Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jane A. Cardoza, Judge, Super. Ct. No. 82486
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Janelle E. Kelley, Interim County Counsel, and William G. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CORNELL, J.
Ro. H. appeals from an order by the juvenile court that temporarily suspended his rights to make educational decisions for his son, R.H. The juvenile court first gained jurisdiction over R.H. in 1999. By Ro. H.’s admission, this is at least his sixth appeal from various orders issued in the dependency proceedings. As with the previous five appeals, we will affirm the juvenile court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
R.H. has been in long-term foster care since 2000. Reunification services and visitation for Ro. H. were terminated in 2001. The report prepared for the most recent status review hearing indicated that R.H. was living in a group home. At the time of the hearing, Ro. H. was incarcerated at Atascadero State Hospital, and R.H.’s mother, V.M., was incarcerated in state prison. There is no indication in the report that Ro. H. had visited R.H. at any time in the recent past.
At the time of the report, R.H. was doing fairly well, having earned the right to return to his regular middle school. The report recommended that the juvenile court order that R.H. remain in long-term foster care. There is no indication in the file that either parent’s right to make educational decisions for R.H. ever was modified.
One day before the above referenced status hearing, the Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services (hereafter the Department) filed a request to change a court order. Specifically, the Department requested that the rights of the parents to make educational decisions for R.H. be restricted temporarily because R.H. had been expelled from school, and a hearing had been scheduled to determine R.H.’s options to continue his education. The request asserted that since Ro. H. and V.M. were not available to attend this meeting or to make any educational decisions for R.H., it was necessary to suspend their right to make educational decisions for R.H. so someone would attend the upcoming hearing and make the decisions necessary to allow R.H. to pursue his education. A hearing on the petition was held a week later. Although Ro. H. was not present at the hearing, he was represented by counsel. The request was granted without objection.
The exact statement in the request was “[R.H.] has been expelled from Pathways Community day School in the Central Unified school district and a special hearing is being set to determine what should be done about [R.H.’s] continuance at Pathways is still a suitable educational setting for him.”
DISCUSSION
Ro. H. argues the juvenile court’s order must be reversed because it was not supported by substantial evidence. This approach was taken by Ro. H. to avoid our concluding that the contention was forfeited by failing to object at the hearing. The Department argues that we may review the order only for an abuse of discretion, and thus we must conclude the issue was forfeited.
We will not enter into the arcane world of substantial evidence versus abuse of discretion. As an indication of how obscure the issue can become, current authority holds that if the order was not supported by substantial evidence, then the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion. (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 435; Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538, 544.) In order to avoid a headache, we will decide the issue on the merits using the substantial evidence standard of review.
The order is supported by substantial evidence if the whole record, viewed in the light most favorable to the order, discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496; People v. Superior Court (Jones)(1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681.) We presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could deduce from the evidence that supports the judgment. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
The information provided by the Department permitted the juvenile court to conclude that R.H. had been expelled from school and a meeting was scheduled to discuss his academic future. The Department viewed this meeting, probably correctly, as a significant event in R.H.’s life.
The juvenile court properly could conclude from the information provided that (1) important decisions about R.H.’s academic future were going to be made at the upcoming meeting; (2) it was necessary for someone with authority to make those decisions on R.H.’s behalf be present at those meetings; (3) neither Ro. H. nor V.M. could be present; and (4) it was necessary for the meeting to be held as soon as possible to permit R.H. to continue his education. These circumstances provide sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err.
Ro. H. also complains because the order was not limited in duration. This is an issue Ro. H. can address with the juvenile court once he is in a position to participate in making educational decisions for R.H.
DISPOSITION
The order from which Ro. H. appeals is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J., KANE, J.