Opinion
J-S58001-16 J-S58002-16 No. 228 MDA 2016 No. 229 MDA 2016 No. 230 MDA 2016 No. 231 MDA 2016 No. 242 MDA 2016 No. 243 MDA 2016
09-30-2016
IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF A.F. APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF D.F. APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF N.F. APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF T.F. APPEAL OF: J.F., MOTHER IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF D.F. APPEAL OF: R.F., FATHER IN RE: RELINQUISHMENT OF A.F., A MINOR APPEAL OF: R.F., FATHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-62 of 2015 Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-63 of 2015 Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-64 of 2015 Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: A-65 of 2015 Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No.: 2015-00063 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
In these consolidated and related appeals, J.F. (Mother) appeals from the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County entered January 5, 2016, that terminated her parental rights to her daughter, A.F., born in August of 2007; her son, D.F., born in March of 2003; her son, N.F., born in May of 2006; and her son, T.F., born in March of 2003 (Children). Also in these appeals, R.F. (Father) appeals from the orders of the trial court, entered on January 5, 2016, that terminated his parental rights to A.F. and D.F. We affirm.
This Court consolidated docket numbers 228, 229, 230 and 231 MDA 2016, sua sponte, on March 11, 2016, and docket numbers 242 and 243 MDA 2016, sua sponte, on March 21, 2016. All six appeals are related because they pertain to the same parents.
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of E.A., the biological father of T.F. and N.F. E.A. did not appeal those terminations. --------
The Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (YFS) filed petitions to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights to the Children on September 24, 2015. The trial court aptly summarized the events that led YFS to file that petition in its opinion entered March 21, 2016. We direct the reader to that opinion for the facts of this case.
The trial court held a hearing on YFS' petitions on December 16, 2015. Testifying at that hearing, in addition to Mother, were YFS caseworker, Christin Wormuth; Scranton Counseling Center therapist, Joelle Budd; YFS visitation worker, Catrina Romano; YFS caseworker, Stephanie Herne; and the Children's grandmother, M.A. Father was incarcerated at the time of the hearing; he did not testify. The trial court entered its orders terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) on January 5, 2016. Mother filed her notices of appeal and statements of errors complained of on appeal on February 4, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Father filed his notices of appeal and statements of errors complained of on appeal on that same date. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 21, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(ii).
Mother raises the following questions for our review:
A. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining [that YFS] sustained its burden of proving the termination of Mother's parental rights is warranted under Sections 2511(a)(1), 2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5), and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act?
B. Even if this Court concludes [YFS] established statutory grounds for the termination of Mother's parental rights, whether the trial court nevertheless erred as a matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining [that YFS] sustained its additional burden of proving the termination of Mother's parental rights is in the best interests of the Children?(Mother's Brief, at 5) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Father raises the following questions for our review:
A. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or sufficiently abused its discretion in determining [that YFS] presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [ ] Father's parental rights under Section 1511(a)(8) [sic] of the Adoption Act?(Father's Brief, at 9).
B. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or sufficiently abused its discretion in determining [that YFS] presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [ ] Father's parental rights under Section 1511(a)(1) [sic] of the Adoption Act?
C. Even if this Court determines [that YFS] presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [ ] Father's parental rights under Sections 1511(a)(1) [sic] and/or Section 1511(a)(8) [sic] of the Adoption Act whether the trial court nevertheless erred as matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining that termination of [ ] Father's parental rights is in the best interest of the [C]hild[ren]?
D. Even if this Court determines [that YFS] presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [ ] Father's parental rights under Sections 1511(a)(1) [sic] and/or Section 1511(a)(8) [sic] of the Adoption Act whether the trial court nevertheless erred as matter of law and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining that the conditions that led to removal have not been remedied and reunification of parent and child was not imminent at the time of the hearing[?]
Our standard of review is as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
presented as well as the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court's order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge's decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court's inferences and deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court's sustainable findings.
Here, the trial court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have examined the opinion entered by the trial court on March 21, 2016, in light of the record in this matter and are satisfied that the opinion is a complete and correct analysis of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County that terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 9/30/2016
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