Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. J216424. Jerry L. Walkerand Joan M. Borba, Judges.
Temporary Judge (pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21).
Lisa M. Bassis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Melissa Mandel, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RICHLI J.
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), petition charged minor Robert H. with three counts of possessing a weapon on school grounds, in violation of Penal Code section 626.10, subdivision (a) (counts 1-3). After the juvenile court denied minor’s motion to suppress evidence, the trial court granted the People’s motion to reduce counts 1 and 2 to misdemeanors, and to dismiss count 3. Thereafter, minor admitted the allegations in counts 1 and 2. Minor was granted probation.
On appeal, minor contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sheryl Stone is an assistant principal at Alta Loma Junior High School. Minor transferred to Alta Loma from Vineyard Junior High School in February 2007 because he was expelled from Vineyard.
On May 15, 2007, the principal and Ms. Suter, Dean of Students, of Alta Loma approached Stone at the end of the lunch period. One of them informed Stone that they had discovered graffiti containing profanity and comments about Vineyard and Alta Loma; the graffiti was pro-Vineyard and anti-Alta Loma. The graffiti contained the word “fuck” in reference to Alta Loma.
The graffiti was found on the 600 building of the school, which is not a centrally located building or a place where students congregate after class. Stone had personally passed the graffiti area earlier in the day and knew for sure that the graffiti was not there.
Stone and Suter tried to determine who had written the graffiti. They discussed students who had attended both Alta Loma and Vineyard. Stone knew that minor had previously attended Vineyard, in part because she was member of the board that met with minor prior to his transfer to Alta Loma in February. Stone is the primary discipline person at Alta Loma. When students transfer to Alta Loma, Stone learns about them if they have disciplinary concerns. When minor transferred into Alta Loma, Stone learned about minor.
Stone then checked the schedules of students who she knew had prior disciplinary issues, and had attended both Vineyard and Alta Loma. She learned that minor and one other student who met the criteria had class schedules that put them in the area of the vandalism at the time it was discovered. The two students would have walked past the vandalized area to go to lunch.
Suter pulled minor out of class and brought him to Stone’s office. Stone asked minor if he had anything in his possession that did not belong in school; he stated no. She asked him about the graffiti. Minor denied any knowledge of the graffiti. Stone asked minor to empty his pockets; he complied. There was nothing of a suspicious nature in his pockets. Stone took minor’s backpack to determine whether he had markers in his possession; she may have unzipped the backpack, but she did not look inside. At this time, minor stated that there were three knives, wrapped in a T-shirt, in the bottom of his backpack. Stone opened the backpack and found the knives.
The other student who also had disciplinary issues, had transferred from Vineyard, and had a class schedule that put him in the vicinity of the graffiti was interviewed and searched.
II
ANALYSIS
The Trial Court Properly Denied Minor’s Motion to Suppress
Minor contends that the juvenile court improperly denied his motion to suppress because Stone did not have reasonable suspicion to detain minor or search his backpack. We disagree.
“Our standard of review on appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings where supported by substantial evidence, but we must exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search and seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. [Citation.]” (People v. Avila (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073-1074; accord People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 846.) The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings. (In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.)
“It is well settled that minor students are ‘persons’ under our state and federal Constitutions and therefore possess fundamental constitutional rights which the state must respect. [Citation.]” (In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 556 (William G.).)
First, we address whether Stone properly detained minor. In In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 565, the California Supreme Court held that a detention of a student for investigation of misconduct is valid if it is not “arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken for purposes of harassment.”
In this case, as discussed above, minor was not randomly selected to visit Stone. Instead, he was identified as a possible suspect because of his affiliation with both schools mentioned in the graffiti, his proximity to the graffiti at the time it was discovered, and Stone’s familiarity with minor’s background. Nonetheless, minor argues that these reasons were insufficient to warrant Stone meeting with minor because there was “a much broader range of possible suspects none of whom were interviewed[.]” Regardless of whether other students also could have been the taggers, it was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing to require minor to meet with Stone under the circumstances. Therefore, we hold that the detention of minor by Stone was proper.
Next, we address whether the search of minor’s backpack was proper. “It is now beyond dispute that ‘the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers.’ [Citations.]” (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 334 (T.L.O.).) Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has agreed “that public school officials are subject to the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (William G., supra,40 Cal.3d at p. 558.) Article I, section 13, of the California Constitution also subjects public school officials to this proscription. (William G., at pp. 558-559.)
In the school setting, however, student searches need not strictly adhere to the requirements of obtaining a warrant or be based on probable cause. (T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 340-341.) The U.S. Supreme Court has held “that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority. [¶] The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search . . . ‘probable cause’ is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable.” (Id. at p. 340.) The court describes a two-part test for determining reasonableness that includes 1) “‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,’” and 2) “whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’” (Id. at p. 341.) This test balances students’ privacy interests against the need for school officials to maintain order. (Id. at pp. 342-343.)
In balancing these interests, “searches of students by public school officials must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched have engaged, or are engaging, in a proscribed activity (that is, a violation of a school rule or regulation, or a criminal statute). There must be articulable facts supporting that reasonable suspicion. Neither indiscriminate searches of lockers nor more discreet individual searches of a locker, a purse or a person, here a student, can take place absent the existence of reasonable suspicion. . . . [¶] In sum, this standard requires articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, warranting an objectively reasonable suspicion.” (William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 564.)
In T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at page 328, a teacher discovered two students smoking in a school lavatory in violation of a school rule. The students were taken to the assistant vice-principal and one of the students denied smoking. The vice-principal then searched that student’s purse, finding cigarettes, rolling papers, marijuana, and other items. The court held that the search was reasonable because the report made by a teacher that students were smoking in the lavatory “gave [the vice-principal] reason to suspect that [that student] was carrying cigarettes with her; and if she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find them.” (Id. at pp. 345-346.) Therefore, the basis for his suspicion and the scope of the search were both reasonable.
In William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at page 555, on the other hand, the assistant principal observed a student carrying a small black bag. The student moved the bag behind his back. The assistant principal asked the student what he had and the student said, “Nothing.” The student was then taken to the office and the assistant principal forcibly took and opened the bag, finding marijuana, cigarette papers, and a scale. (Ibid.)
The court held that “[the assistant principal] articulated no facts to support a reasonable suspicion that [the student] was engaged in a proscribed activity justifying a search. The record reflects a complete lack of any prior knowledge or information . . . relating [the student] to the possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs or other contraband. [Citations.]” (William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 566.) The fact that the assistant principal suspected the student of being tardy or truant did not provide a reasonable suspicion for a search, and neither did the student’s attempt to conceal the bag. (Id. at pp. 566-567.) Therefore, the search was illegal. (Id. at p. 567.)
The difference between these two cases is that in T.L.O., the vice-principal had formed reasonable suspicion based on a report from a teacher that students had been smoking. It was then reasonable for the vice-principal to infer that that student could have cigarettes in her purse, justifying the search. In William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d 550, the assistant principal had not received a report or seen behavior indicative of any infraction other than, perhaps, tardiness or truancy. His suspicion, which resulted in a search, seemed to be based merely on a hunch, not any articulable fact such as a report from a witness. Therefore the search was illegal because there were no articulable facts to serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion.
The present case is far more like T.L.O. than William G. Here, Stone summoned minor to her office only after determining which students had ties to both Alta Loma and Vineyard, which students had possible disciplinary problems in the past, and which students had a class schedule in the vicinity of the graffiti. Hence, Stone had reasonable suspicion based on these facts that minor may have participated in the tagging and that markers used in the graffiti might be found in his backpack. Therefore, the search was conducted legally and the trial court properly ruled to deny the motion to suppress evidence.
In conclusion, it was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing to require minor to meet with Stone, and the search of minor’s backpack was based on the reasonable suspicion it contained the instrumentalities of the vandalism.
The juvenile court properly denied minor’s suppression motion.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J., KING J.