Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. DP001655
ELIA, J.Maria R. appeals from the order of the juvenile court removing her daughter Rayna T. from her custody, placing Rayna with her father Raymond T., and dismissing the dependency case. She contends that the juvenile court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act and that the court's order was not supported by substantial evidence and was an abuse of discretion. She further contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Background
On February 15, 2007, Rayna T., then almost one and a half years old, was the subject of a petition filed by the Santa Cruz County Human Services Agency (Agency) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The petition alleged that Rayna and her three older half-siblings were at risk because of Maria's mental health problems and drug abuse. The petition also alleged that Raymond had failed to protect Rayna from Maria. Rayna and her siblings were ordered detained and placed in the care of their maternal grandparents.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
On March 22, 2007, appellant appeared for the jurisdictional hearing, as did Rayna's father, Raymond. Both requested appointment of counsel and the court appointed attorneys who were in court and ready to accept the appointments. Counsel for appellant requested a continuance "in order to be able to discuss the report and the recommendations with my client." Counsel for the Agency told the court that appellant had no Indian ancestry so the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) would not apply to appellant's three older children. Raymond told the court that his mother had some Indian heritage from a Cherokee tribe in Oklahoma and that his father was African-American. He said that he had "checked several years ago" with someone on a Cherokee reservation. Raymond said that he would have to prove where his maternal great-great-grandfather was buried, that this burial had occurred before records were kept, and that as a result he was unable to prove his ancestry "on paper." The court ordered the agency to notify the Bureau of Indian Affairs "as well as any Cherokee tribes in Oklahoma."
The Agency had no contact information for the father of appellant's other children.
Counsel for Raymond told the court that Raymond had flown to California from Arkansas the day before and would be returning the next day. Counsel said that it was Raymond's desire to have Rayna return to Arkansas with him the next day. Counsel said that the Agency had "almost completed its investigation as to the appropriateness of placement of Rayna" with appellant. Counsel told the court that Raymond had lived in Arkansas with his sister and brother-in-law since the previous June and that they lived in a "neat, clean, and safe" four bedroom home in a "Mayberry like community." Counsel said that Raymond was an associate pastor with the Missionary Baptist Church and presented Raymond's card to the court. Counsel said that Raymond was "safe, stable, sober, and available to take care of Rayna." Raymond told the court that he had been present at Rayna's birth and "clipped the cord." He said that he was the one to name her Rayna. He said "I love her. I want to take her back with me. Her mother, too, if she wanted to go."
Counsel for the Agency said that the Agency would "absolutely" want Raymond to be able to visit Rayna that day and the next. Counsel said that the Agency would like the State of Arkansas to "check out the house to make sure it's appropriate" or to have someone from the Agency bring Rayna there for a temporary visit. Counsel said, "Bad things happen in Mayberry, too. Just because this gentleman appears to be clean and sober from looking at him and does not have a bad record, we just can't make that recommendation that the child be returned to him today." Counsel for appellant said that appellant was objecting to having Rayna placed with Raymond. The juvenile court continued the matter for two weeks.
The jurisdiction/disposition report asked the court to have appellant participate in two psychological evaluations to determine if reunification services should be bypassed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), which provides that reunification services need not be provided to a parent suffering from a mental disability that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services. The report summarized a number of incidents of both paranoid and delusional behavior by appellant leading to both voluntary and involuntary commitments and included reports from the Behavioral Health Unit of Dominican Hospital.
The report said that appellant was "clearly suffering from a mental disability that impacts her ability to parent her children. Given all the available evidence it is quite obvious that [appellant] has suffered from mental health issues for an extended period of time and that [appellant's] current state of paranoia, aggressive behavior, delusional thinking and unwillingness or inability to address mental health and substance abuse issues have increased the risk to her children." The report noted that appellant had "a history of psychiatric episodes, which have affected her ability to parent," that appellant had "tested positive for methamphetamines, Barbiturates (sleeping pills), and Benzo (Tranquilizers)" and that the "Agency, family members, school officials and the children themselves have grave concerns regarding the children's safety in the care of their mother[.]" The social worker who prepared the report attempted to interview appellant but "due to [appellant's] mental health state at the time" she "was unable to give logical answers to questions regarding her social history."
Attached to the report were temporary orders from family court from a year earlier, March 2006, stating that appellant and Raymond would share joint legal custody of Rayna, that appellant would live with Rayna at appellant's parents' house, and that appellant "shall immediately contact her primary care physician to arrange for a referral to a psychiatrist or psychologist for the purpose of assessing mother for possible bipolar disorder or other mental health difficulty that could compromise her parenting."
The report said that the agency was "strongly considering" placement of Rayna with Raymond and was "in the process of assessing [Raymond's] ability to care for his daughter." The report noted that Raymond had been aware of appellant's "mental health difficulties" and that in 2006 he took Rayna to his home, then in Texas, after appellant had threatened to kill herself and her children. When the court in Santa Cruz asked him to return Rayna, Raymond "did so immediately." He said that "the Family Court told him that he 'overreacted.' "
On April 5, 2007, counsel for appellant appeared for the jurisdictional hearing and asked for a continuance. Counsel said, "We were not able to communicate with the mother and contact her and I would like to be given the opportunity to talk to her regarding this hearing." The court denied this request.
Counsel for the Agency asked the court to remove Rayna's three older siblings from appellant's care, and to offer reunification services while continuing to seek the psychological evaluations "for the potential purpose of bypass." Counsel asked that the court continue disposition for Rayna and said that the Agency was having "no luck" in having the state of Arkansas check out Raymond's home. Counsel asked for an order pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). Counsel for appellant told the court, "without being in contact with my client and without authorization to proceed today, I cannot have any comments." The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true and removed Rayna and her three older half-siblings from appellant's care.
On May 17, 2007, counsel for the agency reported that the state of Arkansas had refused to participate unless the juvenile court agreed to keep jurisdiction until Arkansas approved of discharging jurisdiction. Background checks on Raymond and everyone living in his home "came back clean." Counsel for Raymond said that Raymond was willing to establish residence in California if necessary "so that [Rayna] may live with him as soon as possible." Counsel for appellant asked that the matter be set for a settlement conference on disposition with a contested hearing to trail. She said that appellant wanted the agency to look into Raymond's history with alcohol and his medical and mental health history. The juvenile court continued the matter.
The agency filed a "memo" with the court reporting that the agency had contacted Raymond to discuss appellant's concerns about him. He said that he was a diabetic, that this condition was controlled by medication, and that he had experienced heart palpitations in 2004. Raymond told the Agency that he had "never had a problem with alcoholism or mental health issues."
On June 7, 2007, counsel for appellant appeared, noted that appellant was not present, and requested a continuance. The request was denied. Counsel for the Agency discussed the photographs that appellant had sent of his living situation and said "It does not appear as though the home is in an unacceptable shape. The only thing I could say that might be missing is we'd love to know that he's got the electrical plug covered." Counsel for the Agency asked the court to place Rayna with Raymond and dismiss the dependency case with custody orders granting legal and physical custody to Raymond. Counsel suggested that appellant and Raymond would be able to work out a visitation schedule together. Counsel for Rayna said that she "would be a little more satisfied if somebody could go and actually see the house . . . but I'm not going to require that before this case proceeds." Counsel for appellant said that she had "no comment."
The juvenile court said that it had "a certain comfort level in this case" based on how Raymond had presented himself in court, how he had cooperated with the investigation, how Raymond and Rayna had "hit it off" when he visited her, and how, from the pictures, Raymond's house in Arkansas looked "like a loving home environment." The court ordered Rayna placed with Raymond with visitation for appellant and the three half-siblings. The court ordered the dependency dismissed.
Discussion
Indian Child Welfare Act Notice
Appellant contends, "The disposition order must be reversed because the county failed to give notice as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act." Appellant states, "Even though the agency and the court had information that gave them both reason to know that Rayna had Indian ancestry (§ 224.3, subd. (b)(1)) and the court ordered the agency to give notice of the proceedings to the BIA and the Cherokee tribes in Oklahoma . . . there is nothing in the record that shows that the agency sent notice to any tribe or to the BIA, the court subsequently failed to ensure that proper notice was given and continued to hold hearings in the case in the absence of any evidence of proper notice." Respondent acknowledges "that the record for this appeal does not include notices under the Act, nor responses from the tribes. It is conceded that such were not part of the record before the trial judge who made the orders on June 7, 2007, and therefore the respondent has not requested augmentation or correction of the record."
Respondent adds, "It is not, however, conceded that notices were never sent by the Agency; official records of the Agency provide more information than is in the record, but such was not filed nor brought before the trial judge." Respondent argues that appellant has no standing to raise the ICWA notice issue. In In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 338-339, the court held that, for purposes of standing, a non-Indian mother was aggrieved by an ICWA notice violation because she had rights and benefits flowing directly from her status as a parent within the meaning of the ICWA. The court explained: "Even a non-Indian parent has rights under the ICWA. The ICWA defines 'parent' so as to include (subject to one exception not applicable here) 'any biological parent or parents of an Indian child. . . . ' [Citation.] It then provides that 'the parent,' as well as the tribe, is entitled to notice. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)" (Id. at p. 339.) "Moreover, giving notice to the tribe could result in a determination that [the minor] is in fact an Indian child. In that event, the juvenile court would have to make certain specified findings before it could terminate parental rights" and these "heightened" findings would "tend to benefit the non-Indian as well as the Indian parent." (Ibid.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a), (d), (f).)
The purposes of the ICWA are to protect the interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families. (In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 1421.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 224, et seq., charges the juvenile court with carrying out these purposes and complying with the ICWA and provides the framework for implementing the ICWA in California dependency proceedings. To ensure a tribe's right to intervene, the ICWA requires that in any involuntary state court proceeding where "the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved," the party seeking foster care placement or termination of parental rights for the Indian child shall notify the child's tribe of the pending proceedings and of its right to intervene. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) The notice requirements apply to all hearings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq. (§ 224.3.)
The ICWA applies to all dependency proceedings regardless of the placement recommendation because, until the court dismisses the petition, the child could be placed in a temporary foster home. (In re Jennifer A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 692, 699-701.) Thus, even where the child is placed with a natural parent, the social services department is bound to comply with the ICWA notice requirements so long as the juvenile court has retained jurisdiction of the case. But placement with a natural parent after a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing does not involve foster care (or termination of parental rights). Thus, even if notice had been given and a tribe had been located and had chosen to intervene, no different result could have flowed from the exercise of that right. This follows because section 361.2 requires the juvenile court to place a child with a previously noncustodial parent who requests custody so long as the placement would not be "detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) There is nothing in the ICWA that affects this state law requirement. Therefore, the juvenile court was bound to place Rayna in this case with Raymond unless that placement was shown to be detrimental to Rayna. The ICWA does not grant a tribe rights that are superior to those of a child's biological parent. To the contrary, the ICWA acknowledges that the parents' interests are paramount. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).) Furthermore, ICWA's purpose is to preserve Native American culture. A child's tribe must be provided notice so that it can intervene to ensure the child is placed with an Indian family. However, because custody of Rayna was transferred from the parent with no Indian ancestry to the one from whom any Indian ancestry flowed, the preservation of Native American culture is not threatened and there are no concerns that Rayna will lose whatever Native American Indian heritage she has or that the tribe will lose the child. (In re Alexis H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 11, 14-15.)
In arguing that she was prejudiced by the failure to give ICWA notice, appellant contends, "Because no determination was ever made as to whether Rayna was an Indian child, the court erred in removing Rayna from Maria's custody without applying the heightened standard of proof required by the act." Section 361, subdivision (c)(6) provides that in an Indian child custody proceeding that a child shall not be removed from a parent's custody unless "continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, and that finding is supported by testimony of a 'qualified expert witness' as described in Section 224.6." Section 224.6, subdivision (a), includes in its definition of a "qualified expert witness" a psychologist "provided the individual is not an employee of the person or agency recommending foster care placement or termination of parental rights."
Here, the juvenile court did find that there was a "substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor or would be if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parents' or guardians' physical custody." The court's findings were supported by the jurisdiction/disposition report, which included over 30 pages of reports from the doctors and staff at Dominican Hospital describing appellant's serious mental health problems. These confirm that appellant was suffering from, among other things, "major depressive disorder with psychotic features," auditory hallucinations, and paranoid ideation. Thus, even under the heightened standards of the ICWA, removal was appropriate and supported by evidence from qualified experts. Thus, under familiar harmless error principles, the ICWA noticing error would warrant reversal only if it appeared reasonably likely that the juvenile court would have reached a different result had it applied the requirements of the act. We see no basis to conclude that it would have . Appellant has failed to demonstrate that another result would have occurred in the absence of the noticing error given that the dispositional order was placement with Rayna's father. Because it is clear that the outcome of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing would have been the same regardless of whether Rayna is an Indian child, any violation of the ICWA notice requirements was harmless. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
The Disposition Order
Rayna was placed with Raymond under the authority of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a). Under section 361.2, subdivision (a), the court must place a dependent child with a previously noncustodial parent who requests custody, unless the placement would be detrimental to the child's safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. Because the noncustodial parent has both a constitutionally protected interest in custody and a statutory right to custody, there must be clear and convincing evidence of detriment to the child before the court can deny the noncustodial parent's request for custody. (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 696; In re Luke M.(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.) Section 361.2, subdivision (a), with its heightened standard of proof, effectuates the legislative preference for placement with the previously noncustodial parent. (In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132.) Thus, absent clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to Rayna to be placed with Raymond, the law requires placement with him. (§ 361.2, subd. (a); In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169 [parenting is a fundamental right, and is disturbed only in extreme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with parenthood].)
"We review the record in the light most favorable to the court's order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that the children would suffer such detriment. [Citations.] Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. [Citation.]" (In re Luke M. supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426.) We must defer to the trial court's factual assessments as we do not have the opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses. (Id. at p. 1427.)
Finding of No Detriment
Appellant contends that "the court's finding that placement with Raymond would not be detrimental to Rayna was not supported by substantial evidence."
Appellant relies on In re John M.(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564. In John M., the minor, age 13, was removed from his mother's custody on the grounds of physical abuse. The trial court denied the minor's noncustodial, nonoffending father's request for custody of the minor on the basis of the minor's statement that he did not want to live with the father. The Court of Appeal reversed and held that the juvenile court erred in failing to find by clear and convincing evidence that the child would suffer detriment if placed with the father. (Id.at pp. 1570-1571.) The court also determined that ICPC compliance was not a prerequisite to the minor's placement with his father. (Id.at p. 1575.) Here, the juvenile court made a finding that it would not be detrimental to Rayna to be placed with Raymond and substantial evidence supports that finding.
The jurisdiction/disposition report included an investigation narrative concerning an incident in March 2006. Raymond had just returned from a visit to see relatives in Texas and told appellant that "he was moving to Texas with or without her and he would be taking his child." Raymond and appellant argued. Appellant grabbed a knife and said that she was going to kill herself. At the time, Rayna was upstairs sleeping in her crib and appellant's older children were at school. Raymond left but returned the next morning with the police who detained appellant for a mental health evaluation. When appellant was released after a few hours, she returned home to find that Raymond had taken Rayna and Rayna's clothes as well as the television, the computer, and other items. Appellant denied having threatened to hurt her children. Appellant argues, "If Raymond truly believed that [appellant] was a threat to herself or to the children, he should not have left Rayna alone with [appellant] for any period of time after she made that threat. If he did not really believe that [appellant] was a threat to herself or Rayna, then his calculated behavior in calling the police to get them to take Maria to the B[ehavioral] H[ealth] U[nit], so that he could leave with Rayna and many of the family's possessions and drive to Texas while Maria was being detained, shows a callous disregard for Rayna's welfare and that he is willing to put his own needs ahead of those of his child."
This incident, which occurred over a year before the disposition hearing and during a time when the couple was together but having serious conflict, does not undermine the juvenile court's finding that there would be no detriment to Rayna in placing her with Raymond. The juvenile court obviously considered Raymond's present circumstances and demeanor as outweighing any negative inferences to be drawn from the past conflicts.
Appellant criticizes the trial court's reliance on the photographs of Raymond's home in Arkansas. Appellant argues, "if the State of Arkansas was unwilling to do a placement inspection without continuing jurisdiction guarantees and the court was unwilling to do that, then the Agency was obligated to explore alternative means of investigating the father's home." That there could have been more investigation into the Arkansas home does not mean that there was not substantial evidence supporting the court's finding of non-detriment. The court could consider the photographs, and specifically referred to Raymond's appearance and demeanor in finding that there would be no detriment to Rayna to being placed with Raymond. Given the deferential standard of review, we cannot say that no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding of no detriment.
Sibling Relationships
Sction 361.2 provides in subdivision (i), "Where the court has ordered removal of the child from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, the court shall consider whether there are any siblings under the court's jurisdiction, the nature of the relationship between the child and his or her siblings, the appropriateness of developing or maintaining the sibling relationships . . . and the impact of the sibling relationships on the child's placement and planning for legal permanence." Sction 358.1, subdivision (d) requires the report to include a factual discussion on the subject of a minor's sibling relationships. "[A] court is authorized to evaluate the appropriateness of keeping siblings together, and to consider sibling relationships as one factor, among many, when determining detriment for purposes of its placement decisions." (In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.)
Rayna has three considerably older half-siblings who were ages 14, 11, and eight at the time this dependency proceeding began. The whereabouts of their father was unknown. The jurisdiction report contains information about them and their expressions of "grave concern" regarding their safety in the care of appellant. The children had been living with their maternal grandparents who were "willing to care for their grandchildren as long as the mother is unable." The report also contained information about how the siblings learned of the incident that culminated in Raymond taking Rayna to Texas with him. On March 22, 2007, counsel for Rayna told the court, "I am delighted that [Rayna] has a father that is interested in her care and come all the way out here. I am aware that, for her, she doesn't know him very well, and the people that she's bonded to are the grandparents, her mother, and her siblings. That in no way means that there are impediments in [Raymond's] way." On April 5, 2007, when the court made its jurisdictional findings as to all the children, the court continued disposition as to Rayna but proceeded to disposition as to her siblings, setting a six-month review hearing. At the time of disposition for Rayna, the court included in its order, at the suggestion of counsel for Rayna, visitation between Rayna and her siblings.
Appellant contends, "The court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether severing Rayna's bond with her siblings would have an adverse impact on Rayna's emotional well-being." Appellant argues, "Although it was required to do so . . . the juvenile court also failed to consider the impact of separating Rayna from her sibling would have on her and whether that would be detrimental to Rayna."
It is important to note that the court was not placing any of these children in foster care or terminating appellant's parental rights. The juvenile court had before it in the report information concerning Rayna's half-siblings, including the significant age difference between them and Rayna, and had heard counsel for Rayna's comments. Although the report could have included more specific information about how her siblings felt about Rayna's placement with her father, Rayna herself was too young to be consulted on this subject. We infer that the court considered the impact on Rayna's emotional well-being of being placed with her father instead of her siblings at their grandparents' home, as the court did order sibling visitation. There is no reason to believe that the juvenile court did not consider the sibling relationship in making its finding that there was not clear and convincing evidence of detriment to Rayna in granting Raymond's request for custody. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.
Effective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant contends, "The order placing Rayna with Raymond and dismissing the case must be reversed because Maria was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel."
"In general, the proper way to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is by writ of habeas corpus, not appeal. [Citations.] . . . [A]n ineffective assistance claim may be reviewed on direct appeal [only] where 'there simply could be no satisfactory explanation' for trial counsel's action or inaction. [Citation.]" (In re Dennis H. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 94, 98, fn. 1.) Usually "[t]he establishment of ineffective assistance of counsel most commonly requires a presentation which goes beyond the record of the trial. . . . Action taken or not taken by counsel at a trial is typically motivated by considerations not reflected in the record. . . . Evidence of the reasons for counsel's tactics, and evidence of the standard of legal practice in the community as to a specific tactic, can be presented by declarations or other evidence filed with the writ petition. [Citation.]" (In re Arturo A. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 229, 243.)
Because appellant has not filed a habeas petition in this case, our review is limited to the appellate record. On the basis of our review, we conclude that appellant has failed to establish that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The test for showing ineffective assistance of counsel in dependency proceedings is the same test used in criminal proceedings. (See In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1667-1668.) A parent claiming ineffective assistance of counsel " 'must demonstrate both that: (1) his appointed counsel failed to act in a manner expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates; and that (2) this failure made a determinative difference in the outcome, rendering the proceedings fundamentally unfair in that it is reasonably probable that but for such failure, a determination more favorable for [the parent's] interests would have resulted.' [Citations.]" (In re Dennis H., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 98; accord, In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 628.)
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a court " 'need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by [the appellant] as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . ., that course should be followed.' " (In re Elizabeth G. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 496, 503.) "Thus, a court may reject a claim if the party fails to demonstrate that but for trial counsel's failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant. [Citation.]" (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1180.)
Appellant argues, "In this case, [appellant's] counsel took absolutely no position on her behalf at the disposition hearing. Counsel asked for a continuance when [appellant] did not appear but once that continuance was denied, counsel did not advocate for her client's rights or interests in any way, shape, or form." Respondent states, "It is unclear whether appellant would prefer to have her trial counsel guess at her wishes, and argue for something which may have been contrary to them if she guessed wrong, or whether she thinks that counsel could have produced evidence unassisted by her client, who might at least have testified if she had something to offer." Appellant argues that had counsel called to the court's attention the sibling issue discussed above, "it is entirely possible that the court would have continued the matter and ordered the Agency to prepare a supplemental report that addressed those relationships."
On this state of the record, appellant has not shown that a better result for her would have been reasonably probable if counsel had taken the suggested actions. That is, on the state of the appellate record, there is nothing that shows counsel could have presented evidence that would have caused the juvenile court to render a different decision at any stage of the proceedings. We conclude that even if appellant's counsel had objected to Rayna's removal from appellant, had asked the court to request more information concerning her sibling relationships, and vigorously advocated for Rayna's placement with appellant, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different.
Disposition
The order appealed from is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSHING, P. J., PREMO, J.