Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. William A. Anderson, Jr., Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed in part, reversed in part, Super.Ct.No. INJ018629.
Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Michael D. Randall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors
OPINION
HOLLENHORST J.
Appellant Danielle S. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings with regard to her children, Taylor and Alexander (the children), and its placement of the children with their father (father), pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1). Mother argues that the court’s visitation order was vague, and that the court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We remand the matter to the juvenile court with regard to the visitation order. Otherwise, we affirm.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 29, 2006, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) filed petitions on behalf of the children. Taylor was nine years old at the time, and Alexander was seven. The petitions alleged that the children came within section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (c) (serious emotional damage), and (g) (no provision for support). The petitions specifically included the allegations that: 1) mother was involved in acts of domestic violence in front of the children with her boyfriend, Rodd G., who threatened to kill her and the children, and verbally and physically assaulted mother; 2) mother neglected the children’s health and safety by failing to obtain a restraining order against Rodd G., as advised by a domestic violence shelter; 3) father had a history of using inappropriate physical discipline with the children, and the children stated, on November 27, 2006, that they were fearful of returning to his care; 4) father did not live with the children, and he had failed to provide them with food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, and/or protection; 5) mother had a history of mental health concerns and admitted to being noncompliant with her prescribed psychotropic medication; 6) mother and father (the parents) had a history with the Orange County Child Protective Services (OCCPS) from February 1993 to October 2006, and failed to benefit from OCCPS’s services; 7) the children were at risk of suffering serious emotional damage from Rodd G. threatening their lives and from seeing him abuse mother; and 8) the children had been left without any provision for support due to father’s unwillingness to provide for them.
Counsel for the children filed a brief on December 4, 2007, joining in the department’s arguments and requesting this court to affirm the juvenile court’s order.
In the detention report, the social worker stated that he interviewed Taylor, who said that Rodd G. had been physically and verbally abusing mother, had flown into a fit of rage and threatened to poison and kill all of them, and had called her (Taylor) deplorable names. Taylor said she was afraid of being at home now since she knew Rodd G. was capable of hurting her and Alexander. Taylor also said she did not want to live with father because she recalled getting lice while in his care, and she recalled father attempting to choke Alexander. The social worker also interviewed Alexander, who said he was afraid to live at home because of Rodd G., as well. Alexander recalled one incident when Rodd G. forcibly grabbed him and spanked his buttocks “real hard.” Alexander confirmed that Rodd G. threatened to kill him, Taylor, and mother. The social worker also interviewed mother, who said that everything “‘was fine at home.’” Mother admitted that she had contacted a domestic violence shelter, but said it was just to “curtail the arguments” between her and Rodd G. The shelter was full, and mother neglected to follow up on referrals to other shelters. Mother further stated that she had been diagnosed with postpartum depression, and that she was not currently taking her prescribed dosages of Prozac. The social worker advised mother to begin her regimen of Prozac and to attempt to enroll in the Shelter From The Storm program. Additionally, the social worker contacted father to advise him of the detention hearing. Father expressed an interest in having the children placed in his custody.
The social worker researched the parents’ history in Orange County, which showed that from February 1993 to May 1993, OCCPS received four referrals of alleged sexual abuse. No other information concerning the referrals was available. In March 2004, a confidential reporting party submitted information regarding father’s physical abuse of mother and the children, but the allegations were determined to be unfounded. Furthermore, in September 2006, a child abuse report was submitted by a confidential reporting party, noting a concern that mother had been using illegal drugs. Finally, in October 2006, the social worker noted “caretaker absence/general neglect” in Riverside County, but found no Child Protective Services (CPS) history on file. The social worker later discovered that a referral was received alleging that mother was abusing drugs and not picking up the children from school.
On November 30, 2006, the juvenile court held a detention hearing. Mother was not present, but father was, and he requested a contested hearing. He also requested that the children be placed with him. The court detained the children in foster care. Father filed a Parental Notification of Indian Status and indicated that he may have Indian ancestry.
A contested hearing was held on December 4, 2006. Mother requested a continuance in order to retain private counsel. The court granted mother’s request. Father’s counsel noted that the department had evaluated father’s home and did not have any concerns. Mother objected to the children’s placement with father because “[the] child[ren] [don’t] want to go there.” The court placed the children with him.
The continued hearing was held on December 7, 2006. Mother requested that the department get the entire record from OCCPS regarding father’s alleged domestic violence, use of corporal punishment, and sexual abuse.
Jurisdiction Report and Hearing
The social worker filed a jurisdiction report on December 19, 2006, recommending that: 1) the court strike the allegations in the petition against father; 2) the court order that the parents share joint legal custody and that father have sole physical custody of the children, pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1); 3) the court grant mother reasonable, supervised visitation; and 4) the court terminate its jurisdiction over the matter. The social worker attached an amended section 300 petition, which deleted the previous allegation that the parents had a history with OCCPS, and added the allegation that mother had a criminal history, including but not limited to her arrest for drug-related charges on September 11, 2005.
The social worker reported that she interviewed the children on December 15, 2006. The children said they lived most of the time with mother and their maternal grandmother, but in September, mother left the home and moved to Indio with Rodd G. Alexander said he was afraid of his mother’s boyfriend because Rodd G. yelled at mother and threatened to kill her. Alexander said he did not want to live with mother. Taylor said she missed her mother, but did not want to go back home as long as mother’s boyfriend was there. Taylor said mother and Rodd G. argued a lot, which scared her, and that Rodd G. called mother, Alexander, and her names. Taylor further told the social worker that Rodd G. kicked mother, which resulted in a bruise on her back.
The social worker also interviewed mother, who denied that Rodd G. was abusive. Mother complained about father and the maternal grandmother in tedious detail, and believed that they were the cause of the children’s removal from her care. Mother claimed that the maternal grandmother would do anything to get custody of the children and that she “‘[was] behind this.’” The social worker observed mother’s demeanor and opined that mother may have “a functional mental disorder that require[d] professional intervention.” The social worker noted mother’s tangential thought process, fixation on father and maternal grandmother, and belief that father and maternal grandmother were “‘persecuting’” her. The social worker asked mother if she had ever had mental/emotional problems, and mother said she had been to a mental health professional, that her “regular doctor” was treating her for depression, and that she was currently taking medication to combat depression. When the social worker asked mother if she would submit to a psychological evaluation, mother became very angry, told the social worker that what was happening to her was wrong, and then said that she did not want the children back. Mother left the interview.
In addition, the social worker interviewed father and asked him about the allegations in the petition that he was physically abusive to the children and mother. Those allegations stemmed from a CPS referral filed in 2004. He said that mother made “absolutely false” allegations to the CPS. The social worker researched the CPS files and confirmed that the allegations were investigated by the CPS and found untrue. Father further stated that mother had a history of erratic moods, unpredictable behavior, instability and volatility. Mother deprived him of seeing the children from 1999 through 2001 and did not want him to have regular contact with them. Father said he always assisted mother by caring for the children, buying food and clothing for them when she allowed it. However, he admitted that he had failed to pay child support on a regular basis. Father told the social worker that he wanted custody of the children and could provide them with a secure and safe living environment.
Ultimately, the social worker believed that mother had serious mental/emotional problems that interfered with her ability to get along with others and parent the children. Mother believed that father, CPS, and maternal grandmother were all conspiring against her to obtain custody of the children. The social worker noted that mother was clearly in an abusive relationship with her current boyfriend, but was unwilling to admit any problems or leave the relationship. The children cited mother’s erratic and unstable behavior and the domestic violence as the main reasons for not wanting to return home. The children expressed their desire to remain with father, who likewise expressed a desire for them to remain with him. Father lived with his mother, and his home passed a home inspection.
A contested jurisdiction hearing commenced on February 22, 2007, but was continued to March 19, 2007. The social worker filed an addendum report on March 8, 2007, noting two episodes of domestic violence between mother and Rodd G. on January 1, 2007, and January 3, 2007, during which the police had to intervene. In addition, there had been eight other police contacts in late 2006 regarding domestic violence between mother and Rodd G. The social worker reported that the children were doing well in father’s care. They reported feeling safe and secure with father. Father reported that the children were anxious when they first started living with him. However, they were able to talk about their experiences with mother and Rodd G. and were currently less anxious and more at ease. The social worker continued to recommend that father be granted sole physical custody of the children and that the court terminate its jurisdiction.
At the contested hearing on March 19, 2007, the social worker testified. He opined that mother had an untreated mental illness, based on her “delusional thought disorder,” as noted in her conversations with the social worker’s supervisor. The social worker testified that he had a background in psychology, which included working as a county mental health professional for five years. He stated that he never tried to contact any medical professionals about mother’s mental health concerns. The social worker further testified that both children were concerned about being exposed to the domestic violence between mother and Rodd G., and Taylor told the social worker that she did not want to even see mother, as long as she was still with Rodd G. Mother also testified, and said that she severed her relationship with Rodd G. Mother further claimed that the children were abducted and concealed from her by the maternal grandmother, father, and a childcare provider.
The court considered the evidence and struck all allegations against father, but found true the allegations against mother. The court found that the children came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c). The court further found by a preponderance of the evidence, that there would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, or well-being of the children if they returned to mother’s home. The court noted that there was a parent, father, with whom the children were not residing at the time of their removal, who desired to assume custody of them. The court then ordered the children to be placed with father, pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1). The court ordered that mother and father have joint legal custody, and that father have sole physical custody. As to visitation, the court ordered reasonable supervised visitation for mother, to be arranged between mother and father, or mother and an agreed upon third party, and supervised by father or a third party. The court terminated its jurisdiction, pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1). In addition, the court signed a restraining order against mother, ordering her not to have contact with the children, except for visitation.
ANALYSIS
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence that the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm due to the allegations of the petition; thus, the court erred in sustaining jurisdiction and ordering them removed from her care. We find no error.
A. Standard of Review
“The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child who is the subject of a petition comes under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. [Citation.] On review, this court will view the juvenile court record in the light most favorable to that court’s order. [Citation.] We may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence, but must decide only whether sufficient evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court. [Citation.] Issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone.” (In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859-860.)
B. There Was Sufficient Evidence
In In re Nicole B. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 874 (Nicole B.), the mother’s live-in boyfriend abused the child. On appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that the child’s home was unfit because of physical abuse by the boyfriend, the appellate court affirmed, even though the boyfriend no longer resided with the mother and the child. The court emphasized that it had to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the lower court’s ruling, and had to indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the lower court’s findings. The court noted that there was nothing in the record indicating that the boyfriend had expressed a willingness not to return. (Id. at pp. 878-879.) The court further held that the close association with the mother in the past provided a basis for inferring a possibility that the boyfriend could return. (Id. at p. 879.)
Here, the court found true the allegation that mother had engaged in acts of domestic violence with Rodd G. in front of the children, and that such circumstances put the children at risk of suffering emotional and/or physical harm. First, mother contends that there was no longer a risk of future harm to the children, since she had moved out of Rodd G.’s home and moved to Orange County by the time of the jurisdictional hearing. At the jurisdictional hearing, mother testified that she moved to Orange County on November 28, 2006. However, as in Nicole B., there was nothing in the record to indicate that Rodd G. had expressed a willingness not to return, since his past close association with the mother provided a basis for inferring that he might return. (Nicole B., supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 879.) In fact, even though mother claimed she moved to Orange County, the evidence showed that the domestic violence between her and Rodd G. continued at their home in Indio. There were two episodes of domestic violence between mother and Rodd G. which required police intervention, on January 1, 2007, and January 3, 2007. We note the police report from January 1, 2007, stated that the police made contact with Rodd G., who was “upset because of an argument he had with his live in girlfriend” who was identified as mother. Rodd G. told the police that mother assaulted him at their residence in Indio. The police arrested mother. In addition, there were eight other police contacts in late 2006 regarding domestic violence between mother and Rodd G.
Furthermore, both children were afraid of living with mother because of Rodd G.’s past conduct, which included physically striking mother and Alexander, and threatening to kill mother and the children. Despite Rodd G.’s conduct, mother consistently denied that there was any domestic violence in her relationship with Rodd G., and she blamed the children for upsetting him. Mother also testified that she had no inclination to protect the children from him. In view of these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that the children would still be at risk of future harm if returned to mother’s home.
Second, mother claims the jurisdictional order must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to establish she suffered from a mental disability that interfered with her ability to care for the children. The social worker who opined that mother had a mental disability that affected her parenting ability had a background in psychology, which included working as a county mental health professional for five years. He observed that mother displayed obsessive and paranoid behavior regarding her claims that father and the maternal grandmother abducted the children and concealed them from her, and that the maternal grandmother would do anything to get custody of the children. Moreover, mother admitted that she had been diagnosed as suffering from depression, that she was being treated by a doctor, and that she was prescribed Prozac to combat it. We incidentally note that, based on past calls for service at the residence, the police officer “wanted to verify whether or not [mother] was mentally stable.” Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support concerns about mother’s mental health.
Mother points out that there was no expert testimony presented regarding her alleged mental disability. However, in In re Khalid H. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 733 (Khalid H.), the court expressly rejected the mother’s contention that evidence from expert witnesses was required to show she was mentally ill in order to declare her child a dependent under section 300, subdivision (b). (Id. at pp. 735-737.) Rather, “[b]ecause the matter to be determined at the jurisdictional hearing is whether a child is at substantial risk of harm at the hands of a parent, due to parental acts or inaction, if that assessment can be made within ordinary experience, no expert is necessary.” (In re Laurie S. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 202.)
Mother further contends that harm to the children cannot be presumed from the mere fact of a parent’s mental illness, but the social worker must demonstrate specifically how the children were harmed by mother’s mental illness. She claims there was no specific evidence of harm done to the children here. However, “[t]he Legislature omitted evidentiary requirements in section 300, subdivision (b), with respect to ‘mental illness.’” (Khalid H., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 736.) Moreover, section 300, subdivision (b) “does not contain a described formal procedure to determine if a parent suffers from a mental illness.” (Khalid H., supra, at p. 736.) Section 300 “merely seeks to obtain jurisdiction over and thereby protect children who ‘are currently . . . being neglected, or being exploited, and to protect children who are at risk of that harm.’” (Khalid H., supra, at pp. 736-737.) In any case, the evidence showed that the children were clearly affected by mother’s mental health problems as they cited her erratic and unstable behavior, as well as the domestic violence, as the main reasons for not wanting to return home.
Viewing the juvenile court record in the light most favorable to the court’s order, as we must, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Disposition Order
Mother contends the court erred in removing the children from her care, and claims that, with the provision of services and supervision, the department could have ensured the children were safe in her custody. Mother argues the court made the dispositional findings only by a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the required standard of clear and convincing evidence. The department concedes that the court utilized the wrong standard of review, but contends any error was harmless since the record demonstrates clear and convincing evidence that the children would be subject to substantial danger if returned to mother’s care. We agree with the department.
A. Standard of Review
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) permits the removal of the child from the home of the offending parent if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “[t]here . . . would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’s physical custody.”
“‘[O]n appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, ‘the clear and convincing test disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong.’ [Citation.]” (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 881.) In other words, “‘we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 880.)
B. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Disposition Order
As discussed above (see ante, § I), there was sufficient evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the children if they were returned home. Of great concern was mother’s denial, until and at the jurisdictional hearing, of any episodes of domestic violence between her and Rodd G. She continued to make this claim, despite the police reports of documented domestic violence between them, as late as January 2007. Mother admitted that Rodd G. got mad at the children and yelled at them, but she blamed them for upsetting him. Accordingly, mother had no inclination to protect the children from Rodd G. Both children were frightened by the domestic violence between mother and Rodd G., and did not want to return home due to the domestic violence, as well as mother’s erratic and unstable behavior.
Mother relies on In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10 (Steve W.) to support her position; however, Steve W. is factually distinguishable. In that case, the mother lived with a man who murdered her oldest son. That man was the father of the mother’s younger son. The juvenile court removed her younger son (the child) from her custody. The appellate court held that the juvenile court erred in ordering the removal of the child from the custody of his mother, since the basis for removal was founded chiefly on speculation. The lower court was concerned that the mother would enter a new relationship with yet another abusive type of person, although, at the time of the hearing, there was no evidence that she was involved in a relationship with anyone. (Id. at p. 22.) The appellate court also noted that all of the circumstances indicated that the mother would not resume her relationship with the murderer or allow him access to the child. The mother had expressed her clear desire to not have anything to do with him. Furthermore, he had been sentenced to prison for six years. (Ibid.)
Here, in contrast to Steve W., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 10 the basis for removal was not speculation. Rodd G. was not incarcerated, and mother was apparently still in a relationship with him.
Given the reported domestic violence, mother’s denial of any domestic violence, and the children’s fear of living with mother and Rodd G., it is clear that the children needed protection. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s order, as we must, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the children if returned to mother’s home. Accordingly, the court properly removed them from her home.
III. The Juvenile Court Properly Placed the Children With Father
Mother argues that the court erred in placing the children with father, pursuant to section 361.2. She points out the petition alleged father’s inappropriate discipline of Alexander, his failure to provide for the children, and his dependency history in Orange County. She further contends the court allowed the department to disregard evidence of father’s history. Mother additionally argues the visitation order made by the court was so vague that it could not be enforced, even in family court. We conclude that the court properly placed the children with father, but that the visitation order was not specific enough.
A. The Removal Order
Section 361.2, subdivision (a) “establishes the procedures a court must follow for placing a dependent child following removal from the custodial parent pursuant to section 361. [Citation.] Subdivision (a) of section 361.2 provides that when a court orders removal of a minor under section 361, the court ‘shall first determine’ whether there is a parent who wants to assume custody who was not residing with the minor at the time the events that brought the minor within the provisions of section 300 occurred. [Citation.] If that parent requests custody, the court ‘shall place’ the child with the parent unless ‘it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the minor.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1820, fn. omitted.) If the court places the child with that parent, it may order that the parent become legal and physical custodian of the child and terminate jurisdiction. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1).)
“A court’s ruling under section 361.2, subdivision (a) that a child should not be placed with a noncustodial, nonoffending parent requires a finding of detriment by clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.] We review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that . . . the children would suffer such detriment. [Citations.]” (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.)
Here, father undisputedly wanted to assume custody of the children and did not live with the children at the time of removal. At the December 7, 2006, hearing, mother’s counsel advised the court that the family had a history with OCCPS and requested the court to ask the department to obtain the entire record from OCCPS about the “possible” issues regarding father, including domestic violence, corporal punishment, and even sexual allegations. Contrary to mother’s contention that the court simply refused the request, the court instructed mother to communicate her request to the department “clearly and with specificity.”
Furthermore, contrary to mother’s contention that the department totally disregarded the evidence she urged it to investigate, the social worker investigated the parents’ histories in Orange, Los Angeles, and Riverside Counties. In the detention report, the social worker stated that he researched the parents’ history in Orange County, which showed that from February 1993 to May 1993, OCCPS received four referrals of alleged sexual abuse. No other information concerning the referrals was available. In March 2004, a confidential reporting party submitted information regarding father’s physical abuse of mother and the children, but the allegations were determined to be unfounded. In the jurisdiction report, the social worker reported that in 2001, the family law court in Orange County ordered shared custody of the children, with mother having primary custody and father having visitation rights every other weekend. In March 2004, the CPS in Los Angeles County received a referral that father was physically abusing mother and the children; however, after a thorough investigation, the CPS concluded that the allegations were unfounded. The social worker further investigated the allegations of abuse in Los Angeles County in 2004, and confirmed that the allegations were unfounded. (The other information that the social worker investigated involved allegations against mother only.)
In addition, prior to the court detaining the children with father at the detention hearing, a home study was done on father’s home; it was determined to be satisfactory, and a background check was performed. The social worker later interviewed father, who said he enjoyed having the children in his care and he wanted to keep them. Father said he could provide the children with a secure and safe living environment. The social worker observed that the children were doing well in father’s care. They felt safe and secure with him.
In sum, there was no actual evidence that father had a history of abuse or violence. Moreover, father had provided a safe home for the children during the short dependency, and wanted to give them a permanent home. Accordingly, the court properly gave father custody of the children.
B. The Visitation Order
At the time of the jurisdiction hearing, father’s counsel asked the court to find the petition true and follow the department’s recommendation. As far as visitation, father’s counsel stated that father was “open to allowing visits for Mother, but she apparently call[ed] at odd times of the night, and there [was] nothing consistent. So, he [was] willing to set up a schedule.” Father’s counsel noted that the recommendation was for supervised visitation with an agreed upon adult, and said that would not be a problem. The court made the custody order, and ordered reasonable supervised visitation for mother that was “to be arranged between Mother and Father, or between Mother and agreed upon third party, and supervised by Father, or by third party.” The court then terminated its jurisdiction. Father’s counsel stated that father would cooperate with any visitation that would be set up through the family court, but he wanted a restraining order put in place so that there would be no problems. That day, a restraining order was filed in the superior court. Attached to the restraining order was a visitation order, which stated that visitation was to be “[a]s set forth in the attached visitation agreement.” However, there was no attached visitation agreement. The visitation order further stated that mother was to have supervised visitation “according to the schedule set forth in item 1 above,” and that the visits were to be supervised by the department or an adult approved by the department. There was no schedule indicated in item 1.
Mother points out that the visitation order did not specify a schedule, and further argues that the order was so vague that it gave father or a third party “the ability to negotiate any or no supervised visitation” for her. While we recognize that the order did not provide a visitation schedule, we disagree with mother’s contention that father could negotiate for no visitation. The court clearly ordered “reasonable supervised visitation,” and the written order stated that mother “will have supervised visitation.” Furthermore, father repeatedly stated his willingness to set up a visitation schedule through the family court. Since mother is now requesting the visitation order to be made more specific, we assume that she has been unable to arrange visitation with father. Mother’s proper remedy is to seek relief in the family law court, since the juvenile court already terminated its jurisdiction. (In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 975-977; §§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1), 362.4.) “While remand to a court different from the one which issued the judgment appealed from is, to say the least, unusual, such a result is necessarily inherent in section 362.4, which expressly contemplates future proceedings in the family courts.” (In re John W., supra, at p. 976.)
IV. Any ICWA Error Was Harmless
Mother contends the juvenile court and the department failed to comply with the notice and inquiry requirements of the ICWA, after father stated that he may have Cherokee Indian ancestry. Any error was harmless.
“When authorities remove a child of Native American descent from his home, the act promotes foster care or adoption by a Native American family in the hope of preserving tribal culture. If, however, authorities do not move the child to another family, the purpose does not come into play. [Citation.]” (In re Alexis H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 11, 15.) “By its own terms, the act requires notice only when child welfare authorities seek permanent foster care or termination of parental rights.” (Id. at p. 14, italics added.) Here, although the children were initially detained in foster care, they were placed with father soon thereafter. The department never sought foster care or termination of parental rights after father’s disclosure of possible Indian ancestry. Thus, any error in failing to comply with ICWA was harmless. (Id. at pp. 15-16.)
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the family law court in order to make a more specific visitation order only. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ P.J., McKINSTER J.