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In re Timothy L.

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jul 17, 2008
No. F054387 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 17, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. JW102942-05, Peter A. Warmerdam, Commissioner.

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Wanda Hill Rouzan, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


OPINION

THE COURT

Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Levy, J. and Cornell, J.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Timothy L. was adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, repeatedly violated probation and admitted committing subsequent offenses, and was committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) after admitting that he committed second degree robbery and evasion of a peace officer during a carjacking and high-speed chase. On appeal, he contends the court abused its discretion when it committed him to DJJ. We will affirm.

On July 1, 2005, the California Youth Authority (CYA) became the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) and was placed within the newly created Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Gov. Code, §§ 12838, 12838.3, 12838.5; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1710, subd. (a).) Given the time frame in this case, the instant record contains references to both CYA and DJJ. We shall refer to DJJ throughout this matter for purposes of consistency.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2002, juvenile authorities received a referral that alleged appellant (born 1991) violated Penal Code section 243, subdivision (a), battery. Appellant successfully completed prevention services. On May 8, 2003, juvenile authorities received another referral, which alleged appellant violated section 243.5, subdivision (a), assault or battery on school property. Appellant was directed to complete community service but failed to do so.

On February 13, 2004, a petition was filed in the Superior Court of Kern County alleging appellant and his siblings were dependent children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d). It was alleged that appellant and his sister were subject to physical abuse by their mother, appellant and his siblings were sexually molested by their half-brother, and their mother knew about the sexual abuse and failed to protect the minors. It was further alleged that appellant and his sister were placed in physical danger from the same half-brother, who had anger-control problems, was physically aggressive toward them, and had a criminal record. Appellant and his siblings were placed in protective custody.

Appellant’s mother admitted she had a long history of using drugs. Appellant’s father had a lengthy criminal record for drug offenses and was on parole. Appellant was attending junior high school. He had intense anger and limited impulse control, and had memories of being sexually abused by his half-brother. He had received counseling and psychotropic medication. He was placed in the home of another half-brother.

At the dispositional hearing, appellant and his siblings were adjudged dependent children. The court ordered their mother to receive reunification services, including counseling for failure to protect the children from sexual and physical abuse.

The instant record is silent as to additional proceedings in the dependency matter, but the record suggests that appellant’s mother complied with the reunification plan because he was subsequently released to her custody in the course of the juvenile wardship proceedings at issue in this case.

The First Juvenile Petition

On February 8, 2004, shortly before the dependency petition was filed, appellant and three or four teenagers were taken into custody for setting a fire in a restroom at Castle Elementary School in Bakersfield. One of the teenagers stated they found a spray can in the restroom, and he held the spray can while appellant ignited it with a cigarette lighter. Appellant was found in possession of two cigarette lighters.

On February 18, 2004, an official from appellant’s junior high school advised juvenile authorities that an expulsion hearing would be held for appellant because of the arson incident and selling marijuana at school.

On February 25, 2004, appellant was transferred to another middle school as a result of his expulsion. After the transfer, he had perfect attendance and did not have any discipline problems. He was doing well in the custody of his half-brother and his wife.

On March 22, 2004, a juvenile petition was filed in the Superior Court of Kern County alleging that appellant was within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), for committing count I, felony arson (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (d)). Appellant denied the allegation and was released to his half-brother’s custody.

On April 21, 2004, the court granted a motion to amend the juvenile wardship petition to add count II, misdemeanor unlawfully causing a fire (Pen. Code, § 452, subd. (d)). Thereafter, appellant entered into a negotiated disposition, admitted count II, and stated his understanding that he might be confined to DJJ. The court dismissed count I without prejudice but with a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

As of May 2004, appellant was still living with his half-brother and had been doing well. However, appellant was involved in an incident at school where he threatened students. He told his half-brother that he was going to get a weapon to harm the same students. Appellant’s half-brother was concerned that he would not be able to control appellant and did not want his family exposed to appellant’s potential violence.

The probation report recommended placing appellant in foster care or a group home because he needed an environment which would provide him with structure, discipline, and accountability for his actions. Appellant needed firm, well defined boundaries along with structure, and he needed counseling to address his anger and assaultive behavior.

On May 7, 2004, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and placed appellant on probation for a period not to exceed his 21st birthday. The court found returning appellant to his parents’ custody would be contrary to his welfare, and placed him in juvenile hall pending a permanent placement.

On June 11, 2004, the court ordered appellant placed at the Excell Center in Turlock, a group home which provides close supervision, fire-setter therapy programs, counseling, and educational services.

On August 15, 2005, appellant was returned to his mother’s home, and on August 30, 2005, the court ordered appellant placed in his mother’s home for the remainder of his probationary period based on his successful completion of the programs at the Excell Center.

Probation Violations

On October 5, 2005, appellant was arrested by the Kern County High School District Police for resisting/delaying a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)); possession of less than one ounce of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b)); disruption of school activities (Ed. Code, § 48900, subd. (k)), and truancy (Ed. Code, § 48260). The charges were handled administratively. On December 13, 2005, appellant’s mother signed an application for a petition that he was out of her control.

On January 6, 2006, the Kern County Probation Department filed a notice pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subdivision (a)(2), that appellant violated the terms of his probation. On January 12, 2006, the court released appellant to his mother’s custody and placed him on home supervision with “No Slack” status, with the specific warning that any violation would result in his return to juvenile hall.

On January 18, 2006, appellant was suspended from school for writing gang graffiti on school property, and he was placed in juvenile hall for violating the terms of his “No Slack” home supervision. Appellant was affiliated with the East Side Crips. He had received multiple suspensions from school for numerous absences and tardies, and for being involved in a verbal confrontation with another student. Appellant admitted he regularly used marijuana and did not return home when ordered by his mother.

On February 10, 2006, the court found continuing appellant’s in-home placement would be contrary to his welfare, he had been tried on probation in the custody of his mother, juvenile hall, and a foster placement, he had failed to reform, and the court’s previous orders had not been effective in his rehabilitation. The court ordered appellant to serve 30 days in juvenile hall as a condition of his probation, after which he would be released to his mother’s custody.

On August 28, 2006, the Kern County Probation Department filed another notice pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subdivision (a)(2), stating that appellant failed to report to his probation officer as ordered, he dropped out of the Community Learning Center in April 2006, and he failed to re-enroll in May 2006.

On September 8, 2006, appellant admitted the probation violation allegation. The court again found continuing appellant’s in-home placement would be contrary to his welfare, and the court’s previous orders had not been effective in his rehabilitation. The court ordered appellant to serve 30 days in juvenile hall as a condition of probation, after which he would be sent to the Blanton Academy for high-risk youth.

On January 9, 2007, another notice was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 777, subdivision (a)(2), which stated that appellant failed the Blanton Academy on November 29, 2006, and his whereabouts were unknown as of December 1, 2006.

On March 12, 2007, appellant admitted violating a court-ordered program, and acknowledged that his admission could result in his confinement at DJJ. The court again found the previous confinement orders had not been effective and ordered him to serve 45 days in juvenile hall, after which he would be returned to his mother’s custody.

The Second Juvenile Petition

On March 22, 2007, another juvenile wardship petition was filed which alleged appellant committed two misdemeanor offenses on March 9, 2007: count I, falsely representing his identity during a lawful detention or arrest (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)), and count II, unlawfully fighting or challenging another person to fight in a public place (§ 415, subd. (1)). The charges were based on an incident where appellant and three other juveniles assaulted an intoxicated individual in a park.

On March 27, 2007, appellant admitted both counts and was released to his mother’s custody.

The Third Juvenile Petition

The instant appeal is based upon the juvenile proceedings that resulted from the following incident. At 1:20 a.m. on August 27, 2007, officers from the Bakersfield Police Department responded to a carjacking dispatch. The victim stated he had parked his car at his house when he was approached by four males. The suspects demanded a ride and the victim refused. The victim said that two suspects hit him, knocked him to the ground, and took the keys to his vehicle. The victim’s son ran outside to help him, and found two suspects in the car and two other suspects running away. The son stood behind the victim’s car and shouted at the suspects to get out. The driver put the vehicle in reverse and attempted to run over the victim’s son, who jumped out of the way to avoid being hit.

The victim said the suspects hit him three times with their hands and feet, he suffered blows to his head and face, and he lost consciousness. The victim had blood on his face and neck, a swollen left eye, swollen lips, and lost a tooth, and he was taken to the hospital for treatment.

About 30 minutes after the report, the officers observed the stolen vehicle and tried to conduct a traffic stop. The driver was subsequently identified as appellant, who was now 16 years old. Appellant failed to comply with the traffic stop and engaged in erratic movements, unsafe lane changes, and ran through stop signs to evade the officers. During the chase, appellant’s 15-year-old passenger got out of the vehicle and tried to run away, but he was apprehended by pursuing officers. The vehicle crashed into a chain-link fence and stopped in a vacant lot. An officer ordered appellant out of the driver’s seat. Appellant emerged from the vehicle but then got back into the driver’s seat, and drove the vehicle straight toward the officer and his partner. The vehicle passed within 12 inches of the patrol car, which was hit by a section of the chain-link fence being dragged by the stolen vehicle.

Appellant continued to evade the pursuing officers and drove approximately 60 miles per hour in residential neighborhoods. He tried to make a turn, lost control of the vehicle, and crashed into a residence. Appellant emerged from the vehicle and ran away. He failed to obey the officers’ orders to halt. The officers finally apprehended appellant by using pepper-spray and physically subduing him.

Appellant told the officers that he did not know the vehicle had been taken by force. Appellant said that two unknown companions said they beat up someone, and he just thought there had been a fight. Appellant asked the two companions for a ride, and they asked him to drive the vehicle. Appellant denied being present when the vehicle was taken. However, another suspect said appellant was present when the vehicle was taken from the victim, and appellant almost ran over the victim’s son. Appellant was detained in juvenile hall.

On September 5 and 26, 2007, an amended third petition was filed which alleged appellant committed 12 offenses on August 27, 2007: count I, carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)); count II, evasion of a peace officer while driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 2800.2); count III, assault with a deadly weapon, a truck (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); counts IV and V, assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon, a truck (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)); count VI, unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); counts VII, VIII, and IX, misdemeanor damaging a vehicle in an accident without notifying the owner (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)); count X, misdemeanor resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)); count XI, violation of probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)(2)); and count XII, second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c)). Appellant again denied the allegations and remained in juvenile hall.

The amended petition was filed on September 5, 2007 and alleged 11 counts. On September 26, 2007, the court permitted the prosecution to amend the petition to add count XII, attempted robbery. Thereafter, appellant entered into a negotiated disposition and admitted three counts. On October 4, 2007, the prosecution filed the amended petition which included the 12th count for attempted robbery, and the court deemed the petition filed as of September 26, 2007.

On September 26, 2007, appellant admitted count II, evasion of a peace officer, count XI, violation of probation, and count XII, second degree robbery, and that he faced a possible commitment to DJJ. The court dismissed the other allegations without prejudice.

Disposition Motions

In anticipation of the disposition hearing, appellant filed a motion and requested a less restrictive placement than DJJ, such as Camp Erwin Owen or the Kern County Crossroads Program. Appellant also filed extrinsic evidence as to the conditions at DJJ, and asserted that such conditions rendered a DJJ commitment inappropriate.

The probation report stated appellant’s adherence to the terms and conditions of the prior grants of probation had been poor. He had not consistently reported to the probation officer, he admitted using drugs, and he failed to regularly attend school. Appellant’s mother and stepfather had numerous complaints about his negative behavior. Appellant’s behavior and attendance at his various schools and court-ordered programs had been unsatisfactory. Appellant denied gang affiliation but admitted that he associated with the East Side Crips, and he had been involved in a gang incident at juvenile hall which nearly resulted in an altercation.

The probation report stated appellant was not eligible for Camp Erwin Owen because of his prior arson-related conviction. He was eligible for the Kern County Crossroads Program but he was not “a suitable candidate based on [his] level of criminal sophistication and the violent nature of the instant offense.” Appellant’s conduct indicated his criminal sophistication level was increasing tremendously, and a commitment to DJJ was appropriate due to the sophistication of the present offense.

The Disposition Hearing

On October 23, 2007, the court conducted the disposition hearing. It reviewed appellant’s motion and the documents regarding conditions at DJJ, but noted such information was “somewhat dated” and did not reflect “the most recent changes in legislation and policy” for DJJ operations, particularly legislation that slashed the number of detainees and the rededication of resources to provide appropriate services to the minors.

Defense counsel argued DJJ was still a violent place and not conducive to rehabilitation, and appellant should receive a less restrictive placement because he had not been placed in a local program yet. Counsel acknowledged appellant was involved in a serious case and led the police on a high-speed chase, but argued that his conduct represented the act of an immature 16-year-old boy. Counsel acknowledged appellant was ineligible for Camp Erwin Owen but asked for a commitment to the Crossroads program followed by a group home placement.

The prosecutor replied the incident did not involve the actions of an immature 16-year-old boy, because such a person “doesn’t beat somebody unconscious, jack their car, and nearly ram an officer; that is behavior that goes way beyond immature. It’s horrendous.” The prosecutor stated the case presented “a close call for us whether he should be filed on as an adult or juvenile.” A commitment to DJJ was appropriate because appellant had been dealing with the probation department since 2002, he had been a ward of the court since 2004, his criminal behavior was not getting any better, and the instant case showed his behavior was becoming more serious. Appellant recently had engaged in gang-related behavior and fights while detained in juvenile hall. He had committed a very serious crime and “showing him a lot of mercy and sending him to Crossroads at this point would be a serious mistake.”

The court reviewed appellant’s record which began with referrals in 2002 and 2003, the first juvenile petition was filed in 2004, and he did marginally well on probation. In 2006, he returned to court for being out of his mother’s control, not going to school, and not reporting to his probation officer, and he failed the court-ordered school program in January 2007. The court found he was ineligible for Camp Erwin Owen, a forestry program, because of his prior arson-related offense. The court rejected the Crossroads program based on appellant’s previous performance on probation, “which certainly has not been particularly good.” Appellant’s recent conduct in juvenile hall indicated he was associating with a gang.

Appellant addressed the court and said he only needed “one more chance to prove myself.” The court replied that it had to consider the facts and circumstances of the current offenses, which occurred at 1:20 a.m., after his curfew, and represented acts of violence.

“There was violence inflicted upon the victim which had his car taken from him in the escape from that scene; the vehicle almost struck a family member who was responding to aid the victim, then there was original pursuit, where the vehicle was stopped and apparently this young man got out of the vehicle, reconsidered his options, returned to the vehicle and proceeded to drive away almost striking the police vehicle, then leading the police on a chase which certainly exposed others in the community to danger and then resulted in a collision and attempted flight by the young man. I guess the only thing that could have made this activity more dangerous would have been the presence of a firearm during the commission of the offense.

“The Court does not believe the commitment program at the Crossroads facility provides adequate time to rehabilitate this young man, nor does it provide adequate protection for the safety of the community.

“The Court does believe that the programs offered by the [DJJ] are well suited and well designed to rehabilitate this young man and deal with his criminal conduct.…”

The court found appellant previously had been tried on probation in the custody of his mother, in juvenile hall, and in foster placement but failed to reform, that previous orders of the court had not been effective in his rehabilitation, and local programs would be ineffective in his rehabilitation. The court committed appellant to DJJ with the maximum confinement time of six years one month, with credit for time served.

On December 13, 2007, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the court abused its discretion at the dispositional hearing because it committed him to DJJ and failed to impose a less restrictive placement. Appellant concedes his most recent offenses were serious, but argues that he lacks an extensive criminal history and his conduct was not surprising because of the sexual molestations he suffered in his mother’s home. Appellant admits he needed intervention, but complains that he was placed in DJJ with “the worst of the worst” and his minimal criminal record and distant gang ties were insufficient to support the DJJ commitment. Appellant complains the court did not adequately consider less restrictive placements on the record, or state why other placements would not have met his needs. Appellant asserts the court’s main reason for the DJJ commitment was the seriousness of the most recent offenses, which is insufficient to support the order.

“The juvenile court's decision to commit a minor to the [DJJ] will be reversed only when an abuse of discretion has been shown. [Citation.] The evidence, however, must demonstrate probable benefit to the minor from commitment to the [DJJ] and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. [Citation.]” (In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 379; In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556.) “An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.]” (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395; In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53; In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1330.)

In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the juvenile court law. (In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1395.) “Under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 202, juvenile proceedings are primarily ‘rehabilitative’ [citation], and punishment in the form of ‘retribution’ is disallowed [citation]. Within these bounds, the court has broad discretion to choose probation and/or various forms of custodial confinement in order to hold juveniles accountable for their behavior, and to protect the public. [Citation.]” (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.) “In 1984, the Legislature amended the statement of purpose found in section 202 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It now recognizes punishment as a rehabilitative tool and emphasizes the protection and safety of the public. [Citation.] The significance of this change in emphasis is that when we assess the record in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law [citation], we evaluate the exercise of discretion with punishment and public safety and protection in mind. Such was not the case before 1984.” (In re Lorenza M., supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 57-58.)

Thus, the juvenile court law now recognizes punishment as a rehabilitative tool (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b)), and emphasis has shifted away from the tradition of a primarily less restrictive alternative oriented towards the benefit of the minor, to the express “protection and safety of the public.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a); In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396; In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) The new directive of protecting the public has led reviewing courts to increasingly uphold more stringent dispositions, including commitments to the DJJ in the first instance. (In re Asean D., supra, at p. 473.)

The statutory scheme “‘contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of disposition orders ... namely, home placement under supervision, foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility and, as a last resort, [DJJ] placement.’” (In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Nevertheless, “it is clear that a commitment to the [DJJ] may be made in the first instance, without previous resort to less restrictive placements.” (In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473; In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) While DJJ is considered a final treatment resource, “there is no absolute rule that a [DJJ] commitment should never be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted. [Citations.]” (In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 183.) The record need only show probable benefit to the minor from commitment to DJJ, and that less restrictive alternatives were considered and rejected. (In re Pedro M., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 555-556.)

After a new juvenile wardship petition is found true under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, “‘the court may consider the juvenile's entire record before exercising its discretion at the dispositional hearing ....’ [Citation.]” (In re Adrian R. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 448, 454.) In determining the appropriate disposition, the court must consider not only the best interests of the minor and the public, but also public protection, the minor’s personal accountability, and “the broadest range of information” pertinent to the minor, “especially his past behavior and performance while a ward.” (In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684-1685; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subds. (a) & (b).) The court may also consider the circumstances and gravity of the offenses perpetrated by the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725.5; see In re Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.)

The court did not abuse its discretion when it committed appellant to DJJ, and there is overwhelming evidence to support the court’s decision that appellant would benefit from such a commitment and it was in the best interests of appellant and public safety. Appellant’s involvement with juvenile authorities began in 2002 and 2003, based on referrals for battery, and assault or battery on school property. He completed prevention services in the 2002 case but failed to complete community service in the 2003 case. In February 2004, appellant and other teenagers were taken into custody for setting a fire in a school restroom. Thereafter, he was expelled from school for the fire incident and selling marijuana on campus. Appellant admitted the misdemeanor offense of unlawfully causing a fire and was placed at the Excell Center. In August 2005, appellant returned to his mother’s custody after successfully completing the program at the Excell Center.

Appellant complains that the wardship proceedings occurred under the shadow of the child dependency proceedings, which also started in February 2004 and resulted in the removal of appellant and his siblings from his mother’s custody because of her failure to protect him from his half-brother’s sexual assaults and physical violence. While the dependency proceedings and the first wardship petition nearly overlapped, the record reflects that appellant’s mother was provided reunification services and appellant was placed with another half-brother during a portion of the dependency/wardship proceedings. While the instant record is silent as to the outcome of the dependency proceedings, the record strongly implies that appellant’s mother complied with the reunification services because he was released to her custody after he completed the Excell Center program.

In October 2005, appellant was arrested by school police for possession of marijuana, resisting an officer, disruption of school activities, and truancy. In December 2005, his mother filed a petition that he was out of her control. In January 2006, the court released appellant to his mother’s custody but subject to “No Slack” status. Later that month, however, appellant violated the release terms by writing gang graffiti on school property. Appellant admitted association with the East Side Crips and that he regularly used marijuana. In February 2006, the court ordered him to serve 30 days in juvenile hall, after which he was released to his mother’s custody.

Appellant continued to violate the terms of his probation and dropped out of school and failed to re-enroll in April and May 2006, and another probation violation petition was filed in August 2006. In September 2006, the court ordered him to serve 30 days in juvenile hall, after which he would be sent to the Blanton Academy for high-risk youths. Appellant failed the Blanton Academy in November 2006, his whereabouts became unknown in December 2006, and another probation violation petition was filed in January 2007. In March 2007, the court ordered him to serve 45 days in juvenile hall, after which he was returned to his mother’s custody. Shortly afterward, however, another wardship petition was filed and appellant admitted misdemeanor offenses of falsely representing his identity and unlawfully fighting.

As of August 2007, appellant had failed every placement except for the initial program at Excell Center in August 2005. He failed to consistently report to the probation officer, he admitted using drugs, and he failed to regularly attend school. Appellant’s behavior and attendance at his various schools and court-ordered programs had been unsatisfactory. Appellant denied gang affiliation but admitted that he associated with the East Side Crips.

The instant disposition order was the result of his involvement in a robbery and carjacking, a vicious assault on the owner, and appellant’s repeated attempts to escape capture by trying to run over the victim’s son, leading the police on a high-speed chase in residential areas, attempting to drive straight into two officers and their patrol car, crashing the stolen vehicle into a residence, and ultimately being taken into custody only after officers administrated pepper spray as he attempted to run away.

Appellant complains that the court failed to consider placement in the Kern County Crossroads Program as a less restrictive alternative, and the court abused its discretion when it committed him to DJJ because of his lack of a criminal record. To the contrary, however, appellant’s conduct represented an escalating level of criminality and violent behavior. Indeed, the facts of the August 2007 incident belie appellant’s claim that the incident merely involved the actions of an immature 16-year-old boy. Appellant was not an idle bystander during this incident, but instead took the lead in trying to run over the victim’s son and ram the stolen vehicle into police officers to effectuate his escape.

Appellant also complains the court failed to make appropriate findings as to whether it considered a less restrictive placement, or find that placement in DJJ was appropriate. To the contrary, however, the court reviewed the entirety of appellant’s juvenile record and found that a commitment to the Crossroads Program would not provide “adequate time to rehabilitate this young man, nor does it provide adequate protection for the safety of the community.” The court further found that “the programs offered by the [DJJ] are well suited and well designed to rehabilitate this young man and deal with his criminal conduct.” The court found appellant previously had been tried on probation in the custody of his mother, in juvenile hall, and in foster placement but failed to reform, that previous orders of the court had not been effective in his rehabilitation, and local programs would be ineffective in his rehabilitation.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

In re Timothy L.

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jul 17, 2008
No. F054387 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 17, 2008)
Case details for

In re Timothy L.

Case Details

Full title:In re TIMOTHY L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Jul 17, 2008

Citations

No. F054387 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 17, 2008)