Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YJ28789, Wayne C. Denton, Commissioner.
Anthony M. Solis for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Appellant Nicholas B. appeals from orders of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602) and ordering him home on probation with a maximum term of confinement of five years and four months.
In a petition filed on May 10, 2006, pursuant to section 602, appellant was alleged to have committed misdemeanor vandalism pursuant to Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a). Appellant denied the allegation and the juvenile court placed appellant home on probation for six months.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
In the petition filed on October 27, 2006, pursuant to section 602, appellant was alleged to have committed second degree robbery (§ 211). Appellant denied the allegation. The juvenile court sustained the petition and found appellant to be a person as described in section 602. The juvenile court ordered appellant home on probation with a maximum term of confinement of five years and four months. Appellant admitted the allegation in the May 10, 2006 petition.
CONTENTIONS
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he used force or fear during the robbery.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Viewing the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below as we must (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138-1139), the evidence established the following. On July 21, 2006, Roy and Justin asked Anthony M. if he could get marijuana for them. Anthony M. called Sonny T., who told him to meet him in Manhattan Beach. Brian S. drove to the meeting place with appellant in the front passenger seat, and Sonny T. and another boy named Jeffery S. in the back seat. Before they drove up, appellant and Brian S. told Jeffery S. and Sonny T. that they wanted to “jack” Anthony M. Anthony M. walked up to the car and counted out $50 in front of appellant while leaning against the car with his hands inside the car window. Appellant grabbed the money from Anthony M. and said “you are jacked.” Anthony M. tried to grab his money back, but the car accelerated while most of his body weight was still in the car. Jeffery S. saw appellant push Anthony M. off and lift his arms off the window. Anthony M. landed on his side and hit his head on the street. His wrist and knee were sprained and his arm, shoulder, hip, and knee were scraped. He was very shaken up.
Roy and Justin’s last initials are not contained in the record.
DISCUSSION
The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Finding that Appellant Used Force or Fear During the Robbery
Standard of Review
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he used force or fear during the robbery. We disagree.
“The role of an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is limited. The court must ‘review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1138.) The uncorroborated evidence of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgment, even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent or false as to other portions. (In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 366.)
We do not reweigh the evidence. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 529.) Even if the circumstances “might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding [, this] would not warrant reversal of the judgment.” (Ibid.)
The Elements of Robbery
Robbery is the taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. (§ 211.) Force, for purposes of a robbery, is more than that needed merely to take the property from the person of the victim, and is a question of fact to be resolved by the finder of fact taking into account the physical characteristics of the robber and the victim. (People v. Wright (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203.) All the force that is required to make the offense a robbery is such force that is sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance. (People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 487, 491 [defendant’s action of running toward the victim and snatching the purse from her hand sufficient to constitute force or fear to support a jury’s robbery verdict], overruled on another point in People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 895.) Indeed, “[t]he nonconsensual snatching of a purse has been held to entail such force as to permit a jury to return a verdict of robbery.” (People v. Lescallett, at p. 491.) The use of force or fear need not occur at the time of initial taking, but may be used to retain possession of the property. (People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 771.) Thus, because a robbery remains in progress until the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety, the use of force or fear to retain property immediately after it has been taken from the owner constitutes robbery. (Id. at p. 772.)
The evidence shows that after Anthony M. counted out the money to appellant, appellant said “I am jacking you,” and pushed Anthony M. off by lifting his arms off the window. Thus, appellant used force to retain the money and also to facilitate his own escape. We conclude that the force was sufficient to constitute a robbery. On appeal, appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence that he used force or fear because Anthony M.’s own body weight caused him to fall off the car and Anthony M. did not testify that appellant used force. He also contends that Jeffery S.’s testimony is suspicious because Jeffery S. provided the marijuana and received immunity for his testimony. But, we cannot reweigh the evidence or reevaluate Jeffery S.’s credibility.
And, even if appellant did not use personal force, he was liable as an aider or abettor. An aider and abettor acts with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator; has the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging the offense; and by act or advice aids the commission of the crime. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.) The evidence is undisputed that appellant and Brian S. intended to “jack” or rob Anthony M. Appellant showed Anthony M. the marijuana, took the money from Anthony M., and Brian S. drove off while Anthony M. was partially inside the car in order to facilitate their escape.
We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that appellant committed a robbery.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.