Opinion
No. 05-20-00523-CV
05-13-2020
IN RE MARCELLA RENEE RODRIGUEZ, Relator
Original Proceeding from the 255th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 19-01790
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Burns, and Justices Partida-Kipness and Nowell
Opinion by Chief Justice Burns
Before the Court is relator's petition for a writ of mandamus regarding the trial court's denial, in part, of an agreed motion for continuance necessitated by delays and extensions arising from COVID-19 emergency orders and concerns. We conditionally grant the writ.
In the proceeding below, the parties seek to dissolve their common-law marriage and resolve issues regarding their children. The case was filed in 2019 and was set for trial on May 5, 2020. In anticipation of trial, responses to relator's written discovery requests were due on April 5, 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic intervened.
Following a disaster declaration issued by Governor Abbott, on March 13, 2020, the Texas Supreme Court issued its FIRST EMERGENCY ORDER REGARDING THE COVID-19 STATE OF DISASTER. The First Order was set to expire May 8, 2020, and in relevant part, provided:
2. Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in Texas may in any case, civil or criminal—and must to avoid risk to court staff, parties, attorneys, jurors, and the public—without a participant's consent:
a. Modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order, for a stated period ending no later than 30 days after the Governor's state of disaster has been lifted;
The First Order was amended several times, including by the Twelfth Emergency Order, which generally mirrored the provision quoted above but provided additional detail regarding its application and set June 1, 2020 as the expiration date. Following its April 12, 2020 renewal, the Governor's state of disaster declaration remains in place.
3. Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in Texas may in any case, civil or criminal—and must to avoid risk to court staff, parties, attorneys, jurors, and the public—without a participant's consent:
a. Modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether prescribed by statute, rule, or order, specifically including those in Section 263.401 of the Family Code and in all proceedings under Subtitle E, Title 5, of the Family Code, for a stated period ending no later than 30 days after the Governor's state of disaster has been lifted; . . . .
The litigants believed the emergency orders extended the deadline to respond to the discovery served in March. Additionally, on an undisclosed date but before mid-April, real party filed a motion for continuance and objection to a remotely conducted trial (the First Motion for Continuance). Real party's counsel twice emailed the trial court's clerk requesting dates for a hearing regarding the First Motion for Continuance. When the parties received neither an order resolving nor setting the First Motion for Continuance, on May 4, 2020, they filed an agreed motion for continuance (the Second Motion for Continuance), to which they attached a rule 11 agreement.
We need not decide whether the parties' understanding was correct.
Our record does not include a copy of the First Motion for Continuance, and relator does not disclose whether she opposed it.
The rule 11 agreement reflected the parties' agreement to 1) file an agreed motion for continuance of the May 5, 2020 trial date; 2) exchange sworn inventories and appraisements by June 1, 2020; 3) mediate, with a specified mediator, not later than June 30, 2020; and 4) extend to May 15, 2020 the deadline for real party's responses to the outstanding discovery requests. Hours after the Second Motion for Continuance was filed, the clerk emailed the parties that trial was continued to May 14, 2020 and would be conducted remotely. Both sides responded with emails requesting a July setting so they could accomplish the matters set out in their agreement, including participating in an in-person mediation in June, and service of the discovery responses before trial. The clerk confirmed the May 14, 2020 setting, however, and this petition followed.
Entitlement to mandamus relief requires a demonstration that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). "A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner" or "when it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles." In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d at 941.
We consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether denial of a continuance presents an abuse of discretion. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004); In re VCC, LLC, No. 13-17-00521-CV, 2017 WL 4296607, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 28, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Similarly, because the adequate appeal prong of the test evades "simple categories or bright-line rules, and requires the careful balancing of jurisprudential considerations," we focus on practical and prudential concerns. See In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding).
Ordinarily, an order denying a motion for continuance presents an incidental trial ruling not reviewable by mandamus. See In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 658 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). Under extraordinary circumstances, however, a trial court may abuse its discretion by denying a continuance. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding); see also Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986) (finding abuse of discretion in denying motion for continuance where counsel withdrew two days before trial, and withdrawal was not caused by client's negligence or fault). Further, mandamus provides an appropriate remedy when the court denies "discovery going to the heart of a party's case." Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); In re SWEPI L.P., 103 S.W.3d 578, 583 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).
Relator contends the trial court incorrectly applied the Texas Supreme Court's emergency orders in denying an agreed continuance premised on the extraordinary circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. She asserts proceeding to trial without discovery responses delayed by an agreement precipitated by a health crisis and emergency orders unparalleled in our nation's history, creates "great injustice." She also explains that because the parties' marriage was created by common law, each lacks legal access to certain documents regarding the marital property. And both parties informed the trial court they sought the continuance, in part, to allow an in-person mediation, not possible—or at least not advisable—according to the wisdom of CDC guidelines. She asserts the emergency orders as well as the unique and serious circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic require flexibility and adaptability in all aspects of our legal system. We agree.
We also observe the parties requested only three additional months to accomplish the matters interrupted by COVID-19.
The parties' communications and agreements reflect their adherence to ethical obligations, as well as the cooperation and flexibility required during this unprecedented time. Denial of the full continuance requested deprives relator of discovery necessary for trial; denies both parties the sworn inventories and appraisements they agreed to create and exchange by June 1, 2020; and denies both the opportunity for an in-person mediation.
In light of the extraordinary circumstances presented here, we conclude mandamus provides the appropriate remedy for respondent's abuse of discretion in denying, in part, the parties' agreed motion for a continuance. We conditionally grant mandamus relief.
The writ will issue only if respondent fails to 1) grant the agreed motion for continuance and 2) continue the trial of this case to a date on or after July 13, 2020.
/Robert D. Burns, III/
ROBERT D. BURNS, III
CHIEF JUSTICE 200523F.P05