Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK78948 D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge.
Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Patty C. appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders issued by the juvenile court. She contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain the court’s jurisdictional findings and its order authorizing the removal of N.C. from her custody. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant Patty C. (Mother), is the mother of N.C., born September 2008. The family, which includes Mother’s partner Ingrid B., has been the subject of four referrals to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) through the Child Abuse Hotline. The first three were deemed inconclusive by DCFS.
The fourth referral, dated July 9, 2009, indicated that Mother failed to take the correct dosage of her prescribed medications, Depakote and Lexapro, necessary to keep her bipolar disorder condition stable, and instead was self-medicating with, and addicted to, Klonopin and Xanax. The referral further claimed that Mother and Ingrid were yelling, screaming, cursing, and calling each other names in the presence of N.C. A voluntary family maintenance (VFM) plan was initiated with the family as a result of these allegations. Mother was referred to numerous counseling and parent education services, but declined to participate in family preservation services.
On September 8, 2009, Mother and Ingrid attended a conjoint counseling session through the VFM plan at Pacific Clinics, where Mother had been receiving counseling and medical treatment on and off since 2004 for her mental health and substance abuse issues. Also present at the session were N.C., then 11 months, Barbara Croon, Mother’s case manager at Pacific Clinics, and Veronica Fry, a clinic staff therapist. The goal of the session was to address the partners’ anger management and discuss housing options for Mother, who was living with Ingrid. The living situation was apparently stressful because the couple had very different parenting approaches and because Ingrid’s Section 8 housing lease required that only one adult live in the apartment. During the session, Mother and Ingrid became embroiled in a yelling match and the meeting deteriorated into a “battle.” Ms. Croon believed Mother appeared haggard, sedated, and unconcerned with the effect of yelling and fighting on N.C., who was “visibly upset.” Neither party was able to remain calm and Ms. Croon removed N.C. from the room at one point to “get him away from the turmoil.” Although the argument was “heated, ” there is no indication that there was physical violence. The session ended with Mother informing Ingrid that she would be leaving their shared housing immediately and that Ingrid would no longer be a part of N.C. ’s life.
It is not clear if the session was on the 8th or the 9th. Barbara Croon’s letter indicates that it was the 8th, as does Ingrid’s testimony, but other parts of the record say the 9th.
Ms. Croon contacted Children’s Social Worker (CSW) Kristal Blouin after the session and expressed concern for N.C. ’s safety. Ms. Croon later documented her concerns, which included Mother and Ingrid’s “explosive” relationship and its potential impact on N.C., Ms. Croon’s fear that Mother was not taking her prescribed psychotropic medications to combat her bipolar disorder, and Mother’s misuse of other prescription drugs, including Klonopin, Xanax, and Loratab, which would impair her ability to care adequately for N.C. on her own. Ms. Croon also expressed concern that Ingrid, not Mother, appeared to be N.C. ’s primary caregiver, stating that while Mother “clearly loves her baby, ” Ingrid “provides the nurture and focus on his immediate and long term needs.” Ms. Croon stressed that, based on her assessment of Mother during her treatment with Pacific Clinics, placing Mother into her own housing with N.C. was “not a realistic goal at [this] time.”
CSW Blouin visited Ingrid’s home the evening of September 8, 2009, to assess N.C. ’s safety. Mother repeated her intention to leave the home right away and indicated that it was “not safe here anymore” and that the “yelling and fighting is not good for me.” Although Mother indicated that she and Ingrid argued every day, she denied there was any physical violence between them. It was “very apparent” to CSW Blouin that Ingrid was N.C. ’s primary caregiver. Mother did not have a plan for where she and N.C. would live, but insisted she would “figure it out.” CSW Blouin convinced Mother to remain in the home until the next morning when a Team Decision Making Meeting (TDM) with DCFS would be held to discuss DCFS’s concerns about Mother’s compliance with taking prescribed medication and the disputes between Mother and Ingrid.
During the TDM on September 10, 2009, Mother’s pupils were constricted, an indicator of overmedication, and she appeared haggard, sedated, and unable to focus. Mother became “very aggressive” during the TDM and continued to insist that she was going to leave Ingrid’s home and that no one would ever see her and N.C. again. Mother further threatened that she would place N.C. up for adoption rather than allow DCFS to take custody of him. Based on the concerns of Pacific Clinics and Mother’s unstable behavior at the TDM, DCFS removed N.C. from Mother’s custody and placed him in foster care.
On September 14, 2009, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The petition alleged that Mother and Ingrid’s domestic disputes (counts (a)(1) and (b)(3)), Mother’s substance abuse (count (b)(1)), and Mother’s failure to take proper medication to control her mental illness (count (b)(2)) placed N.C. at substantial risk of serious physical and emotional harm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The court considered these counts and the evidence provided by Mother and DCFS at a joint jurisdiction and disposition hearing on December 9, 2009.
At the hearing, Ingrid testified that the triggering argument on September 8, 2009, was “heated” but nonviolent and reasserted that her arguments with Mother were never physically violent. Ingrid further testified that neither party yelled during the counseling session and denied that Ms. Croon had ever removed N.C. from the room during the argument or that Ms. Croon had instructed Mother or Ingrid to remain calm. Ingrid did admit that she and Mother fought in the home in front of N.C. Mother testified that their arguments were related to parenting styles and that they were attempting to control their behavior because yelling had a negative effect on N.C. Mother agreed that their arguments were not physically violent.
Evidence was presented to the court that Mother has a history of mental illness and has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and panic disorder. In March 2009, Pacific Clinics psychologist and psychiatric nurse practitioner, Dr. Jungyeol Oh, prescribed Mother Depakote and Lexapro to combat her bipolar symptoms and Klonopin to combat panic.
Dr. Oh testified that if Mother took her medication as prescribed she would not suffer functional impairment. However, prior to N.C. ’s removal in September 2009, Mother exhibited “unreliable behavior” in showing up for monthly appointments, had not taken her medication properly, and failed to follow through on the lab work required by Pacific Clinics to monitor her medication usage. DCFS evidence shows that Mother complied with lab testing requirements only once before N.C. ’s removal. The results of that test showed low levels of Depakote, indicating that Mother was not taking her bipolar medication as prescribed. According to Mother’s therapist at Pacific Clinics, the risk of inconsistency in taking prescribed medications is that “if you’re not medically compliant you’re not stable, and you lack the ability to handle stress.”
Mother testified that she had failed to take her prescribed bipolar medications as directed in the past because she did not like the side effects, but indicated that she was taking them appropriately now. Ingrid confirmed that Mother took her medications only “off and on” until August or September of 2009. Dr. Oh testified that since N.C. ’s removal, Mother had been more reliable and seemed “calmer, ” indicating that she was possibly taking at least “some medication.” Mother submitted to testing once after N.C. ’s removal, on September 28, 2009, and tested at the appropriate levels of Depakote, but was a “no-show” for three other scheduled drug tests.
Mother also has a history of substance abuse, including admitted past addictions to crack cocaine and prescription drugs. Mother claims that she stopped abusing illicit substances including crack cocaine, “speed, ” and “crystal meth” when she discovered she was pregnant in January 2008. In 2009, Mother received valid prescriptions from Pacific Clinics to treat her panic, but also obtained multiple prescriptions from different doctors for Xanax (a benzodiazepine), Klonopin (a benzodiazepine), and Lorcet (a narcotic) and was addicted to benzodiazepines and opiates. Although she was not taking her prescribed psychotropic medications properly, Mother would be “frantic” in phone calls to Pacific Clinics about obtaining her Xanax or Klonopin prescriptions. According to Ms. Croon, Mother was apparently unable to identify her current addiction to prescription pain medication as related to her former addiction to crack cocaine. After N.C. ’s removal, Mother asked Dr. Oh to discontinue her prescription for Klonopin because she was afraid of being accused of taking too much. However, the substance abuse treatment center Mother enrolled in reported that she tested positive for benzodiazepines.
Dr. Oh testified that Mother’s addiction to Klonopin and/or Xanax caused her to overmedicate herself. The physical effects of overmedication could be drowsiness or slow movement. Mother displayed such symptoms both before and after N.C. ’s removal, as evidenced by her appearing sedated and unable to focus during the September 9, 2009 TDM, falling asleep during her first dependency court appearance on September 14, 2009, and falling asleep repeatedly and/or displaying very low energy levels during several visits with N.C. When questioned about falling asleep during the September 14, 2009 detention hearing, Mother stated that the Klonopin she had taken for anxiety before her court appearance made her “drowsy, sleepy.”
After Mother’s September 28, 2009 drug test, Ms. Croon wrote a letter to DCFS indicating that Mother was medication compliant. However, Mother missed drug tests on September 23, 2009, November 13, 2009, and December 1, 2009. Mother claims she did not attend her scheduled drug tests because she was instructed by a social worker that the results would come back “dirty” due to her use of Klonopin. By November 12, 2009, Ms. Croon told CSW Blouin that she suspected Mother was “using” due to her unstable, erratic behavior, which included making phone calls to CSW Blouin, calling her “Satan” and “Fuckin Bitch, ” and accusing her of enjoying taking N.C. away and “practicing your satanic ways.” On November 20, 2009, Mother tested positive for opiates and hydrocodone.
In mid-November, more than two months after N.C. ’s removal, Mother still had not enrolled in the programs and counseling services recommended by DCFS. Mother finally enrolled in an out-patient drug treatment program on November 24, 2009, and she had enrolled in five counseling services, programs, or support groups by the December 9, 2009 hearing.
Evidence was presented to the court that Mother’s medication was having an effect on her interaction with N.C. Following the initial detention hearing on September 14, 2009, Mother was allowed DCFS-monitored twice weekly two-hour visitations with N.C. Mother displayed instability during several visits. At a preliminary September 10, 2009 visit, Mother repeatedly told the caregiver, “I’m so happy he’s with you. He smells really good so I know you bathe him.” The caregiver later documented a 10-minute crying episode on September 18, a series of “no-shows” for visitation in September and November, and poor attention to her own and N.C. ’s hygiene. Mother’s interactions with the caregiver included strange behavior such as repeating the same questions about N.C. ’s health and condition and not remembering the answers, and “blasting” the caregiver with statements indicating that it was not her responsibility to bring snacks, diapers, or toys to visitations and “[e]veryone needs to back off.”
Mother displayed symptoms of overmedication, including inattentiveness and drowsiness, during several visits. During the preliminary monitored visit on September 10, 2009, the caregiver reported that Mother was “incoherent, ” lethargic, and fell asleep at one point. On a September 16 visit, Mother fell asleep twice, had to be awakened by the caregiver, and twice asked to end the visitation early. Mother had several overall positive visits on September 18, 21, and 25; however, Mother was a “no-show” or missed the bus for the subsequent three visits on September 29, 30, and October 2. Mother also missed visits on November 3, 6, 10, 13, and 17 due to illness or “no-shows.”
Mother continued to display varying energy levels during her October visits, and her inattentiveness to N.C. ’s physical safety concerned the caregiver. During one visit, Mother failed to secure N.C. in a child’s swing properly, nearly causing him to fall out. During another, Mother allowed N.C. to walk in front of a moving swing, forcing another parent to intervene to protect N.C. from injury. On various visits, Mother did not clean N.C. ’s or her hands before feeding him snacks by hand, even after they had been playing in the playground sand and mulch, blew her nose on her shirt and used the same shirt to wipe N.C. ’s face and bottle, and pulled N.C. around by the wrist or arm while he was walking, rather than allowing him to hold her fingers. On her October 30 visit, Mother did notice N.C. falling out of a swing and later walking in front of a moving swing and intervened before he could be injured.
During several visits in October, Mother displayed difficulty understanding how to feed her child and what food was appropriate for a child N.C. ’s age. On October 6, Mother fed N.C. a whole rib as a snack, which caused the child to choke until the caregiver intervened. On October 9, Mother fed N.C. a whole apple as a snack, which again caused the child to choke until the caregiver intervened. On October 23, Mother brought a full size sandwich for N.C., and did not understand that taking bites from a sandwich was “beyond [ N.C. ’s] current abilities.” On October 27, Mother brought more appropriate snacks, which she explained were packed by Ingrid; however on October 30, Mother brought N.C. an adult-sized portion of Chinese food and fish and chips take-out. After being informed by CSW Blouin that these were inappropriate snacks for a one year old due to the demonstrated risk of choking, Mother replied, “well then I won’t bring him any more food.”
After hearing evidence and argument at the hearing, the court amended the petition and sustained counts (a)(1) and (b)(3) due to the confrontations between Mother and Ingrid. It also sustained count (b)(1) based on Mother’s past substance abuse and current abuse of prescription medication, and count (b)(2) due to her failure to take prescribed medications for her bipolar disorder, each of which the court found rendered her incapable of caring for her child. Finding substantial risk that N.C. would suffer physical and emotional harm if left in Mother’s custody, the court ordered that he remain in foster care. DCFS was required to provide Mother with family reunification services, including parenting education classes, individual counseling, drug rehabilitation, and a domestic violence group. The court also ordered that no one was to use physical punishment when disciplining N.C.
DISCUSSION
I. There Was Insufficient Evidence in the Record to Support a Jurisdictional Finding Under Section 300, Subdivision (a)
Mother contends that the record does not support a finding of section 300, subdivision (a) dependency jurisdiction over N.C. because there was no evidence of physical violence between Mother and Ingrid and any risk of harm to N.C. was purely speculative. Factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800-801; Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) “In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible. Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact.” (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547; In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1633.)
Citing to Court of Appeal cases suggesting that section 300, subdivision (a) jurisdiction may not be based on speculation (e.g., In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10; Nahid H. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1051), Mother argues that, absent some evidence of physical violence between the parents or involving N.C., there was insufficient evidence presented to the juvenile court to support a finding that N.C. was at risk of “serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally” by a parent or guardian. We agree. However because, as we discuss below, we affirm the court’s finding of section 300, subdivision (b) jurisdiction, this conclusion “profits [Mother] nothing because, ‘[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence....’ (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)” (In re Andy G. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1415, fn 6.)
The full text of section 300, subdivision (a) provides a child is subject to juvenile court jurisdiction if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian. For the purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm. For purposes of this subdivision, ‘serious physical harm’ does not include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks where there is no evidence of serious physical injury.”
II. There Was Substantial Evidence in the Record Supporting a Jurisdictional Finding Under Section 300, Subdivision (b)
Mother next contends that substantial evidence did not support the court’s findings under section 300, subdivision (b). The relevant provisions of subdivision (b) provide that a child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of the parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect the child or the parent’s inability to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s mental illness or substance abuse. Mother urges that there is “little evidence” in the record to support section 300, subdivision (b) jurisdiction because her mental illness and abuse of prescription medication are not sufficiently connected to the alleged substantial risk of harm to N.C. We disagree.
The precise wording of section 300, subdivision (b) authorizes dependency jurisdiction where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.”
With respect to count (b)(2), relating to Mother’s mental illness, while there may be no presumption of parental unfitness from the bare fact that a parent suffers from mental illness, a parent’s failure to take psychotropic medication to treat his or her mental illness may be a relevant factor in determining the risk of harm to his or her children. (See, e.g., In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635.) Mother’s brief mistakenly relies on cases such as In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822 and In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, where evidence of the existence of a parent’s mental illness alone was deemed insufficient to justify dependency jurisdiction. Mother’s bipolar diagnosis itself is not what poses a risk of harm to N.C. Instead, it is her failure to consistently take the correct dosage of her prescribed psychotropic medication that adversely affects her ability to care for her infant son.
Mother admittedly failed to take Depakote, the key medication prescribed by Dr. Oh to treat and stabilize her bipolar disorder, as prescribed until at least August or September 2009. Although Mother tested at the appropriate levels of her psychotropic medications once in late September 2009, she missed her subsequent scheduled drug tests, providing DCFS and the court with no information about her continued medication compliance. Dr. Oh told the court at the jurisdiction hearing that if Mother was medication compliant, she should not be functionally impaired, but her therapist stated that without medication she would be unstable and unable to handle stress.
Contrary to Mother’s assertions, there was ample evidence establishing that Mother’s failure to consistently take her prescribed medication had an impact on her ability to care for N.C. Mother displayed unstable and irrational behavior both before and after N.C. ’s removal, including frequent angry and “heated” arguments with her partner in front of N.C., irrational and agitated responses during meetings with DCFS, and erratic behavior during monitored visitations with her son. Mother and Ingrid’s September 8, 2009 argument in front of N.C. was so explosive that both the case manager and therapist present at the counseling session felt it necessary to alert DCFS to protect N.C. ’s well-being. Mother also rashly threatened to leave Ingrid’s home with N.C. later that night, notwithstanding the fact that she and her infant son had nowhere else to live and that Ingrid apparently was N.C. ’s primary caregiver.
After N.C. ’s removal, Mother’s unstable behavior continued; she suffered from a crying breakdown during one monitored visit with N.C., missed at least eight other visits due to “illness” or “no-shows, ” and displayed a troubling inability to properly care for N.C. and an unwillingness to learn. When informed by CSW Blouin, for example, that whole ribs, whole apples, whole sandwiches, Chinese food, and fish and chips were inappropriate snacks for a one year old because he could easily choke on such items, Mother replied that she would simply no longer bring food for her son. Based on these facts, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that Mother’s overall erratic behavior, stemming from her inconsistency in taking her psychotropic medication, placed N.C. at substantial risk of harm.
With respect to count (b)(1), relating to Mother’s substance abuse, while there must be a nexus between the parental substance abuse and the harm or risk of harm to the child, that requirement is satisfied in this case. Mother’s dependence on prescription anti-anxiety and pain medication itself is shown by Dr. Oh’s testimony, Ms. Croon’s letters, CSW Blouin’s accounts of Mother’s symptoms of overmedication at TDM’s and visitations, and Mother’s “dirty” test results. Contrary to Mother’s argument, this case is distinguishable from cases such as Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322 and In re David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th 822, where the risk of harm to the child was quite removed from the alleged substance abuse of the parents and remained broadly speculative. Here, there are numerous indications that Mother’s addiction to benzodiazepines and opiates, which she admits make her “drowsy, sleepy, ” affect her functional ability to care for N.C.
Mother’s drowsiness caused her to fall asleep during several monitored visits with N.C., clearly placing N.C., an unmonitored one year old at a busy park, at substantial risk of harm. Additionally, Mother’s low energy levels and drowsiness led to overall inattentiveness that placed N.C. at continual risk of harm, including almost being struck by a moving swing on one visit, nearly falling from an improperly secured swing on another, and choking twice on the inappropriately large snacks provided by Mother. During each of these episodes, it was the foster caregiver or other playground parents, not Mother, who recognized the danger to N.C. and secured his safety.
Unlike cases such as In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, where parental intoxication posed a one time risk of harm to minor children in their car, Mother’s persistent drowsiness and inattention to her very young child posed an ongoing risk of harm to N.C. ’s safety. Mother dissects the overall picture presented by the evidence into individual episodes, attempting to minimize the impact of the evidence of Mother’s instability as a whole. This attempt is unpersuasive. While one episode of crying, one drowsy day, or one episode of inattentiveness nearly resulting in injury to N.C. might be insufficient standing alone to suggest a substantial risk of harm, the combined weight of these and other indicators of Mother’s ongoing substance abuse provide the requisite substantial evidence to support the court’s section 300, subdivision (b) finding.
III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Disposition Order Pursuant to Section 361
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) requires a finding by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, ” and “there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’s physical custody.” A section 300 jurisdictional finding is prima facie evidence that the child is in danger in the parent’s custody; but “[t]he parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)” (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917, italics added.) Mother contends that removal of N.C. from her care was inappropriate because there was no clear and convincing evidence that he had been exposed to physical harm or was in substantial danger of being exposed to physical harm. We disagree.
As discussed in part II, ante, Mother’s inconsistent compliance with her psychotropic medication regimen and dependence on other prescription medications placed N.C. at a substantial, and ongoing, risk of harm. Given N.C. ’s very young age, Mother’s drowsiness and inattentiveness, as well as her apparent lack of familiarity with proper parenting techniques, place him at a particularly high risk of physical harm. While engaged in a fight to regain custody of her son, and knowing that her substance abuse made her sleepy and drowsy, Mother continued overmedicating prior to her monitored visits, causing her to fall asleep on several occasions or be lethargic on others. The substantial danger this behavior posed to N.C. is obvious.
Furthermore, Mother moved out of Ingrid’s apartment in November 2009, which should stem the explosive situation between Mother and Ingrid in the home. However, Ms. Croon and CSW Blouin each expressed the view that it was “very apparent” Ingrid was N.C. ’s primary caregiver, the one who “provides the nurture and focus on his immediate and long term needs.” As a result, Mother’s separation from her partner enhances rather than ameliorates the substantial danger to N.C. For example, while there are numerous examples in the caregiver’s notes of Mother bringing inappropriate food for N.C. to visits, there is only one mention of Mother bringing an age-appropriate snack: when Ingrid packed the visitation bag.
Mother primarily relies on In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530 to support her argument that removal was inappropriate and that the court could have pursued reasonable alternative means to ensure N.C. ’s physical safety. This reliance is misplaced given the factual dissimilarity of the two cases. While the mother in Jamie M. did have a mental illness and a history of noncompliance with her medical treatment, she did not have Mother’s substance abuse issues. Nor was an appropriate nexus established showing that the mother’s mental illness, under control at the time of the disposition hearing, was linked to risk of harm to her children. Indeed, the juvenile court in Jamie M. was found to have wrongly based its disposition order on a “per se inference of detriment to her children” based on the mother’s schizophrenia diagnosis. (Id. at p. 537.) Here, however, Mother’s mental illness and failure to take her medication, in combination with her substance abuse, have been sufficiently linked to risk of harm to N.C.
We do not agree with Mother that supervision and testing were reasonable alternatives to removal. DCFS offered Mother services both before and after N.C. ’s removal, including referrals to individual counseling services, case management, family preservation services, parent education classes, and outpatient drug treatment programs, but by late November, Mother still was not participating in therapy or case management with Pacific Clinics and had missed three intake appointments with the suggested outpatient drug treatment program. Mother also missed numerous scheduled drug tests and, as late as December 7, 2009, two days before the hearing, tested positive for benzodiazepines. She displayed an ongoing unwillingness to take direction from CSW Blouin or the foster caregiver regarding problematic visitation issues. Although Mother managed to enroll in several programs before the hearing in December, this last-minute enrollment did not demonstrate that Mother was committed to obtaining help for her mental illness and substance abuse, or that the danger her behavior posed to N.C. could have been avoided through alternatives to removal.
Based on the combined weight of the evidence, the juvenile court reasonably determined that there was clear and convincing evidence of substantial danger to N.C. ’s physical safety if he was returned to Mother and that no reasonable means to protect N.C. existed absent removal.
With respect to Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s order prohibiting corporal punishment of N.C., we note that “[w]hen a child is adjudicated dependent, the dependency court has broad discretion to make any reasonable orders for the care and support of the child.” (Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1087, fn. 12.) Mother has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in fashioning its order.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P.J.MANELLA, J.