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In re M.W. M.A.W.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Second Division
Sep 18, 2024
2 CA-JV 2024-0034 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sep. 18, 2024)

Opinion

2 CA-JV 2024-0034

09-18-2024

In re Dependency of M.W., M.A.W., and M.A.-W.,

Melvin W., Tucson In Propria Persona Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Autumn Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety


Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100JD201100095 The Honorable Alexandria Anemone, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Melvin W., Tucson In Propria Persona

Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General

By Autumn Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Eckerstrom and Vice Chief Judge Eppich concurred.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STARING, Chief Judge:

¶1 Melvin W. appeals from the juvenile court's order finding his three children, M.W. (born August 2009), M.A.W. (born August 2010), and M.A.-W. (born December 2013), dependent. We affirm.

¶2 Melvin has been incarcerated since 2018 and is not scheduled for release until 2060. In May 2023, after the children's mother was arrested, their maternal aunt retrieved them from their mother's home and filed a private dependency petition as to both parents. The juvenile court directed the Department of Child Safety (DCS) to investigate. Pursuant to that investigation, DCS filed a petition alleging the children were dependent as to both parents. After a contested hearing in September 2023, the court found the children dependent as to Melvin because his incarceration made it impossible for him to parent his children. This appeal followed.

In a later order, the juvenile court found the children dependent as to their mother. She is not a party to this appeal.

¶3 Melvin's opening brief does not meaningfully comply with the rules governing appellate briefs; although he identifies legal arguments, he cites little authority and provides no citations to the record. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a) (appellate brief must contain statement of facts with citation to record and argument including supporting authority); see also Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 607(b) (Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., applies to appeals from juvenile court). Melvin's failure to comply with our rules or develop a legal argument constitutes waiver. See Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11 (App. 2013); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009). Because we prefer to resolve cases on their merits, however, we will attempt to discern and address the substance of Melvin's arguments. See Adams v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1984).

¶4 Melvin first argues the juvenile court was prohibited from finding the children dependent as to him absent a report of neglect or abuse being made to the hotline established by A.R.S. § 8-455. That statute requires DCS to provide a "centralized intake hotline" to receive reports of "suspected abuse or neglect." § 8-455(A). It additionally requires DCS personnel to refer to the hotline any communication of suspected abuse or neglect. Id. The hotline "is the first step in the safety assessment and investigation process." § 8-455(B).

¶5 We cannot agree with Melvin's apparent position that a hotline report is a prerequisite to a DCS investigation. The statutory scheme contemplates that a juvenile court may order DCS to investigate after a private petition is filed: a court may make "any temporary orders necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the child," including directing DCS to provide services, join a pending proceeding, or take custody. A.R.S. § 8-841(G), (H). For the same reason, Melvin's additional argument that DCS was required to generate a "report prepared by a hotline work[er]" before it could file a dependency petition also fails.

¶6 Melvin next asserts the juvenile court violated his due process rights by permitting DCS to file a substitute dependency petition. But Melvin cites no authority, and we find none, suggesting that DCS lacks the authority to file a dependency petition when a private petition is pending. No such limitation appears in § 8-841(A). Indeed, as DCS points out, the juvenile court has inherent authority to substitute DCS as petitioner in a dependency action in which DCS recommends that the court find the children to be dependent. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Superior Court, 178 Ariz. 236, 241 (App. 1994).

¶7 Melvin's final two arguments also merit summary rejection. Although he asserts the juvenile court failed to address his motion to dismiss, the record shows the court denied that motion during the contested dependency hearing. Finally, Melvin fails to support with fact or law his blanket assertion that the court's decision finding the children dependent was grounded in racial discrimination and made for the "pecuniary gain" of DCS. Thus, we do not address that argument further. See Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11; Ritchie, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62.

¶8 We affirm the juvenile court's order finding M.W., M.A.W., and M.A.-W. dependent as to Melvin.


Summaries of

In re M.W. M.A.W.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Second Division
Sep 18, 2024
2 CA-JV 2024-0034 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sep. 18, 2024)
Case details for

In re M.W. M.A.W.

Case Details

Full title:In re Dependency of M.W., M.A.W., and M.A.-W.,

Court:Court of Appeals of Arizona, Second Division

Date published: Sep 18, 2024

Citations

2 CA-JV 2024-0034 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sep. 18, 2024)