Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. INJ12288, Christopher J. Sheldon, Judge. Affirmed.
Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST Acting P.J.
Appellant Diana M. (mother) appeals from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 order terminating parental rights to four of her children. On appeal, mother argues that the order terminating parental rights should be reversed since the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) failed to comply with notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; hereafter, ICWA). We affirm the order.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
Counsel for the children filed a brief on October 30, 2007, joining in respondent’s brief and urging us to affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
First Section 300 Petition
On April 6, 2000, mother’s children, Debbie G. (15 years old), Abel G. (12 years old), N.P. (9 years old), Mary P. (7 years old), M.P. (6 years old), and Maggie P. (4 years old) (collectively, the six children), were detained and placed in the protective custody of a relative caretaker and foster care shelter because of the inability of mother and Romeo P. to protect them. Romeo P. (father) was the father of all the children, except Debbie G. and Abel G. The department filed a petition on behalf of the six children, alleging that they came within section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). The petition essentially alleged that mother tested positive for methamphetamine on March 29, 2000, that during March 2000 father used controlled substances, that father broke mother’s arm during a domestic violence altercation, that father was arrested on March 27, 2000, for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5), and that mother and father severely neglected the six children. The juvenile court detained the children.
Romeo P. is not a party to this appeal.
The father of Debbie G. and Abel G. was Abel. G. (Sr.), who was deceased.
Jurisdiction/disposition
The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report and stated that ICWA did not apply. Mother signed a waiver of constitutional rights and submitted the petition on the basis of the social worker’s report. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the court found the allegations in the petition to be true and found that the six children came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The court adjudged them dependents of the court, removed them from mother’s custody, and ordered mother to participate in reunification services.
Six-Month Status Review
The social worker filed a six-month status review report and recommended that mother be provided with six more months of services. The social worker reported that mother participated in an outpatient drug treatment program. However, father died in a work-related accident, and mother relapsed. She then entered a residential treatment program on November 21, 2000.
On April 24, 2001, the court ordered the six children to be returned to mother’s custody after determining that she had complied with her services and resolved the problems that led to the dependency. The court terminated the dependency.
Second Section 300 Petition
On June 15, 2005, the department filed a new petition alleging that four of mother’s children, N.P., Mary P., M.P., and Maggie P. (the children), came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The petition essentially alleged that mother had chronic substance abuse issues, she did not have a stable home, and she was not providing for the basic needs of the children.
At the detention hearing on June 17, 2005, counsel for the children informed the court that this was a possible ICWA case. The court asked mother if the children had any Indian heritage. Mother replied that the children were “Blackfoot Indian” on their father’s side of the family. She stated that the Indian ancestry was through her mother-in-law, who was from West Virginia. When the court asked for the name of the mother-in-law, the court reporter transcribed mother’s response as “Noella (phonetic) Padua.” A paternal uncle, Alejandro I., was present in court and provided Noella’s date of birth. Alejandro I. also informed the court that his mother was not a registered member of the Blackfeet Indian tribe (the tribe) and indicated that she had “very minute blood.” The court ordered the department to send notice to the tribe. The court then ordered the children detained.
Jurisdiction/Disposition
The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report and noted that she sent notice of the proceedings to the Blackfeet Tribal Business Counsel, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and Indian Child and Family Services. The ICWA notice listed mother’s name, address, and birth date, and father’s name, birth date, and date of death. The notice also listed the paternal grandmother as “Luella” Padua, with the birth date of May 16, 1922, and birth place of West Virginia.
On July 11, 2005, the court found the allegations of the petition to be true, declared the children dependents of the court, and ordered them to be removed from mother’s custody. The court further ordered mother to participate in reunification services and scheduled a six-month review hearing for January 5, 2006.
Six-Month Status Review
The social worker filed a six-month status review report recommending that reunification services be terminated, since mother’s whereabouts were unknown, and because the children stated that they did not want to reunify with her.
The social worker also noted that she sent notice to the BIA and the tribe. This notice provided the same information as the last notice, plus mother’s and father’s places of birth. The notice also listed “Luella” Padua as the paternal great-grandmother, with the same birthdate and birthplace as in the last notice.
On January 4, 2006, the tribe responded by stating that it was unable to find mother, father, or Luella Padua on the tribal rolls. Thus, it concluded that the children were not Indian children.
At the six-month status review hearing on January 31, 2006, the court found that proper notice had been provided pursuant to ICWA. The court ordered that reunification services be continued for another six months.
Twelve-Month Status Review
In an addendum report filed on July 21, 2006, the social worker recommended that reunification services be terminated and that a section 366.26 hearing be set. The social worker reported that mother was unable or unwilling to complete her case plan and that she only visited the children sporadically.
On August 23, 2006, the court terminated reunification services, ordered adoption as the permanent plan, and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Section 366.26 Hearing
The section 366.26 hearing was held on March 14, 2007. The court terminated parental rights and found the children to be adoptable. Mother filed a notice of appeal that same day.
ANALYSIS
The Record Shows That the ICWA Notice Requirements Were Met
Mother argues that the court erred in finding proper ICWA notice had been given because the notice was deficient and not meaningful. She specifically contends that the notice was deficient since the paternal grandmother’s name was misspelled and other paternal biological information that could have been easily obtained was omitted. We find no error.
A. Notice Requirements Under the ICWA
“In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912, subd. (a); see In re Samuel P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1264-1265.) The ICWA defines “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
“One of the primary purposes of giving notice to the tribe is to enable it to determine whether the minor is an Indian child. [Citation.] Notice is meaningless if no information or insufficient information is presented to the tribe. [Citation.] The notice must include . . . information about the Indian child’s biological mother, biological father, maternal and paternal grandparents and great-grandparents or Indian custodians, including maiden, married and former names or aliases, birthdates, places of birth and death, current and former addresses, tribal enrollment numbers, and/or other identifying information. [Citations.]” (In re S.M. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115-1116.) “Substantial compliance with the notice requirements of ICWA is sufficient. [Citation.]” (In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 566.)
B. The ICWA Notice Sent to the Tribe Was Sufficient
As stated above, mother claims that the ICWA notice was defective due to an alleged misspelling of the paternal grandmother’s name. Respondent filed a request for judicial notice of an addendum report filed on October 17, 2007, with the superior court. The report indicated that the social worker spoke with a paternal uncle, Alejandro I., who stated that the paternal grandmother’s correct legal name was Luella Amelia Fitch Padua. This court reserved ruling on the request for judicial notice for consideration with the appeal. We now grant the request. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) Furthermore, we note that the reporter’s transcript states that the court reporter’s spelling of the paternal grandmother’s first name as “Noella” was phonetic. In any case, the social worker correctly spelled the paternal grandmother’s first name as “Luella” in the notices sent to the tribe and the BIA.
Mother also asserts that when the department sent the second notice to the tribe and the BIA, it mistakenly listed “Luella” Padua as the paternal great-grandmother, instead of the paternal grandmother. Mother is correct. However, we find such error harmless, since both notices listed the same surname, birth date, and birth place for “Luella.” Thus, the department provided sufficient information for the tribe and/or the BIA to identify her.
Mother further argues that the department failed to include information pertaining to other paternal relatives, such as the paternal grandfather and great-grandparents. However, information regarding these paternal relatives was not necessary, since the paternal grandmother was the person with the alleged Indian heritage, and her information was provided in the notices.
We conclude the court properly found that the department substantially complied with the ICWA notice requirements.
C. Any Error Was Harmless
As stated above, the ICWA defines “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) Mother has never asserted that the children are members of a federally recognized tribe or that they are eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe and are biological children of a tribe member. She has never stated that she or father has tribal membership. Rather, mother merely stated that her children could have Indian heritage through their paternal grandmother. Furthermore, the paternal uncle affirmatively stated that his mother was not a registered member of the claimed tribe. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the children are “Indian child[ren],” as defined by the ICWA, nor is there any reason to believe more notices would result in any more information.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: RICHLI J, MILLER J.