Summary
noting that, in issuing its order, "[this same trial court] figuratively removed her judicial robe and stepped into the role of directing Department operations"
Summary of this case from In re The Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs.Opinion
04-22-00196-CV
07-06-2022
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2020-PA-01945, In the Interest of J.D., a Child, pending in the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas. The Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez signed the order at issue in this proceeding. This is the third mandamus the Department filed complaining of orders affecting this child. See Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00087-CV (filed Feb. 14, 2022), and Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 04-22-00163-CV (filed Mar. 18, 2022).
Petition for writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BETH WATKINS, JUSTICE
The child at the center of this case, fifteen-year-old J.D., is in the permanent managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services. In the underlying proceeding, the trial court removed the caseworker assigned to J.D. and ordered the Department to replace her with other named Department employees. The Department filed a petition for writ of mandamus and an emergency motion to stay the trial court's order. We granted the emergency motion. Now, we conditionally grant the petition.
Background
The parental rights of J.D.'s parents have been terminated, and the Department is his permanent managing conservator. On March 31, 2022, the trial court held a permanency hearing after final order to continue the process of finding placement for J.D. The Department reported that negotiations were in progress for J.D.'s placement in Tennessee. The parties and the trial court discussed travel arrangements and a seamless transfer of care for J.D., who was recovering from surgery. Amber Winters was the Department caseworker assigned to J.D.
At that hearing, Winters testified that she had not seen J.D. since his March 22 surgery because she had been working on other Department cases. Following testimony about her working relationship with J.D., Winters confirmed that she hung up on J.D. during a recent phone call because she found him to be disrespectful. Based on the ongoing discord, J.D.'s guardian ad litem recommended that a new caseworker be assigned. Without commenting on that recommendation, the trial court continued the hearing.
When the hearing resumed on April 4, the Department called Eric Bryant, Winters's supervisor, to testify. The record does not show that Winters was present in the courtroom. Bryant testified that he did not know if he had the authority to remove Winters from J.D.'s case, but even if he did, Winters was his best caseworker.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally rendered an order, which was signed on April 20, 2022 (collectively, "the April 4 order"). The trial court ordered, inter alia:
"caseworker Amber Winters is discharged from this case effective immediately."
"Eric Bryant and Diane Ruiz are appointed to assume the role of caseworker and to effectuate the move of the child to Tennessee."
"the caseworker and unit assignment following the child's move to Tennessee shall be transferred to supervisor Sabrina Bedford. Eric Bryant and Diane Ruiz are to facilitate that transfer."
"Eric Bryant and Diane Ruiz may lean on Sabrina Bedford's unit now if there is a caseworker in that unit that they trust to assist with the staffing of this case. But Eric Bryant and Diane Ruiz are to act in the role of caseworker until the child is moved to Tennessee."
"the Attorney Ad Litem, Guardian Ad Litem and CASA volunteer are each ordered to e-file a bullet point report of concerns they have had with Amber Winters. These reports are to be e-filed by close of business on April 8, 2022."
"all attorneys are to be copied on these e-filed reports and . . . the Assistant District Attorney will forward the reports to Eric Bryant and Diane Ruiz."
"the Department is to staff with the Program Director regarding the reported concerns regarding caseworker Amber Winters. The Department is to e-file their corrective action plan to improve her work for future children. This is to be e-filed by the close of business on April 13, 2022."
The Department then filed this original proceeding arguing that the April 4 order violated the Separation of Powers Clause because it effectively gave the trial court administration over agency functions. The Department also argued that the April 4 order violated sovereign immunity as well as its right to choose its representative in court. Despite being given an opportunity to do so, neither the respondent nor the real parties in interest responded to the Department's petition.
We agree that the April 4 order violated the Separation of Powers Clause. Because that conclusion is dispositive, we do not reach the Department's remaining arguments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Analysis
Standard of Review
To receive mandamus relief, the Department must show the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion and it has no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839, 840 (Tex. 1992). If the April 4 order is void, the Department does not have to show a lack of an adequate appellate remedy for mandamus relief to be appropriate. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). "A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court." Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Applicable Law
"The separation of the powers of government into three distinct, rival branches- legislative, executive, and judicial-is the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government." Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Texas Constitution mandates:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. Authority bestowed upon one branch of government cannot be exercised by another branch “unless expressly permitted by the constitution.” See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993).
"The Separation of Powers Clause is violated (1) when one branch of government assumes power more properly attached to another branch or (2) when one branch unduly interferes with another branch so that the other cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers." In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 635 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). "The application of these two tests is not always straightforward, as there is an overlap in the functioning of the three different branches of government." Martinez v. State, 503 S.W.3d 728, 733-34 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2016, pet. ref'd).
Although the Separation of Powers Clause "appears on its face to be rigid and absolute . . . such a construction would be impossible to implement in all cases because not every governmental power fits logically and clearly into any particular 'department.'" Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 671 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Texas courts have never held that the three branches of government operate with absolute independence; instead, courts have "long held that some degree of interdependence and reciprocity is subsumed within the separation of powers principle." Id. at 672. Accordingly, the separation of powers doctrine "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id.
Where one branch of government assumes powers more properly attached to another branch or unduly interferes with the powers of another, any resulting order is void. See State v. Ferguson, 125 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. 1939) (orig. proceeding) (noting the availability of mandamus relief from a void order where one branch of government usurps the power of another); see also D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 635.
A. The Judicial Branch
The power of the judiciary is "divided among . . . various named courts by means of express grants of 'jurisdiction' contained in the constitution and statutes." Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979). "In addition to the express grants of judicial power to each court, there are other powers which courts may exercise though not expressly authorized or described by constitution or statute." Id.
Here, the trial court derives its constitutional power from Article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 ("District Court Jurisdiction Consists of Exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body[.]"). District court judges in Texas are charged with the powers explicitly defined in the constitution and powers inherently derived "'from the very fact that the court has been created[.]'" See Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398).
The trial court's statutory power in this case derives from the Texas Family Code. Specifically, the April 4 order was issued under the authority of Family Code Chapter 263, which requires trial courts to review the placement of children in the Department's care. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.501(b) (requiring court to conduct permanency hearing within 90 days of the date of termination order and at least every six months thereafter); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.5031(a)(4) (requiring court to review permanency progress report to determine, inter alia, child's safety and well-being); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.502(a-1) (requiring Department to include certain information in permanency progress report); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 155.001-.003 (establishing court's continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over child-including to render and modify orders-after rendition of final order in Title 5 cases, under which Chapter 263 falls). Thus, the trial court had the statutory duty and power to review the Department's permanency plans for J.D.
As noted above, courts may also exercise powers "not expressly authorized or described by constitution or statute." Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398. "These powers are woven into the fabric of the constitution by virtue of their origin in the common law and the mandate of [the Texas Constitution's] separation of powers between three co-equal branches." Id.; see also Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. 2017). "The inherent judicial power of a court is not derived from legislative grant or specific constitutional provision, but from the very fact that the court has been created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities." Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398. "The inherent powers of a court are those which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and integrity." Id. Inherent power "springs from the doctrine of separation of powers .... [and] exists to enable our courts to effectively perform their judicial functions and to protect their dignity, independence and integrity." Id. at 399. Trial courts have the inherent authority "to ensure the proper administration of justice." Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 36.
B. The Executive Branch
The power to make the law of the people is vested in the legislative branch through Article 3, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled ‘The Legislature of the State of Texas.'”); see also Diaz v. State, 68 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied). “The power of the legislature includes the power to make, alter, and repeal laws, when such power is not expressly or impliedly forbidden by other provisions of the state Constitution.” Diaz, 68 S.W.3d at 685.
The legislative branch is empowered to create agencies and "may delegate its powers to agencies established to carry out legislative purposes, as long as it establishes 'reasonable standards to guide the entity to which the powers are delegated.'" Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 467 (Tex. 1997) (quoting Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 740-41 (Tex. 1995)); see also FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2000) ("Defining what legislative power is or when it has been delegated is no easy task."). The legislature is not required "to include every detail and anticipate unforeseen circumstances [as such obligation] would . . . defeat the purpose of delegating legislative authority." Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 740.
In this case, the Department is a state agency, administered by the Health and Human Services Commission, that is legislatively designated to, inter alia, provide support and services to children through state and federal funding. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.002; Tex. Dep't of Family &Protective Servs. v. Parra, 503 S.W.3d 646, 651 n.5 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2016, pet. denied) ("The Health and Human Services Commission oversees the Texas Health and Human Services system, which is composed of five state agencies, including [the Department]."). As a state agency, the Department's "powers are limited to (1) powers expressly conferred by the Legislature, and (2) implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the express responsibilities given to [the Department] by the Legislature." Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm 'n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192-93 (Tex. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In delegating authority to the Department, the legislature specified that the Department: shall develop and implement a caseload management system for child protective services caseworkers and managers that:
(1) ensures equity in the distribution of workload, based on the complexity of each case;
(2) calculates caseloads based on the number of individual caseworkers who are available to handle cases;
(3) includes geographic case assignment in areas with concentrated high risk populations, to ensure that an adequate number of caseworkers and managers with expertise and specialized training are available;
(4) includes a plan to deploy master investigators in anticipation of emergency shortages of personnel; and
(5) anticipates vacancies in caseworker positions in areas of the state with high caseworker turnover to ensure the timely hiring of new caseworkers in those areas.TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.0529(a); see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.016(2) ("'Shall' imposes a duty). The legislature also provided that in calculating each individual caseworker's caseload, the Department "shall consider" additional factors, including but not limited to "caseworkers who are on extended leave"; "caseworkers who worked hours beyond a normal work week"; and "caseworkers who are on a reduced workload." TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 40.0529(b). Thus, the Department has the authority and responsibility to manage its caseworkers' caseloads, both as part of a Department-wide "caseload management system" and in determining how many and which cases to assign to individual caseworkers. Id.; Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d at 467 (legislative branch "may delegate its powers to agencies established to carry out legislative purposes, as long as it establishes 'reasonable standards to guide the entity to which the powers are delegated.'").
Human Resources Code section 40.032(a) specifically provides, "The [D]epartment may employ personnel necessary to administer the [D]epartment's duties." TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.032(A); see also TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.016(1) ("'May' creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power."). The Department is required to "develop a system of annual performance evaluations based on measurable job tasks." See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 40.032(c). Through these statutes, the legislature expressly gave the Department discretion to hire and evaluate its personnel.
Application
Against this background, we consider whether the trial court had the power to order the Department to: (1) remove caseworker Winters from a case to which it had assigned her; (2) replace Winters with other named employees; and (3) require the parties to take steps ultimately leading to the Department's creation of a "corrective action plan."
Chapter 263 of the Family Code required the trial court to "review the permanency progress report" established for J.D. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.5031(a)(4). But Chapter 263 does not define the term "review." Therefore, we look to the ordinary and plain meaning of the term, with a preference to harmonizing the statutory scheme as a whole. See Greater Hous. P'ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2015). "Review" means to consider, inspect, or reexamine a subject or thing. Review, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The inclusion of "review" within the text of section 263.5031 allows the court to inspect, consider, or reexamine the Department's "permanency progress report to determine: (A) the safety and well-being of the child and whether the child's needs, including any medical or special needs, are being adequately addressed; . . . (C) . . . whether the placement continues to be in the best interest of the child;" and other factors. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.5031(a)(4).
We find no authority in the Family Code authorizing a trial court to impose specific personnel requirements on the Department following its review of a permanency progress report. Similarly, we are not aware of any authority that would permit a trial court to substitute its judgment for the Department's in determining an individual caseworker's caseload. See In re Tex. Dep't of Family &Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00096-CV, 2022 WL 2135572, at *7 (Tex. App.- San Antonio June 15, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Nor have we identified any authority under which a trial court may proscribe how the Department evaluates or disciplines its employees. See McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. 2003) (courts of appeals must interpret statutes "in a manner that effectuates the Legislature's intent"); see also Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 726 (cautioning that courts' role is "not to judge the wisdom of the policy choices of the [l]egislature, or to impose a different policy of our own choosing"). We do not question that trial courts have the power to decide and monitor issues before them, especially when the best interest of a child is at stake. See generally Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). However, this power does not extend to the assignment and management of Department employees. Cf. Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 38 (holding commissioners court had legislative power to define salary range of county employees; judiciary was limited to determining if range is reasonable); see also McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 748 (acknowledging that judiciary's "role . . . is not to second-guess the policy choices that inform our statutes or to weigh the effectiveness of their results"; rather, courts are tasked to "interpret those statutes in a manner that effectuates the [l]egislature's intent.").
Moreover, because "[e]xceptions to the constitutionally mandated separation of powers are never to be implied in the least," we do not believe modifying caseworker assignments or directing the potential discipline of a Department employee is a proper exercise of a trial court's inherent or implied powers to determine the best interest of a child. See Norwood, 418 S.W.3d at 570; see also Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 37 (trial court "may not usurp legislative authority by substituting its policy judgment for that of the [Department] acting as a legislative body"); Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. 1988) ("[W]hen the [l]egislature has spoken on a subject, its determination is binding upon the courts unless the [l]egislature has exceeded its constitutional authority.... While we have held that courts have certain 'inherent powers' . . . these 'inherent powers' [do not] furnish a basis for either ignoring, refusing to enforce or striking down otherwise valid statutes.").
Personnel assignments and internal personnel discipline are duties better fit for the Department, whose agents have a more comprehensive understanding of the needs of all the children in its care, of its caseload, of its caseworkers' obligations, and of its own budget. By dismissing Winters from the case, assigning other Department employees to J.D.'s case, and ordering certain potentially disciplinary steps for a Department employee, respondent figuratively removed her judicial robe and stepped into the role of directing Department operations. A court may not overhaul the functions of another branch of government, no matter the public interest at stake. See In re L.L., 65 S.W.3d 194, 196 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet. dism'd) ("Under the doctrine of separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of state government, Texas courts do not dictate to the Legislature how it should discharge its duty.").
For these reasons, we agree with the Department that the trial court exercised power that more properly belonged to another branch of government. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE § 40.0529. Because the decretal paragraphs the Department complains of in the April 4 order violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution, they are void. See In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 635. Accordingly, the Department is entitled to mandamus relief without a showing of no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605.
Having concluded that the Department is entitled to relief on its first argument, we need not reach its second and third arguments that the trial court's order violates sovereign immunity or improperly deprives the Department of the right to choose who represents it in court proceedings regarding J.D. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Conclusion
The trial court lacked the authority-constitutional, statutory, inherent, or otherwise-to order the Department to: (1) remove a caseworker from a case to which it had assigned her; (2) replace that caseworker with other named employees; and (3) require the parties to take steps toward the creation of a "corrective action plan" for its caseworker. Decretal paragraphs 4.7-4.13 in the April 4 order are void.
We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to, no later than fifteen days from the date of this opinion, vacate decretal paragraphs 4.7-4.13 of its Permanency Hearing Order After Final Order rendered on April 4, 2022 and signed on April 20, 2022. The writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court fails to comply within fifteen days of the date of this opinion.