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In re of

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Apr 13, 2018
No. J-A27045-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2018)

Opinion

J-A27045-17 No. 974 WDA 2017

04-13-2018

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.M.L. APPEAL OF: R.J.D. AND J.E.D.


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order June 7, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County, Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 2 Adoption 2017 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:

R.J.D. ("Mother") and J.D. ("Stepfather") (collectively, "Appellants" or "Petitioners") appeal from the Order denying their Petition to terminate the parental rights of M.E.L. ("Father") to K.M.L. ("Child") (born in December 2007), Father's female child with Mother. Petitioners filed the termination Petition so that Stepfather may adopt Child. We affirm.

In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the following procedural history and factual background as follows:

Mother and [Father] . . . start[ed] dating while they were in high school, and the two moved in together immediately after they graduated. At the time, the two also lived with Mother's [female] child from a previous relationship, [H.E.] (hereinafter referred to as "H."), who was approximately four years old at the time. In 2000, Mother and Father had their first child together, a son, named [J.L.] (hereinafter referred to as "J."). While Mother was pregnant with [J.], Father was arrested for allegedly assaulting Mother's [a]unt. This arrest resulted in a conviction of Indecent Assault - Complainant is Unconscious or Unaware of Contact[FN1] on November 2, 2001. Father served time in the Somerset County Jail for this offense.
Mother and Father were married in 2006, and Child was born [in December of 2007]. Child was about five or six months old when Mother and Father separated. Mother moved out of the home and filed a Petition for Protection from Abuse (hereinafter referred to as "PFA") against Father. Between the time Mother moved out from the residence and filed for the PFA, [J.] and Child were in the sole custody of Father in the home. The PFA was entered on October 30, 2008, and Mother was granted custody of [J.] and Child during the PFA process. On December 8, 2008, the parties came to an agreement regarding custody of [J.] and Child, in which Mother and Father shared legal and physical custody.

Father was arrested in July of 2009 on allegations that he sexually assaulted [H.] A trial was held, and Father was convicted of one count of Indecent Assault[FN2] on January 28, 2011. Father served time for this conviction in the Somerset County Jail. This conviction required that Father register on the Pennsylvania Sexual Offender Registry. From the time of his arrest to the conclusion of his sentence, Father was not permitted to have contact with either [J.] or Child, or any child under the age of eighteen (18)[,] by way of a condition in Father's criminal sentencing [O]rder.

[R.L.], Father's father (hereinafter referred to as "Paternal Grandfather"), and [K.L.], Father's mother (hereinafter referred to as "Paternal Grandmother")[] (collectively hereinafter referred to as "Paternal Grandparents")[,] filed a Petition for Intervention in Custody Case on October 30, 2009.[FN3] The parties came to an agreement, and Paternal Grandparents were granted unsupervised visitation with [J.] and Child on December 8, 2009. The visits were scheduled to occur every other Saturday[,] from 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.

On January 30, 2012, the [c]ourt entered a No Contact Order (hereinafter referred to as [the] "2012 No Contact Order") between Father and [J.] and Child. Father was prohibited from having any contact whatsoever with [J.] and Child until further order of the [c]ourt. Father filed a Petition for Modification of the Current Custody Order on July 9, 2013, requesting shared legal and physical custody of both [J.] and Child. A custody trial was scheduled for November 14, 2013. However, on the day of trial, in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329(c), the [c]ourt ordered that Father must first submit himself to an Initial Evaluation to determine whether he poses a threat to [J.] and Child and whether
counseling is necessary. The custody trial was continued multiple times due to lack of the submission of the Initial Evaluation in February of 2014, April of 2014, and September of 2014.

On May 13, 2014, [J.] was no longer able to reside with Mother, and [J.] went to live with Paternal Grandparents. Father also resided with Paternal Grandparents at that time, and continues to reside in that home. Because of the 2012 No Contact Order that was in effect, [Somerset County] Children & Youth Services (hereinafter referred to as "CYS") was notified that [J.] would be living in the same home as Father. It is believed that CYS had no objection to this arrangement. [J.] has been living with his Paternal Grandparents and Father since that time, and Father has had de facto primary physical custody of [J.]. [J.] does not currently have contact with Mother. Father filed a Petition for Modification of Custody on January 13, 2017. Father requested in that [P]etition that the 2012 No Contact Order be lifted[,] and that he be granted primary legal and physical custody of [J.]. Additionally, Father requested that he be granted shared legal and physical custody of Child.

On January 30, 2017, Mother filed an Emergency Petition to Suspend Partial Custody, Modify Custody, and Contempt of Custody Order of January 30, 2012. In that [P]etition, Mother alleges that Paternal Grandparents allowed several instances of contact or threatened contact between Father and Child. The [c]ourt found Paternal Grandparents in Contempt of the January 30, 2012 Order in an Order dated March 14, 2017. As sanctions for this contempt, the Paternal Grandparents' visitations with Child were reduced from 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m., and Paternal Grandparents were ordered to pay a three[-] hundred[-] dollar ($300) fine. This March 14, 2017 Order reiterated that Paternal Grandparents should ensure that "there is no contact either directly or indirectly between [Child] and [Father]." Additionally, the March 14, 2017 Order stated that "[t]he prohibition of contact includes presenting photos, written or electronic messages or gifts represented as from [Father]."

Also on January 30, 2017, Petitioners filed the instant Petition. The basis for the Petition is 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1): that Father has "evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights" to Child. Petitioners further requested that Father's parental rights be terminated so that [Stepfather] is able to adopt Child. Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights (hereinafter referred to as "Amended Petition") on May 2, 2017. In the Amended Petition, the Petitioners allege [that] the basis for termination of parental rights is set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11)[,] in addition to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)[,] that Father "is required to register as a sexual offender." Petitioners again requested that Father's parental rights be terminated so that [Stepfather] is able to adopt Child.

The [c]ourt appointed [Attorney Robbins as GAL, and Attorney Huston as legal counsel for Child.] GAL filed a Report ... on May 9, 2017, in which it was argued that [Child's] best interests would not be served by terminating Father's parental rights[,] because instead of a settled purpose to relinquish his rights, Father has "taken measures to begin reestablishing a relationship with [Child]."

A hearing on the Amended Petition was held on May 9, 2017[, and on May 16, 2017]....

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126([a])(4).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126([a])(8).

3 Docketed at Somerset County 858 CIVIL 2008, 913 CIVIL 2008. All references to the underlying custody case are at this docket number.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/17, at 1-5 (footnotes in original, emphasis added).

On February 10, 2017, the trial court appointed Christopher R. Robbins, Esquire ("Attorney Robbins"), as the guardian ad litem ("GAL") for Child, and, on May 5, 2017, the trial court appointed Sara E. Huston, Esquire ("Attorney Huston"), as the legal counsel for Child. See In re: Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (initially filed on March 28, 2017) (holding that a trial court is required by statute to appoint counsel to represent a child's legal interests in a contested involuntary termination proceeding). At the hearing on the termination Petition, both Attorney Robbins and Attorney Huston actively questioned the witnesses. The GAL, Attorney Robbins, recommends that, in the best interest of Child, the court should not terminate Father's parental rights. GAL Letter, 9/1/17. Child's legal counsel, Attorney Huston, disagrees, arguing that the trial court improperly denied the Petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child, in that it erred in its consideration of section 2511(a)(1) and (11), and it erred in failing to proceed to a best interest analysis under section 2511(b). Brief of Legal Counsel of Child at 3. Thus, we acknowledge that Child's attorneys are in conflict. This conflict, however, does not alter our scope and standard of review, and our ultimate conclusion, as discussed, infra.

On June 7, 2017, the trial court entered the Order at issue, which denied the Petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to Child. Appellants timely filed an appeal from that Order, along with a Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

In their brief on appeal, Appellants raise the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Petition to terminate parental rights based upon 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11)[,] where [F]ather is required to register as a sexual offender[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding [F]ather's completion of his sentence, [F]ather's compliance with registration and probationary requirements[,] and the fact that [C]hild was not the victim of the crime for which [F]ather is required to register as a sexual offender[,] as reasons to not terminate [F]ather's parental rights based upon 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11)[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred in finding [that] Appellants failed to establish[,] by clear and convincing evidence[,] that [F]ather's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11)[?]

4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that it[] "would not be in [Child's] best interest to terminate [F]ather's parental rights simply because he is required to register as a sexual offender[,]" when the [c]ourt did not perform a best[-]interest analysis or an analysis to determine if there is a parent-child bond or relationship[?]

5. Whether the trial court erred by not performing an analysis under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)[,] since Appellants established [that] [F]ather is required to register as a sexual offender under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] Ch. 97 Subch. H[?]

6. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that [] [F]ather failed or refused to perform parental duties for a period in excess of six months pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)[?]

7. Whether the trial court erred in finding [F]ather did not demonstrate a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)[?]

8. Whether the trial court erred in considering [F]ather's payment of [c]ourt[-][o]rdered and garnished child support as a factor that illustrates [F]ather has not demonstrated a settled purpose to relinquish parental rights to Child[?]

9. Whether the trial court erred in finding [that] [F]ather was prevented from seeing [C]hild by a No Contact Order when the No Contact Order forbid [sic] [F]ather from having contact with both of his children and [F]ather did not abide by the [O]rder and had regular contact with [C]hild's sibling[, J.?]

10. Whether the trial court erred in finding [F]ather's filing of a Petition for Modification of Custody in 2013 and 2017, with no other action taken, as concrete steps to overcome the obstacle of a No Contact Order sufficient to defeat a 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) Petition[?]
Brief of Appellants at 4-7. For ease of disposition, we combine Appellants' arguments, and address (a) whether the trial court properly found that Appellants failed to meet their burden in establishing grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) and (11); (b) whether the trial court erred in not finding that Appellants met their burden of proving grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(11), based solely on Father's status as a reporting sex offender; and (c) whether the trial court erred in not conducting a separate best-interest analysis pursuant to subsection (b).

In reviewing an appeal from an order determining a Petition for the termination of parental rights, we adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, [19], 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275, 284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America , Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely , [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio , [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Appellants challenge the trial court's rejection of their argument that Father's parental rights should be terminated under section 2511(a)(1) and/or (11), as well as section 2511(b). Section 2511 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.


* * *

(11) The parent is required to register as a sexual offender under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to registration of sexual offenders) or to register with a sexual offender registry.


* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

Further, regarding subsection (a)(1),

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-55 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

Regarding the definition of "parental duties," this Court has stated as follows:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty[,] which requires affirmative performance.


* * *

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.
Id. at 855 (citations omitted).

We are also cognizant that a parent's incarceration "neither compels nor precludes termination of parental rights." In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828.

Nevertheless, we are not willing to completely toll a parent's responsibilities during his or her incarceration. Rather, we must inquire whether the parent has utilized those resources at his or her command while in prison in continuing a close relationship with the child. Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be forfeited.
Id. at 828 (citation omitted).

Appellants argue that they presented three bases upon which the court should have terminated Father's parental rights to Child: (1) Father's settled purpose to relinquish his parental claim in excess of six months preceding the filing of the Petition, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1); (2) Father's failure to perform parental duties in excess of six months preceding the filing of the Petition, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1); and (3) the fact that Father is required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. Ch.97 Subch. H, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11). Brief of Appellants at 13.

Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by affording significant weight to Father's filing of a Petition to modify custody on January 13, 2017, and his payment of court-ordered child support. Id. at 14. Appellants assert that Father's Petition for modification immediately preceded their filing of their Petition for termination, and that Father acknowledged his suspicion that Appellants would be filing the termination Petition. Id. According to Appellants, Father's filing of the modification Petition is not sufficient to demonstrate his desire to parent Child, and to counter a conclusion that Father has a settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights. Id.

Appellants point out that, on November 13, 2014, the trial court ordered Father to provide his evaluation, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329(c), before the court could make a determination regarding custody, and Father has never provided such evaluation to the court. Brief for Appellants at 14. Because Father failed to provide evidence that he poses no risk of harm to Child, Appellants assert, there is no reasonable expectation that Father will remedy the circumstances that currently prevent him from having custody of Child. Id. Appellants argue that Father's filing of one custody Petition in three years does not satisfy Father's parental duties toward Child, and does not defeat their claim that Father has demonstrated a settled purpose to relinquish his parental claim to Child. Id. at 15.

Child's legal counsel, Attorney Huston, joins in the argument Appellants make in their brief. Brief of Legal Counsel for Child at 3. She asserts that, after the trial court had entered the Custody Order in 2013, Father sat idly by for nearly four years. Id. at 8. She contends that Father's attempt to modify the Custody Order in early 2017 does not remedy his complete failure to parent Child for multiple years. Id. Further, she argues, Father's payment of child support for Child was not a sufficient reason to deny the termination Petition. Id. She alleges that the 2012 No Contact Order did not present an obstacle to Father's parenting of Child, and that Father's filing of the custody modification Petition in 2017 did not show the necessary reasonable firmness in avoiding an obstacle to his parenting. Id. at 8-9. Thus, Child's legal counsel argues, section 2511(a)(1) was satisfied in this matter. Id. at 5-11.

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Appellants' arguments regarding the trial court's consideration and application of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (11). See Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/17, at 6-17. After a careful review of the record, this Court finds the trial court's determination that Father has not evinced a settled purpose to relinquish his parental duties or failed to perform parental duties with regard to Child, where he has continued to pay child support for Child in the face of the non-contact order, and where he has attempted to obtain custody of Child, is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. We must defer to the trial court judge as long as the factual findings are supported by the record, and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Id. Accordingly, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion with regard to the trial court's determination as to section 2511(a)(1). We therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion with regard to this claim. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/17, at 6-17.

Next, we address Appellants' challenge to the trial court's interpretation of section 2511(a)(11). Brief for Appellants at 16. Appellants contend that it is uncontested that Father is required to register as a sex offender. Id. Appellants contend that the trial court misconstrued section 2511(a)(11) by improperly emphasizing the word, "may," as used in that subsection. Brief for Appellants at 17.

Child's legal counsel, Attorney Huston, agrees with Appellants that, as Father is a sexual offender who is required to register, Appellant established grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(11). Brief of Child's Legal Counsel at 3-5. She states that, as such, the termination of Father's parental rights was mandatory. Id.

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/17, at 17-19. We agree and affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion with regard to Appellants' arguments, with the following addendum. See id.

We acknowledge that Father undisputedly is required to register as a sexual offender. Section 2511(a)(11) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:


* * *

(11) The parent is required to register as a sexual offender under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 97 Sub. H.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11) (emphasis added).

Our Court has stated that

"the interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court committed an error of law." Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 570 (Pa. Super. 2005). "As with all questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo and the appellate scope of review is plenary." In re Wilson , 879 A.2d 199, 214 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc).
In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. 2007).

The object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. B.K.M. v. J.A.M., 50 A.3d 168, 174 (Pa. Super. 2012). In interpreting statutory language, initially we look to the plain language of the statute, and determine whether any ambiguity exists. Id. "Only when the words are ambiguous may we look to the general purposes of the statute, legislative history, and other sources in an attempt to determine the legislative intent." Holland v. Marcy , 883 A.2d 449, 455 (Pa. 2005). Further, "[w]e must construe words and phrases in the statute according to their common and approved usage. We also must construe a statute in such a way as to give effect to all its provisions, if possible, thereby avoiding the need to label any provision as mere surplusage." Cimino v. Valley Family Med., 912 A.2d 851, 853 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

Our review of the plain language of section 2511(a)(11) discloses that a parent's rights "may" be terminated under that section, but it is not mandatory. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(11). We cannot ignore the plain language of the statute. See Holland , 883 A.2d at 455. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that section 2511(a)(11) does not mandate that Father's parental rights be terminated based solely on his status as a registered sex offender.

Finally, Appellants argue that the trial court improperly failed to conduct a best-interests analysis pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Brief for Appellants at 17-18, 22. Appellants assert that, upon finding section 2511(a) satisfied, the court was required to conduct an analysis of Child's best interests under section 2511(b). Brief for Appellants at 17-18, 22. According to Appellants, because the trial court improperly failed to find section 2511(a) satisfied, the trial court, in turn, erred in failing to consider Child's physical and emotional needs and welfare in relation to section 2511(b). Brief for Appellants at 13-14.

Child's legal counsel likewise argues that because Father is a registered sex offender, thereby meeting Appellants' burden under subsection 2511(a)(11), the trial court should have proceeded to consider section 2511(b), and it erred in failing to do so. Brief of Child's Legal Counsel at 11.

As set forth above, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that Appellants have failed to establish grounds for termination pursuant section 2511(a). Subsection (b) provides that if the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) (emphasis added)). Subsection (b) does not require this separate best-interests analysis where grounds for termination under subsection (a) are not met. Because Appellants failed to establish grounds for termination under subsection (a), consideration of Child's best interests under subsection (b) was not mandated. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm the Order of the trial court.

Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/13/2018

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Summaries of

In re of

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Apr 13, 2018
No. J-A27045-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2018)
Case details for

In re of

Case Details

Full title:IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.M.L. APPEAL OF: R.J.D. AND J.E.D.

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Apr 13, 2018

Citations

No. J-A27045-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2018)