Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JV06688
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Tim C. (appellant), the father of O. C. (the minor), appeals from orders of the juvenile court awarding custody of the minor to the mother and terminating its jurisdiction over the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (f), 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant, proceeding in propria persona, makes multiple contentions of alleged prejudicial error. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2006, Yolo County Department of Employment and Social Services (DESS) filed an original juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300 on behalf of the then nearly 12-year-old minor. That petition, as amended, alleged appellant struck the minor with a belt, and averred that appellant was unable to control the minor or meet the minor’s needs. The petition also alleged the minor’s mother’s whereabouts were unknown.
The minor had lived with appellant. DESS placed her in a Yuba County foster home. On April 27, 2007, the juvenile court sustained the petition as amended. Thereafter, the minor ran away from her placement and was located in Oklahoma with her mother. DESS began an evaluation of the mother to determine her suitability for placement of the minor.
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent child and ordered appellant to participate in a reunification plan. The juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to continue the disposition hearing until a criminal proceeding against appellant was resolved. Appellant also sought a jury trial, and requested the minor’s medical records. As to the latter matter, the juvenile court dropped it from the court’s calendar after both counsel for appellant and appellant failed to appear.
In its December 2007 status review report, DESS recommended termination of reunification services. According to DESS, it had received no information as to appellant’s compliance with the court-ordered case plan. DESS was continuing to evaluate the minor’s mother for placement. It noted the minor appeared to be doing well in her mother’s custody. Finally, DESS opined that returning the minor to appellant would create a substantial risk of detriment to the well-being of the minor.
At the December 12, 2007, 12-month review hearing, counsel for DESS advised the juvenile court the minor was doing well in the custody of her mother. According to counsel, although the mother had “a very troublesome past,” she was engaged in services and had not used illegal drugs in the past year. DESS recommended that the minor remain with her mother.
Counsel for appellant argued that placement of the minor in Oklahoma with her mother was not in the minor’s best interests. Counsel again requested production of the minor’s medical records, on the ground they might support the proposition that appellant’s actions had been reasonable due to the minor’s physical condition. The juvenile court denied appellant’s request. Appellant’s counsel also argued that permitting the minor to go to and remain in Oklahoma violated appellant’s procedural due process rights.
At the conclusion of the review hearing, the juvenile court awarded sole physical and legal custody of the minor to the minor’s mother in Oklahoma, and terminated its jurisdiction over the minor.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to stay the dependency proceedings pending resolution of the criminal proceedings against him.
Appellant’s claim is not cognizable in this appeal. “An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders, for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.” (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563.) Here, at the disposition hearing the juvenile court denied appellant’s motion to stay the criminal proceeding. Thus, appellant should have made the claim he states here, which relates to that prior order, in an appeal following the disposition hearing. (§§ 360, 395.)
II
Appellant asserts a right to use appropriate corporal punishment. He made an identical claim in argument filed the day of the 12-month review hearing, whose orders are the subject of this appeal.
The claim fails because it is irrelevant to issues at the 12-month review hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) Appellant should have tendered the claim in an appeal following the disposition hearing. (§§ 360, 395.) It is too late now.
III
Appellant argues the juvenile justice system is unconstitutional, and claims the right to a jury trial in dependency proceedings.
As to the latter claim, in dependency proceedings no such right exists. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.682(b)(1).) Regarding the juvenile dependency system, appellant did not tender any challenge to the system in the juvenile court. The record reflects appellant had ample opportunities to bring that issue to the attention of the juvenile court, if he had wished to do so.
Although ordinarily waiver constitutes the “intentional relinquishment of a known right,” traditionally waiver also was found from conduct that reasonably could be construed as the equivalent of an abandonment of that right. (Cf. Rubin v. Los Angeles Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 292, 298.) Alternatively, “[u]nder the doctrine of invited error, where a party, by his conduct, induces the commission of an error, he is estopped from asserting it as grounds for reversal.” (Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 158, 166.)
As has been noted in dependency decisions, if waiver or invited error were not found, a party could “trifle with the courts by standing silently by, thus permitting the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable.” (In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886.)
The California Supreme Court stated the rule this way: “‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method . . . . The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver . . . . Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.’ [Citation.]” (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1.) “‘The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . .’” (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023.) “‘“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590, fn. omitted; cf. In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [holding that correct legal term for loss of right based on failure to assert it in a timely fashion is forfeiture, not waiver].)
Here, as we have seen, appellant tendered no challenge to the constitutionality of the dependency system. Whether denominated estoppel, waiver, or forfeiture, appellant’s conduct in the juvenile court precludes him from raising the issue here. (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re Gilberto M. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198-1200.)
IV
Appellant claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to order production of the minor’s medical records. The juvenile court denied his request after it had ordered dismissal of the dependency proceedings.
As the argument of appellant’s counsel made clear, appellant wanted the minor’s records primarily to support his theory that his actions were justified in attempting to address the minor’s behavior difficulties. Even assuming the records were relevant to reunification and the review hearing, we agree with the juvenile court’s conclusion that the request made at that hearing was untimely, as the record shows the court already had dismissed the dependency proceedings. There was no error.
V
Appellant’s final contention is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding custody of the minor to the minor’s mother in Oklahoma.
Section 361.2 establishes the procedures a court must follow for placing a dependent child following removal from the custodial parent pursuant to section 361. (In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1820.) When a court orders removal of a minor under section 361, the court first determines whether there is a parent who wants to assume custody who was not residing with the minor at the time the events that brought the minor within the provisions of section 300 occurred. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) “If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a)., italics added.) The juvenile court must make the detriment finding by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 700.)
“[A] nonoffending parent has a constitutionally protected interest in assuming physical custody, as well as a statutory right to do so, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s choices will be ‘detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.’ [Citation.].” (In re Isayah C., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 697.) It is not the nonoffending parent’s burden to show that she is capable of caring for her child. Rather, it is the party opposing placement who has the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child will be harmed if the nonoffending parent is given custody.
Here, the juvenile court did not find that placement of the minor with her mother would result in detriment to the minor. Accordingly, properly framed, the issue is whether the evidence before the juvenile court compelled a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that placement with the minor’s mother would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor. It did not. In fact, at the review hearing, appellant proffered no evidence in the form of testimony on the issue of detriment. Moreover, appellant’s written argument, filed on the day of the review hearing, noted only that around the time of the minor’s birth, 13 years ago, the mother was using illegal drugs.
When a juvenile court transfers custody to the noncustodial parent pursuant to section 361.2, it can terminate jurisdiction if it finds ongoing supervision is no longer necessary. (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1); In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1135.) The juvenile court’s discretion to terminate jurisdiction or continue its supervision is very broad. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179.) The exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (In re Sarah M. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1496, disapproved on other grounds in In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204.)
Section 361.2, subdivision (b), provides the court with three alternatives at disposition when a child is placed with the noncustodial parent. The court may: “(1) Order that the parent become legal and physical custodian of the child. The court may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent. The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the child. . . . [¶] (2) Order that the parent assume custody subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and require that a home visit be conducted within three months. . . . After the social worker conducts the home visit and files his or her report with the court, the court may then take the action described in paragraph (1), (3), or this paragraph. . . . [¶] (3) Order that the parent assume custody subject to the supervision of the juvenile court. In that case the court may order that reunification services be provided to the parent or guardian from whom the child is being removed, or the court may order that services be provided solely to the parent who is assuming physical custody in order to allow that parent to retain later custody without court supervision, or that services be provided to both parents, in which case the court shall determine, at review hearings held pursuant to Section 366, which parent, if either, shall have custody of the child.”
In this case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by granting custody to the minor’s mother and terminating jurisdiction. There simply was no evidence, other than a bare assertion of drug abuse 13 years earlier, to compel any finding that placement with the minor’s mother would be detrimental to the minor. In sum, appellant failed to carry his evidentiary burden.
For purposes of resolving the claim, we presume that appellant has a sufficient legal interest, or standing, to make an abuse of discretion argument, based on an interest in having the minor returned to his custody.
Finally, we reject appellant’s assertion in his brief, also made at the review hearing, that the minor was in Oklahoma without appellant having the opportunity to challenge the circumstances surrounding her relocation. Appellant could have requested a contested hearing on the matter, or might have sought a continuance of the review hearing. He did neither. It is too late to raise the issue now.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., BUTZ, J.