Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK70291, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
Karin S. Collins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BOREN, P.J.
V.M. (Mother) appeals a dispositional order of the dependency court that limits her educational rights with respect to her daughter, N.M. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2007, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that Mother physically abused N.M. (age 10) by burning her with an iron and hitting her with a wire, and that Mother emotionally abused the child by telling her that she wants her removed from the household. In interviews with DCFS and the police, N.M. stated that she had argued with Mother while ironing her school clothing, and that Mother pushed her to the floor, hit her with an electrical cord, and burned her wrist with the hot iron. N.M. told investigators that the abuse was ongoing: Mother “has a history of hitting her regularly with sticks, the broom, a belt and an electrical cord. [N.M] stated that after she was ready for school, mother drove her to school but did not allow [N.M.] to get out of the car. [N.M.] stated mother told her that she was not going to attend school, instead she was going to a correctional center because of her behavior.” Mother later took N.M. to school. N.M. was afraid of returning to Mother’s care. A medical examination showed injuries consistent with child abuse.
Mother denied the allegations of abuse, and painted herself as the victim of an attack by N.M. Mother conceded that she told N.M. that she was going to take her to a correctional center, because she feels the child is “insubordinate, rebellious and incorrigible.” Two neighbors reported that they often hear N.M. crying and Mother yelling at N.M.
There were prior reports of child abuse against Mother. In 2003, when N.M. was six years old, a caller reported that N.M. came to school with four-inch welts on her face and had other marks and bruises. The 2003 referral was inconclusive because N.M. denied that Mother abused her. In 2005, an anonymous caller reported child abuse to the police, due to Mother’s “constant screaming and yelling at the child,” the sound of the child being hit with an object, and the child’s cries of “no mommie, no mommie.” In that investigation, N.M. denied being abused.
Mother initially agreed to accept voluntary family reunification services. However, after further consideration, DCFS decided that Mother caused serious physical harm to N.M.; gave “questionable” explanations for the origins of the child’s injuries; and refused to accept responsibility for her actions. As a result, DCFS placed N.M. in protective custody. N.M. was relieved that she was not going home and was happy in her placement.
A petition was filed on October 10, 2007. It alleged that Mother physically abused N.M. with a hot iron, an extension cord, brooms, sticks, shoes, wires and belts, causing unreasonable pain and suffering and serious injury. The petition also alleged that Mother failed to protect N.M., and that N.M.’s father failed to provide her with the necessities of life. The juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining N.M. Family reunification services were ordered, and Mother was authorized to have monitored visitation.
The allegations against the father were later stricken.
In its jurisdiction report, DCFS conducted an interview with N.M. N.M. described the most recent incident of abuse in detail, noting that she started to pack her belongings after Mother told her that she was taking her to a correctional center. N.M. stated that Mother hits her with a high heel, cooking utensils, and telephone and curling iron cords. Mother hits her with a belt with such frequency that “I have marks like a tiger” and bleeds from her wounds. N.M. suggested that “The problem is that maybe she (mother) doesn’t know how to discipline me.”
Attempts were made to interview Mother, but she did not respond. DCFS categorized the family as being at “high” risk for future abuse due to the excessive physical discipline imposed, Mother’s unwillingness to take any responsibility for her actions, and her justification of maltreatment. DCFS recommended that N.M. not be returned to Mother’s home until Mother “is able to clearly accept responsibility for the safety of her child and her role as a protector and role model.”
In a supplemental report, DCFS stated that it now had information that N.M.’s adult sibling Nancy M. was a victim of physical abuse by Mother, resulting in police and court involvement. N.M.’s father, Juan M. (Father), reported that Mother “is a very violent person” who physically attacked him on numerous occasions, causing him injury, breaking his eyeglasses, and frightening Nancy. Father obtained a restraining order against Mother in 2001, due to Mother’s attacks. Father stated that Mother hit Nancy with a belt, causing welts. Nancy was put in foster care, and after the family reunified, Mother resumed her physical abuse of Nancy and Father.
In an interview, Nancy (now age 26) described horrific maltreatment by Mother, which included rubbing Nancy’s face against a toilet until it bled, and making the child (then age 9) lick the blood; forcing Nancy to eat until she vomited, then forcing Nancy to eat the vomit; biting Nancy’s face and dragging her by the hair; hitting Nancy with electrical cords while turning on loud music to cover the child’s screams.
N.M.’s therapist described her as friendly, cooperative, articulate and intelligent. Mother had visited N.M. only once during the two and a half months that the child was in foster care. The therapist did not want N.M. to have visits with Mother until after the child has undergone therapy to resolve the many issues resulting from Mother’s abuse and neglect. DCFS recommended that the court order Mother to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.
In a further report, DCFS noted that Father and Nancy had moved to a new family home. They expressed interest in having custody of N.M. Father described himself as “responsible, sincere [and] employed.” Nancy, who was previously unaware of Mother’s abuse of N.M., expressed her “full intention and desire to protect [N.M.]. I would do everything necessary for [N.M.] to be comfortable.” Father was having regular visitation with N.M.
At a hearing on December 17, 2007, DCFS advised the court that Mother was being limited to one telephone call per day, “because there were harassing phone calls and it became monitored because of the nature of the calls.” The court told Mother, “You’re no longer to call the foster home at all until further order by this court.” Further, the court imposed the requirement that the telephone calls “must be only allowed in a therapeutic setting” along with monitored face-to-face visitation in a therapeutic setting.
The petition was adjudicated in January-February 2008. N.M. testified in chambers. She stated that Father advised her to misbehave, lie, and disobey Mother. She described “bad” behavior as speaking back to Mother or feeding a stray cat. She testified that Mother has hit her and inflicted pain since she was about six years old. Mother hits her with a belt, a shoe, a broom, and wooden spoons. Mother burned her with an iron and beat her with an electrical cord simply because Mother did not like the clothing that N.M. was wearing to school. Mother struck her on the head with objects, and has caused her to bleed by beating her with a belt until the belt broke. While she was in Mother’s custody, N.M. was hit nearly every day. Despite this, N.M. is not afraid of Mother.
Instead of foster care, N.M. testified that she would “rather be back at home with one of my parents.” She began having a relationship with Father two years ago, when she telephoned him. After that, he visited her every weekend, and she enjoys spending time with him. She thought it would be “weird” to live with Father and Nancy, “because I’ve never been under their roof.”
Mother testified and denies that she ever abused N.M. She insisted that N.M. fabricated the allegations, and that Father encouraged the child to misbehave. The misbehavior started in 2005, when Father and N.M. began visits. Mother denies that she ever abused Nancy.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found that N.M. is a highly credible witness. By contrast, Mother’s testimony was “not credible.” The court observed, “it’s been a long time since I’ve seen such an angry parent on the witness stand. It doesn’t show up on the record that the mother was so angry testifying, she was vibrating. Her tone of voice, her body language, her vibration, frankly brought this court easily back to the fear [N.M.] must have felt when her mother used to beat her regularly, and the fact that the mother did that in private versus in front of anybody is not surprising.”
The court sustained the allegation that Mother inflicted serious physical harm on N.M. Moving directly to disposition, the court declared N.M. to be a dependent of the court, finding that there would be substantial danger if N.M. were returned to Mother’s or Father’s care. Custody was given to DCFS for foster placement. Reunification services were ordered for Mother, consisting of parenting classes, individual counseling, anger management and conjoint therapy. Over the objections of Mother and Father, the court “eliminat[ed] educational rights and appointed the foster mother as responsible adult.” Mother was given monitored visitation; Father and Nancy have unmonitored visitation.
DISCUSSION
Mother appeals from the dispositional order. The order is appealable. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395; Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 259.) When appeal is taken from a dispositional order, “we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports [it]. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)
All further statutory references in this opinion are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The dependency court is authorized to place limitations on the exercise of parental authority over educational decisions. “In all cases in which a minor is adjudged a dependent child of the court . . . the court may limit the control to be exercised over the dependent child by any parent or guardian and shall by its order clearly and specifically set forth all those limitations. Any limitation on the right of the parent or guardian to make educational decisions for the child shall be specifically addressed in the court order. The limitations may not exceed those necessary to protect the child. If the court specifically limits the right of the parent or guardian to make educational decisions for the child, the court shall at the same time appoint a responsible adult to make educational decisions for the child . . . .” (§ 361, subd. (a).)
Mother’s brief glosses over the appalling facts contained in the record. The dependency court repeatedly expressed concerns about Mother. First, the court limited Mother to monitored visitation in a therapeutic setting. Then, it required that Mother’s telephone calls to N.M. occur in a therapeutic setting. Finally, it observed that Mother possesses a terrifying anger, so extreme that Mother was “vibrating” on the witness stand. The abuse described by N.M. and Nancy is long-term, outrageous, and raises serious questions about Mother’s mental state. Mother is completely unrepentant.
The trial court did not order a psychological evaluation for Mother, though an evaluation may well be warranted.
The court is entitled to limit parental educational decisions as “necessary to protect the child” under section 361. There is enough in this record to support the trial court’s conclusion that Mother should have no involvement in N.M.’s schooling. After beating N.M. with an electrical cord and burning her with an iron, Mother drove the child to school but refused to let her out of the car, instead engaging in emotional coercion by saying that she was going to take N.M. to a correctional center. Presumably, Mother was trying to frighten N.M. into staying mum and not telling school administrators about the physical abuse she had just inflicted. The court could legitimately fear that Mother would use her educational rights to participate in school activities, attend parent-teacher conferences, or volunteer at the school. Once divested of her educational rights, Mother will presumably be kept off campus and unmonitored contact with N.M. will be foreclosed.
Mother’s counsel told the court that Mother “is very involved with the minor’s school.”
The record makes plain that Mother cannot be given responsibility to protect N.M.’s welfare. She has beaten the child viciously and regularly. At this point, until it is established that Mother has reformed, we agree with the trial court that Mother should have no say in any aspect of N.M.’s life, including her education.
The trial court was entitled to make its decision based on the evidence, and particularly based on its observations of Mother while she was on the witness stand. The court was not prevented from making its order simply because DCFS did not question Mother’s educational rights. Mother notes that a new court rule (effective January 1, 2008) instructs the court to “explain to the parent or guardian why the court is limiting his or her educational rights and must direct the parent or guardian to the rights and responsibilities of the educational representative . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2)(E)(ii).) The court did not do so in this case. Nevertheless, the court’s failure to apply rule 5.651 does not change the outcome. The court had good cause to limit Mother’s educational rights, and this remains true even if the court did not explain its reasoning to Mother. Any error committed by the court was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (dispositional order) is affirmed.
We concur: DOI TODD, J. ASHMANN-GERST, J.