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finding no qualified right of access to criminal mental competency reports that have not been admitted into evidence
Summary of this case from United States v. GuerreroOpinion
Docket Nos. 98429, 98430.
Decided March 29, 1994.
On application by the plaintiffs, for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, affirmed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Rehearing denied 445 Mich. 1203.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Don W. Atkins, Principal Attorney, Appeals, for the people.
Butzel, Long (by James E. Stewart, Leonard M. Niehoff, and Eugene H. Boyle, Jr.) for The Detroit News.
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz Cohn (by Herschel P. Fink and Michael A. Gruskin) for the Detroit Free Press, Inc.
MEMORANDUM OPINION.
After preparation of a psychiatric evaluation, the defendant in this criminal case was found competent to stand trial. The decision was based upon the stipulation of the parties and upon a report from the Recorder's Court Psychiatric Clinic.
The report was not marked as an exhibit or admitted into evidence.
The Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press sought access to the psychiatrist's written report, but the motion was opposed by the prosecutor, the defendant, and the clinic. After a hearing, the district court denied the newspapers' motion, but did provide them an edited copy of the report.
The edited copy was several pages long. It briefly explained why the examination was being conducted, and it included background information concerning the pending criminal charges. The copy also included the psychiatrist's conclusions regarding the issue of competency to stand trial.
The newspapers applied for leave to appeal, seeking the full text of the psychiatrist's report. The Recorder's Court denied leave to appeal after a hearing at which it considered the merits of the dispute.
The Court of Appeals granted the newspapers' applications for leave to appeal, and later affirmed. 202 Mich. App. 595; 509 N.W.2d 894 (1993).
In the order granting leave, the Court of Appeals also ordered the Recorder's Court to make additional findings regarding its decision not to allow full disclosure. Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 7, 1993 (Docket Nos. 159314, 159315). Those findings were made before the Court of Appeals issued its decision in this matter.
The newspapers have now applied for leave to appeal to this Court.
They have also filed motions for immediate consideration, which we grant.
In its opinion of affirmance, the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed this issue in light of the common law and controlling principles of federal law:
The United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized a "common-law right of access" to judicial records. Nixon v Warner Communications, Inc, 435 U.S. 589, 599; 98 S Ct 1306; 55 L Ed 2d 570 (1978). However, the common-law right of access is not absolute and the decision to permit access is left to the discretion of the trial court. Id.; United States v Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 409 (CA 6, 1986). Some courts considering the issue have found that where a judicial record by tradition has been confidential, access is granted only upon a showing of important public need or to "serve the ends of justice." Times Mirror Co v United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1219 (CA 9, 1989); United States v Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (CA 7, 1989).
In determining whether a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches to a criminal proceeding, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized two complementary considerations. Press-Enterprise Co v Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, [8]; 106 S Ct 2735; 92 L Ed 2d 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II). See also Booth Newspapers [ Inc v 12th Dist Court Judge, 172 Mich. App. 688; 432 N.W.2d 400 (1988)]. The first is whether the place and process at issue have historically been open to the press and general public. Secondly, there is the consideration "whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question." Press-Enterprise II, supra at 8; Booth Newspapers, supra. If both questions are answered in the affirmative, a qualified right of access applies to the proceeding, and that proceeding may not be closed unless specific findings are made that "`closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'" Press-Enterprise II, supra at 13-14, quoting Press-Enterprise Co v Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510; 104 S Ct 819; 78 L Ed 2d 629 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I).
Several courts have recognized that the qualified First Amendment right of access may also extend to certain documents submitted in connection with judicial proceedings. Corbitt, supra; Globe Newspaper Co v Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497 (CA 1, 1989); In re New York Times Co, 828 F.2d 110 (CA 2, 1987); United States v Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (CA 3, 1985); Baltimore Sun v Thanos, 92 Md. App. 227; 607 A.2d 565 (1992). We believe that the test enunciated in Press-Enterprise II is the proper test to apply in determining whether a qualified First Amendment right of access extends to a particular judicial document submitted in conjunction with a pretrial hearing. However, the right of access to a document submitted for use in a hearing should be considered separately from the right to attend the hearing itself. Corbitt, supra at 228-229; Thanos, supra at 234, n 4. We conclude that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, there is no right of access to the competency report prepared pursuant to defendant's request for a competency hearing. [ 202 Mich. App. 600-601.]
Applying these principles, the Court of Appeals accurately recounted that competency reports that have not been admitted into evidence have traditionally been viewed as confidential in Michigan, and that public access would not "play a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question." However, the Court of Appeals attempted to bolster its analysis with a discussion of the psychiatrist-patient privilege stated in MCL 330.1750; MSA 14.800(750).
The discussion of the statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege was unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. While we approve the remaining portion of the Court of Appeals analysis, the statutory privilege is not a basis for our affirmance.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
CAVANAGH, C.J., and BRICKLEY, BOYLE, RILEY, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred.
The majority's statement that the "Court of Appeals accurately recounted that competency reports that have not been admitted into evidence have traditionally been viewed as confidential in Michigan, and that public access would not `play a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question,'" ante, pp 740-741 (emphasis added), ignores the following statement by the district judge who was sitting as trier of fact:
I have looked at [the competency report] in it's [sic] entirety. Dr. Rosen [a Recorder's Court Clinic's psychiatrist] indicated that he interviewed Mr. Atkins for approximately 2 hours on September 9th and 10th of this year. . . . Based on this report, which I have examined in full, and the stipulations between the parties, I do find Benjamin Thomas Atkins, competent to stand trial on all 3 matters. [Emphasis added.]
Since the competency report was the basis of the judge's decision finding the defendant competent to stand trial, it should be deemed to have been admitted in evidence without regard to whether it was formally admitted in evidence.
I would grant leave to appeal.
MALLETT, J., concurred with LEVIN, J.