Opinion
No. 2-685 / 00-1743.
Filed December 11, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, L. VERN ROBINSON, Judge.
Respondent appeals a district court ruling declining to impose contempt sanctions against the petitioner. AFFIRMED.
Royce Moore, La Porte City, pro se.
Erik Booth, of Fisher, Ehrhart, McCright Turner, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by HECHT, P.J., and VAITHESWARAN and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Laura Moore Shaw was held in contempt for failing to facilitate visitation between her two children and their imprisoned father, Royce Lee Moore, as agreed to in a stipulated divorce decree. The stipulation provided she was to take the children to the prison once or twice a month and have the contacts monitored by an "appropriate monitoring agency." The district court found she had not done so but ruled she could purge the contempt by complying with "the terms and conditions of the Stipulation." The court further ruled that if Laura failed to comply with the stipulation, Moore could request sanctions.
Moore asked for and was granted a sanctions hearing. At the hearing, Laura testified she had been unable to find a social worker to monitor the visits. Despite this obstacle, her attorney stated she had taken the children to the prison the day before the hearing. Based on this record, the district court declined to impose sanctions. Moore appealed.
In a domestic relations action, Iowa Code section 598.23 (1999) sets forth the permissible sanctions for contempt. See Skinner v. Ruigh, 351 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Iowa 1984). That provision allows but does not require a court to impose a jail sentence or one of several alternate sanctions. See Iowa Code § 598.23(1), (2). The sentence imposed rests within the discretion of the district court and we will not interfere unless there is a gross abuse of that discretion. See Kirk v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 508 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993).
The provision states:
1. If a person against whom a temporary order or final decree has been entered willfully disobeys the order or decree, the person may be cited and punished by the court for contempt and be committed to the county jail for a period of time not to exceed thirty days for each offense.
2. The court may, as an alternative to punishment for contempt, make an order which, according to the subject matter of the order or decree involved, does the following:
a. Withholds income under the terms and conditions of chapter 252D.
b. Modifies visitation to compensate for lost visitation time or establishes joint custody for the child or transfers custody.
c. Directs the parties to provide contact with the child through a neutral party or neutral site or center.
d. Imposes sanctions or specific requirements or orders the parties to participate in mediation to enforce the joint custody provisions of the decree.
The district court concluded that imposition of a sanction was not warranted because Laura attempted to comply with the stipulated decree but was unable to secure a social worker to supervise the visits. The court further noted Laura attempted to purge the contempt by taking her children to the prison without a social worker. We agree with Moore that this effort did not satisfy the letter of the contempt order. However, we conclude the court's decision to withhold sanctions did not amount to an abuse of discretion, given the unavailability of regular monitoring personnel, as set forth in the stipulation.
Moore's remaining challenges to the court's ruling have either not been preserved for our review or are unnecessary to decide. We affirm the district court's ruling on contempt sanctions.