Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. J050014571
Reardon, J.
After sustaining the allegations of several wardship petitions, the juvenile court committed 16-year-old appellant Ronnie F. to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of confinement of eight years four months. On appeal, he challenges the disposition hearing, contending that (1) the prosecutor’s withdrawal of later petitions to allow disposition based on earlier petitions was improper and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJJ. He also challenges the commitment order, contending that the juvenile court (3) failed to consider the facts and circumstances of his case when setting the maximum term of confinement; (4) miscalculated his maximum term of confinement; (5) did not award him credit for time served; and (6) improperly imposed conditions of probation. We agree that the commitment order is deficient and order that a corrected commitment order be issued. In all other respects, we reject Ronnie’s challenges to the disposition hearing that resulted in his DJJ commitment.
In his reply brief, Ronnie complains that the People misstated the facts in the respondent’s brief. We rely on the record on appeal-not the summaries contained in the parties’ briefs-for our statement of facts.
Appellant Ronnie F. was born in June 1992. He has been the subject of numerous juvenile wardship petitions over the course of a four-and-a-half-year period. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).) In April 2005, he was arrested for vehicle theft. In June 2005, when he was almost 13 years old, Ronnie was alleged to have stolen a vehicle, received stolen property and operated a vehicle without a license. (Pen. Code, § 496; Veh. Code, § 10851; former Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a) [Stats. 2004, ch. 755, § 3].) He failed to appear at a pretrial hearing and was arrested in August 2005 on a bench warrant. He was released to his mother on home supervision. In August 2005, the felony stolen vehicle allegation was reduced to a misdemeanor, Ronnie admitted the allegation, and the juvenile court found that it was true. The other allegations were dismissed. A month later, Ronnie was declared a ward of the juvenile court. He was ordered to home supervision, subject to various terms of probation.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
By November 2005, the probation department reported that Ronnie was not in compliance with the conditions of his home supervision. He failed to appear at his progress hearing and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Ronnie was arrested on that warrant in December 2005. The following day, the juvenile court ordered him to be released from juvenile hall to his father’s custody. Another arrest warrant was issued when Ronnie failed to appear at his next progress hearing.
In March 2006, a subsequent petition was filed alleging that Ronnie had committed first degree residential burglary and possessed burglar’s tools. (Pen. Code, § 459; former Pen. Code, § 466 [Stats. 2002, ch. 335, § 1].) He was ordered detained at juvenile hall. Later that month, Ronnie admitted committing the burglary. The felony allegation of burglary was found true and the misdemeanor possession allegation was dismissed.
Meanwhile, in April 2006, a first amended subsequent petition was filed alleging that Ronnie had again committed vehicle theft and operated a vehicle without a license. (Veh. Code, §§ 10851, 12500, subd. (a).) The new petition noted the prior findings of misdemeanor vehicle theft and felony burglary. The new vehicle theft allegation was reduced to a misdemeanor, Ronnie admitted its truth, and the juvenile court found that the allegation was true. The motor vehicle operation allegation was dismissed. Ronnie was released from juvenile hall to his mother, subject to electronic monitoring, pending disposition. He was also referred for a mental health evaluation. Ronnie refused to complete the evaluation.
In May 2006, Ronnie removed his electronic monitor and a warrant was issued for his arrest. A notice was filed that month, alleging that he violated the terms of his home supervision. (See § 777, subd. (a).) This matter was later dismissed. Ronnie failed to appear at a June 2006 disposition hearing, prompting yet another bench warrant for his arrest.
In July 2006, a subsequent petition was filed alleging that Ronnie had committed carjacking while armed with a firearm; that he had possessed various firearms and live ammunition; and that he made criminal threats. (Pen. Code, §§ 215, 422, 12022, subd. (a)(1); former Pen. Code, §§ 12031, subd. (a)(1) [Stats. 1999, ch. 571, § 3, p. 3963], 12101, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1) [Stats. 1995, ch. 751, § 2, p. 5595].) In August 2006, an amended petition was filed alleging that Ronnie had committed a carjacking while armed with a firearm; that he possessed a short-barreled shotgun, another firearm and live ammunition; that he twice made criminal threats and resisted police officers. (Pen. Code, §§ 69, 215, 422, 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12101, subd. (a)(1); former Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a) [Stats. 2004, ch. 247, § 7].) Both new petitions noted the earlier findings of two allegations of misdemeanor vehicle theft and one of felony burglary. Ronnie was detained at juvenile hall.
The supplemental petition was amended to allege the commission of robbery, a lesser included offense of carjacking. (Pen. Code, § 211.) Ronnie admitted that he had committed robbery and had done so while armed with a firearm. The juvenile court found these allegations to be true. The remaining allegations of the amended supplemental petition were dismissed.
In the fall of 2006, the probation department explored the possibility that Ronnie might be suitable for placement in a facility with a very structured environment. In December 2006, he was placed in a Los Angeles group home. At May and October 2007 review hearings, the probation department reported that after an initial period of adjustment at the group home, Ronnie’s attitude and behavior had started to improve. He participated in counseling and attended high school. In January 2008, Ronnie successfully completed the group home program and was returned to his mother’s home, where he lived for several months.
In April 2008, another notice was filed, alleging that Ronnie-then 15 years old-had twice failed to report to his probation officer. (§ 777, subd. (a).) His whereabouts were unknown and a warrant was issued for his arrest. In May 2008, Ronnie was arrested and detained at juvenile hall. He admitted that he had violated the terms of his probation. He was removed from his mother’s home, but the probation department was given discretion to release him to her custody again under certain conditions.
By June 2008, the probation department was concerned about Ronnie’s gang involvement. Reportedly, members of a local gang intended to kill him. Ronnie also reported that he was bipolar, but felt no need to take medication to control his anger. In July 2008, Ronnie was released to his mother’s home on electronic monitoring.
In September 2008, Ronnie removed his electronic monitor and left home without the permission of his mother or his probation officer. Another notice was filed alleging that Ronnie had done so and that his whereabouts were unknown. (§ 777, subd. (a).) In October 2008, another bench warrant issued and he was arrested and detained at juvenile hall later that month. The September 2008 probation violation matter was ultimately dismissed on the prosecutor’s motion.
Later in October 2008, another notice was filed alleging that Ronnie had violated the terms of his probation by possessing stolen goods, being a passenger in a stolen car, fleeing from police, giving police a false name, and possessing marijuana. (§ 777, subd. (a).) This notice also alleged the findings that Ronnie had been found to have committed four other offenses. Ronnie admitted that he had violated the terms of his probation and this allegation was found true. In November 2008, the juvenile court referred Ronnie for a mental health evaluation, which was filed with the court in January 2009.
In December 2008, Ronnie was alleged to have committed residential burglary and to have possessed stolen property. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 496.) The new petition alleged the findings on the four earlier allegations against him. In February 2009, the juvenile court dismissed the allegations of this petition in light of his admission of the truth of the October 2008 petition allegations. It ordered that Ronnie be placed at a local juvenile camp, subject to specified conditions of probation.
All subsequent dates refer to the 2009 calendar year unless otherwise indicated.
In March, 10 days after he arrived at camp, Ronnie escaped. A warrant issued for his arrest. A petition alleged that Ronnie had done so and noted the four earlier juvenile court findings against him. (§ 871.) He was arrested under a false name by Hayward police in June on suspicion of residential burglary. He was released with a notice to appear. Ronnie remained at large until he was arrested at a friend’s house and detained in September. By this time, his mother’s house was overrun by gang members-Ronnie’s mother had moved out of the house. A subsequent petition was filed later in September, alleging that the 16-year-old had possessed a concealed firearm. (Pen. Code, § 12101, subd. (a)(1).)
In October, a notice was filed alleging that Ronnie had violated the terms of his probation by escaping from camp in March, committed attempted burglary and vehicle theft in June, and possessing a firearm in September. This notice also alleged the earlier findings made against him. (§ 777, subd. (a).) Ronnie admitted that he had violated the terms of his probation by escaping and possessing a firearm. The juvenile court found these allegations to be true. The allegation that he had violated his probation by committing burglary was stricken. The juvenile court permitted the prosecution to withdraw the March escape and September firearm possession petitions, as the October probation violation notice included these allegations.
In November, the juvenile court committed Ronnie to the DJJ. The juvenile court also ordered that Ronnie be subject to various gang and weapons conditions of probation. The commitment order set a maximum term of confinement of eight years four months, including time for the August 2006 robbery and arming enhancement, the April 2006 vehicle theft which was listed as felony, the March 2006 residential burglary, and the August 2005 misdemeanor vehicle theft. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 459, 12022, subd. (a)(1); Veh. Code, § 10851.) At the time of the hearing, the juvenile court was uncertain whether the report of credit for time served was accurate, so the determination of those credits was continued. The commitment order did not specify the amount of credit to be applied against that maximum term of confinement as those credits had yet to be determined. The juvenile court did not resolve the outstanding credits issue.
II. WITHDRAWAL OF PETITIONS
A. Contentions on Appeal and Underlying Facts
First, Ronnie contends that the prosecution materially impaired the juvenile court’s authority at disposition by withdrawing the petitions alleging a March misdemeanor escape and a September possession of a concealed weapon. As these petitions alleged offenses that could not form the basis of a DJJ commitment, their withdrawal allowed the juvenile court to rely on its earlier finding that Ronnie had committed robbery as alleged in the August 2006 amended petition, which was an offense making him eligible for commitment to the DJJ. (§ 707, subd. (b)(3).) In so doing, he reasons, the prosecution intentionally avoided the application of statute and materially impaired the juvenile court’s authority to choose a disposition for Ronnie, in violation of the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. (See Cal. Const., art. III, § 3; § 733, subd. (c) (section 733(c).)
Ronnie also asserts that this constituted a violation of his due process rights, but he makes no argument in his opening brief to support this claim of error. As his only due process argument-and a minimal one at that, without any citation to authority-appears for the first time in his reply brief, we need not address this issue. (See People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 353-354; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 986-987; Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 701, pp. 769-771.)
A minor may not be committed to the DJJ unless his or her most recent offense alleged in any petition and found to be true by the juvenile court is one described in section 707, subdivision (b). (§ 733(c); In re D.J. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 278, 284 (D.J.).) Subdivision (b) of section 707 specifies those offenses which may form the basis of a DJJ commitment. These DJJ-eligible offenses include the robbery alleged in August 2006, but not the misdemeanor escape or possession of a concealed weapon allegations that were alleged in the March and September petitions, respectively. (§ 707, subd. (b)(3).) The juvenile court permitted the prosecution to withdraw the March and September petitions. Omitting from our considerations the later petitions that were dismissed, withdrawn or that actually constituted notices of violations of probation, the robbery alleged in the August 2006 amended petition was Ronnie’s most recent offense found to be true by the juvenile court. Thus, it appears that the juvenile court committed him to the DJJ on the basis of the finding made pursuant to this petition. (See § 733(c); see also Pen. Code, § 211.)
B. Legal Issues
1. Forfeiture
On appeal, Ronnie argues that by withdrawing the March and September petitions alleging conduct that would not have made him eligible for DJJ commitment, the prosecution improperly avoided the application of this provision. This argument fails for several reasons. First, Ronnie’s claim of error was not preserved for appeal. The withdrawal of the subject petitions was part of a disposition negotiated between the prosecution and Ronnie’s trial counsel. His counsel was given an opportunity to object to the proposal. He made no objection other than to urge the juvenile court to order the petitions withdrawn with prejudice so that the prosecution could not renege on its agreement later. As the withdrawal of these two petitions was part of a negotiated disposition to which Ronnie’s counsel agreed and did not object before the juvenile court, any right to challenge the withdrawal on appeal was forfeited. (See, e.g., People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103 [timely assertion of error required]; In re Uriah R. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1157-1158 [negotiated, actually imposed disposition bars appeal]; People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 334, 342-343 [defendant estopped from challenging plea agreement on appeal].)
2. Petition for Section 733 Purposes
Even if Ronnie were able to overcome this procedural hurdle, he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim of error. Recently, this Division held that the practice of dismissing later notices alleging violations of probation in order to allow the juvenile court the option of a DJJ commitment at disposition is proper. We further held that later-filed charges of probation violations-even if contained in documents titled “ ‘petitions’ ”-are actually notices of probation violations, not petitions alleging criminal conduct for purposes of section 733(c). (D.J., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 280, 285-288; see In re Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 495, 502.) In essence, when we determine the most recent petition for purposes of this provision, we consider only petitions alleging the commission of a criminal offense, not notices of allegations of violation of probation. (§ 733(c); D.J., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 280, 285-286.) Other courts have also adopted this interpretation of section 733(c). (In re M.B. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1477-1478; In re J.L. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 43, 58-61.)
With the passage of Proposition 21 in March 2000, the supplemental petition in former section 777 was replaced with a notice provision. (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 491; compare § 777, subd. (a) with former § 777, subd. (a) [Stats. 1989, ch. 1117, § 18, pp. 4127-4128].)
Ronnie acknowledges his disagreement with this line of authority, citing instead to a case in which the juvenile court was not permitted to dismiss a later petition because to do so was not in the interests of justice. (See V.C. v. Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1463-1468 (V.C.); see also § 782 [allowing juvenile matter to be dismissed in interests of justice].) In our earlier D.J. case, we distinguished it from the circumstances of V.C. In V.C., the minor agreed to a negotiated disposition for the purpose of avoiding a DJJ commitment. After that disposition proved ineffective, he was deprived of the benefit of the negotiated disposition when the underlying petition was dismissed. The juvenile court then relied on an earlier petition alleging a DJJ-eligible offense to support a DJJ commitment. (See, e.g., D.J., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 287; V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1465-1468.) The appellate court held that the dismissal of the later petition was not in the interests of justice, because it violated the minor’s due process right to receive the benefit of the negotiated disposition. (V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1465-1467.) As there had been no disposition on the withdrawn petitions before their withdrawal, the circumstances in the matter before us likewise differ from the case that Ronnie cites.
Ronnie also attempts to distinguish this line of cases from his case, primarily because those cases involved the formal dismissal of petitions, rather than the less formal withdrawal of them. (See § 782 [dismissal of juvenile court petition in interests of justice].) In the context of the case before us in which the juvenile court allowed the withdrawal of later petitions with prejudice, we are satisfied that this is a distinction without a difference. (See Civ. Code, § 3528 [substance matters more than form].)
Ronnie also reasons that because the prosecutor alleged the probation violations by means of the Judicial Council form required for a petition, the use of this form elevates the notice of probation violations pursuant to section 777 to a “petition” within the meaning of section 733(c). We have already rejected a similar claim of error, as the intent to charge only violations of probation is clear from the face of the challenged petitions. (See, e.g., D.J., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 288-289.)
In our recent ruling, we observed that if a pending petition charging a non-DJJ-eligible offense that came before the juvenile court for disposition, that petition could be dismissed in the interests of justice in order to permit the juvenile court to commit the ward to the DJJ based on an earlier sustained petition alleging the commission of a DJJ-eligible offense. (D.J., supra, 185 Cal.App.4that p. 287, fn. 6; see In re J.L., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 56-57; but see V.C., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1464-1465 fn. 9 [criticizing dismissal in interest of justice].) That is precisely what happened in Ronnie’s case. The juvenile court allowed the prosecution to withdraw the March and October pending matters with prejudice-precluding the prosecution from refiling those substantive allegations-before disposition on those matters. (See, e.g., In re J.L., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 56 [People not entitled to refile allegations].) Even if we were to reach the merits of the issue that Ronnie raises on appeal, we would conclude that the juvenile court had the authority to permit the prosecution to withdraw the pending petitions.
3. Separation of Powers
If we addressed this issue, we would also reject Ronnie’s related contention that the prosecutor’s withdrawal of the petitions violates the separation of powers. The California Constitution forbids persons charged with the exercise of one of our three branches of government-executive, legislative and judicial-from exercising the powers of another branch. (Cal. Const. art. III, § 3; People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134.) The separation of powers doctrine limits the authority of one of the three branches of government to assume the core functions of another branch. It does not prohibit one branch from taking an action within its sphere of authority that had an incidental effect on another branch. Instead, it bars one branch from exercising the complete power constitutionally vested in another branch. The doctrine anticipates that there will be some common boundaries created by the different branches that will not affect core functions. (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 662.) For example, a prosecutor’s exercise of charging discretion inevitably affects a court’s dispositional options. Once charges have been filed, the court has the authority to determine the appropriate disposition of the underlying matter. (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 553-554; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 517.)
By its withdrawal of the two later petitions-an action which the juvenile court approved in open court-the prosecution gave the court the option of a DJJ commitment. The prosecutor’s withdrawal of the March and September petitions did not compel that disposition. As such, the withdrawal of the petitions did not affect a core juvenile court function, because it did not prevent the juvenile court from exercising its complete power. Instead, that withdrawal had only an incidental effect on the exercise of judicial power. (See, e.g., In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 662.) The withdrawn petitions cleared the way for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to commit Ronnie to the DJJ if that court deemed this disposition to be appropriate. The withdrawal did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. If we reached the merits of the issue he poses on appeal, we would conclude that the juvenile court’s reliance on the August 2006 amended petition and Ronnie’s admission that the robbery allegation satisfied the requirements of section 733(c).
4. DJJ Commitment Foreclosed
Ronnie also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to DJJ. This claim of error is based on his underlying assertion that the juvenile court was required to rely on the March and September petitions alleging non-DJJ commitment offenses rather than the August 2006 amended petition. He reasons that as the later petitions were improperly withdrawn, section 733(c) foreclosed a DJJ commitment in this matter. As we have already rejected his underlying argument, we also find no merit in this claim of error. (See pt. II.B.2.-3., ante.)
III. MAXIMUM TERM OF CONFINEMENT
A. Failure to Exercise Discretion
Alternatively, Ronnie contends that the juvenile court failed to exercise its discretion in setting his term of confinement, thus denying him due process and a fair disposition hearing. A juvenile court must set the maximum term of confinement at the DJJ based on the facts and circumstances of the matter that brought a minor within the jurisdiction of that court. That maximum term of confinement may be less than, but may not be more than, the prison sentence that would be imposed on an adult offender. (§ 731, subd. (c); In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 491-492, 495; see In re Carlos E. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1533, 1542-1543 [California Youth Authority case].)
On the Judicial Council commitment form, the juvenile court must acknowledge its consideration of the individual facts and circumstances of the underlying matter by checking a box. (In re Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 498-499.) The juvenile court did not check this box on Ronnie’s commitment order. On appeal, Ronnie urges us to conclude that this omission establishes that the juvenile court did not consider the facts and circumstances of his case, such that it did not understand or exercise its discretion to impose less than the maximum term of confinement.
If the appropriate box had been checked on the form, the juvenile court’s exercise of its discretion would have been apparent. (In re Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 499, fn. 4.)
We disagree. A juvenile court is not required to make an oral pronouncement of the facts and circumstances relied on to determine the maximum term of confinement. (In re Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 496-498.) On a silent record, we presume that the juvenile court performed its duty to consider the facts and circumstances of an individual minor’s case when setting the maximum term of confinement. (Id. at pp. 492, 498-499.) This presumption is consistent with appellate practice and provisions of the Evidence Code. A juvenile court order is presumed to be correct on appeal, requiring an appellant to affirmatively show error. (In re Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 498-499.) The law presumes that the juvenile court’s official duty-in the case before us, to consider the facts and circumstances of Ronnie’s case when setting his maximum term of confinement-has been regularly performed. (See Evid. Code, § 664; In re Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 499.) This is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof. (Evid. Code,§§ 601, subd. (b), 605, 660.) Thus, we presume that the juvenile court understood its duty, unless Ronnie offers evidence overcoming this presumption. (See id., §§ 600, subd. (a), 606.) As the applicable Evidence Code provisions do not state a standard of proof, he must overcome the presumption by a preponderance of evidence. (See id., § 115.)
Ronnie has not proven that the juvenile court failed to understand its duty to consider the unique facts and circumstances of his case when setting the maximum term of confinement. We presume that the juvenile court was aware of its discretion to impose less than the fullest possible term of confinement unless evidence to the contrary appears in the record. (See In re Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 494, 499.) The record contains no evidence tending to support Ronnie’s theory that the juvenile court failed to consider the unique facts and circumstances of his case when setting the maximum term of confinement. The record shows that the juvenile court was familiar with those facts, recounting details of the case at the disposition hearing. The juvenile court said nothing at the disposition hearing to suggest that it did not consider those facts and circumstances when setting the maximum term of confinement. Other than the failure to check the appropriate box on the commitment form, Ronnie offers no evidence to overcome the presumption that the juvenile court considered these facts-as it was required to do-when setting the maximum term of confinement. As he has not met his burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence, we presume that the juvenile court understood its duty and met it. (Evid. Code, §§ 601, 605, 606, 660, 664.)
B. Calculation
Ronnie also asserts that the juvenile court erred in calculating his maximum term of confinement. He contends that this term should have been eight years. The maximum term of confinement may be no more than the prison sentence that would be imposed on a similarly situated adult offender. (§ 731, subd. (c); In re Julian R., supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 491-492.) The juvenile court’s commitment order set a maximum term of confinement of eight years four months-six years for robbery with an arming enhancement, eight months for one finding of felony vehicle theft, 16 months for residential burglary, and four months for misdemeanor vehicle theft. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 459, 12022, subd. (a)(1); Veh. Code, § 10851.) In fact, both vehicle theft findings were misdemeanors. To the extent that it cites the April 2006 vehicle theft as a felony, the commitment order is in error.
This error has implications for the maximum term of confinement as well. If an adult were sentenced for these offenses and the robbery was deemed to be the principal term, a consecutive subordinate term equal to one-third of the middle base term should have been imposed for each of the other three offenses. (Pen. Code, § 1170.1, subd. (a).) One-third of the one-year maximum jail term for misdemeanor vehicle theft is four months, not eight. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).)
The maximum term of confinement should have been set at no more than eight years. The Attorney General correctly concedes that the juvenile court’s maximum term of confinement calculation was erroneous. We order the juvenile court to prepare a corrected DJJ commitment form consistent with this opinion and to transmit a copy of that corrected form to the DJJ.
This correction will also afford the juvenile court the opportunity to check the appropriate box on the corrected form to dispel any doubt about its consideration of the unique facts and circumstances of Ronnie’s case. (See pt. III.A., ante.)
IV. CREDITS
Ronnie also contends that the juvenile court failed to order that he receive any credit for time served. He reasons that the DJJ commitment order must be amended to reflect his entitlement to 632 days of credit as calculated by the probation officer on December 1. He asks us to remand this matter and order the juvenile court to prepare an amended commitment order reflecting these credits. Ronnie is correct that the juvenile court failed to include an award of any precommitment credit in its commitment order. The Attorney General reasons that a remand for a formal award of credits is not necessary, because the DJJ has already given Ronnie credit for his precommitment time against his maximum term of confinement. However, as we order the commitment order to be corrected for other reasons, the corrected order shall include an appropriate reference to the credits Ronnie is entitled to receive.
In September 2010, we granted the People’s request for judicial notice of the DJJ’s confidential report of Ronnie’s confinement history. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.252(a), 8.401(a)(1).) At that time, we deferred a finding of relevancy. In light of this conclusion, we need not determine the relevancy of this proffered matter.
V. CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
Finally, Ronnie asserts that his commitment to DJJ requires that the juvenile court order imposing probation conditions be stricken. The disposition order committed him to the DJJ and also purported to impose various gang and weapons conditions of probation. As the People again concede, he is correct. Once a ward is committed to the DJJ, the juvenile court’s direct supervision of the minor ends. A juvenile court’s imposition of probation conditions constitutes an attempt to regulate the minor’s rehabilitation, which is now the sole responsibility of the DJJ. The conditions must be stricken. (See, e.g., In re Allen N. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 513, 515-516 [prior law requiring California Youth Authority commitment].) As the matter is being remanded to the juvenile court for correction on another point, that corrected order shall not include any conditions of probation.
The commitment order is remanded to the juvenile court for correction consistent with this opinion. As corrected, the commitment order is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J.Sepulveda, J.