Opinion
A099973.
7-30-2003
In re SHANE K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent. v. SHANE K., Defendant and Appellant.
Shane K. appeals from juvenile court orders sustaining a misdemeanor vandalism allegation and committing him to the custody of the probation department for placement in a suitable foster home or institution. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
At around 10:00 p.m. on July 19, 2001, Kevin Richter heard a loud thud on the outside of his house, followed five or ten seconds later by a can of Pepsi crashing through the dining room window, hitting the wall and landing on the couch. The can dented the wall and splattered soda over the carpets and sofa. Another can landed in the backyard.
Officer Chris Waldrop of the Vacaville Police Department was dispatched to the Richter home, having received information that a blue van was involved in the incident. About two miles from the Richter residence, he saw and stopped a van matching that description. An adult and four juveniles, including Shane, were in the van, as was a 12-pack of Pepsi. All of the occupants appeared nervous. Suspecting they were involved in the vandalism, Officer Waldrop asked the driver if he was responsible. After first denying any knowledge, the driver then identified others in the van as the perpetrators. Officer Waldrop asked the youths to identify who had thrown the cans, telling them that otherwise everyone could possibly be arrested. Shane and another minor admitted having thrown the cans.
The record does not disclose how many cans remained in the 12-pack.
Officer Waldrop directed Shane and the others to drive back to the Richter residence under police escort to investigate whether the damage warranted an arrest. After returning to the house, while seated in the parked van, Shane repeated his admission in response to further questioning.
Officer Waldrop testified he had not read Shane his Miranda rights because he had not yet decided whether to effect an arrest.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (Miranda).
POLLAK, J.
I concur. Shane certainly was not in custody when the van was stopped and he initially confessed to Officer Waldrop that he had thrown the cans. It is less clear that he was not subject to custodial restraint when he and the others returned to the Richter residence at the direction of the officer and under police escort, between two police vehicles. However, even if Shanes confirmation of his admission should not have been received in evidence because of a Miranda violation, any error in this respect was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the initial confession was properly received. Notes:
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.
Pollak, J.
DISCUSSION
I.Miranda
At the end of the jurisdictional hearing, Shane moved to strike his admissions based on an alleged Miranda violation. The trial court concluded Miranda did not apply because Shane was not subject to custodial restraint when he made the admissions. We agree.
In reviewing Miranda claims, "we must accept the trial courts resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.] However, we must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained." (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 128, 885 P.2d 887, internal quotation marks omitted.)
It is hornbook law that Miranda warnings are only required if the suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation. (Miranda , supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 473-474; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) " In applying Miranda . . . one normally begins by asking whether custodial interrogation has taken place. "The phrase custodial interrogation is crucial. The adjective [custodial] encompasses any situation in which a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. " [Citation.] Absent "custodial interrogation," Miranda simply does not come into play. [Citation.]" (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401, 966 P.2d 442.)
"Custody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived. [Citations.]" (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1050, 846 P.2d 756, internal quotation marks omitted, overruled on other grounds in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325-326, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 114 S. Ct. 1526.)
"`Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. . . . [Citation.]" (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 401-402.) "The initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. [Citation.]" (Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 323.) The focus is on how a reasonable person in the suspects circumstances " would have understood his situation. " (People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 272, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610, overruled on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1, 889 P.2d 588.) Of the numerous factors that are recognized as potentially relevant to the determination, "no one factor is dispositive. Rather, we look at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest. [Citation.]" (People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162.) Here, Shane asserts Officer Waldrops questions constituted custodial interrogation because the officer testified to his belief that, at the time of questioning, the youths were not free to leave. Not so. "An officers subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody." (Stansbury v. California,supra, 511 U.S. at p. 319.) As the court explained in In re Joseph R. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 954, 960: " An officers views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in custody, but only if the officers views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. [Citation.]" Here, the record here contains no testimony that Officer Waldrops view was communicated to the participants.
Nor do we find persuasive Shanes contention that he was effectively in custody during Officer Waldrops questioning. "[A] policeman who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to `investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. [Citation.] `The stop and inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation." [Citation.] Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officers suspicions." (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 439, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 104 S. Ct. 3138, fn. omitted (Berkemer) [holding traffic stops typically do not require Miranda advisements].)
Shane and his companions were questioned while temporarily detained to determine whether they were involved in the vandalism. The questioning occurred in public and among his companions, so that Shane was unlikely to fear police abuse should he not cooperate. (See Berkemer,supra, 468 U.S. 420 at p. 438.) He was neither placed in restraints nor told he was under arrest. The questioning appeared to be brief and the suspects were allowed to drive their own vehicle back to the Richter home. Shane had not been removed from the van or otherwise restrained when he made the admissions. In short, Officer Waldrop took no action that would lead a reasonable person in Shanes position to experience a restraint tantamount to an arrest. Based on these facts, the trial court properly rejected the claim that he was subjected to custodial interrogation.
II.Involuntary Confession
Shane contends his conviction must be reversed because his statements to Officer Waldrop were involuntary and should have been excluded on that basis. He has waived this issue by failing to raise it below. (People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 172, 852 P.2d 331.)
Shane further claims that, if the objection is deemed waived, his trial counsel deprived him of effective assistance of counsel by failing to raise it at trial. The claim fails because, on this record, the objection would not have resulted in a different outcome. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) A confession or admission is involuntary, and therefore subject to exclusion at trial, only if it is the product of coercive police activity. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659, 941 P.2d 752.) The inquiry, a factual one based on the totality of the circumstances, is whether the suspect made the statement as a result of a free and unconstrained choice or "because his will was overborne." (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 827, 905 P.2d 1305.) The record here contains no evidence that Officer Waldrop engaged in any coercive or deceptive tactics or that Shanes statements were the product of coercion. Accordingly, his assertion that the objection would have prevailed is, at best, a matter of surmise.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Parrilli, J.