Opinion
22-P-342
12-02-2022
ADOPTION OF NORMA.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The father appeals from a decree of the Juvenile Court approving the adoption plan of the Department of Children and Families (department). The judge held a trial over five nonconsecutive days on competing adoption plans for the child, then three years old. The father advocated adoption by his half-sister, the child's aunt, whom the child never met (father's plan). The department and the child supported adoption by the child's foster mother, with whom the child was placed immediately after birth (department's plan). Concluding that the judge applied the correct legal standard and weighed each plan appropriately, and that her choice of the department's plan did not fall outside the range of reasonable alternatives, we affirm.
The father agreed to the termination of his parental rights.
The mother did not appear for the trial and her parental rights were terminated. She is not a party to this appeal.
Background. We summarize the judge's relevant findings, which "are both specific and detailed, demonstrating, as we require, that close attention was given to the evidence." Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 165 (2001). At the time of trial, the child was safe, secure, and settled in a home with people who were able and willing to meet every one of her needs, including any future need to have a connection with her biological family. The child was bonded to the foster mother and they had a loving "mother/daughter" relationship. The child also had a loving relationship with the foster mother's older children and considered them to be her family.
The father proposed adoption by the aunt in January 2020. The department immediately began proceedings under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children because the aunt lived in Georgia. Although it twice provided the aunt with contact information for the child's adoption worker in Massachusetts, the department never heard from her. On the first day of trial in May 2021, a department social worker testified that the aunt had not contacted the department to inquire about the child or request a visit with her, whether in person or virtual. Following that testimony, the aunt called the department to ask for a virtual visit with the child. Her request was denied because the trial had already begun. The department did not hear from the aunt again until she testified virtually on the fourth day of trial in July 2021.
The aunt had six children and eighteen grandchildren. Years earlier, she was granted custody of one of her grandchildren (Mary, a pseudonym) after Mary was removed from the care of her mother, the aunt's child. The aunt lost custody of Mary after the aunt violated a safety plan by returning Mary to Mary's mother, who fled with Mary and triggered an "Amber Alert." In 2014, the aunt allowed the father to live with her and to care for her grandchildren without making any effort to learn about the father's circumstances. At the time, he "had a significant substance abuse issue" and was living in Georgia in violation of his parole in Minnesota. He had previously served a State prison sentence for armed robbery in Massachusetts, where a companion charge of assault with intent to rape had been filed and dismissed.
When the child was born, and at the time of trial, the father was incarcerated. The father intended in the future to be a "real father and daddy" to the child and believed he could assume that role if the child was placed with the aunt. The aunt would allow such contact only if the father was "doing right." However, based on her history of allowing the father into her home without question, the judge had "significant concerns about [the aunt]’s ability to determine if [the father] is indeed ‘doing right’ and is safe to be around the child."
After finding that both the aunt and the foster mother were financially stable and would provide the child with a safe home, the judge "considered a number of factors, including but not limited to [the child's] connection to [the foster mother], her connection to [her] biological family, and her present stability." Balancing those interests, the judge concluded that adoption by the foster mother was in the child's best interests. The judge reasoned "that [the child's] current placement meets all of [the child's] needs, is safe, stable and secure, involves no disruptions of [the child's] life, maintains her relationships and bonds with the only family she has ever known, allows her to remain in a home with the people she considers her siblings, allows her to maintain her current providers, provides access to, and boundaries with, biological family, fills her life with unconditional love, and is the preferred placement from [the child's] position."
Discussion. "In cases where the parents have offered a competing plan, the judge must assess the alternatives and, if both pass muster, choose which plan is in the child's best interests, however difficult that choice may be." Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 475 (2001). Here, both plans were suitable options, and the judge chose the department's plan. We review her decision for abuse of discretion or error of law. See Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 225 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034 (1999).
The father claims that it is possible that the judge committed an error of law by applying an incorrect standard because "nowhere in the analysis did the judge set forth the standard for evaluating competing plans" or "fully state the required legal standard." It is true that the judge did not cite Adoption of Dora or any other case when describing her task in this case. However, she made detailed findings about the child, the aunt, and the foster mother before engaging in a thoughtful analysis of the suitability of each plan for the child, including a discussion of each plan's potential strengths and weaknesses. The judge prefaced her analysis by stating, "In this case the Court was presented with competing adoption plans.... This Court is required to determine which placement is in [the child's] best interests." We have no doubt the judge understood and applied the correct legal standard.
Next, the father identifies two grounds for questioning whether the judge abused her discretion by giving undue weight to the department's plan: first, the judge stated in her decision that the father's plan was not entitled to special weight but made no similar statement about the department's plan; second, the judge made no findings about what weight she gave the department's plan, if any. We agree with the child that this claim is not supported by the record. The judge stated during the trial that "the Department's opinion at this stage ... is not relevant. The Court will equally assess both plans. Neither plan gets priority in the Court's mind." Her silence on the subject in the written decision therefore does not support the inference urged by the father. "[T]he judge obviously considered both plans carefully, and appropriately sought to determine which plan was in the child's best interests." Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. at 226.
The father's contention that the judge gave improper weight to the bond between the child and the foster mother is belied by the judge's express statement that "[t]his Court does not presume that [the child's] bond with [the foster mother] requires her permanent placement there." His claim that the judge "chose to maintain the status quo to the detriment of the child" is not supported by citation to record evidence of detriment and is contradicted by the judge's assertion that "this Court sought neither to ‘fix’ nor to simply ‘maintain the status quo.’ " The father's remaining challenges "amount to no more than a disagreement with the judge's weighing of the evidence and credibility determinations regarding witnesses." Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. at 166. On appeal, "our task is not to decide whether we, presented with the same facts, would have made the same decision," Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. at 225, but whether the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, "such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives." L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). Here, the judge's decision reflects the even-handed assessment of evidence and meaningful evaluation of each plan that our caselaw requires, see Adoption of Jacob, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 272 (2021), and cases cited, and does not fall outside the range of reasonable alternatives.
Decree affirmed.