. The court continued the existing orders.
On September 7, 2005, Father and T.M. moved to Sacramento and were living with the maternal grandfather. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown.
A little less than two years later, father and his girlfriend were charged with child endangerment. Their arrests resulted in the opening of a formal family maintenance case in Alameda County. On July 3, 2007, father was convicted of this crime and incarcerated. While father was incarcerated, T.M. lived with his two step-siblings and their mother, father’s girlfriend.
On August 30, 2007, mother was sentenced to prison for violating her probation on drug related charges. Her release date was January 14, 2008.
Because of father’s arrest, the agency on September 12, 2007, filed another section 300 petition on behalf of T.M. Under subdivision (b), the petition alleged that father had a previous child protective services history and had been arrested and convicted. With regard to mother, it asserted that courts had terminated mother’s parental rights for another child and had terminated her reunification services related to T.M. It alleged that both parents had substance abuse histories. Under subdivision (g), the petition alleged that both parents were currently incarcerated. Under subdivision (j), the petition stated that T.M.’s siblings were currently involved in a formal family maintenance case and T.M. was subject to the same living conditions and parenting as that of his siblings. The agency reported that T.M. had not been present when the events prompting the arrest for child protection occurred. However, the petition would permit T.M. to be included in the formal family maintenance services the family was receiving for T.M.’s step-siblings.
Mother filed a section 388 petition on November 6, 2007, seeking to have T.M. placed with a maternal great-aunt. The juvenile court summarily denied the petition on November 14, 2007.
Agency filed a report for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The child welfare worker stated that father had been released from jail and was again living with his girlfriend, T.M., and his other two children. T.M. reported that he had been present when his maternal grandmother was doing drugs. The worker recommended that there was clear and convincing evidence that reunification services should be denied to mother.
Agency filed an addendum report on October 25, 2007. The report again recommended that mother not be offered family reunification services. It recommended the ordering of family maintenance services to T.M. and father.
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was held on November 14, 2007. The parties stipulated to jurisdiction upon dropping the section 300, subdivision (g) allegation regarding father’s incarceration. Mother testified that she was opposed to T.M.’s being placed with father and his girlfriend because she believed it was an unstable living environment. The court found T.M. to be a dependent of the juvenile court and placed T.M. in the home of father. It also ordered the agency to provide family maintenance services to T.M., the other children, and father. The court adopted the findings and recommendation of the agency, including the denial of reunification services to mother.
Following the court’s announcement of its findings, counsel for mother requested that mother be scheduled a visit with T.M. in November and in December at Chowchilla Valley State Prison. The court responded: “That’s in the discretion of the agency, given resources, [T.M.’s] desires and interests.” Counsel for mother objected on the basis that counsel did not believe that it was a “proper delegation to grant the agency the discretion as to whether or not visitation occurs.”
Mother filed her notice of appeal challenging the order denying mother’s section 388 petition and objecting to the order placing T.M. in father’s home and leaving the question of visitation to the discretion of the social worker. Agency filed a request, which we granted, to have subsequent orders in the juvenile court included in the record on appeal.
DISCUSSION
The only ruling mother challenges in this court is the juvenile court’s ruling to give the agency discretion to decide whether T.M. could visit mother once in November 2007 and once in December 2007 while she was at Chowchilla Valley State Prison. The agency responds that, since it is now well beyond those dates, this issue is moot and we should dismiss the appeal. We agree.
We therefore do not need to consider the agency’s argument that, even if we were to address the merits of the appeal, we should affirm the judgment because mother cannot establish any prejudice resulting from the claimed error.
“When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed. (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 . . . .) ‘ “ ‘[T]he duty of this court . . . is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” [Citation.] . . . “[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the [respondent], an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant him [or her] any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. [Citations.]” ’ (Ibid.)” (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.)
Here, mother is challenging the ruling on visitation in November 2007 and December 2007. It is now almost one year later. Thus, even if mother were to prevail on the merits of her appeal, the result could have no practical impact or provide her effectual relief since we cannot go back in time and change the number of visits T.M. had with his mother in 2007.
Furthermore, orders made at a subsequent hearing render previous visitation orders moot. (In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1210; In re Steven H. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1752, 1760, superseded by statute as explained in In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 34.) In the present case, the agency requested that we take judicial notice of subsequent orders, and we granted that request. A visitation order filed on January 8, 2008, establishes that the court, at that time, ordered supervised visits between T.M. and mother. An order filed May 12, 2008, indicates that father, mother, and the maternal grandmother requested mediation. The mediation resulted in an agreement that T.M. would visit his maternal relatives once every other week and that mother would not be allowed to participate in these visits until she contacted the child welfare worker and participated in her social services case plan. The court adopted the terms of the mediation agreement at the hearing on June 24, 2008. Accordingly, these orders moot the prior order regarding visitation in November 2007 and December 2007.
We may still consider the merits of a moot issue if the issue on appeal could evade review or if it could affect the rights of the child or parents in future proceedings. (See, e.g., In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548; In re James B. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 524, 528.) We decide the question of mootness in juvenile cases on a case-by-case basis. (In re Angela R. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 257, 264.)
The present issue on appeal has not evaded review. Indeed, other appellate decisions have directly addressed the question of the court’s giving a third party the authority to determine visitation. (See, e.g., In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1237 [order granting the department the “complete and total discretion to determine whether or not visitation occurs would be invalid”]; In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 46-49 [improper delegation of judicial power to children when they were given absolute discretion as to whether they wanted to visit their mother]; In re Donnovan J. (1997) 58 Cal.App .4th 1474, 1475 [unlawful delegation of judicial authority when therapist given right to determine whether children should visit their parent]; In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374-1376 [order that did not give Child Protective Services power to determine whether visits occurred was proper, although juvenile court may delegate to social worker responsibility to manage details of visitation]; In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 755-757 [order stating that visitation with parents “ ‘be under the direction of the Department [of] Social Services’ ” was improper because order did not specify whether parents had visitation rights or, if so, frequency and length of visits].) Thus, the issue presented by this appeal is not an issue that has evaded review.
We also conclude that the court’s failure to grant mother’s request for two visits at the end of 2007 will not have any collateral effect on future proceedings. The court had already denied mother reunification services. Moreover, even when visitation was permitted and mother was not incarcerated, mother had only sporadic contact with T.M. during the more than four years he was outside her home. Finally, mother, in 2008, agreed not to have any future visits with T.M. until she participates in her case plan. Thus, given mother’s agreement not to have future visits with T.M. until she meets her obligations, the court’s earlier decision not to provide her with reunification services, and her sporadic visits with T.M. when not incarcerated, we conclude that her inability to visit with T.M. twice at the end of 2007 will not affect any subsequent proceedings.
We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot. (In re Jessica K., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315.)
DISPOSITION
We hereby dismiss this appeal.
We concur: Haerle, Acting P.J., Richman, J.