Opinion
11-P-793
02-28-2012
SCOTT A. MURPHY'S CASE.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
This matter returns to us after remand to the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents (board) for further consideration in light of a later decision of a second administrative judge on claims involving the same employee. Upon review of the board's thorough decision after remand, dated April 12, 2011, we affirm the board's reinstatement of its June 24, 2009, decision.
The remand order concerned the board's June 24, 2009, affirmance of the decision of an administrative judge (first administrative judge) dated March 30, 2007, regarding the employee's §§ 13, 30, & 34 claims for carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) in the right arm. The decision of the second administrative judge was dated April 27, 2009, and concerned the employee's § 36(j) & (k) claims for CTS in both the right and left arms. On remand, the board consolidated the two matters, affirmed the first administrative judge's decision, and recommitted the second administrative judge's decision for further findings of fact. The present appeal concerns only that aspect of the board's decision on remand as affirmed the first administrative judge's decision.
The employee's request for appellate attorney's fees and costs is denied.
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1. For the reasons stated by the board, the claims, issues, and evidence in the claims heard by the two administrative judges were sufficiently dissimilar that the respective administrative judges rationally could reach different conclusions as to whether to permit the introduction of additional medical evidence.
2. The board did not err in declining to create a bright line rule for the determination of medical complexity. Pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 11A(2), that determination is for the administrative judge to make in individual cases, based upon the specific facts and circumstances presented.
3. Substantially for the reasons stated in the board's original decision in this case, dated June 24, 2009, there is no merit to the employee's argument that the administrative judge erred by awarding a reduced attorney's fee.
So much of the April 12, 2011, decision of the reviewing board as reinstates its decision dated June 24, 2009, is affirmed.
By the Court (Cypher, Cohen & Wolohojian, JJ.),