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In re Saylor/Graf

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Jul 18, 2017
No. 336149 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 18, 2017)

Opinion

No. 336149 No. 336157

07-18-2017

In re SAYLOR/GRAF, Minors.


UNPUBLISHED Eaton Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 14-018857-NA Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and MURRAY and BORRELLO, JJ. PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 336149, respondent-mother appeals as of right from a circuit court order terminating her parental rights to her five minor children (TS, IS, GS, CS and MG) under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (children will likely be harmed if returned). In Docket No. 336157 respondent-father appeals from the same order, except in connection with only the four older children. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

The trial court acknowledged that the youngest child, MG, was born after respondents divorced and respondent-father was not the biological father of that child.

A. BACKGROUND

This case began in response to respondent-father's having severely beaten respondents' son TS with a speaker wire, for which respondent-father served terms of imprisonment and parole for second-degree child abuse. DHHS filed a petition on April 14, 2014, regarding the three oldest children (the two youngest children, CS and MG, had not yet been born). The petition reported that Child Protective Services (CPS) received a complaint regarding respondent-father striking TS with speaker wire several times because TS broke his glasses. The petition alleged that TS suffered injuries that were "black and blue with bruising." The petition also alleged that respondent-mother admitted that respondent-father had "gone overboard," and that respondent-father had many times resorted to such excesses with the child. Respondent-mother appreciated that this was excessive about three years ago but she was afraid of respondent-father from the domestic abuse that he perpetrated against respondent-mother.

The circuit court ordered that the children remain in the home with respondent-mother and that respondent-father be removed from the home. On June 9, 2014, the circuit court assumed jurisdiction over the children and ordered that reasonable efforts be made for reunification. Sometime after July 2014, respondent-father pleaded guilty to second-degree child abuse and was sentenced to 19 months imprisonment. He was released in early 2016.

On March 27, 2015, the court ordered that reasonable efforts continue to be made and ordered that respondent-mother receive outreach counseling, domestic violence training, and case management services.

Thereafter, while respondent-father was serving his prison sentence, respondent-mother gave birth to a daughter (CS), over whom the court assumed jurisdiction upon reports that the infant was diagnosed with failure to thrive, reflux, and cleft palate, and had been hospitalized three times because of weight loss, which was attributed to improper feeding. After respondents divorced, respondent-mother gave birth to a fifth child (MG), who had no legal father and whose putative father had no involvement with the case. The children were ultimately removed from the home when the court found that the home was unfit and that the two youngest children had health issues.

A foster-care case manager involved with the case listed respondent-mother's barriers to reunification as emotional stability, employment, housing, and parenting skills. She listed respondent-father's barriers as housing, emotional stability, domestic relations, and parenting skills. Asked about the progress of either parent, the case manager replied, "I would say minimal." Following several permanency planning hearings, on August 10, 2016, the circuit court authorized DHHS to proceed with a termination petition. The court cited respondent-mother's significant barriers of mental health, parenting abilities, housing and employment despite having received services such as a parenting coach, counseling and resource instruction.

The trial court held a termination hearing on October 31, 2016. At the hearing, petitioner presented evidence that respondent-mother continued to live in a "filthy" and cluttered house, maintained only spotty employment, tended to downplay the significance of the domestic violence she and the children had experienced, and suffered from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder. Petitioner presented evidence that respondent-father failed to address his anger issues, and upon being released from prison had not found stable housing or sufficient employment to support the children. Petitioner's witnesses opined that the bonds between the children and their parents were variously weak or nonexistent.

The foster-care case manager opined that respondent-mother was unable to meet her own emotional needs and so would not be able to meet the children's. She further testified that if any of the children were returned to respondent-father, her "biggest concern would be safety," adding, "I don't think that [respondent-father] has demonstrated that he has learned the skills to be able to control his anger management with the children."

At the close of proofs, the circuit court found grounds for termination as set forth above and concluded that termination was in the children's best interests. The trial court entered a termination order on November 16, 2016. This appeal ensued.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

An appellate court "review[s] for clear error both the court's decision that a ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and . . . the court's decision regarding the child's best interest." In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). "Clear error exists when some evidence supports a finding, but a review of the entire record leaves the reviewing court with the definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a mistake." In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 700; 847 NW2d 514 (2014).

C. ANALYSIS

I. SERVICES

Both respondents make arguments suggesting that DHHS did not provide adequate services in the furtherance of reunification. However, respondents fail to raise this issue in their question presented and this Court need not address arguments that are not germane to the issues set forth in the statement of questions presented. MCR 7.212(C)(5). Nevertheless, we have addressed the arguments and found that they lack merit.

"In general, petitioner must make reasonable efforts to rectify conditions, to reunify families, and to avoid termination of parental rights." In re LE, 278 Mich App 1, 18; 747 NW2d 883 (2008). Specifically, "[r]easonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases" unless certain aggravating circumstances are present, MCL 712A.19a(2), and aggravating circumstances did not exist in this case. Petitioner makes "reasonable efforts" when it gives the parent referrals for, and attempts to engage the family in, services. In re JL, 483 Mich 300, 322-323 n 15; 770 NW2d 853 (2009).

A. RESPONDENT-MOTHER

The record shows that DHHS provided respondent-mother with a reasonable opportunity to participate in services. Kimberly Christensen, a counselor, testified that she started working with respondent-mother in February 2015. She continued offering counseling sessions to respondent-mother on a pro bono basis after funding ran out. Christensen testified that DHHS renewed her contract with respondent-mother on two occasions, but did not offer a third renewal because respondent-mother was not making progress. In addition, Dr. Shannon Lowder, a mental health professional, testified that she performed a psychological evaluation of respondent. Dr. Lowder testified that respondent-mother had been in therapy for two years. Furthermore, Charise Tuell, a visit coach, worked with respondent-mother for about one month, supervising five parenting visits. Micha Lurie, another visitation coach, worked with respondent-mother for about six weeks. Pamela Dunckel, an infant mental health specialist, observed some of respondent-mother's parenting time visits. In addition, Kimberly Cena, a mental health therapist, worked with the family doing in-home visits to work on emotional issues and parent-child interactions and parenting skills. Thus, the record shows that respondent-mother was provided abundant services, including family and parenting services, personal counseling, domestic violence counsel, and supportive visitation. These amount to reasonable efforts to reunify respondent-mother with her children and respondent-mother has failed to show that petitioner did not fulfill its obligations under MCL 712A.19a(2).

B. RESPONDENT-FATHER

With respect to services, the record shows that respondent-father was afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate in services. During his 19-month prison sentence, respondent-father participated in services. He participated in a program called "thinking for a change," participated in a financial class, and completed Michigan Works testing. After his release, DHHS referred respondent-father to a domestic violence program called "PATS." Respondent-father attended counseling sessions with Lorna Poyner, but he maintains that he initiated these sessions. Poyner testified that she worked with respondent-father on anger issues and she was still seeing respondent-father at the time of the termination hearing. In addition, respondent-father received substance abuse counseling. Bonnie Miriani, a substance abuse counselor, testified that she worked with respondent-father, but respondent-father quit seeing her after her diagnosis. Sheila Kaminski, a substance abuse counselor, met with respondent-father on four occasions. In addition, DHHS held a family planning meeting where respondent-father stormed out, slamming the door on his way. This record supports that DHHS provided respondent-father a meaningful opportunity to participate in services.

Respondent-father argues that he was attending the PATS course and that his parole officer thought the latter a 20-week course while other indications in the record suggested a longer period, and also that delayed funding made it difficult for him to continue in it without interruption. Respondent-father suggests that his parole officer's misapprehension of how long the program took caused the officer to fail to appreciate respondent-father's progress. However, the parole officer's testimony indicated that he had ongoing concerns about respondent-father's progress:

It took him a while to get into the program. He has had one other violation for not attending class. I received an email on Thursday stating that he's not attending class again, which could lead to another violation. Progress reports were not good. I believe when I was speaking to him on the phone they made reference to he was just sitting in the class counting the squares on the ceiling, not participating, not trying to get anything out of it.
Thus, the parole officer's testimony does not support that respondent-father was denied the opportunity to participate in the class.

Respondent-father also argues that he was not afforded an opportunity for parenting time. Respondent-father's parole officer testified that the conditions of respondent-father's parole included that he not have contact with persons under 17 years old without his permission, which the officer was unwilling to provide in the absence of positive feedback in connection with respondent-father's participation in the domestic violence course. Respondent-father characterizes the prohibition of contact with children as a condition of parole as a failure on petitioner's part to provide services, but cites no authority for the proposition that where a parent's participation in parenting time or other reunification services is hampered as a consequence of that parent's criminal liability, the situation should be deemed a failure on petitioner's part to provide opportunities. Moreover, other professionals testified that respondent-father still had anger-management issues and that respondent-father needed to show improvement on those issues.

In short, respondent-father has not shown that petitioner failed to fulfill its obligations under MCL 712A.19a(2).

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Petitioner has the "burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a ground for termination." In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 430-431; 871 NW2d 868 (2015) (quotation marks omitted). "To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).

The trial court terminated both respondents' parental rights, in part, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), which provides as follows:

(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:


* * *

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.

A. RESPONDENT-MOTHER

Here, the conditions that led to the termination included housing, employment, parenting skills, domestic violence and emotional instability. It is undisputed that more than 182 days elapsed since the dispositional order. The record shows that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent-mother would rectify the conditions within a reasonable amount of time. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).

The trial court found there was a "long history of harm to these children while the children were in the care of respondent-mother, which "has come from the beating of the father with the mother's knowledge and minimization of that beating." Respondent-mother points out that this case began over concerns regarding respondent-father's abuse of their son TS, and argues that her divorce from respondent-father, and the latter's having moved away, undercut the trial court's conclusion that (c)(i) was satisfied. However, respondent-mother testified that she and respondent-father "still communicate" even if they are "not together," and Christensen expressed the concern that respondent-mother was "not . . . able to . . . completely break that bond with her ex-husband," elaborating that "once he was released and then the divorce was final they spent a lot of time together," adding that "even though she said that it was in the context of taking care of their differences so that they could parent the children together . . . it seemed to be more . . . of dependence . . . and didn't want to let that go until something was concrete with" her new boyfriend.

Further, respondent-mother had other barriers to reunification. She admitted that these included housing and employment, to which case manager Megan Walters added emotional stability, resource availability and management, and parenting skills. The trial court specified "housing, employment, parenting skills, domestic violence and emotional stability."

Concerning housing, the trial court found as follows:

To say that that home is filthy would be the biggest understatement of the day. It's totally inhabitable [sic], and what was interest to me at least was [respondent-mother's] saying on the stand that she didn't think it was bad. Clearly a major issue regarding that housing. Testimony was it was cluttered, it was completely filthy. But the mother has said that it's okay. Her counselor, Ms. Christensen, testified that there has been no progress with housing and . . . has stated she also feels that there's no reasonable expectation that that will change. And the testimony . . . has shown that there has been no improvement in the housing situation . . . since this case started . . . way back in 2014.
Respondent-mother does not dispute the court's factual conclusions concerning her housing, but instead protests that she "was making every effort to secure new housing," but had "no control over being placed on a waiting list for low income housing." Respondent-mother thus admits to a lack of progress in her housing to the time of the termination hearing, and apparently to a lack of expectation that the situation will improve unless and until someone offers her subsidized housing.

In context, presumably "uninhabitable." --------

When asked about her employment history since 2014, respondent-mother described five different jobs, but admitted to having no employment between September 2015 and June 2016, and from six weeks thereafter until the present, explaining that she was "waiting to hear back from GM," and otherwise "rely[ing] on my mother and my boyfriend." Dr. Lowder opined that respondent-mother's personality disorder was apt to interfere with her employment prospects because "they often can't get along with co-workers." The trial court described the evidence as indicating "a long history of either no or short employment," and noted that there was no testimony that expectations concerning GM had come to fruition. The court concluded, "There's been no . . . noticeable improvement at all in this employment situation," and the record supports that conclusion.

Moreover, the trial court concluded that there had been no progress in the areas of mental health and parenting skills. Respondent-mother admitted that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and agreed that she was working on issues relating to emotional stability. Dr. Lowder testified that respondent-mother's "stress index" was "off the charts," indicating a person in need of immediate counseling, and that "several diagnoses" indicated "very clear psychopathology," including bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder. Dr. Lowder concluded, "I can't recommend that she be a custodial parent because I think her children would be at such significant risk based on all the psychopathology," and agreed that the children would be in harm's way if returned to her. Dr. Lowder also testified that respondent-mother's "prognosis" for better parenting "would be very poor" in light of her having already had two years of therapy. Similarly, Christensen agreed that respondent-mother would not be able to manage her mental health issues in a reasonable amount of time.

On this record, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist, that 182 days had elapsed, and that there was no reasonable probability that respondent-mother would rectify the conditions within a reasonable amount of time. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Given that there was at least one ground for termination, we need not address the other grounds upon which the trial court relied. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

B. RESPONDENT-FATHER

The conditions that led to termination for respondent-father included domestic violence, anger issues, housing, employment, parenting issues and emotional stability. The trial court found that the barriers to reunification had not been resolved and would not be resolved in a reasonable amount of time as follows:

[I]t goes without saying that there was serious physical abuse of [TS] . . . . After [respondent-father's] incarceration he did have counseling . . . where he scored in the moderate to severe danger range for anger. His parole officer testified that he's not complied with domestic violence counseling or programming and that his progress is not good as a parolee, and that he had no participation in class, and he still needs to have a complete domestic violence class as part of his parole which has not happened yet.

The court also found that respondent-father had not improved parenting skills, as he had no parenting time during his incarceration and had never met his daughter CS and treated his legal daughter MG differently because he doubted his paternity. The court also found that respondent-father obtained housing after he was released from prison, but he was again facing eviction for nonpayment of rent. Concerning employment, the court acknowledged that respondent-father had obtained employment at Peckham after his release from prison. However, the court reasoned that respondent-father did not have a good history of employment and his post-promotion salary remained at $8.50 an hour.

The court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable probability that they would be resolved within a reasonable amount of time given the age of the children. Here, respondent-father continued to display issues with anger-management; Walters testified that respondent-father had only made "minimal" progress on overcoming the barriers that prevented reunification including housing, substance abuse, emotional stability, domestic relations and parenting skills. Respondent-father had obtained housing in a trailer, but was at risk of losing the housing and could not provide housing for the children "at this time." Walters testified that there would be a concern for the safety of the children if they were returned to respondent-father. Walters explained that respondent-father had anger-management problems, and that respondent-father did not accept responsibility for the abuse that he perpetrated against TS. Walters also opined that respondent-father could not meet the emotional needs of the children. In addition, Dayton Driver, respondent-father's parole officer, testified that respondent-father's participation in PATS was "very shady," elaborating as follows:

It took him a while to get into the program. He has had one other violation for not attending class. I received an email on Thursday stating that he's not attending class again, which could lead to another violation. Progress reports were not good. I believe when I was speaking to him on the phone they made reference to he was just sitting in the class counting the squares on the ceiling, not participating, not trying to get anything out of it.

On this record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the circuit court erred in finding grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Given that there was at least one ground for termination, we need not address the additional grounds upon which the trial court based its decision. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

III. BEST INTERESTS

"If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5). Although termination of parental rights requires proof of at least one of the statutory termination factors on clear and convincing evidence, "the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to the best-interest determination." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 83; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).

A. RESPONDENT-MOTHER

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Here, the original petition was initiated in 2014 and termination occurred over two years later. Over the course of the proceedings, respondent-mother did not show that she was unable to overcome the barriers to reunification. She only made "minimal progress" on overcoming housing issues, substance abuse issues, emotional stability, domestic relations and parenting skills. For example, a report from Families First indicated that respondent-mother minimized the abuse that TS suffered and she downplayed respondent-father's abusive behavior inflicted upon her. Although respondent-mother divorced respondent-father, after respondent-father was released, she continued to see him and one of the professionals testified that she could not break the bond with respondent-father. Although respondent-mother made progress on recognizing domestic violence, she was still dependent upon respondent-father and involved in a relationship with him.

In addition to the issues involving her relationship with respondent-father, respondent-mother had other serious barriers to reunification that she could not overcome including housing, employment, and mental health issues. Respondent-mother lived in an "unsatisfactory and unsanitary" home, but Christensen testified that respondent-mother was "dependent" on that environment and respondent-mother made no progress on securing suitable housing. Dr. Lowder explained that respondent-mother did not recognize that her home was unfit for children despite case workers describing the home as "filthy" and "cluttered." Respondent-mother also had ongoing mental health issues including bipolar disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Dr. Lowder testified that these conditions made it difficult for respondent-mother to focus on caring for the needs of the children. Dr. Lowder explained that respondent-mother would not be able to "place the needs of her children above her own needs." Furthermore, respondent-mother prioritized relationships above her children's needs, which was not consistent with the children's best interests and interfered with employment prospects. Testimony showed that respondent-mother had not obtained employment at the time of the termination hearing—two years after the initial petition was filed.

Respondent-mother also had significant issues with a lack of parenting skills. Dr. Lowder testified that the two youngest children had "failure to thrive," and she attributed this to respondent-mother's inept care. In addition, Tuell, a visit coach, testified that respondent-mother struggled to care for all five children, and respondent-mother only made "minimal" progress during five weeks of coaching. Dunckel, an infant mental health specialist, explained that respondent-mother was unable to provide structure for the children and stated that the children would not be in a safe environment if placed with respondent-mother. According to Dunckel, the two youngest children did not display a strong attachment to respondent-mother, and were doing well in placement with foster families. Duckel concluded that respondent-mother did not have the capacity to safely care for the children. Similarly, Cena, a mental therapist, testified that two of the children, TS and IS, showed improved behavior in their placements and Cena did not think that either of these children trusted their parents.

Finally, the testimonies offered by the professionals involved in this case showed that termination was in the best interests of the children. Dr. Lowder testified that she could not recommend that respondent-mother be the custodial parent to the children because "I think her children would be at such significant risk based on all the psychopathology." Dr. Lowder further explained that given that respondent-mother had two years of therapy, it was unrealistic to think that she would change and be able to parent effectively. Christensen testified that respondent-mother had ongoing issues and would not be able to manage all of her issues in a "reasonable" amount of time. Dunckel also concluded that respondent-mother did not have the capacity to care for the children. Similarly, Walters testified that respondent-mother did not have the capacity to care for the children. Respondent-mother did not have appropriate housing, she was unemployed, unable to meet her own emotional needs and could not meet the needs of the children. Walters stated that respondent did not have a strong bond with the children.

Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that respondent-mother was simply unable to overcome all of the significant challenges that she faced. She did not have appropriate housing, and appeared not to recognize that the housing was inappropriate. She had not secured employment, and had serious mental health issues of her own that she needed to address. Respondent-mother continued to rely on respondent-father after he was released from prison and she did not display the understanding that was necessary to keep the children safe. In addition, respondent-mother did not have a strong bond with all of the children and the children needed long-term stability that respondent-mother could not provide. In contrast, testimony showed that the children were doing well in their placements—either with relatives or in foster care—and termination was a necessary step in providing the children with safety and stability for their futures. In short, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in the children's best interests.

B. RESPONDENT-FATHER

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent-father's parental rights was in the four older children's best interests. Here, the evidence and testimony of the professionals involved in the case showed that respondent-father could not meet the needs of the children and he could not provide the stability and safety that is required for a successful parent-child relationship. For example, Poyner, a counselor, testified that respondent-father had moderate to severe anger issues, and was about to lose his house and he had a "lot of crises in his life." Walters testified that respondent-father only made "minimal" progress on issues including housing, substance abuse, emotional stability, domestic relations and parenting skills. Dunckel testified that respondent-father needed to show stability in his life with regard to housing, employment, and emotional stability. She noted that respondent-father exhibited anger issues by slamming the door and leaving a DHHS family team meeting and she opined that respondent-father had "difficulty regulating his emotions." Walters testified that respondent-father could not provide housing for the children and did not have sufficient income to provide for the children. Walters explained that respondent-father did not take full responsibility for the harm that he perpetrated against TS and she did not think that respondent-father was emotionally stable. Finally, respondent-father's parole officer testified that respondent-father was not reaching the proper achievement in his domestic violence program. In contrast, the testimony showed that the children were showing improvement in their placement with relatives and foster care. This record supports that respondent-father could not meet the needs of the children and that respondent-father had not overcome his own personal issues sufficient to provide guidance, stability and a safe home environment for the children. Accordingly, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent-father's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357.

Concerning the court's conclusion that respondent-father's bond with the older children had deteriorated from lack of contact with him, respondent-father argues that "[h]ad [petitioner] provided Father with the reasonable opportunity to complete PATS and visit with the children he would have had the opportunity to show that he was benefiting as far as parenting skills are concerned from services and strengthen the bond with his children." However, at issue was what bonds existed for purposes of determining the children's best interests, not the reasons why they deteriorated.

Respondent-father argues that the court "failed to consider" that respondent-father "had participated in services since the incident that gave rise to the abuse" but was "never given an opportunity to prove that he had parenting skill through supervised parenting times," and again attributed those problems to petitioner's failure to provide sufficient services. However, caseworkers and other professionals testified that respondent-father continued to display issues with anger management and the trial court heard the parole officer testify that respondent-father, for whatever reasons, had not completed PATS. Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that respondent-father did not exhibit the requisite parenting skills.

Respondent-father also argues that the trial court undervalued that the children were placed with relatives. See In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144. But the court conscientiously noted the relative placements, while consistently concluding that those were overridden by other factual imperatives. Accordingly, the court properly considered that the children were placed with relatives.

In sum, respondent-father fails to show that the trial court clearly erred in concluding form the preponderance of the evidence that termination of his parental rights was in the children's best interests

Affirmed.

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Christopher M. Murray

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello


Summaries of

In re Saylor/Graf

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Jul 18, 2017
No. 336149 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 18, 2017)
Case details for

In re Saylor/Graf

Case Details

Full title:In re SAYLOR/GRAF, Minors.

Court:STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

Date published: Jul 18, 2017

Citations

No. 336149 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 18, 2017)