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In re Stone

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Jul 20, 2017
No. 336329 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 20, 2017)

Opinion

No. 336329

07-20-2017

In re A. L. STONE, Minor.


UNPUBLISHED Ingham Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 15-001105-NA Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ. PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating his parental right to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.

It appears that the child's mother voluntarily released her parental rights to the child in December 2016. She is not a party to this appeal. --------

I. STATUTORY GROUNDS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent argues that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. Before a court can terminate a parent's rights to his or her child, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination listed in MCL 712A.19b(3) exist. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A trial court's decision that a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence is reviewed for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). "When reviewing the trial court's findings of fact, this Court accords deference to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).

B. ANALYSIS

The trial court found that grounds for termination were established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), which permit termination of parental rights under the following circumstances:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.


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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.


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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.

The conditions that led to the adjudication with respect to respondent were prior incidents of domestic violence between respondent and the child's mother, respondent's abuse and neglect of the child, respondent's history of substance abuse, and respondent's lack of suitable housing. In addition, respondent was found to have an unfit home environment due to his lack of housing, neglect, and criminality. By the time of the termination hearing, respondent had made progress in treating his alcoholism and had completed an inpatient program, which he claimed included therapy and anger management sessions. However, respondent had not completed any domestic violence classes. Moreover, respondent pleaded guilty to felonious assault with a knife for an incident involving the child's mother, and he was sentenced to 18 months' probation for that conviction. Respondent has never provided care for the child, and he did not participate in a parenting class. In addition, he participated in parenting time only for a two-month period between April and June 2016. He did not respond to several attempts to schedule additional parenting time. By the time of the termination hearing—more than a year after the child had been placed in care—respondent was still unable to provide an appropriate home for the child. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions that led to the adjudication had not been rectified and were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable period of time.

With respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), respondent made very little progress during the pendency of the case. He had not parented the child in the past, and more than a year after the child's removal he still did not have suitable housing and had not completed parenting classes. Also, he repeatedly rejected any services offered by petitioner. A parent's failure to comply with a parent-agency agreement is evidence of the parent's failure to provide proper care and custody for the child. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The caseworker testified that she last spoke with respondent on October 28, 2016, and he stated that the child should remain in her current placement "because he needed to get things around before he could take care of [the child]." As with § 19b(3)(c)(i), respondent's lack of progress over the course of the case supports the trial court's finding that there was no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time.

The evidence also supports the trial court's reliance on MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) as an additional ground for termination. The harm to a child contemplated under § 19b(3)(j) includes emotional harm as well as physical harm. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). The trial court relied on respondent's lack of participation in services and lack of housing to find that this ground had been established. "[A] parent's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his or her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent's home." In re White, 303 Mich App at 711. Given the circumstances detailed above—including respondent's conviction for felonious assault against the child's mother and his lack of beneficial domestic violence counseling—the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(j) was established by clear and convincing evidence.

II. BEST INTERESTS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination of his parental rights was in the child's best interests. A trial court's decision regarding a child's best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5) is reviewed for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357.

B. ANALYSIS

MCL 712A.19b(5) provides:

If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made.
Whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests is determined by a preponderance of the evidence. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. Factors to be considered include "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). This Court may also consider whether it is likely "that the child could be returned to her parents' home within the foreseeable future, if at all." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).

Respondent argues that termination was not in the child's best interests in light of the child's placement with respondent's cousin. In In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43, this Court stated:

[B]ecause a child's placement with relatives weighs against termination under MCL 712A.19a(6)(a), the fact that a child is living with relatives when the case proceeds to termination is a factor to be considered in determining whether termination is in the child's best interests. Although the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child's best interests, the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children's best interests. A trial court's failure to explicitly address whether termination is appropriate in light of the children's placement with relatives renders the factual record inadequate to make a best-interest determination and requires reversal. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.]

Here, the trial court noted that the child was doing well in her relative placement. It found that respondent's cousin was providing the stability and emotional and educational support that the child needed, which respondent was unable to provide. The record supports the trial court's findings. As discussed earlier, respondent still did not have housing, even though the case had been ongoing for more than a year. The court's finding that respondent was content to be a "visitor" in the child's life, rather than a parent, is supported by his lack of contact with her throughout her life and during most of the case. The trial court did consider the child's relative placement, but determined that termination of respondent's parental rights was still in the child's best interests in order to provide her with the stability that she needed. This finding is supported by the testimony of the caseworker, who testified that termination would be in the child's best interests because the child needed permanency and stability, her current relative care provider was meeting her education and mental health needs, and the child could still maintain a relationship with her parents with this placement in addition to gaining the stability she needed.

The trial court reasoned that termination was preferable over a guardianship because a guardianship would result in nine more years of "legal limbo" for the child. Respondent testified that he did not think termination was in the child's best interests because he thought it was important for her to have a father in her life and he wanted to be a part of her life. However, respondent had never before been a care provider for the child, and he admitted that the child's placement with his cousin was the best place for her. Moreover, from the evidence presented, respondent's cousin was open to allowing respondent to remain a part of the child's life. Therefore, terminating respondent's parental rights would not leave the child without respondent in her life, but it would still provide her with needed stability. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro


Summaries of

In re Stone

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Jul 20, 2017
No. 336329 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 20, 2017)
Case details for

In re Stone

Case Details

Full title:In re A. L. STONE, Minor.

Court:STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

Date published: Jul 20, 2017

Citations

No. 336329 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 20, 2017)