Opinion
02-24-00109-CV
08-29-2024
In the Interest of S.I., a Child
On Appeal from the 362nd District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-1285-362.
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brian Walker, Justice.
In this suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), Appellant T.I. (Mother) appeals the trial court's final order in which it appointed her as joint managing conservator and F.M. (Father) as joint managing conservator with the right to determine the residence of their teenage daughter, S.I. Mother raises two issues on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief not requested by any party in their pleadings or tried by consent and (2) the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to modify orders entered by a foreign state court. We will affirm.
We use initials or aliases for the names of the child and her family members to protect the child's privacy. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8(b).
I. BACKGROUND
In February 2023, the Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) filed its original SAPCR petition seeking to terminate Mother's parental rights to S.I. Broadly, the Department had concerns about Mother's mental health, neglectful supervision of S.I., and failure to follow-up on S.I.'s outcries of sexual abuse. S.I.-who was fifteen at the time-was removed from Mother's care, spent some time at a psychiatric hospital, and then was placed in a foster home. The trial court appointed the Department as S.I.'s temporary managing conservator.
At the time of filing its original petition, the Department was unaware of Father's identity. Father lives in Massachusetts, and it appears from the record that S.I. had not lived with him since she was three years old.
After learning Father's identity, the Department filed its first amended petition and added him as S.I.'s alleged father. The amended petition was the live pleading at the time of the final hearing. The Department pleaded that it would make reasonable efforts to return S.I. to Mother and Father. And though it requested termination of their parental rights, the Department explicitly predicated these requests on first being unsuccessful in its reunification efforts. The Department also pleaded certain requests for the trial court to enter permanent conservatorship orders, including, for example:
In each of its permanency reports to the trial court, the Department maintained that its primary permanency goal was family reunification.
Pursuant to §§ 153.005 and 263.404, Texas Family Code, if the child cannot safely be reunified with either parent, but may be permanently placed with a relative or other suitable person, the Department requests that the Court appoint the person as permanent sole managing conservator of the child; if the parental rights are terminated or if the department specifically consents in writing to being appointed permanent sole managing conservator without terminating of parental rights.
The case progressed with Mother working some of her required services and S.I. traveling to Boston for a 10-day unsupervised visit with Father. The Department also became aware of a 2007 paternity case involving Mother, Father, and S.I. that had been commenced in a Suffolk County, Massachusetts probate and family court. The Massachusetts court informed the Department that, within that case, Father had been found to be S.I.'s father and that two child support orders (Massachusetts Orders) had subsequently been entered. The Massachusetts Orders required Father to pay monthly child support and Mother to provide S.I.'s health insurance. They made no determinations related to S.I.'s custody or visitation.
In light of the Massachusetts Orders, the Department filed its Motion Regarding Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement in which it asked the trial court to confer with the Massachusetts court regarding jurisdiction and to find that Texas was S.I.'s home state and that the trial court had jurisdiction to render custody orders in this case. The trial court then entered its Order Regarding Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement which contained the following findings and orders:
The Honorable Judge McFarling of the 362nd Judicial District Court conferred with the office of Judge Brian Dunn of the Probate and Family Court Department of Suffolk County, Massachusetts. The Suffolk County Court does not wish to retain any continuing jurisdiction and wants this court to hear the case.
. . . .
The Court, after examining the record and hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, finds that all necessary prerequisites of the law have been satisfied and that this Court has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties.
. . . .
The child was brought to Texas on or about February of 2021, and has now resided in Texas for more than six months.
. . . .
[Father] . . . continues to live in Massachusetts. As a result of the action of [Mother] . . . the child moved to Texas.
. . . .
The Court therefore finds that the State of Texas is the home state of the child the subject of this suit and has jurisdiction pursuant to Subchapter C, Chapter 152, Texas Family Code, to render final orders for the custody of the child.
At the final hearing in February 2024, the Department did not seek termination of the parents' rights to S.I. Instead, the Department, S.I.'s attorney, and the guardian ad litem recommended that the trial court permanently place S.I. with Father in Boston. S.I.'s attorney reported that S.I. had expressed a desire to live with Father and to have visitation with Mother.
The trial court ruled orally that termination was not appropriate and stated, "I think it's more like treating this as a modification, so I think in the best interest of the child it would be best to try living with [F]ather . . . ." It then appointed Mother and Father as joint managing conservators, with Father having certain exclusive rights- namely, to designate S.I.'s primary residence-and Mother having visitation rights.
Mother then voiced her strong disagreement with the ruling:
I am a U.S. president candidate, and I override the courts. So you today were supposed to give me back my child, okay? . . . My child does not need to go anywhere. I am the primary care for this child . . . . There was no need for you to agree to send my child to Boston, Massachusetts, who has health conditions. . . . She's supposed to be here with me. [Father] is not taking care of her. He has not seen her since she was three years old. Okay? . . . So I do not appreciate that you overridden my power today, okay, as a judge because you do not care about the United States of America's laws -- federal laws. Okay?
You are not supposed to be sending that child anywhere over my authority. The presidents have authority over the courts.
The written final order comports with the trial court's oral rulings related to S.I.'s custody. It also contains a finding that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case, orders Mother to pay monthly child support and for S.I.'s health insurance, and orders that the Department was removed as S.I.'s managing conservator and was released from all previously-ordered duties. Finally, the trial court ordered that "all relief in this case, and not expressly granted, [was] denied."
II. DISCUSSION
A. Conservatorship Orders
In her first issue, Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Mother and Father as joint managing conservators even though such relief was never requested by the Department or any other party, and the issue was not tried by consent. She argues that the only relief sought was termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights and that the trial court, upon denying this relief, could not go further and make conservatorship determinations without violating her right to due process. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review trial court decisions on matters of child custody, control, possession, and visitation for an abuse of discretion. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); In re W.M., 172 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). "A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably or without reference to guiding principles." W.M., 172 S.W.3d at 725.
Due process requires that pleadings give reasonable notice of the claims asserted, and a trial court's judgment must conform to the pleadings. Moneyhon v. Moneyhon, 278 S.W.3d 874, 878 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). Pleadings should be liberally construed to contain any claims that reasonably may be inferred from the specific language used. Id. In the child-custody context, "a suit properly invoking the jurisdiction of a court with respect to custody and control of a minor child vests that court with decretal powers in all relevant custody, control, possession[,] and visitation matters involving the child. The courts are given wide discretion in such proceedings." Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1967). Thus, Texas courts have "long recognized that pleading standards may be relaxed on issues concerning the custody of children." In re J.O., No. 04-19-00381-CV, 2019 WL 6719029, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Further, Section 161.205 of the Texas Family Code provides that-in parental-rights termination cases-"if the court does not order termination of the parent-child relationship, the court shall: (1) deny the petition; or (2) render any order in the best interest of the child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.205 (emphasis added); see In re M.I.A., 594 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2019, no pet.) ("[Section 161.205] authorizes-and in fact requires-the court to render any order it determines is in the child's best interest."). Thus, citing Section 161.205, Texas courts have routinely affirmed trial court orders denying termination that also made conservatorship determinations. See M.I.A., 594 S.W.3d at 608-09. This includes cases where relief was granted on unpleaded theories or theories not tried by consent, see In re R.W.K., No. 10-16-00393-CV, 2017 WL 1957444, at *2 (Tex. App.-Waco May 10, 2017, no pet.), or where nonparties were appointed as managing conservators of the child, see M.I.A., 594 S.W.3d at 608-09 (collecting cases); In re A.N., No. 10-16-00394-CV, 2017 WL 4080100, at *8 (Tex. App.-Waco Sept. 13, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (collecting cases). Additionally, a trial court is required to appoint both parents as joint managing conservators of the child (as happened here) unless such appointment would not be in the best interest of the child because it would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(a).
2. Application
Here, the Department pleaded for termination but also made it clear that its first goal was reunification. And, though it did not specifically plead for Mother and Father to be appointed as joint managing conservators, it did ask the trial court to make certain custody determinations in the event that it did not terminate their parental rights. In the end, the trial court denied termination and reunified S.I. with her parents, naming them as joint managing conservators.
Thus, given (1) the Department's clear reunification goals, (2) its pleading for the trial court to consider custody issues, (3) Section 161.205's mandate for the trial court to "render any order" in S.I.'s best interest, (4) the requirement that parents be named joint managing conservators unless it is not in the child's best interest, and (5) the wide latitude given to trial courts to make custody determinations, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that Mother's due-process rights were not violated when it named the parents joint managing conservators of S.I.
B. Modification of Foreign Order
In her second issue, Mother argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify the Massachusetts Orders because they had not been filed as foreign orders under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and were not in evidence for the trial court to consider. We disagree with the premise of Mother's argument that the trial court's final order modified any custody determinations of the Massachusetts Orders. Those orders did not make any child-custody determinations to modify.
Section 152.203 of the Texas Family Code provides that a Texas court
may not modify a child[-]custody determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Section 152.201(a)(1) or (2) and:
(1) the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 152.202 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under Section 152.207; or
(2) a court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.203. "Child[-]custody determination" is defined as "a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child" and "does not include an order relating to child support or another monetary obligation of an individual." Id. § 152.102(3). Paternity orders constitute child-custody determinations only to the extent that they "provid[e] for legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child." Id.; see In re McMillan, 265 S.W.3d 918, 919-20 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, orig. proceeding) ("The UCCJEA applies to paternity actions only to the extent that such actions are included in 'a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.'" (quoting Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(4))); see also In re C.R.-A.A., 521 S.W.3d 893, 899-900 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, no pet.) (holding that Oklahoma order determining paternity that also required the father to pay support and medical expenses was not a child-custody determination because there was no indication in the record that the order resulted from custody proceedings and the order did not expressly adjudicate possessory rights to the child); In re T.B., 497 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied) (holding that order from Florida paternity proceeding constituted a child-custody determination where it declared paternity but also approved a settlement between the parties, provided a parenting plan, and set a visitation schedule); cf. In re Powers, 974 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) ("Continuing jurisdiction over visitation issues cannot be manufactured based on an order directly addressing only paternity and support issues.").
Here, the paternity proceedings in Massachusetts accomplished only three things: determined Father's paternity, set child-support amounts, and ordered Mother to pay for S.I.'s health insurance. There is no indication in the Massachusetts Orders or anywhere else in the record that the Massachusetts court made any determinations related to custody or visitation with respect to S.I. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(3). And there is no indication that the trial court believed itself to be modifying any purported custody determinations from those orders. It is true that the trial court stated orally that it was treating this case "more like . . . a modification." But it is not clear which order the trial court believed that it was modifying. It is just as likely that the trial court regarded its final order as a modification of its own prior temporary orders which had named the Department as S.I.'s managing conservator.
No matter the trial court's belief, speculation on this point is irrelevant to determining Mother's issue which relies on the premise that the trial court improperly modified the custody determinations of the Massachusetts Orders. Having held that those orders did not make any child-custody determinations, it necessarily follows that the trial court made no such modifications. We overrule Mothers' second issue.
To the extent that Mother contends that the trial court improperly modified the child-support determinations in the Massachusetts Orders, we overrule this argument because she did not adequately brief it on appeal. See Gunderson v. Nat'l Indoor RV Ctrs., LLC, No. 02-24-00025-CV, 2024 WL 3365233, at *2 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth July 11, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) ("Without appropriate citations to the record, citations for legal references, and substantive legal analysis, a brief is inadequate to present an issue for our review, and the issue is waived." (cleaned up)). The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) governs child support and is "a completely independent unform law" from the UCCJEA, which governs custody issues. In re M.I.M., 370 S.W.3d 94, 97 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied). "The standards of each act are different, and they evaluate jurisdiction independently." Id. Mother's only argument on this issue is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA; she makes no such argument under the UIFSA, which would require a separate jurisdictional analysis that she has not briefed for our review.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Mother's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.