Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DP011887, Caryl Lee, Judge.
Michael D. Randall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Julie J. Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minor.
OPINION
FYBEL, J.
Introduction
J.F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, S.W., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (all further code references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated). Mother’s trial attorney had signed a stipulation to terminate parental rights, and the juvenile court found a factual basis for the stipulation based on reports submitted by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA).
Mother argues the order terminating her parental rights to S.W. must be reversed because the juvenile court did not ask her if she agreed with the stipulation and did not determine whether she knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to termination of parental rights. Mother contends her parental rights are protected by due process and, therefore, the juvenile court had a constitutionally derived obligation to make those determinations.
L.W. (Father) appealed, and his counsel filed a letter stating no arguable issues could be found. We granted Father 30 days in which to file a supplemental brief presenting any issue he believed was arguable. When the 30 days had elapsed, Father had not filed a supplemental brief, and we dismissed Father’s appeal pursuant to In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.
We affirm without deciding whether the juvenile court had an obligation to determine whether Mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to terminating her parental rights. We conclude (1) any error in failing to make those determinations, if of constitutional magnitude, was not structural, but is subject to a harmless error analysis; and (2) any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 standard. We therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
I.
Protective Custody
S.W. was born to Mother in April 2005. S.W. suffers from numerous health issues and “profound global developmental delays.” She has been diagnosed as having chromosome deletion 4 syndrome (also called Wolf-Hirschhorn syndrome), a genetic disorder that commonly causes mental retardation, microcephaly, seizures, hyptonia, and cleft lip or palette. S.W. suffers from microcephaly and has developed a seizure disorder requiring daily medication and acute observation.
Mother also suffers from developmental delays and a severe speech impairment. She has been diagnosed as having “Encephalopathy, Unspecified with Developmental Speech Disorder and Developmental Articulation Disorder with Apraxia.”
S.W. was taken into protective custody in June 2005, when she was two months old. S.W.’s weight was very low—below the fifth percentile, and she was at risk for failure to thrive. At the time, Mother and S.W. had been living for about three weeks with Mother’s friends, Robin and Chris M. An SSA social worker met with Mother and Robin M. and reported: “Since [Mother’s] and S[.W.]’s arrival, Ms. M[.] has had to teach the mother the basics of caring for a baby. . . . Ms. M[.] further reported that at times [Mother] sleeps throughout the night and forgets to get up to feed the baby. However, Ms. M[.] has helped [M]other by setting an alarm for her and has been getting up with [Mother] to help feed the baby. [Mother] and S[.W.] are under Ms. M[.]’s constant supervision and she has not allowed [M]other to be with the baby alone. Ms. M[.] believes that [Mother] is unable to care for the child by herself and needs full-time help.”
Father, though married to Mother, could not help care for S.W. because he lived in a sober living facility. Father too was developmentally delayed.
On June 9, 2005, SSA convened a team decisionmaking meeting to discuss S.W.’s initial removal. In attendance were Mother, Father, Robin and Chris M., two social workers, two public health nurses, and members of the regional center staff. The following concerns were identified at the meeting: (1) “[S.W.] is at risk of Failure to Thrive due to her diagnosed Deletion 4 Syndrome”; (2) “[S.W.] is 8 weeks of age and is in the 5th Percentile for her age”; (3) “[S.W.] has had difficulty with feeding as she eats slowly”; (4) “[Mother]’s own disability and level of functioning poses a risk to the infant. [M]other has been observed to be i[m]patient, and gets frustrated when the child does not eat”; (5) “[M]other seems more concerned with her relationship with . . . Father than caring for [S.W.]”; (6) “[M]other does not have a stable residence and has been removed from Section 8 Housing due to evictions”; (7) “[M]other has repeatedly refused services from regional center”; and (8) “[F]ather is not available at this time to care for [S.W.] as he lives in a group home and is working on his own sobriety.” A consensus was reached to place S.W. in protective custody with a home evaluation of Robin and Chris M. for possible placement.
II.
Section 300 Petition and Detention Hearing
On June 13, 2005, SSA filed a section 300 petition alleging failure to protect. Among other things, the petition alleged Mother suffered developmental delays that impaired her ability to attend to S.W.’s special needs. On June 14, the juvenile court ordered S.W. detained and permitted Mother and Father to have monitored visits.
The jurisdiction and disposition report, filed July 5, 2005, provided this assessment: “Developmentally delayed mother with severe speech impediment who just gave birth to a newborn baby on April . . ., 2005. The baby has a genetic disorder called Deletion 4 Syndrome, which results in multiple physical disabilities, as well as mental retardation and learning disabilities. The baby will progressively require more care as the child becomes older.” SSA expressed concern that Mother was not able to adequately care for S.W. without 24-hour assistance. The report stated Mother “appears to have a learning disability” and is “unable to care for [S.W.] on her own.” However, Mother had told a social worker: “‘I don’t need help. I don’t need nothing. I know what to do.’”
Mother and Father pleaded no contest to the petition. At a hearing on July 6, 2005, the juvenile court advised Mother of her rights, and she signed a written waiver of those rights. The court found the allegations of the petition, as amended by interlineation, to be true by a preponderance of the evidence, declared S.W. a dependent child, vested custody with SSA, and adopted SSA’s recommended case plan. The court informed Mother that noncompliance with the case plan could result in termination of her parental rights. Among other things, the case service plan included participation in a domestic violence program, a parenting class, compliance with psychiatric treatment, and counseling.
III.
Six-month Review Report and Hearing
The juvenile court conducted a six-month review hearing on January 19, 2006. SSA’s status review report, filed December 27, 2005, reported S.W. had been placed in a medical foster home and was receiving excellent care.
The December 27 report stated: “[S.W.] was last seen on November 28, 2005 for a physical. The child weighed 11 lbs. 12 oz., and her height was 24 ½ inches. The child is gaining weight at a satisfactory rate. The child is up-to-date on her immunizations. The child has been prescribed Albuterol and Pulmicorte to be used as needed. Her next Well Baby Exam is on February 8, 2006.” S.W.’s occupational therapist reported S.W. was doing well for a child in her condition, and attributed this to “the foster mother[’]s highly involved care of the child.” The therapist also reported S.W. had “some suck/swallow/breathe issues” and was about 50 percent delayed. When S.W. was seven and a half months old, her cognitive ability was at age level three and a half months, her language skills were at age level three months, her gross motor skills were between age levels three to five months, her fine motor skills were at age level three and a half months, her social/emotional skills were at age level three months, and her self-help skills were at age level four to five months.
As to Mother, the report stated: “The mother is complying with most aspects of her case plan. She is receiving counseling weekly, with Catholic Charities. The mother has completed a Parenting Education Program. The mother will begin an Anger Management/Personal Empowerment Program on December 6, 2005. The mother is late in beginning this program due to no-fault [sic] of her own. . . . On November 1, 2005, the undersigned referred the mother to Olive Crest . . . for an Anger Management Program. [¶] The mother has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and has chosen not to take Risperdal and Paxil, the psychotropic medications that had been described for her.” Mother was not in consultation with her psychiatrist.
Mother’s therapist at Catholic Charities believed Mother could take care of S.W. by herself, but “‘would benefit from help.’” However, the SSA report stated, “[m]ost of the professionals consulted for this report agreed that [M]other couldn’t take care of this special-needs child by herself.”
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered and authorized funding for Evidence Code section 730 evaluations of Mother and Father. The court continued reunification services and set a 12-month review hearing.
Mother underwent the Evidence Code section 730 evaluation. An interim review report, filed March 29, 2006, reported: “Dr. Jennifer Bosch performed the Psychological Evaluation per [section] 730 E[vidence] C[ode] for [Mother]. Dr. Bosch indicates that [M]other fits the diagnosis of Encephalopathy, Unspecified with Developmental Speech Disorder and Developmental Articulation Disorder with Apraxia. Apparently [M]other has a low average I[ntelligence] Q[uotient]. [M]other’s judgment appears to be impaired. She has a long-standing problem with making good sound decisions when it comes to a multitude of different issues. [M]other lacks judgment, lacks stability, has anger management issues, a low frustration tolerance and an inability to place her baby’s needs before her own. Further, [M]other has reported that she wants to have another baby despite the possible complications that may be similar or more profound than baby [S.W.]’s current deficits. Dr. Bosch states, ‘Unless an ideal placement can be found where [Mother] was being supervised [‘]round-the-clock and was given substantial assistance as it pertains to her child, then it is regrettable that in this examiner’s opinion [M]other is not capable of caring for her child.’”
IV.
Twelve-month Review Hearing and Termination of Reunification Services
The 12-month review hearing was continued several times and ultimately was held on October 25, 2006. SSA filed reports on May 30, June 8, July 17, July 28, August 28, and September 29. The SSA reports concluded Mother and Father were incapable of caring for S.W. and of safely meeting her many special developmental and medical needs.
SSA reported S.W. remained with the same foster parents and stated: “The foster mother . . . continues to be very involved in all aspects of S[.W.]’s health, daily care and learning, and is consistent with therapy attendance (one hundred percent), as well as follow-through of home program. The foster mother reports significant events that have occurred and frequently contribute to S[.W.]’s therapy and overall success.” Mother and Father had twice-weekly, monitored visitation, and the monitors reported the visits were “appropriate and generally uneventful.”
On March 22, 2006, S.W. weighed 13 pounds three ounces and her height was 26 inches. On July 10, 2006, S.W. weighed 16 pounds 12 ounces. S.W. participated in occupational therapy twice a week, physical therapy twice a month, infant stimulation therapy (an electrical stimulation therapy to assist in swallowing) once a week, and vision therapy twice a month.
On April 26, 2006, S.W. experienced a severe seizure requiring hospitalization for four days. She continued experiencing periodic seizures and was hospitalized for them again in May and in June. S.W. continued to have “respiratory issues” and feeding problems. On May 25, S.W. underwent fungiplication surgery to prevent reflux and had a gastrointestinal tube placed in her for feeding. On August 2, S.W. received a “‘Mickey button,’” a device to replace the gastrointestinal tube so S.W. would no longer have to be attached to feeding equipment.
S.W.’s occupational therapist reported S.W.’s basic health, until the time the seizures had started, was stable except for possible sinus infection. S.W. had surgery in December 2005 to release her tongue from the base of her mouth and had excellent recovery. S.W. remained severely developmentally delayed. At age one, S.W.’s gross motor skill level, fine motor skill level, and cognitive skill level were at age three and one-half months. S.W.’s language skill level was at three months with “scattered skills” at five months, and her emotional skill level was at four months.
Despite these challenges, the occupational therapist described S.W. as “a happy little infant girl.” However, the senior social service supervisor believed S.W. “has characteristics that indicate that she is not adoptable.”
Mother completed a parenting education program and attended individual therapy from August to December 2005. Due to her developmental delays and speech anomaly, Mother was not appropriate for the anger management program at Olive Crest, but her individual therapy included anger management issues. Mother and Father requested and were referred to marriage counseling. Their marriage and family therapist reported: “‘Both are very low functioning but appear to manage daily living with assistance. Both want to live together as a family and raise their infant daughter. [Mother] wants two children. [Father] is not so sure. [Father] is secure in his present housing and [Mother] needs housing with supervision. . . . Couple does not truly realize depth or complexity of their personal problems.’”
Mother’s living arrangements were unstable. Marietta Landauer, Mother’s regional center counselor, reported that, as of May 1, 2006, Mother was living temporarily in an apartment. Ms. Landauer was working with Mother to place her in an adult foster agency home. Mark Mazza of Family Connections reported Mother has a history of “‘irresponsible behavior’” and of “sabotaging her placements, which puts her at risk of homelessness.” Mother had been homeless for a period of time, and on several occasions had run out of money weeks before receiving her Social Security check. SSA’s May 30, 2006 report stated, “[i]f this high-risk child were placed with [M]other, these behaviors would place the child at risk of homelessness and without financial resources for formula, food, diapers, clothing, etc.” On June 7, Mother met with an independent living services provider and told her she was homeless but living with a friend. Mother had no money because she had spent her Social Security check for the month. In July, Mother told the social worker she would have her own place in August and she was earning $20 a week cleaning bathrooms at Integrity House.
On July 11, 2006, the social worker spoke with the director of Father’s sober living group home. The director reported that Mother was “‘hanging around some bad people’” and when Father tried to break up with Mother, she threatened to kill S.W.
Mother got an apartment with several roommates. Father had left the sober living facility and had moved in with Mother. Independent living services was working with Mother to help her budget her money.
Mother stipulated to termination of reunification services and to a long-term plan of foster care for S.W. Mother also stipulated to these findings: (1) there had not been substantial progress made toward alleviating or the mitigating the causes necessitating placement, (2) Mother and Father had not substantially complied with the service plan, and (3) April 25, 2007 was the likely date by which S.W. may be placed for adoption or legal guardianship.
At the 12-month review hearing on October 25, 2006, the juvenile court accepted the stipulation, terminated reunification services, ordered S.W. to remain in long-term foster care, and authorized SSA to continue its efforts to find an adoptive home for S.W.
V.
Periodic Reviews Leading to the Section 366.26 Hearing
SSA filed a status review report on April 16, 2007. S.W. remained in the same foster home, and the foster parents had asked to be considered for adopting her. S.W. continued receiving occupational, physical, and feeding therapy. The physical therapist reported S.W. “has ‘had ups and downs because of her medical problems and seizure’, but . . . has made some improvements most recently.” An ophthalmologist diagnosed S.W. as having cortical blindness and being legally blind. An electroencephalogram revealed S.W. suffered frequent small seizures.
Mother’s circumstances had deteriorated. Mother had lost another home and had been moving between homeless shelters and motels. She was no longer enrolled at Integrity House because she had been stealing money from the program and from others in the home. On March 26, 2007, she reported to the social worker that she could no longer stay at the motel where she had been living.
Mother and Father were not getting along. The social worker reported: “[M]other reports that she and the father have been fighting and she reports that the father ‘hits’ her and has ‘anger issues, and a drinking problem’. . . . The mother reports telling the father that he ‘cannot see his daughter’ even though she ‘knows it’s not nice’.” Mother continued to visit S.W. regularly and wanted S.W. placed in her care.
In an addendum report, filed on May 23, 2007, SSA stated: “As to the mother, she has a history of mental illness, developmental delays, homelessness, having no money, spending her [Social Security] check . . . frivolously, anger management issues, relationship conflicts with the father, and an inability to care for herself. Because of the mother’s background, the mother has a difficult time caring for herself, which realistically, may make it difficult for the mother to care for the child, especially a child who is as medically fragile as the child S[.W.].” While Mother “clearly love[d]” S.W., Mother was “unable to meet the safety needs of the child” and did not have “the means to ensure that the child’s medical, emotional and developmental needs are properly met.”
SSA recommended setting a section 366.26 hearing. At the periodic review hearing on May 24, 2007, the juvenile court accepted the recommendation.
SSA filed a report on September 4, 2007, stating: “During this period of supervision, [S.W.] has been receiving her medical, emotional, and physical needs while in the caretaker’s home. The child continues to have many medical issues that require frequent attention from specialty physicians, particularly due to her neurological state. The child has recently been having frequent episodes of seizures and is currently being closely monitored by the caretaker and the neurologist. The child continues to show some improvement while in physical, occupational, and vision therapy, but according to the therapists[] and the caretaker, the child’s improvement is based on the child’s current medical status. The child has recently received a prone stander to help strengthen the child’s core muscles and to help increase the child’s positioning of her body in an upright position so that the child’s internal organs remain in place and grow appropriately. Without the prone stander, it is likely that the child will suffer from other medical complications. During this period of supervision, the caretaker has been attentive to meeting the child’s medical needs and continues to be proactive in ensuring the safety and well[-]being of the child.” S.W. took nine medications daily. Mother continued to have weekly monitored visits with S.W.
The foster parents were in the process of completing paperwork, submitting documents, and undergoing tests necessary to go forward with adopting S.W. The foster parents told the social worker they loved S.W. as their own and were eager to adopt her. An SSA report, filed on January 22, 2008, reported the foster parents’ adoption home study was complete except for school references and medical and tuberculosis tests. SSA recommended terminating parental rights.
S.W. had to be hospitalized in September 2007 due to “‘fever, coughing, increased work of breathing’” and was prescribed home suction equipment to remove excess secretions to avoid aspiration. She was hospitalized again in November 2007 for respiratory distress, and continued to have seizures. She was hospitalized again in late December 2007 due to an allergic reaction to her antiseizure medication.
On November 15, 2007, Mother’s counsel filed a section 388 motion requesting the juvenile court to vacate its order setting a section 366.26 hearing and to reinstate reunification services. Counsel asked the Regional Center of Orange County for a letter supporting the request to reinstate reunification services. In response, the regional center sent a letter stating it had reviewed Mother’s case and was unable to comply with the request. The appellate record does not include a ruling on Mother’s section 388 motion.
VI.
Section 366.26 Hearing and Termination of Parental Rights
After several continuances, the section 366.26 hearing was held on January 24, 2008. Mother’s counsel signed a stipulation to terminate parental rights and to find adoption to be in S.W.’s best interest. In making his appearance for the record at the section 366.26 hearing, Mother’s counsel stated that Mother was present.
The juvenile court received in evidence the SSA reports submitted from September 13, 2007 to the hearing date and, based on the reports, found a factual basis for the stipulation. The court found that termination of parental rights was in S.W.’s best interest. The court ordered parental rights terminated and S.W. placed for adoption. Mother timely appealed.
Discussion
Mother contends the order terminating parental rights must be reversed because the juvenile court did not ask her if she agreed with the stipulation and did not determine whether she knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to terminating her parental rights. She contends, “[g]iven the constitutional dimension of the rights involved, the juvenile court should have inquired if [she] knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived her right to contest the hearing.” County counsel argues in response the juvenile court had no such obligation, but had a duty to advise Mother of the consequences of a waiver only at the jurisdictional hearing.
We do not resolve whether the juvenile court had an obligation to determine whether Mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to terminating her parental rights. Presuming for the sake of argument the juvenile court had such an obligation, we conclude any error in failing to make those determinations was subject to a harmless error analysis, and was harmless under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18.
I.
Any Error in Failing to Determine Whether Mother Knowingly, Voluntarily, and Intelligently Stipulated to Terminating Parental Rights Is Subject to a Harmless Error Analysis.
Mother cites no authority, and our research has disclosed none, for the proposition a juvenile court’s failure to determine whether a parent voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently stipulated to terminating parental rights constitutes a due process violation. In In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1258-1259, the court concluded the juvenile court’s failure to warn a parent of the consequences of the parent’s submission to dependency jurisdiction did not constitute a due process violation. The court stated: “In fact, by analogy to case law regarding Boykin[ v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238]/[In re ]Tahl[ (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122] admonitions in criminal prosecutions, an advisement about the consequences of a plea is not constitutionally mandated. Rather, the rule compelling such advisement is a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. [Citations.]” (Ibid., fn. omitted; see also In re Patricia T. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 400, 407 [“By analogy with the Boykin/Tahl rules, we conclude that although admonitions concerning the waiver of rights in dependency proceedings are rooted in constitutional considerations, the specific nature of any advisements about the consequences of such waivers are set solely by rule”].)
From those authorities, it would appear any obligation of the juvenile court to determine whether a parent’s stipulation to terminate parental rights was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent would be derived from statute or rule, not from the federal or state Constitution. (See In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 200 [juvenile court has no obligation to advise parents of consequences of waiving their rights when submitting at a hearing to terminate reunification services]; In re Monique T. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1376-1377 [juvenile court required by rule to explain rights to mother and obtain waiver personally before jurisdictional hearing].) Error in failing to make that determination therefore would be subject to a harmless error analysis. (In re Monique T., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.)
But if the juvenile court had a constitutional obligation to determine whether Mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to termination of parental rights, the failure to do so would not be a structural defect and therefore would be subject to harmless error analysis. “Structural defects requiring automatic reversal of a criminal conviction typically involve basic protections without which ‘“a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.”’” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 914 (James F.).) Errors that can be assessed under the evidence presented to determine whether they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt generally are not structural defects. (Id. at p. 917.)
In James F., the juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem for the father without explaining to him what a guardian ad litem was or what powers the guardian ad litem had, and did not give the father a meaningful opportunity to be heard in opposition to the appointment. (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 911.) Later, at the permanency hearing, the juvenile court terminated parental rights and found the child to be adoptable after hearing testimony from the mother and the paternal grandfather. (Id. at p. 910.) Although the procedural error in appointing the guardian ad litem caused no actual harm to the father, the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the error was structural and therefore precluded harmless error analysis. (Id. at pp. 916-917.)
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal, and concluded, “a juvenile court’s error in the process used for appointment of a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding is a form of trial error that is amenable to harmless error analysis.” (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 918-919.) The Supreme Court reviewed the differences between criminal law and juvenile dependency law and stated: “These significant differences between criminal proceedings and dependency proceedings provide reason to question whether the structural error doctrine that has been established for certain errors in criminal proceedings should be imported wholesale, or unthinkingly, into the quite different context of dependency cases.” (Id. at pp. 915-916.) The California Supreme Court explained the United States Supreme Court had not applied the structural error doctrine outside the criminal context, “nor has it ever held that harmlessness is irrelevant when the right of procedural due process . . . has been violated.” (Id. at p. 917.) Addressing the Court of Appeal’s reasons for finding structural error, the Supreme Court concluded appointment of a guardian ad litem did not deprive the father of his right to participate in the litigation, treating the error as structural was unnecessary to provide an incentive to avoid the error in the future, and the flawed procedure used to appoint a guardian ad litem did not render the dependency proceeding fundamentally unfair. (Id. at pp. 917-918.)
In this case, any error in failing to determine whether Mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to terminating parental rights “can ‘be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [the error was] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 917.) As the James F. court noted, the United States Supreme Court has never applied the structural error doctrine to dependency proceedings or deemed harmless error analysis irrelevant to a claim of due process violation. The stipulation did not deprive Mother of her right to participate in the litigation because she could express her desires through her attorney. Mother was present at the section 366.26 hearing when the juvenile court accepted the stipulation and terminated parental rights.
Treating the asserted error as structural is unnecessary to create an incentive for juvenile courts to follow required procedure. “We assume that juvenile courts make every effort to follow required procedures, and we question whether treating a procedural error as a structural defect requiring automatic reversal would significantly decrease the frequency of such errors.” (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 918.) The James F. court explained, “the price that would be paid for this added incentive, in the form of needless reversals of dependency judgments, is unacceptably high in light of the strong public interest in prompt resolution of these cases so that the children may receive loving and secure home environments as soon as reasonably possible.” (Ibid.; see also In re A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914, 925; D. E. v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 502, 513.)
Any error in failing to determine whether Mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to terminating parental rights did not undermine the integrity of the dependency proceeding or produce an unjust result. At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must review the social services agency’s reports, indicate it has read and considered the reports, receive other evidence, and make findings and orders. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) Notwithstanding the stipulation to terminate parental rights, the juvenile court in this case fully complied with section 366.26, subdivision (b).
II.
Any Error Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
If the juvenile court in this case erred by not determining whether Mother knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently stipulated to terminating her parental rights, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18. The Chapman standard asks whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Id. at p. 24.)
We can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, the result of the section 366.26 hearing would have been the same if Mother had not stipulated to termination of parental rights and had contested the hearing. The sole purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is to select and implement one of the listed permanent placement plans. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304.) Here, the juvenile court selected termination of parental rights and ordered S.W. be placed for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) To terminate parental rights and order adoption, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence “it is likely the child will be adopted.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) “The issue of adoptability . . . focuses on the minor, e.g., whether the minor’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt the minor.” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.)
In this case, the foster parents intend to adopt S.W. and, at the time of the section 366.26 hearing, had almost completed the application to adopt her. They have cared for S.W. since June 2005 and have proven they are capable of meeting her special physical, mental, and emotional needs. The SSA reports, which the juvenile court received and considered, described in detail the love and care the foster parents have shown S.W. The foster parents have adopted children in the past and understand the adoption process and responsibilities.
Mother does not describe what evidence she would have produced at the hearing that would have produced a different result. She asserts only that the adoption cannot go forward because the foster parents have not submitted tuberculosis clearings. County counsel has requested we take judicial notice of an SSA report, filed on July 1, 2008, showing the tuberculosis clearances have been completed and a minute order dated July 11, 2008, stating the juvenile court had received the SSA report. Mother does not oppose the request. We grant the request for judicial notice, but only for the purpose of showing the tuberculosis clearances had been completed, and for no other reason. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396.)
At the 12-month review hearing on October 25, 2006, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and placed S.W. in long-term foster care pursuant to a stipulation Mother does not challenge. A finding that the court has continued to remove the child from the parents’ custody and has terminated reunification services constitutes a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights unless “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to” at least one of the circumstances listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) through (vi). (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Of those, only subpart (i) was conceivably relevant in this case. It states: “The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The SSA reports showed that Mother did maintain regular monitored visitation with S.W. and loved her. However, it is beyond reasonable doubt S.W. would not benefit from continuing the relationship. Mother and S.W. have never forged a true parent-child relationship. S.W. was removed from the home at age two months due to Mother’s inability to take care of her. The SSA reports establish beyond any doubt Mother never has been capable of meeting S.W.’s many and profound physical, mental and emotional needs without 24-hour assistance. The SSA reports stated that during visits with S.W., Mother and Father had a difficult time focusing on the S.W., and their attention span was limited because S.W. could not respond to them. Because Mother has had great difficulty in dealing with her own significant mental health and developmental needs, her monitored visits with S.W. “‘could not have created the type of bond and parent-child relationship necessary to force this child to forgo adoption.’” (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 918.)
Disposition
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., IKOLA, J.