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In re Richard G.

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Three.
Nov 17, 2003
No. A100849 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003)

Opinion

A100849.

11-17-2003

In re RICHARD G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. DAVID G., Objector and Appellant.


Gina C. is the mother of Richard G., Joseph G., John C. and Alexandria C. David G. is the biological father of Richard and Joseph. All four of Ginas children were living with her at the time they were removed from her home by the Lake County Department of Social Services (department). On September 20, 2002, the Lake County juvenile court found all four children adoptable and terminated Davids and Ginas parental rights in relation to Richard and Joseph. David presents three arguments in his appeal from the termination order. He first contends that the order must be reversed because the court did not provide reunification services for him at any point during the dependency proceedings. He next asserts that the court erred in failing to give him notice that, because Alexandria, one of the children in Richards and Josephs sibling group, was under the age of three at the time the department initiated dependency proceedings, the court was empowered to limit reunification services to six months, rather than twelve. He finally asserts that the court erred in failing to consider Richards and Josephs wishes regarding termination of parental rights and adoption. We find that David has waived his right to advance the first claim by not appealing from the dispositional order of July 16, 2001. We find no merit in Davids claim that he was entitled to notice of potential early termination of services and that David has waived this claim by failing to assert it in the writ petition he filed following the courts December 31, 2001, order terminating reunification services. We also find that the department did assess and consider Richards and Josephs wishes regarding termination of parental rights and adoption and therefore reject appellants third claim.

I. FACTS

The department first removed the children from Ginas custody on February 22, 2001, and on February 26, 2001, filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that Gina had failed to protect the children. The department alleged that Ginas home was in "deplorable, filthy condition," constituting a danger to the children. Every surface in the kitchen was laden with "general filthy, old rotting food, dirt, grease, grime, and/or dirty dishes." The floors in the home were filthy, and dirty clothes were piled throughout the house. Johns breathing apparatus, used for asthma, was "filthy and the tubing was filled with dirt and mucous." The department also alleged that Gina had been the subject of five previous child protective service referrals, dating back to 1993. Gina had previously been treated for substance abuse as well.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.

On March 19, 2001, the court conducted a joint jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Prior to the hearing, the department submitted a report to the court. The department interviewed Gina, who reported that David was "on the run," attempting to evade arrest on an outstanding warrant. The department also indicated that Gina had agreed to a urine screen, which tested positive for methamphetamine. The department stated that Gina had a long family history of drug and alcohol abuse. However, following the childrens detention, Gina had been making efforts to clean the home and had tested negative for drugs and alcohol on two occasions. The children had originally been placed in separate foster homes; however, they experienced "pain and loss from the separation." Thus, after verifying Ginas efforts to clean the home and her negative drug tests, the department had placed the children with her again on March 7, 2001. The department recommended a family maintenance plan, one agreed to by Gina. Among other things, the plan called for Gina to secure treatment through AODS—Alcohol and Other Drug Services. At the hearing, the court admitted the report into evidence. No additional evidence was presented. Counsel for the minors stipulated to jurisdiction and indicated that he concurred with the family maintenance recommendation. The court sustained the petition and ordered services in conformity with the departments report.

On June 1, 2001, the department filed a supplemental petition alleging that Gina had violated several terms of her family maintenance plan. She had failed to seek mental health counseling, she had failed to seek drug counseling through AODS, she had tested positive for methamphetamine on two occasions and she had avoided additional drug tests. Gina had also avoided contact with her social worker and had told her children to be very quiet when the worker attempted a home visit so that the worker would think no one was home. The condition of the home had also deteriorated since the hearing of March 19, 2001.

The department again submitted a report to the court. At that point, Davids whereabouts were still unknown. The department noted that, on June 11, 2001, Gina had been ordered by a criminal court to participate in "residential and day treatment at DAAC in response to her drug related charges." However, as of June 17, Gina had not appeared for treatment. The department stated that Gina, "with the exception of one paternal grandmother to the child Richard, [had] no support" from her family or the families of any of the fathers. The department clarified that Richard (only) received "emotional and caregiving support" from his paternal grandmother, who lived next door to Ginas home. The children had been placed together in a foster home. All had adjusted to the home and reported that they liked being there. The department asked the court to find that Gina had made very poor progress in alleviating the conditions that led to the childrens removal and that the previous disposition had been ineffective. The department recommended vacating the family maintenance hearing set for September 17, 2001, and setting a six-month review hearing on December 31, 2001.

On July 16, 2001, the court conducted a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on the supplemental petition. David appeared at that hearing, in custody and represented by counsel. Gina did not appear at the hearing; however, her counsel represented her interests. Davids counsel indicated that David "was looking at some time in incarceration." However, he was "now looking at the possibility that he might be able to do a six-month program, and then be able to go through the process of reunification." In response to Davids request, the court declared him to be the father of Richard and Joseph. The court made findings in consonance with the departments recommendations and transferred the case to family reunification. The court set a six-month review hearing for December 31, 2001.

Prior to the hearing, the department submitted another report. At the time, David was incarcerated at Sierra Conservation Center. The children continued to do well in the same placement, and the foster family, which had been approved as an adoptive family by California State Adoptions, wished to adopt the children if reunification with Gina failed. Gina had been living with friends in Clearlake, doing odd jobs for spending money. Gina failed to complete numerous outpatient and residential treatment programs and had never begun the parenting class that was a requirement of her reunification plan. The department stated that the children were "extremely bonded together and it would be detrimental to the children to break up the sibling ties." The department opined that there was not a "substantial probability" that another six months of reunification services would result in successful reunification and asked that the court find that there was "not a substantial probability that the children will be returned to the physical custody of the parent with eighteen months of the original detention."

At the hearing on December 31, 2001, Davids counsel took issue with the concept that an additional six months of reunification services would not likely result in reunification. The childrens attorney argued that it would not be in the best interests of the children to break up the sibling group in order to place one or two of the children with Davids mother, as David had requested. Counsel also indicated that, from the childrens standpoint, there was "nothing to lose" in ordering six more months of services for Gina. The court, however, agreed with the departments recommendations and specifically found that there was not a substantial probability that the children would be returned to the physical custody of the parent within 18 months of the original detention. Accordingly, the court terminated services and set the case for a permanency planning hearing on April 15, 2002.

David petitioned for writ review of the order of December 31, 2001. In his petition, he argued that the department had failed to make a detailed evaluation of possible placement of Richard and Joseph with his mother. He also asserted that the court erred in failing to order an additional six months of rehabilitation services for Gina. On April 11, 2002, we denied the petition on its merits.

The department submitted a report in anticipation of the section 366.26 hearing. The report included an adoption assessment prepared by the Adoption Services Bureau of the State Department of Social Services. The Adoption Services Bureau found that all four children were adoptable. The Bureau also indicated that the foster family that had cared for the children since May 31, 2001, wanted to adopt the children. Both the Bureau and the department recommended that all parental rights be terminated and that the court choose adoption as the permanent plan for the children.

The section 366.26 hearing took place on September 20, 2002. Davids counsel was present but David did not attend. Gina testified that she had been drug- and alcohol-free for five months. She was learning how to parent and to live a "clean and sober life." She believed that the children would benefit from an ongoing relationship with her because she would "be able to be with them more, give them the attention they need," and the children would see her clean and sober. She testified that, although she completed a program to help her cope with her addictions in 1997, she "was in denial," not believing that she truly had a problem. She indicated that she now recognized that she had a problem and that she would work on dealing with it "for the rest of [her] life." At the conclusion of the hearing, the court noted that the purpose of the hearing was not to determine whether the children should return home but rather "to select a permanent plan for them." The court found that the relationship between Gina and the children was not a "parental" one and that David had "no parental relationship [with] his two children." The court then terminated parental rights and chose adoption as the permanent plan for all four children.

II. ANALYSIS

A. David Has Waived the Right to Challenge the Juvenile Courts Failure to Order Reunification Services for Him

As a general rule, when a child is removed from a parents custody, the juvenile court must "order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the childs mother and statutorily presumed father or guardians. Upon a finding and declaration of paternity by the juvenile court . . . the juvenile court may order services for the child and the biological father, if the court determines that the services will benefit the child." (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Even if a parent is incarcerated, the court must "order reasonable services unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child." (§ 351.5, subd. (e)(1).)

Here, the juvenile court did not order the department to provide reunification services to David while he was incarcerated, nor did the court find that providing such services would be detrimental to Davids children. David contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to order the department to provide him with services and that the error is prejudicial, mandating reversal of the order terminating parental rights. He acknowledges that he did not object to the juvenile courts failure to order services for him and that he did not raise that issue with a reviewing court at any point prior to this appeal. However, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and for failing to ask for appellate review of the error, thus permitting him to reach the "no services" issue in this appeal. We disagree.

Davids possible entitlement to reunification services depends on his legal status as "alleged," "biological or natural," or "presumed" father." An alleged father is a man who might be a childs father but whose biological paternity has not been established or who has not achieved presumed father status. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15 (Zacharia D.).) "A biological or natural father is one whose biological paternity has been established, but who has not achieved presumed father status . . . . [Citation.]" (Ibid.) A natural or biological father may become a presumed father if "[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." (Fam. Code § 7611, subd. (d).) The distinction between alleged, biological and presumed fatherhood is of substantial importance in a juvenile dependency context. Although an alleged father has the right to notice of dependency proceedings, he has no "known current interest" in the proceedings until and unless paternity is established. (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596 (Francisco G.).) By contrast, a biological father may receive services if the juvenile court determines that those services would benefit his children, while a presumed father is—with some limited exceptions that do not apply here—entitled to services. (Id. at p. 597; § 361.5, subd. (a).)
In his opening brief, David asserts that the court found him to be the boys presumed father. We disagree. While during the course of the July 16, 2001, hearing David testified that he was the biological father of both boys, and the court found that he was their father, at no point did David ask to be declared to be the boys presumed father. Moreover, after David testified, the childrens counsel asked the court to declare David to be their "natural" father and the court did so. Thus, it appears that the court only found David to be the boys biological or natural father. Accordingly, for purposes of analysis in this part only, we will assume that David was potentially entitled to reunification services. (Francisco G., supra, 91 Cal.App4th at p. 597.)

Section 395 governs the right to appeal in dependency matters. "This statute makes the dispositional order in a dependency proceeding the appealable `judgment. [Citation.] Thereafter, all subsequent orders are directly appealable without limitation, except for post-1994 orders setting a .26 hearing when the circumstances specified in section 366.26, subdivision (l ), exist. [Citations.] A consequence of section 395 is that an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order. [Citations.]" (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150 (Meranda P.).)

The rule that a parent will be deemed to have waived any claim of error in proceedings from which an appeal could have been taken—the waiver rule—applies even when a parent asserts that he or she was denied effective assistance of counsel in the earlier proceedings from which an appeal could have been taken. (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1151-1160.) The waiver rule is not absolute; however, it "will be enforced unless due process forbids it." (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208 (Janee J.).)

David asserts that he was denied due process here, citing In re Eileen A. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1248 (Eileen A.) and In re S.D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068 (S.D.)—two opinions by different panels of Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District. In Eileen A., a one-year-old child became a dependent of the court due to severe physical abuse by her father. The court denied reunification services to both parents, although Eileens mothers "only sin was ignorance and lack of vigilance." (Eileen A., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1252.) Because the court denied services for the parents, it immediately set the case for a section 366.26 hearing, at which the court terminated parental rights. On appeal from the termination order, mother argued that her counsel had been ineffective for failing to file a section 388 petition for modification in order to inform the court about pending divorce proceedings with Eileens abuser, parenting classes and counseling she had become involved in, and her contact with and attention to her daughter. (Id. at pp. 1252-1253.)

The Supreme Court recently disapproved Eileen A. to the extent it was inconsistent with the Supreme Courts expressed views on the consideration of postjudgment evidence in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413-414.) Such disapproval did not extend to the principles for which David cites Eileen A. in this appeal.

The Court of Appeal determined that mother could advance her ineffectiveness of counsel claim. The court pointed out that, because the juvenile court denied services, the case moved from disposition to termination in five months. The court opined that someone in mothers position would not have known that she needed to file a section 388 petition and would instead have relied on her counsels expertise in attempting to avoid losing her child. The court concluded that mothers "only real chance to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the failure to file a section 388 modification petition is now." (Eileen A., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1258, fn. omitted.)

David likens his case to Eileen A., arguing that, like mother there, he could not be expected to know his rights and was thus dependent on counsel to assert them. He asserts that he did not fail "to appeal from an adverse ruling that would have been evident even to a non-attorney."

In our view, Eileen A. does not stand for the proposition that claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are never subject to the waiver rule when counsels shortcomings relate to matters beyond the ken of a layperson. While Eileen A. certainly discusses the fact that laypeople would not know of the value of filing a section 388 petition or even the fact that such a procedure exists in the dependency system, the Court of Appeal seems to have rested its determination that mother could assert her claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on the fact that the appeal from the termination order constituted the first—and only—opportunity she had to bring counsels shortcomings to the attention of a reviewing court. (Eileen A., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1258.)

In the case before us, David had two opportunities to bring counsels shortcomings to the attention of a reviewing court: an appeal from the July 16, 2001, dispositional order, and a writ petition challenging the December 31, 2001, setting order. (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1149-1150; Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 206.) David did file a writ petition with respect to the December 31, 2001 order; however, he challenged the courts choice not to order an additional six months of services for Gina and did not raise the question of services for himself. He filed no appeal from the July 16, 2001, dispositional order. While he may attempt to assert that his failure to raise the "no services for him" issue in his writ petition was a consequence of his trial counsels continuing ineffectiveness because trial counsel also filed the writ petition on his behalf (cf. Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 209), he may not make that claim regarding his failure to appeal from the July 16, 2001, dispositional order because he was entitled to independent appellate counsel for purposes of that potential appeal. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 210.)

In his writ petition, David also argued that the department had not adequately evaluated his mother as a placement for Richard and Joseph.

In S.D., a two-year-old minor was detained because her mother was incarcerated and her father could not be located by the authorities. (S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1071-1073.) At the jurisdictional hearing, mothers counsel agreed that the agencys petition could be sustained under section 300, subdivision (g), on the ground that mother was unable to provide for her child while incarcerated. (Id. at pp. 1074-1075.) The court sustained the petition on that basis. The court ordered reunification services for mother. However, when it became clear that mother would not be released from prison within the statutory period for reunification with her child, the court terminated services and set the case for a section 366.26 hearing. At that hearing, the court found the minor adoptable and terminated all parental rights. (Id. at pp. 1075-1076.)

On appeal from the termination order, mother asserted that her counsel was ineffective at the jurisdictional hearing because section 300, subdivision (g), provides that an incarcerated parent is only deemed unable to provide for his or her child if the parent "cannot arrange for the care of the child," and uncontroverted evidence established that mother had two sisters who were willing and able to take care of her child while she was incarcerated. (S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1076-1078.)

The Court of Appeal found that mother had not waived the right to advance her ineffective assistance of counsel claim, noting that the record contained no evidence that she was ever informed that her own ability to arrange care for her child while she was incarcerated was significant and might make a difference. (S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App. 1081 & fn. 5.) Accordingly, the court concluded that mother was unaware of her counsels error and could not "reasonably have been expected to complain about it earlier." (S.D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081.) The court further determined that invoking the waiver rule in the face of the clear jurisdictional error would not prejudice the minor because he would remain in the care of mothers sister, where he had been placed by the agency, until mother was released from prison. (Id. at p. 1082.)

S.D. is plainly distinguishable from the case before us. In S.D., the effect of overturning the termination order was to place the minor in the same position he would have been in had the petition been denied in the first instance: he would remain in his maternal aunts care until mothers release from prison. (S.D., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1082.) Here, by contrast, if we were to reverse the termination order and remand, the juvenile court would have to determine whether David should receive services. If the court were to order services for David, selection and implementation of final plans for at least Richard and Joseph would be delayed for a significant period of time—with no assurance that the result would be any different from the one reached on September 20, 2002. That prospect is unacceptable.

"In the last analysis, at some point the interests of a parent, and therefore the correction of purported error which operates to the detriment of the parent, must give way to the interest of the child in a stable, secure, long-term, continuous home environment. Under Californias dependency statutes, this moment arrives when the juvenile court terminates reunification and sets a permanency planning hearing. [Citations.] At this juncture, the balance of the competing interests is tipped well towards the child; it is presumed the interests of the child and the natural parents have diverged and are inconsistent. [Citations.] Therefore, if a parent, for whatever reason, has failed to timely and appropriately raise a claim about the existence or quality of counsel received at a proceeding antedating the [section 366.26] hearing, we will apply the waiver rule to foreclose the parent from raising such an objection on appeal from the termination order." (Meranda P., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.)

B. David Was Not Entitled to an Admonishment that the Failure to Participate in Reunification Services Could Lead to Termination of Reunification Efforts Within Six Months of the July 16, 2001, Hearing, and He Has Waived the Right to Complain of Any Conceptual Error

Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(3), provides that, where a "sibling group" is removed from parental custody and one of that group is a child under the age of three, the court may limit services "to some or all of the sibling group" to a period of six months from the date that child entered foster care. Section 361.5, subdivision (a), also provides: "In cases where the child was under the age of three years on the date of the initial removal from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian or is a member of a sibling group as described in paragraph (3), the court shall inform the parent or guardian that the failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly in any court-ordered treatment programs or to cooperate or avail himself or herself of services provided as part of the child welfare services case plan may result in a termination of efforts to reunify the family after six months."

At the conclusion of the July 16, 2001, hearing—which David attended—the court stated: "The parents are advised that with regard to the minor Alexandria [C.], failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly in the court-ordered treatment program or to cooperate or avail themselves of services provided as a part of the child welfare service plan may result in termination of efforts to reunify the family within six months." The court also ordered that "that admonition be sent to the parents." That day, the court clerk mailed a copy of the court minutes, which included a written version of the admonishment, to Gina and to one of Alexandrias alleged fathers, who had not attended the July 16, 2001, hearing.

The admonition read in open court and mailed by the clerk on July 16, 2001, plainly informed Alexandrias parents that the failure to participate in programs or avail themselves of services could result in early termination of family reunification efforts. David argues that the courts failure to provide him with the admonition mandated by section 361.5, subdivision (a), deprived him of "adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard." He asserts that "lack of adequate notice mandates reversal." We see no merit in Davids claims.

We first note that David cites no authority for the proposition that section 361.5, subdivision (a), required the court to admonish him—a parent who was not receiving services—of the possible early termination of reunification efforts, and our independent research has led us to no such authority. In our view, both the plain language of the statute and the role it plays in the dependency scheme make it clear that David was not entitled to the admonishment given to Gina.

As reflected above, the statute provides that "the court shall inform the parent or guardian that the failure of the parent or guardian to . . . avail himself or herself of services . . . may result in termination of efforts to reunify the family after six months." (Italics added.) Thus, while section 361.5, subdivision (a), clearly requires that the court admonish a parent who is receiving services, we see nothing in the plain language of the statute (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268) that places a burden on a juvenile court to admonish a parent not receiving services of the possible early termination of reunification efforts. We see no reason to imply such a requirement when the legislature has not established one. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1858 [courts are not to insert words when construing a statute].) Moreover, construing the statute to require an admonition only to a parent receiving services makes sense in light of the overall statutory scheme. (Cf. Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 489.) The purpose of reunification services is to address the problems that led to the dependency and work toward reunification of the family. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362.) By definition, only those receiving services are in a position to avail themselves of services—or, more pointedly, to make timely, substantive progress in reunification. Requiring that a person not receiving services be admonished of the possible early termination of reunification efforts does not advance the goals of the statutory scheme.

Second, even if we accepted Davids view that he was entitled to the admonishment in question, he waived any right to challenge the courts failure to give it by failing to address the courts omission in his earlier writ petition. David was informed that reunification efforts might be cut short prior to the December 31, 2001, six-month hearing. On December 11, 2001, the department served David and his counsel with copies of its pre-hearing report recommending that reunification services be terminated and that a section 366.26 hearing be set for April 15, 2002. At the December 31, 2001, hearing, Davids counsel asked that the court order six more months of services for Gina but did not request services for David or assert that David had not been informed or did not realize that services were subject to early termination. Moreover, in his writ petition, while David argued that the court erred in failing to order additional services for Gina, he did not assert as error the courts failure to admonish him. Because David failed to challenge the courts purported error in his writ petition, he may not advance it here. (Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 209-210.)

David attempts to avoid that conclusion by asserting that the Meranda P. waiver rule does not apply—or should not be applied—when "due process forbids it." (See Janee J., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) In the context of dependency proceedings, due process requires that a parent have "adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. [Citations.]" (In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689.) The admonition required by section 361.5, subdivision (a), does not provide notice of a hearing or pending action against a parent. Nor does it afford a parent the opportunity to be heard on any issue relevant to the dependency or potential termination of parental rights. It does nothing more than inform the parent that reunification efforts may cease within six months unless the parent avails himself or herself of the services offered. We see no due process concerns stemming from the courts failure to admonish David.

C. The Juvenile Court Properly Considered the Childrens Wishes at the Termination Hearing

Section 366.26, subdivision (h), provides: "At all proceedings under this section, the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests of the child." This Division has interpreted that subdivision to "require the juvenile court to receive direct evidence of the childrens wishes regarding termination and adoption at the permanency planning hearing. This evidence may take the form of direct formal testimony in court; informal direct communication with the court in chambers, on or off the record; reports prepared for the hearing; letters; telephone calls to the court; or electronic recordings. Although a childs presence in court is not required, an out-of-court statement, as in a report or other form, must reflect the fact that the child is aware that the proceeding involves the termination of parental rights." (In re Diana G. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1480.)

David argues that the departments pre-termination hearing report does not indicate that the department "considered the wishes of Richard or Joseph regarding their father before proceeding to terminate his parental rights." We disagree.

The adoption assessment prepared by the Adoption Services Bureau includes a section entitled "Childs/Childrens Attitude Toward Placement and Adoption." The bureau stated that Richard had been interviewed "concerning [his]attitude toward placement and adoption." He "understand[s] the concept of adoption and [had] stated that [he] want[s] to remain with [the] current foster family and to be adopted by them." The bureau further noted that "Richard stated that adoption means that he will have a forever family and that his foster parents will be his mom and dad." The bureau opined that "Joseph appears to be too young to understand the concept of adoption. However, Joseph certainly wants to remain with his brothers and sister and readily expresses his love for his foster mother." When asked to draw a picture of his family, his drawing included the foster parents, "with a smile because they loved him."

Plainly, the bureau made efforts to assess the childrens attitudes toward termination of parental rights and adoption and to present that assessment to the court. The fact that Joseph is too young to understand the concept of adoption does not mean that the bureau did not consider his best interests in its adoption assessment. (Cf. In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1592 [when child is too young to understand concept of, or express feelings about, adoption, court may consider childs feelings regarding prospective adoptive parents, biological parents and living arrangements].)

III. DISPOSITION

The order of September 20, 2002, terminating parental rights is affirmed.

We concur, Parrilli, J., Pollak, J.


Summaries of

In re Richard G.

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Three.
Nov 17, 2003
No. A100849 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003)
Case details for

In re Richard G.

Case Details

Full title:In re RICHARD G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LAKE…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Three.

Date published: Nov 17, 2003

Citations

No. A100849 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2003)