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In re Shyanne

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight.
Nov 26, 2003
No. B166184 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003)

Opinion

B166184.

11-26-2003

In re SHYANNE T. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Respondent, v. ROSA P. and MARIO S., Appellants.

Mary Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant Rosa P. Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant Mario S. Craig E. Arthur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors. Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, and Pamela S. Landeros, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.


Rosa P. (mother), Mario S. (father) and the three minor children (Shyanne T., Francisco S., and Timothy S., collectively referred to as the younger siblings), appeal from the order terminating mothers and fathers parental rights to the younger siblings. In separate appeals, mother, father and the younger siblings all contend: (1) there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that the younger siblings were adoptable; and (2) the juvenile court erred in finding the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) and (E) exceptions to the preference for termination of parental rights and adoption did not apply. In addition, the younger siblings contend: (1) the adoption assessment report was insufficient; and (2) the juvenile court erred by giving the Department of Children and Family Services (the department) "unfettered discretion regarding adoptive placement of the younger siblings amidst a cloud of unanswered questions." After review, we affirm the order.

Father appeals only from the termination of his parental rights to Francisco and Timothy, not Shyanne, who was not his biological child. He joins in the arguments advanced by mother, Francisco, and Timothy regarding the childrens adoptability and Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(A) and (E) exceptions. Inasmuch as we affirm the order, we need not address fathers argument that a finding of reversible error vis-à-vis mother and Francisco and Timothy, would require reversing the order vis-à-vis father, as well.

All further undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the time dependency proceedings were initiated in Riverside County on June 30, 2000, mother had five children: Sara B. (age 10), Ray B. (age 7), Freddie B. (age 6), Shyanne T. (age 3), and Francisco S. (age 15 months). Mothers sixth child, Timothy S., was born on July 15, 2000, several weeks after dependency proceedings were initiated. Father is the presumed father of Francisco and Timothy. Shyannes father is deceased.

Ray B. is the presumed father of Sara, Ray and Freddie (referred to collectively as the older siblings). The older siblings are not subject of this appeal. Accordingly, we do not recount facts relating only to the older siblings except where those facts are relevant to issues on appeal.

On June 28, 2000, all of the children (except for Timothy, who had not been born yet) were detained and, two days later, a section 300 petition was filed alleging that they came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d) and (g) because mother and father had physically abused them; father had sexually abused Sara and mother had failed to protect her; father had committed acts of domestic violence against mother in the childrens presence; mother had a history of substance abuse; and Ray B., who also had a history of substance abuse and whose whereabouts were unknown, had not provided for the older siblings. The older siblings were placed with their paternal grandmother. Shyanne and Francisco were placed in shelter care. When Timothy was born on July 15, 2000, he was detained and placed in shelter care.

In August 2000, the juvenile court sustained an amended petition, finding that all six children came within section 300, subdivisions (a), (d), (g) and (j). The older siblings remained placed with the paternal grandmother, while the younger siblings were placed with mother, who was then residing in an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. Family maintenance and reunification services were ordered for mother and reunification services were ordered for father.

By the six-month review hearing in March 2001, mother and the younger siblings had moved from Riverside County to Los Angeles County, where they were living in the home of the maternal grandparents. Father, meanwhile, had been incarcerated and, in addition to several pending criminal charges, was on an immigration hold. He had not seen his children. Although mother had participated in six months of substance abuse and parent education services, she was still reluctant to accept the fact that Sara had been abused. The juvenile court found mother and father had failed to "participate/complete" the court ordered case plan. It extended reunification services to mother for another six months.

Eventually, father was sentenced to 15 years.

At an April 8, 2002, review hearing, almost two years after dependency proceedings had been initiated, the juvenile court selected long term foster care with the paternal grandmother as the permanent placement plan for the older siblings and ordered continued family maintenance services for mother and the younger siblings. Just one month later, the younger siblings were detained after mother twice tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. A section 387 supplemental petition was filed on May 16, 2002. On June 12, 2002, mother once again had a positive drug test, this time for marijuana. Prior to the hearing on the petition, Shyanne told a social worker that she did not want to return to the maternal grandmothers home because mother and the maternal grandmother hit her and Francisco with belts and shoes. Francisco, however, denied any physical abuse and told the social worker that he wanted to return to the maternal grandparents home. Meanwhile, a maternal aunt who was a licensed foster mother already caring for three foster children, offered to return her current charges to the county so that she could provide long term foster care for the younger siblings.

Following a hearing on June 18, 2002, the juvenile court sustained the section 387 petition, terminated reunification services for mother and the younger siblings, and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing on October 7, 2002. It ordered the department to continue to evaluate the maternal grandparents home for placement and that mother be allowed twice weekly visits with the younger siblings. Mother did not seek review of this order.

According to the report prepared for the October 7, 2002, section 366.26 hearing, the younger siblings were all doing well in their respective foster homes. Shyanne was described by her therapist as "very cooperative and wonderfully imaginative." Franciscos foster mother had indicated a desire to care for all three children in long-term foster care, and possibly as their legal guardian. The maternal grandparents had made several "major adjustments" to make their home more suitable for placement, but the department questioned whether the "quality of childcare provided by [the maternal grandmother] would be beneficial to the best interests of the children." The department was continuing to interview prospective relative care givers for the younger siblings. Meanwhile, the younger siblings participated in weekly visits with one another and the extended maternal family, although mothers participation was sporadic. The juvenile court continued the section 366.26 hearing to February 3, 2003, pending which it ordered the department to continue its attempts to locate an adoptive family for the younger siblings.

According to the report prepared for the February 3, 2003, hearing, mother was doing well in an inpatient drug treatment program, had remarried a man she met in that program, and was pregnant with her seventh child. The younger siblings continued to do well in their respective foster placements. Shyanne had expressed a desire to return to live with the maternal grandmother, but could not say why she wanted to do so; Francisco only expressed such a desire when asked; and Timothy was too young to express any desire on the subject. Although reunification services had been terminated, and the maternal family visited the younger siblings only sporadically, the maternal grandparents expressed their belief that the younger siblings would eventually be returned to mother, but stated that they would adopt them "if they had to." The maternal grandparents home was rejected for adoptive placement, however, because of overcrowding issues and because the maternal grandfather had failed to provide the department with citizenship documentation, a requisite for such placement. Meanwhile, Timothys foster parents indicated they were considering adopting all three younger siblings.

On February 3, 2003, the juvenile court found the younger siblings were likely to be adopted and that adoption was the appropriate permanent placement plan. The matter was continued to April 2, 2003, for a contested section 366.26 hearing as to termination of parental rights. On that date, after hearing mothers testimony and reviewing the reports, the juvenile court terminated parental rights as to the younger siblings and ordered their custody transferred to the department for the purposes of adoptive planning and placement.

Mother, father, and the younger siblings filed timely notices of appeal.

DISCUSSION

The Juvenile Courts Finding That the Children Were Adoptable is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Mother, father, and the younger siblings contend there was not sufficient evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the children were adoptable. The essence of each of their arguments is that this is so because the younger siblings comprised a sibling group that needed to be placed together, but that no adoptive family had been identified to do so. The younger siblings further argue that there was no evidence as to what efforts the department was making to place the children as a sibling group, why they had not already been so placed or when they would be so placed. We find no error.

Parental rights may be terminated only after a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1204 (Jerome D.).) "Clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1205, internal quotation marks omitted.) We review the juvenile courts finding for substantial evidence, viewing the evidence in the light must favorable to the judgment and making all legitimate inferences in favor of upholding the juvenile courts order. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361-1362.)

"[T]he issue whether a dependent child is likely to be adopted focuses on the child rather than on the prospective adoptive family . . . ." (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1650 (Sarah M.).) "[I]t is not necessary that the minor already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent `waiting in the wings. [Citations.] [¶] Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minors age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parents willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family." (Id. at pp. 1649-1650, italics omitted; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)

Here, the Permanency Planning/Adoption Assessment reports for each of the younger siblings contained substantial evidence that each was adoptable. According to the assessment reports dated January 29, 2003, six-year-old Shyanne had no apparent emotional, mental or health need concerns. Her academic performance in kindergarten had been at grade level and she had no learning or behavior problems and no special needs. She was doing well in her foster placement. Shyannes foster mother was not interested in adopting Shyanne, but would cooperate in helping to find an adoptive family. Three-year-old Francisco had no apparent developmental difficulties, emotional or mental health concerns. Franciscos foster mother was definitely interested in adopting Francisco and Timothy, but was uncertain about Shyanne. Two-year-old Timothy was meeting all developmental milestones and had no apparent mental health needs or concerns. Although Timothys foster mother initially expressed a desire to adopt all three of the younger siblings, she subsequently concluded she was interested in adopting only Timothy. In accordance with the departments recommendation to continue the permanency planning hearing to find an adoptive home willing to take the younger siblings as a sibling group, on February 3, 2003, the juvenile court continued the matter to April 2, 2003. On that date, the juvenile court terminated parental rights over the minors objection that there was not sufficient evidence they were adoptable. We find the evidence legally sufficient.

In addition to the maternal grandparents, two other families had also expressed interest in adopting the younger siblings as a sibling group. Although one potential adoptive family did not develop into an actual adoptive family (Timothys foster family), a second potential adoptive family was identified and still a viable possibility (Franciscos foster family). This evidence was sufficient from which to infer that the younger siblings physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to them, including the fact that they were part of a sibling group, were not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting them, and generally indicated that they were likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (Cf. Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1649-1650.)

Jerome D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, relied upon by the younger siblings, does not compel a contrary result. In that case, the finding of adoptability was based partially on the mothers boyfriends willingness to adopt. The appellate court found this insufficient because the adoption assessment report had failed to note that the boyfriend had a criminal history involving domestic violence against the mother; that the child had a prosthetic eye, which required treatment; and whether there were any other approved families willing to adopt. (Id. at p. 1205.) Here, the adoption assessment reports contained all of the relevant information about the younger siblings mental and physical health, as well as information about the prospective adoptive families, including the maternal grandparents. Unlike in Jerome D., there was no evidence that negative information had been omitted from the assessment reports.

The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Finding the Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(A) and (E) Exceptions Did Not Apply

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception to the preference for termination of parental rights and selection of adoption as the permanent plan, did not apply. Mother argues that there was substantial evidence that she was the younger siblings caretaker for a substantial portion of their lives, maintained continued contact with them after they were detained, and that there existed a bond between her and the younger siblings. Mother, father, and the children all contend the court abused its discretion in finding the subdivision (c)(1)(E) exception also did not apply. They argue that there was substantial evidence the siblings had developed a bond within the meaning of the exception. We find no merit in either contention.

a. Benefits of Continued Relationship With Mother Did Not Outweigh

Benefits of Adoption.

". . . A finding . . . under section 366.21 or 366.22, that the court has continued to remove the child from the custody of the parent . . . and has terminated reunification services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (A) The parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)

The parent has the burden of showing either that (1) continuation of the parent-child relationship will promote the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents, or (2) termination of the parental relationship would be detrimental to the child. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 465 (Angel B.).) "To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parents rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed. [Citations.] A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. [Citation.]" (Ibid. at p. 465, italics omitted.) The biological parent must have occupied a parental role. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.)

"The factors to be considered when looking for whether a relationship is important and beneficial are: (1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the childs particular needs. [Citation.] While the exact nature of the kind of parent/child relationship which must exist to trigger the application of the statutory exception to terminating parental rights is not defined in the statute, the relationship must be such that the child would suffer detriment from its termination. [Citation.]" (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 467, fn. omitted.)

Here, at the April 2, 2003, hearing, mother testified that the younger siblings called her "mom," had been out of her care for only the past six months and that she visited with them every Saturday, from 11 a.m. to noon. There was contrary evidence, however, that the siblings had been out of her care for almost one year, having been detained the second time on May 13, 2002, and that mother had only visited them "sporadically" since then. The juvenile court found the evidence insufficient to satisfy the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception, observing: "We are dealing with a mother who has had nothing but monitored visits on a weekly basis with her three children and has not progressed beyond that. And it appears as if the visits have been nothing more than just visits, and havent risen to the level of taking parental control." The younger siblings were too young to understand the concept of a biological parent; since their detention they had spent few hours with mother; and there was no indication that their interactions with mother were like those of a child with his or her mother. They were all doing well in foster care and there was no evidence that they had any needs that could be met only by mother, rather than a foster/adoptive mother. "[T]here was no hint in the record before the juvenile court that [the younger siblings] would be harmed in any way if [their] relatively brief, albeit happy, visits with Mother were to end." (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 468.)

Mothers argument that the younger siblings could have had their need for long term stability satisfied by placement with the maternal grandparents is not supported by the evidence. On the contrary, the evidence established that the maternal grandparents home was not an appropriate placement. In addition to overcrowding and safety issues, which had been somewhat ameliorated, an uncle living there had a criminal record and the maternal grandfather had been uncooperative in providing the department with the paperwork needed to qualify him as an adoptive parent.

b. Benefit of Maintaining the Sibling Relationship Did Not Outweigh

Benefits of Adoption.

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), provides an exception to termination of parental rights when: "[t]here would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of that relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the childs best interest, including the childs long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).) The mere existence of a sibling relationship is not enough to trigger the exception. The sibling relationship "must be `sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination. [Citation.] If the court finds there is a substantial detriment, it must `weigh the childs best interest in continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption. [Citation.]" (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1016-1017 (Jacob S.).) The benefits of adoption may outweigh even substantial detriment. (Id. at p. 1018.)

Here, although counsel for father expressly objected to termination of parental rights based upon the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) exception at the April 3, 2003, hearing, and counsel for mother asked the court to consider the relationship between the older and younger siblings when deciding whether to terminate parental rights, no evidence was proffered at the hearing to establish the applicability of that exception. On appeal, mother argues that the following evidence in the record was sufficient to establish the exception: Shyanne lived with the older siblings until she was three and one-half years old and Francisco until he was 16 months old. Subsequently, the younger siblings participated in mothers visits with the older siblings and the older siblings had some overnight visits at the home of the maternal grandmother, where the younger siblings were then living. After the younger siblings were detained in May 2002, they continued to visit with the older siblings. At the October 7, 2002, hearing, the juvenile court granted Sarahs request for visits with the younger siblings. In February 2003, the younger and older siblings were visiting weekly.

This evidence was not sufficient to establish that any interference with the sibling relationship between the older and younger siblings would be so detrimental as to outweigh the benefits of permanent placement through adoption. There was no showing that the younger siblings understood that the older siblings were anything more than playmates. Moreover, we note that there was no indication that any adoptive parents would not allow sibling visits to continue. (Cf. In re L.Y.L (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952; Jacob S., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015; In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 254.) On the contrary, there was evidence that Franciscos foster mother enjoyed the sibling visits. Even assuming another adoptive family would not be as accommodating, the evidence was insufficient that ongoing sibling contact would be more beneficial to the younger siblings long-term emotional interest than the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).)

The Adoption Assessment Reports Were Sufficient

The younger siblings contend the adoption assessment reports did not sufficiently comply with section 361.5, subdivision (g). They argue that the reports had too little information about any prospective adoptive home. We disagree.

In pertinent part section 361.5, subdivision (g) provides: "Whenever a court orders that a hearing shall be held pursuant to Section 366.26, it shall direct the . . . licensed county adoption agency, or the State Department of Social Services . . . to prepare an assessment that shall include: [¶] . . . [¶] (4) A preliminary assessment of the eligibility and commitment of any identified prospective adoptive parent or guardian, particularly the caretaker, to include a social history including screening for criminal records and prior referrals for child abuse or neglect, the capability to meet the childs needs, and the understanding of the legal and financial rights and responsibilities of adoption and guardianship. . . . [¶] (5) The relationship of the child to any identified prospective adoptive parent or guardian, the duration and character of the relationship, the motivation for seeking adoption or guardianship, and a statement from the child concerning placement and the adoption or guardianship, unless the childs age or physical, emotional, or other condition precludes his or her meaningful response, and if so, a description of the condition. [¶] (6) An analysis of the likelihood that the child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated."

In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, cited in the childrens brief, is inapposite. The appellate court in that case reversed an order terminating parental rights, noting that the juvenile court did not have any adoption assessment report, only references to adoption assessments in status review reports: "While the section 366.26 report did include a bare statement that the chances for adoption were `very good, this hardly amounts to clear and convincing evidence. A social workers opinion, by itself, is not sufficient to support a finding of adoptability. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 624.)

In contrast, the juvenile court here had before it adoption assessment reports as to each of the three younger siblings. Those reports discussed each of the factors set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (g). In particular, those reports discussed the departments efforts to place the younger siblings as a sibling group with each of their respective foster families. The reports also detailed the appropriateness of the maternal grandparents home. As such, those reports satisfied the requirements of section 361.5, subdivision (g). (See In re Diana G. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1481 [substantial compliance is sufficient].)

The Juvenile Court Did Not "Abdicate Its Role"

The younger siblings contend the juvenile court erred by failing on April 2, 2003, to continue the matter to give the department more time to find an adoptive home that would take them as a sibling group or, alternatively, to order long-term foster care as the permanent plan if no such adoptive home could be found. As we understand it, their argument is that the juvenile court should have exercised its section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) discretion and retained jurisdiction "to ensure that indeed the children would be placed together. Instead, the court abdicated its role to [the department]." This contention lacks merit.

In pertinent part, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) provides: "If the court finds that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the child pursuant to paragraph (1) and that the child has a high probability of adoption but is difficult to place for adoption and there is no identified or available prospective adoptive parent, the court may identify adoption as the permanent placement goal and without terminating parental rights, order that efforts be made to locate an appropriate adoptive family for the child within a period not to exceed 180 days. . . . At the expiration of this period, another hearing shall be held and the court shall proceed pursuant to paragraph (1), (3), or (4) or subdivision (b). For purposes of this section, a child may only be found to be difficult to place for adoption if there is no identified or available prospective adoptive parent for the child because of the childs membership in a sibling group . . . ." (Italics added.)

First, the assertion that the juvenile court "abdicated its role by . . . giving the [department] unfettered discretion regarding adoptive placement of the children . . . ," reflects a misunderstanding of the dependency law. In In re Harry N. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1378, this court held that, "absent an abuse of discretion, the Legislature has given the power to the Department, not the court, to decide where a child should be placed after parental rights are terminated and pending adoption. (Id. at p. 1397.) Thus, the juvenile court did not "abdicate its role" when it transferred custody of the younger siblings to the department for adoptive placement. Rather, it followed the procedure established by the Legislature in the statutory scheme of the dependency laws for the evaluation and placement of dependent children in adoptive homes.

Second, the juvenile court did not give the department "unfettered discretion" to place the younger siblings in an adoptive home(s). On the contrary, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a dependent child after parental rights have been terminated to assure that the department does not abuse its discretion to decide where the child should be placed. (See, e.g., § 366.3, subd. (a) [if adoption is the permanent plan, "the court shall retain jurisdiction over the child until the child is adopted . . . . The status of the child shall be reviewed every six months to ensure that the adoption . . . is completed as expeditiously as possible. When the adoption of the child has been granted, the court shall terminate its jurisdiction over the child."].)

Finally, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) is discretionary, not mandatory. The juvenile court is not required to refrain from terminating parental rights until an appropriate adoptive family is found for difficult to place children. Under the circumstances here present, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in electing not to proceed pursuant to that section. This is because by April 2, 2003, the matter had already been continued 180 days from the initial section 366.26 hearing on October 7, 2002. During that time, Shyanne had gone from 5 years old, to more than 6 years old. In another 180 days, she would be almost 7 years old, making her even more difficult to place. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(3) [child seven years of age or more may be found "difficult to place"].) It is reasonable to infer from this record that the juvenile court determined that proceeding pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) would have been detrimental to the likelihood of Shyanne being adopted at all, much less as a part of a sibling group.

Moreover, even assuming that failure to proceed pursuant to subdivision (c)(3) was an abuse of discretion, which we do not believe it was, any such error was patently harmless here. This is because the juvenile court did, in fact, continue the matter 180 days from the initial section 366.26 hearing on October 7, 2002, to allow the department to find an adoptive home for the younger siblings. Although the juvenile court did not on October 7, 2002, make an express finding that the younger siblings were adoptable but difficult to place because they were part of a sibling group within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3), such a finding is implicit in its order which expressly refrained from selecting a permanent placement plan and continued the hearing to allow the department "to attempt to locate an adoptive family within 120 days and to prepare/submit a report regarding such efforts." Thereafter, on February 3, 2003, the juvenile court found the younger siblings were likely to be adopted, chose adoption as the permanent plan, but still did not terminate parental rights. Instead, it continued the matter to April 3, 2003, to allow mother to contest the findings. During that time, the department continued to assess the possibility of placing the younger siblings with the maternal grandparents or one of the foster families. Although the department recommended at the April 2, 2003, hearing, that the juvenile court find the younger siblings adoptable, but difficult to place pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3), the juvenile court terminated parental rights, finding the younger siblings were adoptable and that neither the section 366.26 subdivision (c)(1)(A) nor (c)(1)(E) exceptions applied, findings which we have already determined were supported by substantial evidence. Under these circumstances, any failure of the juvenile court to expressly find the younger siblings difficult to place within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) and to continue the matter another 180 days was patently harmless.

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., BOLAND, J.


Summaries of

In re Shyanne

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight.
Nov 26, 2003
No. B166184 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003)
Case details for

In re Shyanne

Case Details

Full title:In re SHYANNE T. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight.

Date published: Nov 26, 2003

Citations

No. B166184 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003)