Opinion
No. 348834
12-19-2019
In re PHILLIPS, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Berrien Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2017-000090-NA Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SHAPIRO, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody) and (j) (reasonable likelihood that children will be harmed if returned to the parent). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition for the removal of respondent's children because she was unable to meet her children's basic needs. Specifically, the petition asserted that respondent had substance abuse issues with alcohol and marijuana and that she was unable to provide her children with stable housing because she could not maintain employment. The trial court ordered that the children be removed from respondent's care. Respondent pleaded no contest to the allegations in the petition, and DHHS provided respondent with services, which included drug testing, individual counseling, substance abuse counseling, and inpatient rehabilitation. DHHS also permitted respondent frequent parenting visits with her children.
However, after approximately one year, respondent was still unable to maintain employment or housing. She missed approximately half her scheduled parenting times and she tested positive for intoxicating or illegal substances on more than half her drug tests. Many of those drug tests were taken during respondent's parenting time with her children. Respondent also inconsistently participated in the services provided to her, and, consequently, she made minimal progress in those services. Furthermore, at the termination hearing, respondent was on probation after being incarcerated for charges of resisting arrest and domestic violence. The trial court terminated mother's parental rights for violation of MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j), and subsequently, determined termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interest. Respondent now appeals.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that it was in the minor children's best interests to terminate her parental rights without considering her bond with her children or her parenting history. We disagree and we affirm the trial court's findings.
Respondent does not argue that the trial court erred by finding that the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights were met. Therefore, we presume that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the unchallenged statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99; 585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled on other grounds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Ferranti, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2019) (Docket No. 157907) (MARKMAN, J., dissenting); slip op at 29 n 20. --------
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's factual findings following a termination hearing are reviewed for clear error. In re Gonzales/Martinez Minors, 310 Mich App 426, 430; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at 430-431 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The trial court must order termination of parental rights if it finds there are one or more statutory grounds for termination of those rights, and if termination is in the best interests of the children. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child[ren] must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court must evaluate each child's best interests individually. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 42. However, if the best interests of the individual children do not significantly differ, then the trial court does not need to repeat the same factual findings for each child. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 715; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The trial court should "consider such factors as the child's bond to the parent[;] the parent's parenting ability[;] the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality[;] and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of . . . the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in [foster] care, and the possibility of adoption." White, 303 Mich App at 714. The child is the focus of the best interest determination, not the parent. Schadler, 315 Mich App at 411.
III. DISCUSSION
In this case, the trial court made the following findings regarding the children's best interests:
Every child deserves someone committed to meeting their needs, providing love, affection, support, maintenance, instruction, discipline, and
guidance. These need—these children need the stability and guarantee of safety that only drug-free caregivers can provide.
[Respondent] however well-meaning she may be at this time of her life cannot provide the safety and stability for these children that they deserve.
* * *
This Court does not take the action it is taking at this time with the intent to punish the parents. This Court acts strictly in the interest of safeguarding these children and giving them stability.
I find for all the reasons it is clearly in the best interest of the minor children to terminate parental rights of the [respondent].
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights, based on her children's best interests, because she has a bond with her children, her children enjoyed visiting her, and she has a past history of adequately parenting her children.
Although the trial court did not expressly address the issue of respondent's bond to her children at the termination hearing, the trial court explicitly inquired into the bond at prior hearings, and the trial court did acknowledge that respondent was attending some of her scheduled parenting time. Furthermore, at the termination hearing, the trial court noted that respondent did "seem to care for [her] children and want[ed] to be a better mother[,]" but that respondent only attended approximately half her scheduled parenting visits and she did not attend the parenting classes she was offered. Therefore, the record as a whole clearly shows that the trial court took respondent's bond with her children into account, irrespective of whether the trial court explicitly commented on that bond in its ruling. The trial court's stated findings need not exhaustively comment on each and every piece of evidence or potential consideration in the record, so long as they are sufficient for our review. See MCR 2.517(A)(2); Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475; 730 NW2d 262 (2007).
A parent's bond with her children may be "outweighed by the children's need for safety, permanency, and stability." In re Jones, 316 Mich App 110, 120; 894 NW2d 54 (2016). The bond between a parent and child is just one factor that the trial court may consider, and a factor that may be outweighed by other factors that prove termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests. See Schadler, 315 Mich App at 411; Jones, 316 Mich App at 120. In this case, respondent never secured stable housing, nor did she maintain stable employment, which prevented her from meeting her financial needs. See Jones, 316 Mich App at 120, 131 (trial courts may evaluate whether a parent "obtained suitable housing during the course of the proceedings"; was able to "meet her own economic or financial needs, let alone the needs of [her] children"; whether a parent utilized services offered to her, for her and her children's possible reunification; and the young age of her children). Respondent had these issues at the beginning of this case, and they were ongoing at the time of her termination hearing. She frequently missed scheduled parenting time, and when she did attend, she was usually under the influence of intoxicating substances. Mother failed 24 of her 33 scheduled drug tests and missed 35 of her 62 visits with her caseworker. Furthermore, a month before the termination hearing, mother was charged with domestic violence, and at the time of the hearing, she was on probation.
Based on respondent's history of being unable to maintain consistent employment and housing, her substance abuse, and her incarceration, we agree with the trial court that respondent did not provide any indication that she would correct her problematic issues in the near future. Furthermore, respondent underutilized the services offered to her - substance abuse counseling, inpatient rehabilitation, parenting classes - and case workers reported she made minimal progress with those services. Therefore, we believe the trial court correctly found respondent provided little or no indication she would start adequately complying with the necessary services or rectify her problems, if the trial court did not terminate her parental rights.
In this case, respondent's bond with her children is outweighed by other factors that showed respondent would not be able to properly care for her children in the future. See Jones, 316 Mich App at 120; Schadler, 315 Mich App at 411. Furthermore, respondent's children should not be expected to wait indefinitely in foster care "if the [problematic] conditions [of respondent's life] leading to the proceedings could not be rectified within a reasonable period of time." See In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 647; 468 NW2d 315 (1991). This point is particularly important because the children are showing progress and emotional stability within the permanence of their new foster home, and they indicated discomfort during their parenting visits with respondent. Case workers testified that respondent's children expressed a desire not to remain in ongoing foster care. However, the children did not express a desire to stay in their mother's care, either. Furthermore, at least one of the children has developed a bond with her foster mother, which indicates permanency and stability in the children's current placement.
Additionally, respondent argues that the trial court did not consider her past adequate parenting. The trial court may consider respondent's past parenting history in determining the best interests of her children. See In re Jones, 286 Mich App at 13. However, a respondent's past parenting history is just one factor the court may consider. See White, 303 Mich App at 714; Schadler, 315 Mich App at 411.
Although again not explicitly stated, the trial court clearly found that the evidence did not show that respondent had an adequate past history of parenting. The only evidence regarding respondent's ability to properly care for her children was a statement from a foster-care specialist, who agreed that the children did show signs of adequate past parenting. However, the remaining evidence in the record supported the trial court's conclusion that respondent did not recently provide this care and she could not provide proper care for her children in the future. For example, respondent missed approximately half her scheduled parenting visits and she refused to attend parenting classes. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, respondent tested positive for marijuana and/or alcohol during multiple scheduled visits with her children, and she was arrested for domestic violence. Therefore, the trial court properly viewed the whole record when considering respondent's past parenting history and it did not err in finding that the record did not support respondent's argument that she provided adequate parenting in the past. See In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 237; 894 NW2d 653 (2016).
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court did not consider that both children, at some point during this case, stated that they would like to return home to her care. Respondent also argues that at some points throughout the proceedings, her children stated they enjoyed their visits with her. However, the trial court was not required to consider or find in favor of the children's preference to live with respondent. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 452-453; 781 NW2d 105 (2009); In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App at 102-103. Furthermore, although some reports indicated that the children wanted to live with their parents, the foster-care specialist testified that the children expressed no desire to live with respondent in particular.
As with respondent's bond with her children, the children's statements must be considered in the context of the whole record. See Medina, 317 Mich App at 237. In that context, we must determine whether future reunification is even possible. See Jones, 316 Mich App at 120 (the court may "consider whether it is likely that the child[ren] could be returned to [their] parents' home within the foreseeable future, if at all" (internal quotes and citation omitted)). Thus, the children's statements must be balanced against the emotional instability the children exhibited when respondent did not visit them, or their discomfort that resulted from respondent's comments during her visits. Additionally, respondents' claims about her children's statements do not overcome her failure to rectify her issues of housing, employment, and substance abuse. The children's expressed interests are not wholly indicative of their best interests, and they do not disprove the burden respondent must overcome to show she could properly care for her children. Therefore, the trial court did not err.
IV. CONCLUSION
The record supports the trial court's finding that it was in the children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights to them. The trial court was not required to make its finding based on the children's inconsistent wishes they return to respondents' or their parents' care. The trial court also had the authority to consider multiple factors, and the whole record, to determine the long-term best interests of the children. For these reasons, the trial court did not clearly err when it terminated respondent's parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro