Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. CK69086, Elizabeth Kim, Referee.
Jesse F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant R. R.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendants and Appellants T. H., B. R., and M. H.
Raymond Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Judith A. Luby, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COOPER, P. J.
R. R. appeals from an order of the juvenile court, finding that he sexually abused his stepdaughter T. H., and declaring T. H. and her half-sisters, M. H. and B. R., subject to jurisdiction of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (b), (d), (j); undesignated section references are to that code), and from the corresponding dispositional orders, prohibiting appellant from residing in the family home and requiring that he participate in sexual abuse counseling. R. R. contends that substantial evidence does not support the finding of sexual abuse. R. R.’s daughters and stepdaughter (T. H.) join in the appeal. Concluding that substantial evidence does support the court’s jurisdictional findings, we affirm the orders.
For protective purposes, we substitute the parties’ initials for their names throughout, including in quotations from the record.
Summary of Facts
During a wedding celebration held at a relative’s home on July 7, 2007, minor T. H., age 15, consumed great amounts of alcohol and became highly intoxicated. While intoxicated, she yelled that she wanted to run away and did not want to return home. She began crying, and yelled that she did not want to sleep with her father anymore, that her mother made her sleep with him in exchange for rent money, and that she did not want her sisters to suffer the same abuse. T. H. also stated that she was pregnant and did not want to have another abortion.
Shortly after midnight on July 8, El Monte Police Officer Lopez responded to an emergency call of a rape having occurred at the celebration. He observed T. H. sitting in the middle of the driveway, heavily intoxicated and exhibiting extremely slurred speech. She was transported to the hospital for treatment. Appellant R. R. was arrested for three outstanding traffic warrants
At 3:45 a.m., El Monte Police Detective Youngquist responded to a call regarding an investigation of an alleged sexual assault. In his preliminary interview with T. H., she recanted her allegations of sexual abuse, and said that she did not recall making any of the statements. Based on the discrepancy between T. H.’s earlier outbursts and her interview statements, Detective Youngquist arranged for a sexual abuse examination at a hospital. The report stated that T. H. denied having had sexual intercourse or an abortion.
Based on the examination’s finding, Detective Youngquist decided to interview T. H. a second time, at the police station as before. After T.H. was returned there, she again asserted that appellant had not molested her, but said that she had been molested by her half-brother, R. R. Jr., when the family had lived in Palm Springs. In addition, however, Youngquist’s report of the interview stated that “[w]hen asked if she had been re-assaulted by suspect, [R. Sr.], she stated ‘no’ over and over again. [T. H.] was adamant that there were only two molestations attributable to [R. Sr.], and one molestation attributable to [R. Jr.] [She] again denied any abortions or impregnation subsequent to these molestations and maintained her ‘virginity.’” (Italics added.)
The molestation described in the court’s ultimate findings was first explicitly attributed to appellant in the Department of Children and Family services (DCFS) Detention Report, prepared from interviews conducted July 8, 2007. According to the report, “[Detective Youngquist] said [T. H.] stated when she and her family lived in Palm Springs area her stepfather had touched her breasts and buttock area, also one time she was awaken [sic] and her underwear were pulled down. [T. H.] said the incident occurred some time in 2005.”
The same allegations appeared in DCFS’s referrals of T. H.’s stepsisters for medical examinations – “While under the influence of alcohol, oldest child [T. H.] disclosed her stepfather sexually abused her, (this abuse led her to become pregnant & having an abortion.) Once sober, the child recanted her story alleging the stepfather molested her 2 years ago, once touching her breast & buttocks over her nightclothes and tshirt & a 2nd time pulling her panties down about a foot.”
At trial, T. H. testified as follows regarding molestation, under questioning by her counsel: “Q: Did you tell them – did you tell the police officer or the detective that your stepfather had molested you? [¶] A: Yes, I did. [¶] Q: You told them? [¶] A: Yes. [¶] Q: Why did you tell them that? [¶] A: Because they told me if I don’t say something – if I kept on saying no that they were going to go arrest my mom and take my sisters. [¶] Q: And it’s - I know it’s difficult, but did your stepfather sexually molest you? [¶] A: No.”
On September 19, 2007, the court amended and found true the petition, as alleging that “On prior occasions the . . . father sexually abused the minor . . . by fondling her breasts and buttocks. Further, the mother did not take the appropriate actions to protect the minor.” T. H. and her stepsisters were placed with their mother, but appellant was ordered to move out of the home, with monitored visitation allowed, and to undergo counseling, including conjointly with T. H. when appropriate.
DISCUSSION
Appellants contend that the court’s findings and orders were not supported by admissible and substantial evidence. “In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court. [Citation.]” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)
The court’s findings, which underpin its orders, derive from hearsay statements by T. H. to the police, as recorded and reported in the detention and other jurisdiction reports of DCFS. Hearsay evidence contained in such social studies is admissible, and may be sufficient to support a jurisdictional finding, unless a timely objection is made. (§ 355, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1).) Appellants raised no objection to the introduction of these reports. Even if an objection had been made, hearsay evidence in social studies is admissible and acceptable when the declarant is available for testimony. (§ 355, subd. (c)(1)(D).) T. H. was available, and she testified. Hence, her reported hearsay statements were available for the court’s consideration.
We turn to the question whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, made under three subdivisions of section 300. The first is subdivision (d), sexual abuse by a parent or household member. R. R. contends that T. H.’s disavowal of her comments at the wedding reception, and her asserted absence of memory of those statements, raise concerns about their substantiality and worth. But R. R. ultimately was not charged with the assault that T. H. referred to at the reception. The amended charges and findings involved incidents occurring two years previously. The substantiality of the wedding reception statements is thus beside the point.
As amended, the petition alleged that “[o]n prior occasions the . . . father sexually abused the minor T. H. by fondling her breasts and buttocks.” As reported by DCFS, T. H. stated that there were two molestations attributable to R. R. According to the detention report, prepared from interviews with Detective Youngquist, T. H. stated that “her stepfather had touched her breasts and buttock area, also one time she was awaken [sic] and her underwear were pulled down.” The record thus contains positive evidence supporting the court’s finding.
A substantial evidence inquiry requires a “determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination . . . .” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.) However, when “two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” (Id. at p. 874.) While the present record contains conflicting evidence and testimony denying the attribution of any molestation to R. R., “an appellate court defers to the trier of fact on such determinations, and has no power to judge the effect or value of, or to weigh the evidence . . . or to resolve conflicts in . . . the evidence.” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199.) Here, the juvenile court weighed T. H.’s range of statements, and determined that she was a minor described by section 300, subdivision (d). The record contains sufficient, substantial evidence to support this determination, and we cannot reweigh the evidence in favor of a different finding.
With respect to section 300, subdivision (b), failure to protect, mother did not acknowledge that T. H. was abused by R. R., and she expressed her intention to reunite with him. The juvenile court found that appellant abused T. H., and that mother knew of this abuse. Section 300, subdivision (b), requires that “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of [her] parent . . . to adequately supervise the child . . . .” The court’s finding of abuse, coupled with the mother’s past action, inaction, and stated intention of reuniting were sufficient to satisfy section 300, subdivision (b).
The court’s third finding, under section 300, subdivision (j), formed the basis for jurisdiction over appellant sisters B. R. and M. H. When a minor has been abused or neglected, subdivision (j) authorizes juvenile court jurisdiction over the minor’s siblings. The court must “consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers relevant in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (§ 300, subd. (j).) Here, R. R.’s daughters B. R. and M. H. were of similar age to T. H. (13 and 11), and would be at risk for abuse. The record that supports the finding that T. H. was a minor described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d), contains sufficient evidence to support a finding that B. R. and M. H. were at risk.
DISPOSITION
The orders under review are affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, J., FLIER, J.